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Forward b 


Report o 
House Sh 
on Intell 




Unexpurgated Pike 

Forward by Philip Agee 

Report of the 

House Select Committee 

on Intelligence, 1976 


Gregory Andrade Diamond 

University of Illinois 

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Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, 1976 

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Except as permitted under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication may be 
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Introduction, by Philip Agee 


1. Delay 4 

2. Cut-off 7 

3. Silenced witnesses 1 3 

4. Flank attack : . 16 

a. An Attack Averted 17 

5. Deletions jg 

6. Privileges 22 

7. More delay 24 

8. Routine problems 26 

a. The right question 30 


1. Oaths and agreements 32 

2. Selective briefings 36 

3. Special restrictions 3g 

4. The release of information 39 


A. COSTS 43 

1. Deceptive budgets 44 

2. An absence of accountability 52 

3. Spending abuses 55 

a. Covert Procurement 55 

b. Local Procurement 57 

c. Accommodation Procurements 59 

d. Research and Development 62 

e. Colleges and Universities 64 

f. U.S. Recording 65 

4. Budget secrecy 69 


;can by 


1. TET: Failure to adapt to a new kind of war 72 

a. The Order of Battle Controversy 73 

b. The Consequences 77 

c. The Aftermath 79 

2. Czechoslovakia: Failure of tactical warning 81 

3. The Mid-east war -- the system breaks down 83 

4. Portugal: the U.S. caught napping 91 

5. India: priorities lost 95 

6. Cyprus — failure of intelligence and policy 98 

7. Domestic internal security and countercountcrintelligencc 106 

a. Institute for Policy Studies 106 

8. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 112 

9. National Security Council Intelligence Committee 114 

10. The management and production of defense intelligence 116 

C. RISKS 121 

1. Covert action 121 

a. Ten Year Survey 122 

b. Election Support 124 

c. Media and Propaganda 124 

d. Paramilitary/ Arms Transfers 125 

e. Organizational Support 125 

f. Trends 125 

g. Three Projects. 126 

2. Intelligence Collection 145 

a. Submarines 145 

b. Interception of International Communications 148 

c. Manipulation of the Media 149 

d. CIA Presence in the Executive Branch 152 

e. CIA Relationships with U.S. and Foreign Police 154 

3. Domestic intelligence investigations 157 

a. Programs as Abuses 158 

b. Law Enforcement Turned Law- Breaking 162 

4. SALT — Political control of intelligence 168 




































In early March of 1991, at about the time that the Kurds were being massacred in 
Northern Iraq after the Gulf War, I saw my first copy of the Pike Commission Report. 

A number of people were talking after a symposium on free speech issues. Paul Muth, a 
Champaign- Urbana activist and host of a talk show on a local public radio station, WEFT, had 
obtained a copy of the report, and was reading aloud about the massacre of the Kurds which had 
taken place in the 70s — an obviously timely bit of history'. He seemed especially to relish 
repeating the quote attributed to Henry Kissinger, that "covert aid is not to be confused with 
missionary work." (See page 138 of this document.) 

By coincidence a few weeks later, Daniel Schorr — the reporter who had leaked the Pike 
Report to the Village Voice, refused to reveal the source of the leak to Congress at the risk of a 
contempt citation, and lost his job at CBS — came to speak at the University of Illinois as part of 
another symposium, on the behavior of the press during the Gulf War. Muth and several friends 
were distributing flyers noting Schorr's role in the release of the Pike Report, and the report's 
relevance to the just-then-completed rout of the Kurds. In the Q and A session, I asked Schorr 
to comment on the Pike Report, which, I noted, had never been published in its entirety in the 
U.S. (Various abridged volumes, printed by foreign publishers, were scattered in academic 
libraries.) Schorr noted that it had virtually all been published in the Voice, though he agreed 
that this did not leave it readily available to the public. He then said that, it being fifteen years 
after the leak, he would no longer object to making available his own unabridged version of the 
report to anyone who wanted it. 

By yet another coincidence, I had just agreed to teach what is sometimes called the 
"monster section" of Political Science 150, "Introduction to American Government," one year 
hence. 1200 students per semester sign up for this course. The publisher who produced the 
textbook I favored was willing to publish additional material to accompany the textbook, at a 
nominal fee as an inducement for me to adopt their text. They had in mind a personalized study 
guide. Suddenly, I had in mind the Pike Report. 

With the help of Schorr's assistant at National Public Radio, Amy Holmen, I obtained a 
photocopy of the Report. Over the summer of '91, I retyped it. My poor progress by October 
of '91 meant I had to seek typing help from Sheila Kovalcik, Sandy Quillman, Barbara 
Kiesewetter, Octavia Florence, and Beth Riefsteck, which I gratefully acknowledge. 

A colleague of mine, Dr. Joseph Miller, happened to own one of the foreign copies of the 
Pike Report, published by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, of London. In addition to 
most of the Pike Report, that edition contained a lucid introduction to the report by former CIA 
agent and thenceforth CIA critic Philip Agee. Agee sets the scene which leads to the production 
of the report, summarizes its findings, and most importantly details the aftermath — the 
suppression of the report — its suppression, Schorr's firing, and the destruction of Otis Pike's 
political career. Jon Earl of McGraw-Hill was kind enough to obtain permission from the 
Foundation (after convincing them that they had in fact published such a book so many years 
before) for Agee's introduction to be reproduced here. I thank them for that, and for their initial 
publication of the report. 

To my knowledge, this is the first publication of the complete and unabridged Pike 
report. Except for correction of some typographical errors (and, doubtless, insertion of others), 

v n 

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the text is exactly as it appeared then. In a number of cases, information is missing from the 
draft; this is noted in the text with the following symbol: | |. 

The Pike Report touches on most of the themes I cover in my course introducing 
students to American government: separation of powers; civil liberties; the roles of the media, 
parties, and interest groups; the operation of Congress and the Presidency; the conduct of foreign 
and domestic policy; the role of information in government; and most importantly the function of 
unelected intelligence agencies in shape events at home and across the world. I could assign any 
number of books on such topics -- Philip Agee's works prime among them - and they would all 
suffer from the same problem of credibility. My students don't know Agee (nor do I), and our 
choice whether or not to believe his reporting is largely a matter of taste and faith. Mere, by 
contrast, we have a government document — the fruit of a Congressional investigation - which 
was ultimately suppressed by the Mouse of Representatives not because it was false, but because 
it was true. It gave away "state secrets" — information about the operation of government that 
students beginning the study of government need to know. 

And, being in the public domain, the price is right. I hope students and others find it 
intriguing and useful. Even sixteen years after (non-)publication, it is still all too timely. 

Gregory Andrade Diamond 

Urbana, Illinois 
October, 1991 

vii i 

Introduction, by Philip Agcc 

"Pike will pay for this, you wait and see . . .. We will destroy him for this." 1 

Strong words, quoted on the floor of the US House of Representatives by Congressman 
Otis Pike himself. He was quoting from an alleged threat made by Mitchell Rogovin, the CIA's 
Special counsel for legal affairs, to Searle Field, staff director of the I louse Select Committee on 
Intelligence headed by Pike. According to Pike, the CIA's Counsel went on: 

"I'm serious. There will be political retaliation. Any political ambitions in New York 
that Pike had are through. We will destroy him for this." 2 

Pike's revelation of the threats, which were immediately denied by the CIA's Counsel, 
came on March 9, 1976, a month after his committee for investigating the CIA had submitted its 
recommendations and gone out of existence. Even if the threats were never made, or if they were 
in fact expressed in a milder, more suggestive fashion, they were consistent with the controversy 
wit hin the committee and its stormy relations with the executive branch that had prevailed from 
the time the committee was established thirteen months earlier. 

In his denunciation of the threats, Pike was reacting to a scries of events that culminated 
only days earlier when New York's weekly Village Voice, in special supplements on February 16 
and 23, 1976, published most of the secret report based on the work of Pike's investigating 
committee. Publication of the report, highlights of which had already leaked into the press from 
January 20 onwards, provoked an emotional and angry outburst from Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger who was criticized severely in the report for his "passion for secrecy" and for making 
false statements to the Congress. At a news conference Kissinger denounced the committee's 
"totally irresponsible behavior... the misuse of highly classified information in a tendentious and 
misleading manner [that] must do damage to the foreign policy of the United States... the use of 
classified information in a manner that is so distorted that the total impact is to produce a 
malicious he. ..a new version of McCarthyism." 3 

Meanwhile a spokesman for the White House said President Ford believed the report 
published in the Village Voice was leaked by someone in the Congress, while Congressman Pike 
suggested that it was leaked by the Executive Branch to help the CIA by making the committee 
look bad. Only days later, in early March, the CIA claimed that the committee had failed to 
return, and couldn't find some 230 documents, at least some of which were classified secret, that 
the Agency had given the committee in the course of its investigation. 

Pike had problems with his own House of Representatives as well. As significant leaks of 
the report began to appear in the New York Times and other publications during the last two 
weeks of January 1976, then-CIA Director William Colby pleaded with the House not to publish 
the report because to do so would damage the country's intelligence activities and endanger 
Agency operations. Then on January 29 the full House voted to suppress publication until the 
White House had been able to censor it - an action tantamount to a rebuke by the House to its 
own investigating committee. After the vote against him, Pike described his committee's work as 
"an exercise in futility" and lamented that the House "probably will not ever have a strong 


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oversight committee/ 4 

Nevertheless, despite the House's submission to the executive, and despite renewed public 
sympathy towards the CIA with the executive's adroit manipulation of the killing of Richard 
Welch, the CIA Station Chief in Athens, in December, and despite the backlash against the 
continued leaks - not just from the House Report, it should be noted - despite ass these factors 
militating against disclosure of the report, it got out. 

In late January, someone still unidentified gave a copy of the report to Darnel Schorr, the 
CBS television news reporter based in Washington, who began using parts of the report in his 
broadcasting when its full publication was expected shortly - before the House voted to allow 
executive censorship. After the House vote, Schorr tried first to get the report published in book 
form, but in the anti-release-of-secrets atmosphere prevailing in February his only sure outlet was 
the Village Voice. After the Voice Published, Schorr explained, 

"I found myself unexpectedly, because of a surprise action by the House, in 
possession of possibly the only available copy of a report, bearing no 
classification on its face, its principal sensations already divulged. ..My problem 
was that doing nothing would mean that I would be suppressing a report that 
might be interesting as a matter of public record." 5 

Schorr's admission brought calls in the House for revocation of his Congressional press 
credentials while at the same time the Department of Justice pondered whether he should be 
prosecuted under the espionage laws - thus reviving First Amendment issues left unresolved when 
the "Pentagon Papers'' trial of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo was aborted during the 
Watergate scandals. The House voted to have its ethics committee (House Committee on 
Standards of Official Conduct) investigate the leak, later appropriating $150,000 for the effort. 

CBS, for its part, suspended Schorr from all reporting duties pending the outcome of the 
Congressional investigation. Schorr was clearly, and surprisingly, on the defensive. 

What had happened in the United States during the two months since Welch's death? It 
seemed that the American public had had enough. Almost two years had passed, beginning with 
publication in May 1974 after a long court battle of The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence? 
during which one scandal and "abuse" after another were charged to the CIA, FBI and other 
security agencies. After an initial overlap with the Watergate episode and the end of the Nixon 
presidency, the scandals had grown dramatically with revelations of the CIA's subversion the 
Allende government in Chile (Sept 1974) and of the CIA's massive, illegal domestic operations 
(December 1974). My own book on the CIA 7 appeared first in January 1975, the same month 
President Ford appointed the Rockefeller Commission to investigate the CIA's domestic 
activities, and the same month the Senate established its investigating committee under Senator 
Frank Church. By February 1976 when the Pike Report was published, a large sector of the 
American public seemed not to want to hear it - some, no doubt, having no more stomach for 
scandal, disillusion and moral conflict; others, surly, because they were beginning to realize just 
how damaging the revelations had become. 

In the midst of the controversy, on February 17, President Ford seized more initiative by 
announcing his "reform" plan for the CIA and other security services. With media coverage that 
only an American President can command, Ford described his executive order to strengthen the 
intelligence agencies, and he recommended to Congress a new law providing fines and prison 
terms for persons who disclose classified information. In his appeal for new legislation, Ford said, 
"It is essential that the irresponsible and dangerous exposure of our nation's 


intelligence secrets be stopped. Openness is a hallmark of our democratic society 
but the American people have never believed that it was necessary to reveal secret 
was plans of the Department of Defense, and I do not think they wish to have 
true intelligence secrets revealed either." 8 

Nevertheless the world already had the I’ike Report, a truly extraordinary and revealing 
document, thanks to the persistence and courage of Otis Pike and the members of his committee, 
of Daniel Schorr, and of the Village Voice. When reading the report one should keep in mind 
not only the conflicting circumstances surrounding its original publication, but also the quite real 
possibilities that existed during the committee's early months, first that the committee would 
make no real investigation, or, second, that the committee would be abolished before even 
beginning its work. 

Established by a House resolution in February 1975, the Select Committee on 
Intelligence was first placed under the chairmanship of Representative Lucien Nedzi of Michigan 
who was also the chairman of the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittee. Since this 
Subcommittee had for many years exercised the House's watchdog responsibility over the CIA, 
Nedzi, as Chairman of the Select Committee, would in a very real sense be investigating his own 
performance. Fortunately he was subject to some strong and effective pushing from two Select 
Committee members whose opposition to the CIA's clandestine interventions abroad was well 
known: Michael Harrington of Massachusetts and Ronald Dellums of California. 

Even so, by June 1975 the committee had hardly turned a stone when the New York 
Times dropped a blockbuster on them. On June 5 the Times revealed that two years earlier 
Nedzi had been briefed by the new CIA Director, William Colby, on the results of a recent CIA 
"in-house" investigation of assassinations, illegal operations, and other abuses. Nedzi had taken 
no action and had not even informed the other members of his House Armed Services 
Intelligence Subcommittee. Harrington, Dellums and liberals on the Select Committee demanded 
Nedzi's resignation, which he gave, but which was refused by the full House in a vote on June 16. 
Thereafter Nedzi refused to function as Chairman of the Select Committee, and a move began to 
abolish it. 

Complicating the impasse was Nedzi's refusal to make classified information available to 
Harrington from Nedzi's Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittee because Harrington had been 
partly responsible for the leaking in September 1974 of details of the CIA's subversion of the 
Allende government. Harrington's information had come form the subcommittee documents of 
Nedzi, who was determined not to give Harrington any more ammunition. 

Finally, on July 17, the House abolished the Select Committee under Nedzi and 
established a new Select Committee under the chairmanship of Otis Pike. Both Nedzi and 
Harrington were left off the new committee which set about the investigation that eventually 
produced the Pike Report. In one of those apparent contradictions not uncommon in American 
politics, Pike, 54, son of a Republican Long Island banker and representative of a conservative 
Long Island district, a Democratic party member since he was 21 and foe of expensive Pentagon 
weapons projects, was responsible for some of the most important and enlightening revelations 
on CIA operations to date. 

Part I of the Select Committee's report, published in the February 23 issue of the Voice. 

, detailed the delays, obstructions and refusals by members of the executive, mainly Director 
Colby, Secretary Kissinger, and President Ford, to provide the documents needed by the 
committee for its investigation. The main administration tactic was to delay turning over 


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documents, in spite of the President's public assurances that her would cooperate in making 
available all material in the executive branch. This tactic eventually provoked a number of 
subpoenas by the Pike committee, some of which at length brought forth the documents. Yet 
the administration, knowing that the committee and a short lifetime and was working against an 
approaching deadline, stalled on issue after issue in order to conceal a maximum amount of 
material over the investigative period. Thus the committee, which wasted the February-July 
period in internal disputes, really only had about Five months - from August to December 1975 - 
to do its investigation and get a report written and submitted to the I louse by its January 3 1 , 

1976 deadline. 

Besides delay, the executive agencies also at times rendered important documents useless 
by excising significant content and even by flatly refusing to turn over documents requested by 
the committee. Finally, fierce battles were fought over the public release of information obtained 
by the committee: both over the specific information and the manner of release. Usually the 
reason given was some questionable allegation that revelation would endanger the "sources and 
methods" of the CIA or one of the other agencies. Yet another tactic was to prevent testimony 
by certain witnesses, as in the case of the State Department officer in charge of the Cyprus desk at 
the time of the coup against Makarios. This officer had written a dissenting report on the 
handling of intelligence in the State Department at the time of the Cyprus crisis, but he was 
prevented by Kissinger from testifying on what had happened and why he dissented. In another 
instance a witness who had revealed financial improprieties in FBI purchasing of wiretapping 
equipment was afterwards subjected to a six-hour "interview" by two FBI agents who convinced 
him to sign a statement recanting insignificant details of his testimony. The witness later 
repudiated that statement, claiming intimidation by the two FBI agents. 

With all the administration's delays, refusals of documents, interference with testimony 
and deletions of content, there can be no doubt that President Ford, Secretary Kissinger and 
Director Colby, to name only the major administration figures, were determined to prevent the 
Pike Committee from making a thorough and effective investigation. In this respect the charge 
can validly be made that the administration tried a cover-up operation with the Pike Committee, 
and to a certain degree probably succeeded. 

Yet, the content of Part II of the committee's report is most extraordinary and revealing. 
The major sections deal with costs, failures to anticipate important events, and an analysis of 
covert action operations between 1965 and 1975. We find that the total US intelligence budget 
exceeds $10 billion. The Congress, however, which appropriates the money, has been told 
consistently that intelligence costs much less because intelligence activities have been placed in 
non-intelligence categories in the budget exercises. On analysis the foreign intelligence budget was 
found to total between three and four times more than Congress was told, while the domestic 
budget was more that five times the reported amount. The committee found accountability for 
secret funds lacking and the consequent spending abuses considerable. One CIA Station, for 
example, spent $41,000 on whisky and other alcoholic beverages during 1971, after which the 
Station Chief was placed in charge of Agency operations in Angola. 

Failure to anticipate major events in recent years reflects, in the Select Committee's view, 
serious shortcomings of the entire US intelligence apparatus. The Tct offensive of 1968, for 
example, wasn't foreseen, partly, at least, because of the American prejudiced, degraded view of 
the Vietcong. Because the technical monitoring system lost track of the Russian army in Poland 
during the first two weeks in August 1968, American intelligence failed to detect the first Warsaw 


Pact invasion move against Czechoslovakia. President Johnson's first news of the invasion came 
from Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington. Similarly the Egyptian and Syrian attacks 
that launched the Yom Kippur was in 1973 caught the intelligence community by surprise, as did 
the coup in Portugal in April 1974, the Indian nuclear explosion in May 1974, and the coup 
against the makarios government in Cyprus in July 1974. 

The Select Committee's review of CIA covert action operations is perhaps the most 
interesting section of the report. Unfortunately the committee's attention was limited to the 
covert action projects approved by the Forty Committee during the 1965-1975 period. As only 
the most sensitive and costly projects required approval by Forty Committee, composed of the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
Director of Central Intelligence, the Select Committee's investigation missed the vast majority of 
these kinds of operations which would have been approved internally in the CIA. Nevertheless 
the revelations on covert action in the report are quite significant. 

We find, for example, that interference in the revered "free electoral processes" of other 
countries was the largest covert action category, comprising 32 per cent of the Forty Committee 
approvals. Twenty-nine per cent of approvals were for media and propaganda operations in 
which American government sponsorship was to be hidden. Twenty-three per cent of approvals 
were for paramilitary operations involving secret support to foreign armies and irregular military 
groups in the form of finance, training and weapons supplies. Still other CIA covert action 
operations involved CIA finding of a "plethora" of civic, religious, professional and trade union 

In-depth analyses appear in the Select Committee's report of three major covert action 
projects, each of great interest. Intervention in italian elections since 1948 cost the CIA $75 
million, including $10 million spent in 1972 alone. Most of this money went to the Christian 
Democrats, although Ambassador Graham Martin obtained, over the CIA's objection, a 
donation of $800,000 in 1972 for political forces of the Italian neo-fascist movement. The 
Ambassador insisted on the donation in order "to demonstrate solidarity for the long pull". 
Underlining the CIA's intervention in Italy was the revelation, in early 1976, from government 
sources other than the Select Committee, that President Ford had approved in December 1975 in 
the Italian electoral process during the months preceding the next Italian elections. (At the time of 
approval it was not known that elections would be held as soon as June 1976.) 

Paramilitary support by the CIA to the Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi government 
from 1972 to 1975, which cost some $16 million, was initiated at the request of the Shah of Iran, 
then engaged in a border dispute with Iraq. Once the Iraqis agreed to a settlement favorable to 
Iran, the Shah had the support to the Kurds cut off. The rebellion collapsed, over 200,000 Kurds 
became refugees, and neither Iran nor the US set up adequate refugee assistance. As one high- 
ranking but unidentified witness told the Select Committee, "covert action should not be confused 
with missionary work". 

The third major covert action operation examined by the Pike Committee was the CIA's 
intervention in Angola in support of the Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi forces. Here we 
find the conclusion that the massive Soviet and Cuban was in large part a reaction to the CIA's 
prior intervention that threatened to upset the three-way stalemate existing before the CIA got 

As a final observation on covert action operations, and one that is perhaps the most 







4 —> 






important of all, the Pike Committee destroyed the doctrine of "plausible denial" whereby a 
President or Secretary of State could plead ignorance if operations went awry. In public 
testimony Secretary Kissinger admitted that every CIA operation of consequence was approved 
by the President, under the Ford as well as previous administrations. And in its report, the 
committee concludes, "All evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control, 
had been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs." 

For all the valuable information contained in the Pike Committee's report, one most 
important area of CIA operations was completely overlooked, possibly because the committee 
considered the matter too hot to handle. These are the relations between the CIA and foreign 
intelligence and security services — commonly known in the Agency as liaison operations. 

Through these operations the CIA trains, finances and in varying degrees guides the foreign 
services into operations that will help the CIA. Over the years the CIA has played a major role 
in the growth and strengthening of many of the world s most dreaded and cruel security services, 
the South Korean CIA, the Indonesian KOPKAMTIB, the Thieu security services in South 
Vietnam, the SAVAK in Iran, the OBAN, CODI, DOPS and SNI in Brazil, the DINA in Chile 
and the Federal Police in Argentina. These services and others helped by the CIA happen to be 
the most notorious practitioners of institutionalized torture and murder in the "free" world today. 
They also happen to be the main sustaining force for the gross social and economic injustices 
prevailing in their countries. 

Nowhere in the Pike Report can one find an indication that the Select Committee even 
considered the CIA's role in promoting and supporting such repressive security services. On the 
contrary, the committee laments the termination of the AID Public Safety programmes of 
assistance to foreign police services (a legitimate foreign aid programme ) because of the CIA s 
involvement in it and bad publicity such as the film State of Siege. If the committee had wanted 
to get the truth, it could have discovered that the Public Safety programmes were an extension of 
operations already initiated by the CIA to establish better "internal security" in foreign countries - 
and that the CIA has continued police assistance work even though the public Safety programmes 
were abolished. 

If the Select Committee had investigated the CIA's liaison operations, thy would also 
have discovered that these operations, while considered within the CIA to be primarily counter- 
intelligence in nature, produce results quite similar to most covert action operations, i.e., they 
strengthen certain political forces and weaken others just as propaganda, labor and election 
operations do. 

Only Congressman Ronald Dellums, in arguing for abolition of all covert action 
operations in the Recommendations section of the report, is willing to fact the political issue: 
"Where have covert operations taken us? Are the nations that we have been 
involved with free democratic societies where the masses of people have benefits 
of democracy, or are those nations for the most part, military dictators, right- 
wing juntas, or regimes with extraordinary wealth and power in the hands of a 
few elitists? If the latter holds, it totally contradicts stated principles of this 
country. If we have been involved in covert actions which generated democracy, 
freedom and justice around the world, maybe we might arrive at some different 
conclusion. But I don't think anyone can justify continued covert action on 
grounds that we foster and develop democracy around the world.' 




Part III of the Pike Report outlines the Select committee's 32 recommendations together 
with additional recommendations of individual committee members. This section was not meant 
to be kept secret and was not published by the Village Voice with Parts I and II. At its last 
session on February 10, the committee approved the recommendations which were then filed with 
the Clerk of the House for possible future action, and they were simultaneously released to the 
press. In fact there was little likelihood that the House would take early action on the proposals, 
partly because of the emerging US electoral campaigns, but mainly because of the general back 
lash against intelligence community "reformers" following the Welch death and the spate of leaded 
secrets - including Parts I and II of the Pike Report. 

Most of the recommendations relate to increasing Congressional control over the 
intelligence community, especially the CIA, and to improving the quality of management and of 
the intelligence product. The report recommends a permanent I louse Intelligence Oversight 
Committee along with closer review of intelligence spending. While the committee would require 
that the CIA advise the House Intelligence Oversight Committee within 48 hours of the approval 
of any covert action operation, the main restriction recommended is to limit each operation to 12 
months. Assassinations and paramilitary operations would be prohibited except in time of was, 
and the general approval mechanism for covert action operations would be institutionalized and 
upgraded. Finally, the Pike Committee recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence 
become a real manager of the whole intelligence community and that an Inspector General for 
the community be established to watch out for "abuses". 

Many will conclude that the Pike Committee failed because its recommendations were so 
limited and in any case would serve to strengthen the CIA and the other agencies. To evaluate 
the committee's work one must examine it along with the other investigative bodies: the Senate 
investigating committee under Frank Church, and the Rockefeller Commission. Both of these 
groups, and President fore as well, in his "reforms" of February 18, 1976, concentrated quite 
naturally on the same areas as the Pike Committee: increasing Congressional oversight, 
improving the quality of intelligence and the management of intelligence agencies and their 
budgets, and preventing future "abuses". To expect more, like that completed abolition of covert 
action operations or prohibiting CIA support to foreign services that torture and murder, was 
unrealistic. After all, the CIA and the other services exist to protect both the government of 
which the investigators are a part and the private interests protected by the government. 

Yet, for all the limitations of the reform exercise, the work of the Pike Committee and 
the other bodies is an exceedingly positive chapter in American history. Who would have 
dreamed, two years ago, that such a great volume of information on secret American intervention 
in foreign countries would ever be made public? Who would have dreamed that the vast, illegal 
domestic operations of the CIA, FBI, and NSA would be revealed in great detail ? Every bit of 
this information, together with the general methodology' that emerges, can be used by people and 
organizations to protect themselves now and when the next wave of the same occurs. No doubt 
wide areas of CIA operations were omitted almost entirely, such as those in the trade union field, 
but no one can say the world's knowledge of secret intervention hasn't improved thanks to the 

Of equal importance is the continuing strength of the best popular traditions in the 
United States that the investigations demonstrate: the free flow of information, resistance to 
government bureaucracy, resistance to government secrecy and covcrups. Through the effective 
functioning of these traditions Americans have been able to learn how necessary corruption and 


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hypocrisy are to the way the current system operates. Abolition of covert action operations, 
which corrupt the country's expressed principles, cannot come until fundamental changes are 
made in other institutions. Meanwhile, the treasure of knowledge gained through the 
investigations must surely contribute to the understanding that government in a "liberal ' society 
must of necessity function in favour of one class and to the detriment of another. 

In July 1976 the chief investigator of the House Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct, who had been trying since March to discover how the copies of Parts 1 and II of the 
Pike Report were leaked to Daniel Schorr, reported that nearly 50 copies of the report were in 
different executive and congressional offices when the leak occurred. None of the 207 government 
officials questioned, including Secretary Kissinger and the members of the Pike Committee, would 
admit to being the culprit. Thanks to one of them, at least, the Bertrand Russell Peace 
Foundation is able to present for the first time in book form Parts I, II, and III of the Pike 
Report, a document of truly historic significance not only for Americans but also for peoples the 
world over who have suffered from clandestine American intervention. 

Cambridge, England 
August, 1976 

1. As reported in the international Herald Tribune, March 11, 1976. 

2. Ibid. 

3. International Herald Tribune, February 13, 1976. 

4. International Herald Tribune, January 31 - February 1. 

5. Daniel Schorr, letter to the New York Times dated February 16, 1976, published in the New 
York Times February 22, 1976. 

6. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by Victor Marchetti and John Marks, Jonathan Cape, 
London, 1974; Coronet Books, 1976. 

7. Inside the Company: CIA Diary , Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1975. 

8. Los Angeles Times, February 19, 1976. 



If this Committee's recent experience is any test, intelligence agencies that are to be 
controlled by Congressional lawmaking are, today, beyond the lawmaker's scrutiny. 

These secret agencies have interests that inherently conflict with the open accountability 
of a political body, and there are many tools and tactics to block and deceive conventional 
Congressional checks. Added to this are the unique attributes of intclligence--notably, ''national 
security , in its cloak of secrecy and mystery--to intimidate Congress and erode fragile support 
for sensitive inquiries. 

Wise and effective legislation cannot proceed in the absence of information respecting 
conditions to be affected or changed. 2 Nevertheless, under present circumstances, inquiry into 
intelligence activities faces serious and fundamental shortcomings, liven limited success in 
exercising future oversight requires a rethinking of the powers, procedures, and duties of the 
overseers. This Committee s path and policies, it's pluses and minuses, may at least indicate 
where to begin. 


The key to exercising oversight is knowledge. In the case of intelligence agencies, this 
translates into a need for access to information often held by the agencies themselves, about 
events in distant places. 

It is an uncertain approach to gathering facts, given the best of circumstances. The best 
of circumstances thereby become a minimum condition. 

The Select Committee's most important work may well have been its test of those 
circumstances, testing perhaps for the first time what happens when Congress unilaterally decides 
what it wants to know and how it wants to know it. 

There were numerous public expressions by intelligence agencies and the Executive that 

It is interesting to note that, despite volumes of literature, public utterances, and court cases 
on the subject, there are no clear definitions of what national security is. E.g., Note 87 Ilarv. L. 
Rev. 976 (1974); Becker, The Supreme Court’s Recent "National Security Decisions: Which 
Interests Are Being Protected? 40 Term. L. Rev. 1 (1972). 

2 Justice Van Devanter, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, wrote that the 
Congressional power of inquiry--with process to enforce it— is essential and appropriate as an 
auxiliary to the legislative function." McGrain v. Daughterly, 27.1 IJ.S. 135, 174-175 (1972). 

Early in the history of our republic, that power was accompanied by "instructions to 
inquire into the condition of the various executive departments, and the ability and integrity with 
which they have been conducted." 13 Cong. Deb. 1057, 1067 (1836). 



full cooperation would be accorded. 3 The credibility of such assurances was important, since 
almost all the necessary materials were classified and controlled by the executive branch. Despite 
these public representations, in practice most document access was preceded by lengthy 
negotiations. Almost without exception, these negotiations yielded something less than complete 
or timely access 4 . 

In short, the words were always words of cooperation; the reality was delay, refusal, 

3 In a letter to the Chairman dated October 14, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger stated: "1 
have no desire to keep anything from the Select Committee with regard to the Cyprus crisis or 
any other subject." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Dr. Kissinger, State Dept., Oct. 14, 1975. 

In a second letter to the Chairman, dated November 3, 1975, Dr. Kissinger again pledged 
his cooperation: "Let me reiterate that my intention is not to withhold any information of use to 
the Committee ... I remain as determined as ever to do everything possible to assist the 
Committee in its difficult and important task." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Dr. Kissinger, 

State Dept., Nov. 3 1975. 

At a news conference on June 10, 1975, President Ford stated: "I will make available to 
the Senate and House Select Committees there [Rockefeller Commission) materials, together with 
other related materials in the executive branch." He went on to say: "So there's not going to be 
any possibility of a cover-up because we're giving them the material that the Rockefeller 
Commission developed in their hearings, plus any other material that is available in the executive 
branch .' (Emphasis added.) President's News Conference, Wash D.C., June 10, 1975. 

4 The following statement by the Chairman, on November 14, 1975, with reference to a 
subpoena of State Department documents, is typical: 

"Chairman PIKE: That troubles me, Mr. McClory. The fact is that three days after the 
subpoena was due, we have nothing. You have had phone calls. Mr. Donner and Mr. Field 
have had phone calls. The President has not asserted executive privilege. You have the assertion 
that he is going to assert executive privilege, but he hasn't done it." Hearings before the Select 
Committee on Intelligence, at [ |, U.S. House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 
(1975) (hereafter referred to as Comm. Hearings). 

The Committee also discovered what Chairman Pike described as the "dribble treatment," 
where one of two documents were delivered each day over the course of several weeks. Dus was 
a partially subtle impediment, as it gave the executive branch an opportunity to deny that it was 
withholding information, while at the same time delaying the Committee's work. 

In the domestic intelligence investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration documents, 
which had been requested for over three months, were opened for Committee "inspection" 48 
hours before a hearing on DEA intelligence. Even then, a subpoena had been necessary to obtain 
information. The staff was not given access to the 17 so-called Kissinger wiretap materials until 
24 hours before Dr. Kissinger appeared before the Committee; and that took place only after 
lengthy negotiations. (Justice Department memoranda relating to the 17 wiretaps are printed as 
pp. IX of the Comm. Hearings, Part 3.) 


missing information, asserted privileges, and on and on 5 . 

The Committee began by asserting that Congress alone must decide who, acting on its behalf, has 
a right to know secret information. This led to a rejection of Executive "clearances" 6 or the 
"compartmentation" 7 of our staff. The Committee refused, as a matter of policy, to sign 

5 The Chairman's comments on September 29, 1975, in a discussion of proposed agreement 
with the Executive, illustrates this point: 

"Chairman PIKE: You thought we had an agreement with the President two weeks ago- 
-or a week and a half ago-and we adopted your proposals in order to get at that agreement. 

"Having adopted your proposals, they said, 'Well, that is the first bite, now we will come 
back for some more.' They have now come back for some more. 

"You want us to adopt these proposals. You keep seeing huge cooperation just around 
the comer and it is not there, and it has not been there." Comm. Hearings at | ), Sept. 29, 1975. 

At a Committee meeting early in September, the Chairman described the Committee's 
experience this far with executive branch cooperation: 

"Here is what we run into . . . Nothing is ever refused— things just are not delivered. 

They very carefully do not refuse, but the language is always the language of cooperation— the fact 
is the fact of non-production . . . ." Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Sept. [ ), 1975. 

A month later, the degree of cooperation had not noticeably improved. As the Chairman 


"I think we all know what is going on here. You asked that we wait another week. You 
say that we ought to be concerned with the official statements and, as I have indicated from the 
day I got on the Committee, the official statements always promise cooperation. There has never 
been an official statement which says, 'In no way are you going to get this information.' But the 
fact of the matter is that we don't get the information." Comm. Hearings, at [ ), Oct. [ ], 1975. 

6 The Committee did accept the assistance of the FBI in conducting background 
investigations of its staff prior to hiring. All decisions, however, concerning the members of the 
Committee's staff and their work were made by the Committee. 

The Director of Central Intelligence requested that the Committee require its staff to sign 
secrecy oaths comparable to those which the CIA requires of its own employees. The Committee 
refused. However, each member of the staff was obliged by the Committee to sign an "Employee 

"Compartmentation is a system employed by the intelligence agencies to restrict the 
distribution of information even among officials with security clearances. The justification for 
compartmentation is described in the following excerpts from a letter to the Chairman from CIA 
Director Colby, on July 28, 1975: 

"National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 (17 Feb. 1972) instructs the 
Director of Central Intelligence to '. . . develop and review security standards and practices as 
they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from 
unauthorized disclosure.' Since the National Security Act did not provide for an authority 
corresponding with the DCI's responsibility in this area, the Directive provides that the Members 
of the U.S. Intelligence Board are responsible for: 'The supervision of the dissemination of 


agreements 8 . It refused to allow intelligence officials to read and review our investigators' notes, 
and avoided canned briefings in favor of primary source material. The Committee maintained 
that Congress has a right to all information short of direct communications with the President. 

Our ability to abide by these policies was a mixed record. 

On the plus side, an aggressive pursuit of facts, and a willingness to support this pursuit 
with subpoenas, produced some unprecedented results. As an example, never before had either 
the Executive or Congress put together a ten-year review of cover action projects. By subpoena- 
which, unfortunately, had to be taken to the brink of contempt enforcement-the staff of the 
Committee analyzed all official covert action approvals since 1965, and reported its results to the 
Committee in a closed hearing 9 . That presentation was one of the more interesting and accurate 
picture of U.S. covert policies yet assembled, and was of no small value to our findings. Other 
examples appear throughout the remainder of this report. 

Nonetheless, if that is the positive side, it was offset by the extraordinary efforts that were 
required, even in a climate favorable to reviewing past Executive conduct, to identify and obtain 

It is a commentary in itself that subpoenas were necessary. 

It is a further commentary that much of the time subpoenas were not enough, and only a 
determined threat of contempt proceedings brought grudging results. 

1 . Delay 

The record of subpoenas is worth reviewing. 

It began on August 5, 1975, when an Assistant Secretary of Defense was asked to appear 
as a witness and bring with him the document by which the National Security Agency (NSA) was 
set up. It was a simply and logical request. The Defense Department controls NSA; the 
Committee was holding hearings on intelligence budgets; NSA has the biggest budget; and the 
Committee wanted to see the authority by which the NSA operates. 






4 —> 

( I ) 





security intelligence material.' The Director of Central Intelligence, acting with the advice of the 
U.S. Intelligence Board, has promulgated a number of directives, regulations, and security 
manuals, related to the protection of foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and 
methods." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA, July 28, 1975. 

8 See notes 105-106 and accompanying text. 

9 This report resulted from a subpoena of documents in possession of the "Forty 
Committee," which is a National Security Council subcommittee that approves covert action. 
(The subpoena is printed in app. 1, Comm. Proceedings, part 4.) 

On November 14, by a vote of 10 to 2, the Committee approved a resolution citing Dr. 
Kissinger in contempt of Congress for his failure to comply with the Forty Committee subpoena. 
The report accompanying the resolution (94-693) was filed December 8. On December 10, after 
negotiations with White Mouse officials, the chairman informed the House that substantial 
compliance had been obtained, and the Committee's report was recommitted. See note 78. 


The official did not bring the document. He did not have "clearance" to 10 . 

For this elementary piece of information, the Select Committee was forced to resort to 
the first of its many subpoenas. It is worth noting that the subpoena was promptly honored”, 
which raises the question why the document was not delivered in the first place. 

By late August, the Committee was preparing for hearings to review what kind of 
intelligence our money buys. Four events were chosen for hearings 12 : the 1973 Mid-East war, 
the 1974 Cyprus coup, the 1974 Portuguese coup, and the 1968 TET offensive in Vietnam. 
During August and early September there were repeated requests for documents and 

In some cases, we were given heavily "sanitized" pieces of paper. "Sanitized" was simply 
a euphemism for blank sheets of paper with a few scattered words left in, often illegible, 
sometimes misleading, and usually inconclusive 14 . In some cases, notably as to the 1974 coup 
in Portugal, there was an absolute refusal to provide anything. 

10 On August 5, 1975, the Committee received testimony from Dr. Albert C. Hall, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence): 

"Chairman PIKE: Well, Dr. Hall, we did make a formal request that you bring this piece 
of paper creating the National Security Agency with you, and you tell us that you want us to 
have everything we need but you didn't bring it. Why? 

"Dr. HALL: We have to get clearance for releasing this material to you, sir. 

"Chairman PIKE: Here we are representing the legislative branch of Government, asked 
to appropriate hundreds of millions of dollars to a certain agency, and we are having difficulty 
finding the statutory authority for that agency even to exist. Now, isn't that ridiculous? Comm. 
Hearings, at [ J, Aug. 5, 1975. 

1 1 The same subpoena required production of the Report to the President and Secretary of 
Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, July 1, 1970, entitled, "National Command and 
Control Capability in Defense Intelligence." This report was provided in compliance with the 
Committee's subpoena. 

For a fuller discussion of the hearing results, see, notes 253-370, and accompanying text. 

13 Letters were sent to the CIA on Aug. 18, 1975; Aug. 19, 1975; Aug 27, 1975; and Sept. 5 
1975. State Department requests were sent on Aug. 19, 1975; Sept. 8, 1975; and again on Sept 8, 
1975. Requests were forwarded to the Defense Department on Aug. 15, 1975; Aug. 19, 1975; 

Sept. 8, 1975; again on Sept. 8, 1975; and Sept. 9, 1975. 

14 The last two pages of one set of documents were typical deletions. The first page was 

apparently a cable. It was blank, except for the following across the top: "3/ND/DOLL- 

Tol: 30JA68/1012Z 300" 

The second page of the cable was even less informative. It was completely blank, except 
for a "Top Secret" stamp. 


As a last ditch effort, with hearings approaching, the Committee turned once more to its 
subpoena power. On September 10, 1975, it subpoenaed materials from the three major 
intelligence agencies and the National Security Council 15 . 

What were the materials that forced the Committee to resort to the force of law? Were 
they the names of agents? No. In fact, the Committee never once asked for the names of covert 
agents. Were they descriptions of secret intelligence techniques? No. They were, simply, copies 
of intelligence publications that had been circulated in the executive branch during the week 
preceding the events that we were examining 16 , documents circulated literally to hundreds, if 
not thousands, of people. 

Were they turned over by the date specified in the subpoena? No. 

The three intelligence agencies supplied bits and pieces of the publications' 7 . Dr. 
Kissinger, as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, refused to turn over a single 
piece of paper from reports provided to the National Security Council during the weeks in 

15 The subpoenas were directed to the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the National Security Council. 



■t— < 






16 The subpoena to the Defense Intelligence Agency on the subject of the Mid -East war 
illustrates the type of documents called for: 

*1. For the period of September 25, 1973, through October 6, 1973, on a daily basis, or 
as frequently as same were issued, the original documents as follows: all Defense Intelligence 
Agency Estimates, Current Defense Intelligence Summaries, Situation Reports, and any and all 
cables emanating from the Defense Attache Office in Tel Aviv, National Military Intelligence 
Center daily briefings . . .." 

17 A staff summary, prepared on September 12, 1975, indicated the following non- 

"CIA Items Not Fumished-Cyprus and Mid-East War 

a. No NIB for July 14 (Sunday)-substantial sanitization. 

b. No Situation Reports for July 13 and 14. 

c. Estimate on Yemen. 

d. CIB's for September 25, 26, 27, 30, October 3." 

(There was heavy sanitization of reports that were furnished.) 

"DIA Items Not Fumished-Cyprus and Mid-East War 

a. DIA Intelligence Summaries for July 14 (Sunday). 

b. DIA Intelligence Bulletin for July 13, July 14, and July 20 (Saturdays or Sundays). 

c. DIA Daily Current Intelligence Briefings for July 13, July 14, and July 20 

(Saturdays or Sundays). 

d. DIA Daily Intelligence Bulletins for September 29, September 30, October 6. 

e. DIA Intelligence Summary for September 30 (Sunday). 

"NSA Items Not Fumished-Cyprus 

a. SIGSUM's for July 13, July 14, July 19, July 20. 

b. "Wrap-up messages" for July 13, July 14, July 15, July 16, July 17." 


question 1 ®. 

By the time hearings on intelligence results began in mid-September, only one agency had 
substantially complied with our subpoena 19 . More than a month would pass before a good 
faith effort at compliance was forthcoming from the National Security Council. 

2. Cut-off 

This problem was soon dwarfed by a new tactic — the cut off. 

On September 12, 1975, the President, or someone using his name, cut off the 
Committee from all classified information. 20 As if that were not enough, his action was 
accompanied by a demand that we immediately turn over all classified materials from our internal 
files. 21 

The reason? The Congress, through this Committee, had passed judgment, after lengthy 
deliberation of the merits, on whether four words "classified" by the executive branch could be 
told to the American people. 22 

18 The September 12, 1975, compliance summary for NSC reads as follows: 

"NSC Items Not Furnished -Cyprus and Mid-East War 

a. Nothing was furnished, unless NSC maintains that CIA and DCI documents 
transmitted to HSC via NSC are reports provided NSC by U.S. agencies.' 

b. Nothing furnished." 

19 This was the National Security Agency. 

Rex E. Lee, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, delivered the order: 

". . . [T]he President's responsibilities for the national security and foreign relations of the 
United States leave him no alternative but to request the immediate return of all classified 
material heretofore provided by any department or agency of the Executive Branch and direct all 
departments to decline to provide the Select Committee with classified materials, including 
testimony and interviews which disclose such materials, until the Committee satisfactorily alters 
its position." Comm, hearings, at [ ], Sept. 12, 1975. 

21 Ibid. 

22 When Mr. Rex Lee appeared before the Committee to announce the President's cut-off of 
information, it became evident that the executive branch had not given the matter equally careful 

"Chairman PIKE. Mr. Lee, you say it revealed certain foreign communications activities 
of the United States. Is that your language? 

"Mr. LEE. That is what I am advised, Mr. Chairman. 

"Chairman PIKE. Did you look at the language of what the committee released? 

"Mr. LEE. I did not. 

"Chairman PIKE. You are sitting here making a statement, saying that we have released 

can by 


The Executive, by its legally questionable reaction 23 , hatl now set aside any immediate 

subpoena problems, and public hearing problems as well. 

As background, a hearing on September 11, 1975, had reviewed intelligence performance 
with respect to the Mid-East war in 1973. The result was shocking In the words of a CIA 
document, "the principal conclusions concerning the imminence of hostilities reached and 
reiterated by those responsible for intelligence analysis were-quite simply, obviously, and starkly 


That same document had verbatim quotes from two intelligence bulletins that were 
moderately favorable and from five bulletins demonstrating that intelligence estimates were ^ 
embarrassingly wrong. The two favorable quotes were declassified and read into the record. 

language relating to the communications activities of the U.S. Government, and you did not even 
look at the language we released." Ibid., at [ ]. 

23 In his appearance before the Committee, the Assistant Attorney General asserted that the 
disposition of security information is solely within the prerogative of the executive branch. 

"Chairman PIKE. You say the legislative branch of Government had no right 
whatsoever to make anything public that the executive branch of Government has no right to 
make anything public that the executive branch of Government does not want public. Is that 
your position? 

"Mr. LEE. That is our position as far as classified information is concerned. 

"Chairman PIKE. So what you say is that in this great democracy, one branch of 
Government, and one branch . . . alone may decide what is secret, and one branch of 
Government . . . alone may decide what is not secret " Ibid., at | |. 

In support of his position, Mr. Lee did not assert that the Congress or the Committee 
was bound, as a matter of law, by Executive Order 1 1652, which established the current 
classification system, nor did he offer any contrary interpretation of section 6(a) of II. Res. 591, 
which explicitly authorized the Committee to release such information as it deemed advisable. 

24 This quotation is taken from the summary conclusion of a post-mortem prepared by the 
intelligence community itself. The principal conclusions of the post-mortem began as follows: 

"1. There was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the 
Middle East on October 6. Those elements of the intelligence community responsible for the 
production of finished intelligence did not perceive the growing possibility of an Arab attack and 
thus did not warn of its imminence. 

"The information provided by those parts of the community responsible for intelligence 
collection was sufficient to prompt such a warning." The Performance of the Intelligence 
Community Before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report, 
Director of Central Intelligence (December 1973). 

25 The two verbatim quotes which were voluntarily declassified by the CIA were: 

'We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Arab-Israeli hostilities remains 
unlikely for the immediate future although the risk of localized fighting has increased slightly 


The five embarrassing quotes, containing the same type of information, were not declassified by 

The Committee objected. 26 

The CIA returned that afternoon to report that, after all, the five quotes could be 

4 October 1973" (emphasis in original). 

There are reports that Syria is preparing for an attack on Israel but conclusive evidence 
is lacking. In our view, the political climate in the Arab states argues against a major Syrian 
military move against Israel at this time. 7 he possibility of a more limited Syrian strike--perhaps 
one designed to retaliate for the pounding the Syrian Air Force took from the. Israelis on 
September 13-cannot, of course, be excluded." INR Memorandum to the Secretary, 30 
September 1973 (emphasis in original). Id. at [ ). 

26 The first of the five quotes, which was later released, is as follows: 

"Syria-Egypt-The movement of Syrian troops and Egyptian military readiness are 
considered to be coincidental and not designed to lead to major hostilities." DIA Intelligence 
Summary, 3 October 1973. 

The text was the subject of an extensive discussion among the Chairman and 
representatives of the CIA: 

Chairman PIKE. Mr. Parmenter, before we go into questioning, would you tell me why 
you have omitted from your sanitized statement here the actual predictions, as contained in the 
report from which you read, I.e., the DIA Intelligence Summary Statement of 3 October 1973? I 
want you to look at what the original report says and tell me why we should not, here in open 
session, hear what the DIA actually said on October 3, 1973. 

"Mr. PARMENTER. There are sources and methods here that we will be happy to 
discuss in executive session. 

"Mr. PIKE. Sources and methods in that statement? 

"Mr. PARMENTER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman PIKE. I find that incredible. How does that differ from the one you read on 
the preceding page (INR Memorandum to the Secretary) as far as sources and methods are 
concerned? ... All I am asking you is, could you tell us why the reading of this just plain, blank 
conclusion by the DIA as to the likelihood of the outbreak of war, would reveal a source or a 

Mr. ROGOVIN. I will assume that the reason for the deletion was the manner in 
which the information was secured — 

Chairman PIKE. It doesn t say how the information is secured. T his is a conclusion. 

Chairman PIKE. Mr. Rogovin, I find, as I look at what has been deleted and what has 
been omitted and what has been retained and read, differs not as to sources or methods, not as to 
the necessity of protecting the sensitivity of stuff, but whether it is in fact rather self-serving. . . ." 
Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Sept. 1 1, 1975. 


declassified. 27 However, in an apparent need not to appear arbitrary in their earlier decision, 
they still insisted that some 13 words still remain classified. 

The Committee debated those 13 words for over four hours in a closed session. The 
CIA Special Counsel was present and in telephone contact with CIA Director Colby; the head of 
the State Department's Intelligence and Research was there; the head of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency was there; and a high official of the National Security Agency was there. No agency was 
without representation, and all had a chance to speak. Nine words were mutually agreed to 
remain classified 28 , but four words were not. 

The four remaining words could not reveal any secret "sources and methods," which is 
the basis of official classifications 29 , because the information they contained could have come 
from any number of sources. In addition, the intelligence was so old by the time it was reported 
that it could not reveal how rapidly our intelligence techniques operated. The Committee 
satisfied itself on these and other points before taking some half dozen roll-call votes on the 

It is possible that never before had so much expertise and thought gone into a 

27 All five quotes are reprinted in the Mid-East War Post-Mortem in an appendix to this 
report. The first two quotes are typical: 

"Syria- Egypt-The movement of Syrian troops and Egyptian military readiness are 
considered to be coincidental and not designed to lead to major hostilities. DIA Intelligence 
Summary, 3 October 1973. 

"Egypt— The exercise and alert activities in Egypt may be on a somewhat larger scale and 
more realistic than previous exercises, but they do not appear to be preparing for a military 
offensive against Israel. Central Intelligence Bulletin, 5 October 1973. Post-Mortem, DCI, 6 
(December 1973), See, note 287. 

28 Of the nine words which the Committee agreed not to release, few of them would have 
revealed, directly or indirectly, any sensitive intelligence sources or methods. Instead, in most 
cases, they constituted personal characterizations, the publication of which might have been 
embarrassing to the United States or to individual foreign officials. 

29 "Sec. 7. In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United 
States and in order further to implement the proviso of section 102(d) (3) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, Eightieth Congress, first session) that the Director of Central 
Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from 
unauthorized disclosure ... 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1973). 

30 In the closed session, Mr. Rogovin, Special Counsel to the CIA, states: . . . [T]he experts 
feel very confident this is the bottom line that can be made public. These are references to real 
time reporting. . . ." Comm. Exec. Sess., at [ J, Sept. 11, 1975. 


declassification decision. Tor this, the Committee was accused of being irresponsible. 31 To 
protect national security, the "President" invoked a cut-off, perhaps before the President ever 
heard of what was going on. 32 

The Committee later learned that in a biography of Dr. Kissinger a year earlier, the 
subject to which the four words referred had been spelled out in great detail. 33 So much for the 
validity of the classification argument. No "high State Department official" had been cut off from 
information or forced to turn over his files as a result of that earlier publication. So much for 
protecting against irresponsibility. 

Police guarding Committee offices were instructed to prevent any takeover of files by the 
Executive, and nothing more was heard of that. 

Nevertheless, the cut-off from information struck at the heart of Committee operations. 
One month out of our five-month investigative period was lost while the issue was negotiated. 

3 ' Mr. Lee referred to what he characterized as the traditional procedures by which the 
Congress has received and treated classified information, a characterization which elicited the 
following colloquy: 

Chairman PIKE. If it is your position that we may never disclose information, how can 
we cany out our responsibilities? 

'Mr. LEE. The same way, Mr. Chairman, that for decades other committees in 
Congress. . . . 

'Chairman PIKE. That is exactly what is wrong, Mr. Inc. Eor decades other 
committees of Congress have not done their job, and you have loved it in the executive branch. 
You tell us that Congress has been advised of this. What does that mean? It means the 
executive branch comes up and whispers in one friendly Congressman s ear or another friendly 
Congressman s ear, and that is exactly what you want to continue, and that is exactly what I 
think has led us into the mess we are in." Comm. Hearings, at [ |, Sept. 12, 1975. 

32 Not only was there a possibility the President did not make the initial decision, but his 
public response on September 13, 1975, was based on inaccurate information. The following 
excerpts are from the September 13, 1975, issue of the Los Angeles Times: 

President Ford, arriving in St. Louis Friday, told reporters that Pike's committee had 
violated an agreement with the White House in handling the intelligence assessments prepared 
prior to the 1973 Mideast conflict. 

"What we did there,' Mr. Ford said, 'was to give these documents to a house committee 
on the basis that they would abide by an agreement as to what would be released and what 
would not." L.A. Times, All, (Sept. 133, 1975). 

At the time of the President's press conference, the only procedures established by the 
Committee for the release of classified information were contained in the Committee's rules. 

There was no separate agreement with the executive branch. 

33 'Finally, from a secret U.S. base in southern Iran, the National Security Agency, which 
specializes in electronic intelligence, picked up signals indicating that the Egyptians had set up a 
vastly more complicated field communications network than mere maneuvers' warranted." 

Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, p. 513, N.Y. (1974) 


an by 

With little choice, the Committee agreed that for purposes of getting the invostigalion underway 
agarn. future drsputes would be referred to the President. 34 This was agreed to on the assurance 
of the President that the Committee would have no further problem with access to 

information. ^rhaps ^ the day the Committee was cut off was also the day hearings 

were scheduled on the 1974 Cyprus coup. Hearings were to be focused on State 
Department's handling of intelligence, and of Dr. Kissinger s role therein Those heanngs had 
to be canceled However, the Committee located a State Department witness who was eager to 
testify C aboutCyprus, e»en in the absence of classified evidence from the Faecutive-his name was 

I hernias BoyMb ^ waj (he state Department officer in charge of the Cyprus desk during the 

period in question. The Committee was interested in what kind of intelligence had been supp 
m Boyatt Regarding the 1974 coup against Archbishop Makanos and the consequent 1 urkis 

mVaS1 ° n M ore important, the Committee wanted to examine how that intelligence, as well as Mr. 
Boyatt's analysis of it, was handled by decision-makers at State ^ Mr Boyatt had, in fact - advis 
the Committee staff that he vigorously criticized the handling of intelligence a ^ rime of 
Cyprus crisis. This criticism was embodied in a written report which was sent through the State 

34 Text of letter from Mr. William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, to the Chairman, 

dated ^ 0 "W [th^ the 0 approval of the President, 1 am forwarding herewith the classified material, 
additional to the unclassified material forwarded with my letter of 29 September 1975 which is 
responsive to your subpoena of 20 September 1975. This is forwarded on loan with the 
understanding that there will be no public disclosure of this classified material (not of test jmo y, 
depositions or interviews concerning it) without a reasonable opportunity for us to consdt 
respect to it In the event of disagreement, the matter will be referred to the President f the 
President then certifies in writing that the disclosure of the material would be detnment^ to the 
national security of the United States, the matter will not be disclosed by the Committee, except 
that the Committee would reserve its right to submit the latter to judical determmafion. Letter 
to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA Sept. 30, 1975; Comm. Hearings, at [ |, Sept. 30, 1975. 

35 On September 26, 1975, Mr. McClory described the President's position as follows: 

We ^assurances, in my opinion, of getting everything we need, and would hope we 
would find we were getting everything we need. Comm. Hearings, at [ ], . ep . , 

36 Mr William Hyland, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State was 
scheduled to be the key witness on September 1 1, 1975. It was 

later restrictions on testimony from Foreign Service officers, prevented the Committee lrom a lull 
investigations of the Cyprus crisis. There is a closely held State Department report identifying the 
P eople 8 who killed the American Ambassador, Rodger Davies, during the crisis, and a P“ bl £ 
protest has perhaps not been raised because these same murderers are now officials in the Cypms 
government Questions related to that intelligence report should, and must, be cleared up. S , 

note 370. 

Department's "dissent channels," 37 and it led to a whole new series of problems. 


3. Silenced witnesses 

In response to the committee's interest in Ihomas Boyatt's intelligence critique, a new 
tactic was fashioned— the silenced witness. 

On September 22, 1975, Mr. Boyatt was ordered by the State Department not to tell the 
committee information which would disclose options considered by or recommended to more 
senior officers in the Department." 38 The order was added on to the existing ban on classified 

That was not the end. Anything Mr. Boyatt did say would have to be in the presence of 
State Department monitors, by order of the Secretary. 39 

It is worth pointing out that this prohibition extended to more than Mr. Boyatt's options 
or advice. Any information that would disclose those options was also banned. An attempted 
interview by the staff, with monitors, demonstrated that this covered almost everything the man 
ever did or said. 40 

"The 'Dissent Channel,' through which this memorandum was submitted, provides those 
officers of the Department of State who disagree with established policy, or who have new 
policies to recommend, a means of communicating their views to the highest levels of the 
Department." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Dr. Kissinger, Dept, of State, Oct. 14, 1975. 


This order was embodied in a September 22, 1975, memorandum from I .awrence S. 
Eagleburger, Deputy Undersecretary of State for Management, to William G. Hyland, the 
Department's Director of Intelligence and Research. This directive stated that "the following 
conditions will pertain to sworn interviews by the Pike Committee staff: 

The Department of State insists that a State Department representative be present during 
the interviews. Should the interviewees wish to be represented by their own legal counsel, the 
State Department representative will be in addition to that private legal counsel. 

"The interviewees are to decline, by order of the President, to discuss classified material. 

'The interviewees are to decline, by order of the Secretary of State, to give information 
which would disclose options considered by or recommended to more senior officers in the 
Department of State." Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Sept. 25, 1975. 

When Mr. Eagleburger appeared before the Committee on September 25, he stated that 
the orders contained in his memorandum of September 22 were issued at the verbal direction of 
the Secretary of State. Ibid. 

39 Ibid. 

40 This was clearly indicated by the following exchange among Mr. Eicld, on behalf of the 
Committee, Mr. Boyatt, and Mr. Hitchcock, the Department's monitor: 

MR. FIELD. Mr. Boyatt, would you please describe for us in detail what was done in 

an by 


The State Department's order was issued in spite of two United States laws which protect 
and guarantee the right of a federal employee to provide information to Congress. 

One statute says that the right of a federal employee "to furnish information to either 
House of Congress, or to a Committee or Member thereof, may not be interfered with or 
denied. " 41 The second law, which directly nears on the Boyatt situation, was specifically 
designed to encourage candid testimony of employees from federal agencies, including the 

Department of State. 42 . H 

The authority invoked by the Secretary of State was neither "classification, nor 
"executive privilege," but a new doctrine that can best be characterized as secretarial 

the State Department not with respect to classified intelligence reports or information, but . . . 
knowledge of any of these events, who was involved, and what they were doing? Would you 

please describe that for us in some detail? 

"MR. BOYATT. 1 would like to ask Mr. Hitchcock's advice. 

"MR. HITCHCOCK. I regret but it appears to me that this comes to the problem of 
the description of the decision-making process which my instructions seem to indicate is 


"MR. FIELD. In other words, it is your position that who was doing 
Department has something to do with decision-making ? 


what in the State 

"MR. FIELD. We can't discuss this activity? We can't discuss where he went to, what 
he did, who he told, what that person told him in response? We can't discuss, as I understand it, 
whether or not he is aware of any moves made by the Secretary of State towards 1 urkey , towards 
Cyprus, either preceding or during this period." Staff interview with Mr. Boyatt, by G. Rushford, 
J. Boos, and A. S. Field, Sept. 22, 1975, copy on file with the Scl. Comm, on InteU. 

41 "The right of employees, individually or collectively to petition Congress or a Member of 
Congress, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or Member 
thereof, may not be interfered with or denied." 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (1973). 

42 "Upon the request of a committee of either House of Congress, a joint committee of 
Congress, or a member of such committee, any officer or employee of the Department of State, 
the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development, the United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, or any other department, agency, or independent 
establishment of the United States Government primarily concerned with matters relating to 
foreign counties or multilateral organizations, may express his views and opinions, and make 
recommendations he considers appropriate, if the request of the committee or member of the 
committee relates to a subject which is within the jurisdiction of that committee. 2 U.S.C. § 
194a (1973). 


privilege.' 43 

The Secretary of State was demanding special treatment. If this Committee could not 
have received testimony from CIA officers or FBI agents about advice or options they presented 
to senior officials, it would have had no choice but to shut down. 44 Oversight would be dead. 

Fortunately, the CIA, the FBI, and other intelligence agencies had cither not heard of 
"secretarial privilege," or did not believe it existed. 

On October 2, 1975, the Committee voted to issue a subpoena for Mr. Boyatt's Cyprus 
critique. 45 Dr. Kissinger responded on October 14, 1975, referring to the subpoena as a 
"request." It was denied, even though it was not a request, but a legal order to produce a 
document. 46 

Time and control are, as we noted at the outset, in the hands of those who have 
possession of documents. Therefore, the Committee, more than one month after issuing its 
subpoena, accepted from Mr. Boyatt no testimony and no document, but something less. We 
were given Mr. Boyatt's memo after it had been mixed into a number of other paragraphs drafted 
elsewhere in the State Department-ostensibly to protect Mr. Boyatt. It ended up very much like 
the proverbial "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. " 47 

This time the euphemism was "an amalgam." 48 

43 Chairman Pike, questioning Dr. Kissinger in an open hearing on Oct. 31, 1975, states, "I 
feel that you are alleging a privilege which has heretofore been reserved only to Presidents. Dr. 
Kissinger responded, "I have deliberately not asked the President to exercise executive privilege, 
nor am I asserting a secretarial privilege." Comm. Hearings, at | |, Oct. 31, 1975. 

44 One example comes from reports on the Cyprus crisis: "On the basis of a single CIA 
report from Athens, the analysts, notwithstanding their earlier concern, conveyed the impression 
to the policymakers that the world had been granted a reprieve." CIA Post Mortem on Cyprus, 
p. iii (January 1975). 

Not only were we told about the report, we were also told about its impact on 
policymakers. Ibid. 

45 For text of Subpoena, see, appendix. Comm. Hearings, at | |, Oct. 14, 1975. 

46 The Committee Counsel, on Nov. 6, 1975, noted that, "MR. DONNER ... A subpoena 
is not an invitation to negotiate. A subpoena is a command by a duly authorized body of 
government to deliver information." Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Nov. 6, 1975. 

47 Winston S. Churchill, radio broadcast, Oct. 1, 1939. 

48 On November 4, the Committee, by a vote of 8 to 5, agreed to the following resolution: 

'Resolved by the Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives that 
an amalgamation of Department of State documents to include in its entirely the papers described 
as the Dissent Memorandum prepared by Thomas Boyatt while Director of Cypriot Affairs in the 
Department, fulfills the requirement of the subpoena issued by the Committee on the 2nd day of 
October, 1975. 


4. Flank attack 

On September 24, 1975, two days after written instructions to Mr Boyatt were issued, 
the Deputy Secretary of State raised for the first time an innuendo that the Committee's actions 
resembled McCarthyism. 49 The Committee's initial reaction was to dismiss any such inference 
as a temporary lapse into poor taste. 

Unfortunately, it was not a temporary lapse. 

The next day, on September 25, 1975, Deputy Secretary 1 aglcburgcr appeared before the 
Committee to explain the Boyatt order. His statement again referred to State Department 
employees' problems with Congress in past times-a clear reference to the McCarthy period of the 
1950's, as his subsequent testimony made clear. 50 On October 14, 1975, Dr. Kissinger's written 
response to the subpoena of Boyatt's intelligence critique again raised a reference to 
McCarthyism. 51 

"Provided the amalgamation is accompanied by an affidavit signed by a person mutually 
acceptable to the Department of State and the Committee, as represented by the Chairman and 
the ranking minority member, attesting that the aforementioned Boyatt memorandum is 
contained unabridged in the amalgamation; 

"The adoption of this resolution shall in no way be considered as a precedent affecting 
the right of this Committee with respect to access to Executive Branch testimony or documents." 
Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Nov. 4, 1975. 

49 Mr. Eagleburger's statement, delivered to the Committee offices on September 24, 1975, 

"Mr. Chairman, this is far from a hypothetical issue. To cite but a single example, the 
Foreign Service and the Department of State were tom apart in the late 194fl's and early 1950's 
over an issue that raised some of the same concerns that are before us today--the ability of 
Foreign Services Officers to give to the Secretary and their other superiors their candid advice, 
secure in the knowledge that this advice will remain confidential . The events of those years not 
only injured individuals, but also did significant damage to the process by which foreign policy is 
made. Who can be certain how many recommendations during the years that followed were 
colored by memories by memories of those experiences?" Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Sept. 25, 

to 1975 - 

50 "I must say again, as I said in the statement today, the issue for me right now is an issue 
of principle. It is the question of our duty to protect junior and middle-grade officers of the 

"O Department on the conduct of their duties within the Department of State." I bid. 

51 "While I know that the Select Committee has no intention of embarrassing or exploiting 
junior and middle-grade officers of the Department, there have been other times and other 
committees-and there may be again--where positions taken by Foreign Service Officers were 
exposed to ex post facto public examination and recrimination." I ntter to Chairman Pike from 

O Dr. Kissinger, Department of State, Oct. 14, 1975. 

< I ) 


The implication was baseless 52 , as both Mr. Eagleburgcr and Dr. Kissinger admitted 
under questioning. 51 

Facts seemed to make no difference. Within days of the innuendo being raised by Dr. 
Kissinger and his Deputy, newspaper columns and editorials were reporting their charges of 
McCarthyism. 54 

To the extent that such media activity may have been inspired, directly or indirectly, by 
the State department, it helped erode support within and outside the Committee for pursuing the 
plain truth. With that erosion, the fiction of an amalgam became feasible. 

Some day the full story of Cyprus may be told, but not by this Committee. 


52 The plain facts are that Senator McCarthy destroyed the careers of State Department 
employees on the basis of their beliefs and politics. This Committee never sought the political 
views of any federal employee. Senator McCarthy operated without evidence. This Committee 
sought only evidence. Senator McCarthy forced people to testify. Mr. Boyatt wanted to testily. 
McCarthyism grew out of a lack of character and integrity, and from a climate of hysteria. 
Restrictive rules are no answer to such problems. 

51 "MR. HAYES. [0]ne of the things that has deeply offended me . . has been the 

implication, the very clear implication, that your position of protecting middle and lower level 
Foreign Service officers is a position of protecting them from McCarthyism . . . 

"SECRETARY KISSINGER. With respect to the charge of McCarthyism, I want to 
make clear that I do not accuse this committee of engaging in McCarthyism and 1 know indeed 
that the Chairman has a record in this regard, and from the convictions of many of the members 
that I am familiar with, I know that this is not the intention of this committee." Comm. 

Hearings, at [ ], Oct. 31, 1975. 

"MR. HAYES. ... I don't think there has been one instance that you can cite or that 
Mr. Leigh can cite, where this Committee has ever taken it upon itself in the tradition of the 
McCarthys ... to, in essence, run a purge operation. 

"MR. EAGLEBURGER. Mr. Hayes, there is no implication in my statement that this 
Committee is performing in the way I described the Department went through in the late '40's 
and early '50's. That is not, sir, my point." Comm. Hearings, at | |, Sept. 25, 1975. 

54 The New York Times editorial of October 19, 1975, was entitled, "Neo-McCarthyism?" 

"In view of the facts, the Intelligence Committee's insistence that it has the right to reach 
into the interior of the State Department to subpoena the dissenting memoranda of junior and 
middle-rank officials— and to summon them to testify on policy issues— is clearly contrary to the 
national interest. . . ." 

The Washington Post editorial of October 6, 1975, entitled "Mr. Pike's Committee" had 
this to say: 

"The analogy of McCarthyism evoked by the State Department is a relevant one, even 
though it appears that in this case the committee of Congress wishing to question Mr. Boyatt 
apparently is inclined to praise him for his views, not persecute him— and use his testimony to 
fault Secretary Kissinger. Certainly Mr. Kissinger should be faulted for his Cyprus policy. . . ." 



a. An Attack Averted 

If „o 'flank' attack was launched by the FBI to discredit the Committee, it may have 

b “" 'TT'ZZrwlS. SwESS?. manufacturer of wiretap equipment tested 
before the Comnuttee. He indicate! 1 that the ™ ^[iTs^rtSonfOTthc' 

'£££ / Recording aid a top FB, oflicia, were 

close friends. . . • r t t c Recording and its PRI friends. The 

The Committee began an investigation of U. b. Recording a lament he was 

On December 2 , . ’ Pn , „ a „ n)s -rv aBe nts were allegedly carrymg out an 

“^BltutSo”^ .h" ageney s contractu,, dealings with U. 8 . R-niu.g 
Company ^ 5 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Us conccm , a „d nffemd to give a statement 

under oath as to the conduct of the FBI agents^ Kaiser claimed that the FBI agents 


stood over him and thrust it in front of hi , . n -75 released a copy of the 

written s^S^ Sffi 

dl r S £££? r^Thes^menUts agents had taken while Kaiser was unde, 
some duress. 

5. Deletions 


its hearings was risks, and how well those risks are controlle . 

,, . , ■ 11 c Recording matter is contained infra, noted 232-242, 

55 The Committee's version of the U. b. Kccoromg m 
and accompanying text. See, Comm. Hearings, at l ], Oct. 9. 19/5. 

» One of the most disturbing aspects of the ta “^:^;tet^tw P wrS^ with 
interrogating a Committee witness about t e ununi apparently seen as 

wh" — personnel the, wem denigrathrg. 


Seven new subpoenas were issued. Four were for materials pertaining to subjects of prior 
hearings. They were honored. 57 The remaining three were directed to Dr. Kissinger, for 
materials pertaining to upcoming hearings. Not surprisingly, those subpoenas went 
unanswered. 58 

Once again, some background is helpful. 

Two of the three subpoenas were for covert action recommendations made by non-CIA 
officials, since the CIA had already opened up its covert action files to us. The third subpoena 
was for intelligence records on Soviet compliance with strategic arms limitation agreements 

When considering risks, covert actions rank as perhaps the highest risk operations in the 
government 59 , short of war. The law allows the CIA "to perform such other functions and 
duties related to intelligence affecting the National Security as the National Security Council may 
from time to time direct." 60 This is the legal authority for covert action. A subcommittee of 

57 The following subpoenas were honored: 

1) To the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, for all minutes of the 
National Security Council Intelligence Committee, its Working Group, and its Economic 
Intelligence Subcommittee; 

2) To the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, for the minutes of all 
meetings of the Washington Special Action Group concerning the Mideast War, the Cyprus crisis, 
and the Portugal coup; 

3) To the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, for all intelligence 
reports furnished to the National Security Council between October 5 and October 28, 1973, 
relating to the Mideast war; 

4) To the Director of Central Intelligence, for all written requests and memoranda of 
requests from the CIA to the Internal Revenue Service since July 1, 1961, for tax information or 
official action by the IRS. See, appendix, for copy of all subpoenas. 


These subpoenas were not complied with: 

1) To the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for all Forty 
Committee records of decisions taken since January 20, 1964, reflecting approval of covert action 

2) To the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for documents relating 
to the Soviet Union's adherence to the provisions of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of 
1972 and the Vladivostok agreement of 1974; and 

3) To the Secretary of State for all State Department documents recommending covert 
actions to the National Security Council since January 20, 1961 

59 See, notes [ ], and accompanying text. 

60 The National Security Act of 1947 states: 

'(d) Powers and Duties. 

"For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several 
Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of 

scan by 


the National Security Council, presently called the Forty Committee, has been assigned the task 
of directing these actions. 

By tracing money, the Committee came across millions of rounds of ammunition and 
weapons being purchased in the early 1970's. These purchases were destined for a questionable 
military venture in a far-off war that most Americans had never heard of, much less felt they had 
any national interest in. 61 

The CIA's military escapade was bad enough, but, on examining documents, the 
Committee discovered that the Forty Committee appeared not to have met or voted on the 
operation. 62 In fact, internal documents showed that the CIA and the State Department had 
turned the project down three times in the previous two years. 

It turned out that during a trip overseas, President Nixon and Dr Kissinger had met 
alone with the head of a foreign government. At that man's request, the Administration had 
involved CIA in an internal war in the head of state's neighboring country. John Conally, on the 
verge of heading "Democrats for Nixon," was sent back to the foreign leader, apparently to bring 
him the good news of final approval. 

A month later, after training for the project had already begun, Forty Committee 
members were sent a memo by Dr. Kissinger informing them, for the first time, of President 
Nixon's decision. 63 

In a separate matter, this Committee was told by former CIA Director Richard Helms of 
a decision to undertake a covert action project in Chile. Mr. Helms had been called into the 
Oval Office and told by President Nixon, with Dr. Kissinger and Mr. John Mitchell present, that 
he was to undertake the project in spite of CIA reservations. He was also told "not to inform the 
other members of the Forty Committee." 64 

the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council— 

"(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the 
national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." 50 U.S.S. 
403(d) (1973). 

There is a more extensive discussion of the authority for covert action. See, notes [ ], 
and accompanying text. 

61 See, notes [ ], and accompanying text. 

62 For a fuller description of this project, see, notes [ ], and accompanying text. 

63 See, note [ ]. 

64 "MR. FIELD. In the case of the C hil e operation, could you describe very briefly how 
that was directed? 

"MR. HELMS. Well, there was a part- 

"MR. FIELD. How you came to be told— 

"MR. HELMS. There was some activity undertaken at the President's direction in Chile 
by his saying to me that he wanted this effort made and that I was not to inform the other 


A pattern was emerging. 

Not all covert actions were generated by the CIA. In particular, paramilitary operations 
of the worst type seemed to come from outside the CIA. Some projects came from the 
President. Some projects came from his Assistant for National Security Affairs, and some had 
their beginning in the Department of State. 65 

Forty Committee records were subpoenaed to see if the pattern was valid. 66 The 
subpoena was limited to the official document by which a covert action was approved. These 
records were often no more than one paragraph long. 

What arrived in response to our subpoena showed nothing--because it was mostly 

The deletions came in all shapes and forms. Typically, there would be one line left on a 
page, saying "A CIA project was telephonically approved," or "The Committee voted to approve 
a CIA paper entitled [title deleted)." Often, if there had been numerous items considered at a 
meeting, the deletions themselves had been cut and pasted together. For example, item eight 

members of the Forty Co m mittee. 

"MR. FIELD. In other words, in the case of the Chilean operation, were you called to 
the Oval Office? 

"MR. ELMS. I was in the Oval Office. 

"MR. FIELD. You were called into the Oval Office and who was present? 

"MR. HELMS. The Attorney General and Dr. Kissinger." Exec. Sess., Oct. 23, 1975. 

See, notes [ ], and accompanying text. 

66 "CHAIRMAN PIKE. The question then becomes-and Mr. Field stated this yesterday- 
are those operations which are generally within the CIA, and in the normal course of business, 
normally more responsible? Do they normally get our nation into less difficulties that those 
which somebody outside the intelligence operation department tells them to do?" Comm. 

Hearings, at [ ], Nov. 14, 1975. 

"CHAIRMAN PIKE. Well, here we are seeking to look at the genesis of all oversight 
and the degree of control and the degree of responsibility by which these operations get launched. 

"You and I, and Mr. Dellums, and Mr. Treen, as members of the Armed Services 
Committee, for years heard the magic word, 'The Forty Committee." It has seemed to us as we 
get deeper and deeper into this that the Forty Committee really has not been all that prevalent in 
the decision-making process in the oversight process. The Forty Committee is always held forth 
as being that body which exercises judicial restraint, perhaps, in authorizing these various 
operations. It has seemed to me and I think most of the members of this committee that the 
activities of the Forty Committee have been relatively negligible in authorizing these operations. 

"We are trying to get the information to see whether anybody ever really argues about 
these things, to see whether anybody votes no on these things, to sec whether the Forty 
Committee is a reality or a rubber stamp." Ibid., at [ ]. 










< 1 > 



might follow item one, giving the impression that only two items had been considered that 
day. 67 Sometimes there would be only one word left on a page--"Chile"--nothing else, 
anywhere, but it was still classified top secret. The information, needless to say, was 
worthless. 68 

Wholesale deletions were encountered in the Committee's investigation of domestic 
covert activities as well. 

COINTELPRO, the FBI's program for disruption of the "New I,eft," like nearly all FBI 
actions, was extremely well documented. The Committee requested the appropriate documents 
in July 69 What it received were summaries so heavily excised as to be unusable 

One memorandum, for example, referring only generically to the "New Left," contained 
the sub-heading, "Recommended Procedure," on one page, and "Results" on the next. The pages 
were otherwise blank. Another document with the same type generic reference, "Blank Extremist 
Organization," was likewise excised in its entirety. 

The Committee protested. Negotiations followed. 70 Finally, in mid-October, an 
agreement was reached whereby less excised memos were made available to Committee staff, at 
FBI headquarters. The Committee persisted, selecting a representative number of memoranda to 
be delivered to its own offices. After some delay, they were delivered, still excised. 

Requests for the documents pertaining to FBI national security wiretaps led to a similar 
experience. One set of documents was delivered, excised beyond use. Negotiations took place for 
almost a month. Finally, a second set of documents was provided, but, again, without identifying 
targets of electronic surveillance. 

67 "MR. FIELD. I think this is the best example of the kind of deletions. The items skip 
from Item 1 to Item 4. Items 2 and 3 are clearly cut and pasted out of the document. It then 
skips from 4 to 7. In other words, here is a document that could conceivably be two or three or 
four pages long. It gives you the feeling that you have gotten a reasonable amount of 
information, but in fact all somebody has done is snip out little sections and paste them together 
and compact them and make it look like it is a complete document." Comm Hearings, at [ ], 
Nov. 14, 1975. 

68 "MR. PIKE. I think that as any of us look at what they have given us, we will simply 
make a pretty easy judgment that what they have given us is so heavily censored and deleted as to 
be meaningless for our purposes." Ibid., at | ]. 

69 It was part of a general request on July 22, 1975, for all documents previously provided 
the Senate Select Committee. 

70 The Senate, which received the same excised material, also objected, with more or less the 
same results. All of this happened before July 22, 1975. Much time could have been saved had 
that information been volunteered to the House. 

6. Privileges 


The second Kissinger subpoena brought even less than the first one. 

For the first time in the history of the Ford Administration, executive privilege was 
invoked. The subpoena which caused this historic assertion was directed to Dr. Kissinger as 
Secretary of State. It was intended for the purpose of examining the type of covert actions 
recommended by the State Department since 1965. 

The State Department reported that it had recommended only eight projects 7 '--this was 
later changed to 16, and still later to 20 72 --but that none of the documents could be provided to 
the Committee. 

Although only a few of the recommendations were from a Secretary of State to a 
President, all documents were being withheld because they were deemed privileged 
communications with Presidents. They included recommendations from lesser State officials to 
the staff of the National Security Council, with no apparent intention that the document be for 
the eyes or the use of the President. 73 

In all cases, the communication did not take place in this President's administration. All 
privileges recognized by law are controlled specifically and personally by the person whose 
communication is being protected, and this President was not in that position as to the 
documents. 7 It must be noted, again, that no other intelligence agency of department withheld 
recommendations for covert action-or anything else-sent to the National Security Council. If I 
they had, the Committee's work would have come to a halt. 

In any event, nothing came forth from the State Department. 

At no time was there a legitimate question as to which documents the Committee was 
seeking, under either this subpoena or the subpoena for Forty Committee documents. At no 
time was the physical amount of paper a problem, since only a few hundred sheets of paper were 

In a letter dated November 10th, the State Department has reviewed their files in 
response to your subpoena of November 6th. They have identified documents that indicate that 
on eight occasions the Department of State submitted recommendations concerning the issue of 
presidential approval of covert activities." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Philip Buchen, 
Counsel to the President, Nov. 14, 1976. 

72 * 

"MR FIELD... We have a very good assurance that the twenty documents which were 
covered by executive privilege from the twenty situations have been identified to us." Comm. 
Hearings, at [ ], Nov. 14, 1975. 


For example, some of the documents, as explained to the Committee at a briefing by Mr. 
William Hyland on Dec. 8, 1975, were merely requests from State employees to the NSC staff, 
asking that CIA be tasked to prepare a paper on a certain subject. 

74 "MR. JOHNSON. ...I don't think we ought to even acknowledge that this is a possibility 
that a President can control everything that has happened in the government files and government 
documents; that the President has absolute control over this since the time of the inception of the 
Republic." Comm. Hearings, at [ j, Nov. 14, 1975. 




at issue. At all times, this Committee, as well as the Congress, had a right--and, in fact, an 
obligation under law 7 --to review the information at issue. 

With no other recourse, the Committee cited Dr. Kissinger for contempt on November 

14, 1975. 


On November 20, 1975, the Committee approved a report to the House of 
Representatives, asking that the Committee's contempt citation be supported by the House itself 
and referred to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution. 77 Contempt proceedings began to produce 
results with respect to the Forty Committee records. Revised editions, with fewer deletions, were 
soon provided. 

Nothing came forth from the State Department. 

The Committee then entered its last two weeks of hearings, having endured more than 
three months of uninterrupted delays, cut-offs, silenced witnesses, amalgams, attacks, deletions, 
and privileges. 

Finally, the evening before the Committee was to take a contempt citation of Dr. 
Kissinger to the floor of the House for a vote, the Committee was given access to State 
Department recommendations for covert action. 78 

75 "Sec. 2. The select committee is authorized and directed to conduct an inquiry into— 

"(5) the necessity, nature, and extent of overt and covert intelligence activities by the 

United States intelligence instrumentalities in the United States and abroad;" H. Res. 591, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 

76 'Resolved, That the Speaker of the House of Representatives certify the report of the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives as to the contumacious 
conduct of Henry A. Kissinger, as Secretary of State, in failing and refusing to produce certain 
pertinent materials in compliance with a subpoena duces tecum of said Select Committee served 
upon Henry A. Kissinger, as Secretary of State; and as ordered by the Select Committee, together 
with all the facts in connection therewith, under the seal of the House of Representatives to the 
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, to the end that Henry A. Kissinger, as 
Secretary of State, may be proceeded against in the manner and form provided by law.' Comm 
Hearings, at [ ], Nov. 14, 1975. 

77 H. Rept. 94-693, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The Committee invoked the provisions of 
law under 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 and 194 (1973). Ibid. 

78 'MR. FIELD. ...Mr. Hyland. ..had both the State Department recommendations and the 
Forty Committee minutes before him. He read verbatim from the Forty Committee minutes, 
and he used the State Department recommendations to verify the date, the country, and the type 
of program that was recommended by the State Department, and in response to our questions, he 
was very forthcoming.' Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Dec. 9, 1975. 





7. More delay 

The third so-called Kissinger subpoena 79 was intended for the review of strategic arms 
limitation agreement (SALT) intelligence handling, but brought instead a return to the delay. 

What is SALT, and why was the Committee so interested in the intelligence aspects of it? 
Briefly, SALT covers the strategic arms limitation agreements signed with the Russians in 1972, 
to limit the arms race. The agreements specifically limit such things as missile production, 
deployment, and testing by the United States and the Soviet Union. The ability of our 
intelligence services to detect whether the Russians are violating this agreement is of vital strategic 
interest. More important, SALT intelligence must be able to move through channels, 
uninfluenced by bias or ulterior motives, to appropriate decision-makers. 

The Committee had earlier received testimony that, during the Vietnam War, a desire to 
please high-level officials may have caused some intelligence to reflect what the upper levels 
wanted to hear. 80 Vietnam is history, but SALT is not. 

To check how intelligence was being handled at the highest levels, and whether it was 
ever withheld from top Executive officials or Congress, the Committee subpoenaed all reports on 
Soviet compliance that had been sent to the National Security Council. 

At first, Committee staff went to the White House and was given a few SALT 
monitoring reports. 81 These, it was said, were absolutely all that the National Security Council 
had in its files on the subject of SALT compliance. It did not seem possible. 

For one reason, the Verification Panel, which exists primarily to review SALT matters, is 
part of the National Security Council and has been quite active. Por another, the Committee had 
already identified dozens of pertinent documents from the intelligence community which had been 
sent to the National Security Council. 82 

The skepticism proved accurate. After Committee proceedings to cite Dr. Kissinger for 
contempt of the SALT subpoena, on November 14, 1975, volumes of SAI T intelligence material 
began to come forth. 

A week had passed since the return date of the subpoena before the documents the 

79 See note [ ]. 

80 See notes [ ], and accompanying text. 

81 These are entitled: "SALT- 1972, Intelligence Baseline Report." They are produced under 
the authority of the United States Intelligence Board. The Committee received one report from 
1972, three from 1973, two from 1974, and one from 1975. 

82 We had not received any documents from the Verification Panel or its subcommittee, the 
Restricted Working Group. In addition, we had identified some 40 documents sent to the NSC 
from CIA that should have been included in the subpoenaed material. 



Committee needed were even identified, making preparations for hearings most difficult. 83 

This was the last of the subpoenas, however. 

In reviewing the oversight experience, access to information, even when it was backed up 
by subpoena, was not satisfactory. As an example, at the State Department we found that lower 
level officials had eventually been ordered not to testify before the Committee; their documents 
were likewise refused to Congress. Upper level officials at State had become inaccessible because 
of executive privilege; and diplomatic exchanges, an important element of intelligence, were 
similarly off limits to the Committee. 

To place the importance of this in perspective, intelligence has two primary consumers: 
military and diplomatic. Diplomacy is preferable to war; yet it is nearly impossible, today, to 
evaluate how well intelligence serves diplomatic ends. If it does not serve well, it is hard to 
imagine how anything could be known or done about it by Congress. 

The passion for confidentiality and secrecy at State is curious, because in many cases the 

( Russians and other adversaries were either directly informed of the same secrets the Committee 
sought, or the Russians knew of them by other means. 84 It is hard to imagine a justification 
for allowing the unelected to keep elected officials in the dark, in a democracy. 

83 The lack of access to documents was the primary reason no administration witness was 
called to testify at the Committee's first SALT hearing. Without documents to identify issues, we 
called a SALT critic, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, to testify. 

Ironically, the same officials who withheld primary source materials from us criticized the 
Committee for not presenting administration witnesses. However, we had no evidence to 
question them about. 

After documents were sent to the Committee, a hearing was held to receive testimony 
from two senior administration officials with reference to certain documents that appeared to 
show withholding of intelligence. The point is that until the Executive opened access to 
documents we could not select appropriate witnesses or be prepared with issues; nevertheless, that 
same Executive made it seem that responsibility for not calling their witnesses rested with the 

84 For example, SALT intelligence was put on "hold"-which means it was not only 
classified, but not even generally distributed in the executive branch. Mr. Hyland testified as to 
one of these "hold" items: 

"MR. FIELD. But the Russians were told it twice while it was on hold. 

"MR. HYLAND. That is the purpose of the system. If you decided not to do it, that is 
one decision. 

"MR. FIELD. Who was it kept from? 

"MR. HYLAND. As far as I am concerned, officials who had an operational policy 
decision were informed. 

"MR. FIELD. That is not the question. Who arc we keeping it a secret from? 

"MR. HYLAND. We are keeping a hold item secret from people who might read the 
Central Intelligence Bulletin that is disseminated in several hundred copies. 

"MR. FIELD. We tell the Russians. 

"MR. HYLAND. Of course." Comm. Hearings, at [ |, Dec. 17, 1975. 





8. Routine problems 

When legal proceedings were not in the offing, the access experience was frequently one 
of foot-dragging, stonewalling, and careful deception. 

A few examples should suffice. 

The President went on television June 10, 1975, and reassured the nation that the 
uncompleted work of the Rockefeller Commission would be carried forward by the two 
intelligence committees of the Congress. The files of the Commission, President Ford 
announced, would be turned over to both committees immediately. 85 

The Committee began requesting those files within the week. We requested and 
requested 86 We negotiated. Finally, by threatening to announce publicly that the President's 
word had not been kept, the files were turned over— in mid-October, some four months late. 

In another case, likewise involving basic research information, the Committee in early 
August requested a complete set of what has become known as the "Family Jewels." This 693- 
page document was the very foundation of the current investigations. It had come into existence 
as the result of an order by former CIA Director James Schlessinger, on May 9, 1973, in the wake 
of Watergate revelations. Dr. Schlessinger had ordered CIA employees to report any possible 
past wrongdoing, and those reports were compiled into the "Jewels" on May 21, 1973. 87 

By the end of August, the Committee had been provided only a sanitized version of the 

85 "Because the investigation of the political assassination allegations is incomplete ... I will 
make available to the Senate and House Select Committees there [Rockefeller Commission] 
materials together with other related materials in the executive branch. ... I should add, that the 
Senate and House Committees are also in the process of making further investigations as they 
have been charged with the responsibility by the Congress; so there's not going to be any 
possibility of any cover-up because we're giving them the material that the Rockefeller 
Commission developed in their hearings. . . .' President's News Conference, Washington, D.C., 
June 10, 1975. 

86 More than two dozen phone calls were made, by three separate members of the staff, over 
a three-month period. 

87 "MR. JOHNSON. On May 9th of '73, Mr. Schlessinger issued a directive calling on all 
CIA employees to report any and all abuses by the CIA. That is a matter of public records, there 
isn't any question about that, is there? 

"MR. COLBY. No, sir. 

"MR. JOHNSON. And is it also a fact that by May 21, just 1 1 days later, there were 
several hundred separate reports of abuses which had been reported to him. 

"MR. COLBY. There were a number of abuses. I couldn't give you a quantitative 

"MR. JOHNSON. That is the report that has been called by a variety of names, it has 
been called potential flap activities, or jewels, or the family jewels; isn't that the report we are 
talking about? 

'MR. COLBY. Yes." Comm. Hearings, at [ |, Aug. | |, 1975. 


document. Letters were sent and negotiations proceeded throughout September. On October 7, 
1975, the staff was told that they would not be allowed to sec the complete record of wrongdoing 

Q Q * 

as assembled in May 1973. 

A second, sanitized version was sent in mid-October, but it was hardly less sanitized than 
the first. As an interesting sidelight, the second version did have one page that was not in the 
first. It was a photocopy of a Jack Anderson newspaper article, nothing more. In the first 
version, that page had been blanked out, with the message, 'This information deleted because it 
reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods." The second version was not deleted, but it 
was classified. 

The Chairman demanded a complete copy of the report, and was told that one would be 
forthcoming. None was. As a result, he scheduled a press conference for 12:00 noon on October 
11, 1975. 

At 1 1:45 a.m. on October 1 1, 1975, the report was finally delivered 89 , after the life of 
the Committee's investigation was more than half over. 

These two examples represent some of the most basic research materials available to the 
Committee. Their contents were crimes, abuses, and questionable conduct, not sophisticated or 
legitimate intelligence secrets. 

Other important information was withheld, such as a Committee request for certain 
records of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. On August 25, 1975, a letter was 
sent asking for a copy of the Board's agendas since 1961 90 No written response to that letter 

88 "On 4 September I formally requested to see the original copy of the unsanitized 'family 
jewels' from the Review Staff at CIA. I was put off. Then Seymour Bolten, Chief of Review 
Staff, countered with an offer to have someone sit with Mr. Pike and let him read a version. This 
was unacceptable, so they further 'compromised' and offered to let Jack Boos and A. Searle Field 
sit at CIA with the sanitized family jewels' and ask for each sanitization as it came up. This was 
also unacceptable and the access flap started. 

"Now, I have been told by Donald Gregg and Seymour Bolten that 'no one will see the 
original, unsanitized family jewels.'" Memorandum to Mr. A. Searle Field, from Emily Sheketoff, 
Oct. 7, 1975. 

89 "Pike told reporters the documents had been turned over to him, for Committee use, 'a 
few minutes before noon.' 

"We have been trying to get documents with hard evidence and a particular document 
including the report generated by Mr. Schlessinger about alleged improprieties within the CIA,' 
the New York Democrat said. 

"Defense Secretary James R. Schlessinger served as CIA director for a few months in 
1973 and held an in-house investigation of the agency before he left that post." "Pike Gets a New 
Report," The Washington Star, p. A- 10, Oct. 11, 1975. 

90 The letter requested "a list of all topics discussed during tiic meetings of the President's 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for January 1961, to present." Letter to Commander Lionel 
H. Olmer, Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary, PFIAB, from Roscoe B. Starek, III, Aug. 
25, 1975. 






has ever been received. 

The Board interested the Committee from the standpoint of command and control. 

There have been numerous recommendations, for example, that a pending executive 
reorganization make this group the key command and control unit for foreign intelligence. 91 

The Committee is still waiting for the Board's documents to be delivered, despite the fact 
that the ranking minority member of the Committee took a personal interest in the matter. A 
month of his efforts produced only a limited right to see certain information, not the documents 

Another important piece of information the Committee requested was the names and 
relationships of newsmen who worked for both the CIA and the American news media at the 
same time. Congressman Dellums asked for this in executive session on August 6, 1975 92 
The information was re-requested by letter on October 14, 1975, and on October 16, 1975, and 
on October 21, 1975, and on October 22, 1975. 93 

The Committee is still waiting for answers about the newsmen. The only information it 
did receive was in response to inquiries about specific newsmen, after we had determined from 
other sources that there was a CIA connection. In fact, in one case, the CIA denied the 
relationship until confronted with irrefutable proof. 

As a final example, there is a category of intelligence that is sent to the Secretary of State, 
who then controls its further dissemination. It is called "NODIS CHEROKEE 94 .' 

The Committee specifically requested NODIS CHEROKEE information with reference 

91 From time to time, the Board has examined the scope and effectiveness of covert action 
and the technical means of gathering intelligence. Staff was informed of current discussions to 
enhance the responsibilities and resources of the Board. Another concern was the role and 
interrelationships of members of the Board with the business community. Many of these 
members are affiliated with major intelligence community contractors. 

92 MR. DELLUMS. Describe the existence and nature of the CIA secret propaganda 
operations in the U.S. I would appreciate detail. How many U.S. journalists overseas are in 
contact with the CIA? How many outlets for media operations does the CIA have in the U.S.?" 
Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Aug. 6, 1975. 

93 This set of requests was for "a complete list of all people now in the news media who have 
ever had a relationship, contractual or otherwise, with the Agency.' Ixtter to Donald Gregg, 
Assistant to the Director, CIA, from Emily Sheketoff, Oct. 21, 1975. 

MR. HITCHCOCK. NODIS CHEROKEE is a particularly sensitive category of 
NODIS messages limited in use to relatively few embassies, covering intelligence materials of 
extraordinary sensitivity, handled virtually only by the Secretary, the President, if he is involved, 
and the Chief of Mission. And virtually one-man dissemination in Washington and the field." 
Interview by G. Rushford, Comm. Exec. Sess. at [ |, Jan. 6, 1976. 

scan by 


to the Cyprus crisis in 1974. 95 It was told that none existed. Two months later other officials 
revealed that the materials do exist. When the Committee went back to State with this new 
information, it was simply told NODIS CHEROKEE was not going to be given to us. 96 By 
then, there was no time left to issue a subpoena. 

a. The right question 

Perhaps the most difficult problem in developing information about intelligence activities 
is knowing the right question to ask. 97 

As an illustration, Committee staff obtained the names of CIA proprietaries, after lengthy 
negotiations. Some time later, staff members noticed that certain names were not on the list. 

The explanation was that those were "fronts," and we had not asked for fronts. 

Nor was this sort of semantic contest confined to staff inquiries. In one public hearing, 
Congressman Stanton and the FBI's Raymond Wannall consumed more than five minutes 
drawing distinctions among "surreptitious entry," "burglary," and "illegal break-in." 98 Five 
minutes compares favorably with the weeks it took Committee staff to obtain precise answers to 
the difference between FBI " inf ormants" and "confidential sources." 

Another example grew out of a Committee investigation of a covert action project that 
had taken place some years ago. 99 This particular project was the subject of unusual interest by 

95 Letters were sent to William Hyland, Director INR, from Gregory Rushford, on Oct. 1, 
1975, and again on Oct. 16, 1975. 

96 "All of them (NODIS CHEROKEE) . . . contain diplomatic correspondence between the 
capitals and Washington. ...Thus, these messages do not deal with the intelligence matters of 
concern to the Committee and do not relate to your request of 16 October." letter to Gregory 
Rushford from J. J. Hitchcock, Department of State, Jan. 5, 1976. 

97 "MR. PIKE. It has been my experience and judgment that if you |Mr. Colby] are asked 
precisely the right question, you will give us an honest answer. You do not lead us into those 
areas which would help us know what the right question was to ask. You do not make it easy 
for us to ask the right question. Anyone who thinks you have been running back and forth to 
Capitol Hill with briefcases bulging with secrets which you are eager to bestow upon us hasn't sat 
on my side of the desk." Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Nov. 6, 1975. 

98 See, Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Nov. 18, 1975. 

99 The single material factor is that informants are live human beings who are paid for the 
information they provide. A question, then, of the number of "informants" used against the 
Institute for Policy Studies could safely be answered in impressively low numbers, when the fact 
is that fully 52 "sources" (unpaid individuals, inanimate objects such as pieces of abandoned trash 
or a reconstructed typewriter ribbon, in addition to true "informants") were used. See, Comm. 
Hearings, at [ ], Nov. 18, 1975. 



the Committee, both because of the country involved and because it entailed tampering in the 
free election of an allied nation. 1 he Committee's objections to the project were strong enough 
that it voted to recommend to the President that the project no longer be kept secret. 

Astonishingly, while the Committee was in the midst of objecting to this past project, 

CIA was obtaining approval for re-instituting the same type of project in the same country. The 
CIA never told the Committee about this renewal. When newspaper revealed the new project, 
Committee staff asked the CIA why it had not been told. The response was, "You didn't ask the 
right question." 

lime and again, a question had to be repeated and variously repeated. Only then would 
the sought-after facts emerge, even though the intent of the questions had been readily apparent. 
The operable ground rules were, as one official put it, "After all, we're not a coke machine; you 
don't just put in a quarter and expect something to come out." 

Examples of the difficulty in asking the right question arc a bit like trying to prove a 
negative; the full impact may not be possible to illustrate. It was, however, the most nagging 
factor in attempting to exhaust the items that deserved Congressional insight . The significance of 
that is that it reflects an attitude which cannot be expected to change; and as long as that is the 
case, ready access to documentary evidence and primary source material is all the more 


Classified information presents a classic paradox: without it, government sometimes 
cannot function; with it, government sometimes cannot function. 

Spy agencies cannot publish details about their operations. At the same time, Congress 
cannot fail to report to its constituents about abuses of their government. What it all means is 
that there must be a responsible system of classification, accompanied by an equally responsible 
and effective system of declassification. 

We have neither. 

It has been easy to create secrets, but this government has yet to construct an adequate 
way to handle the problems too many secrets create. We have no Official Secrets Act-which 
would make it a crime to publish secrets-because such a law would be unconstitutional. 100 

Mr. Colby stated: "I do not believe that the question of an Official Secrets Act has to be 
looked at in the context of our Constitution. . . I would not apply it to the press, for example, 
because I think that would run into real conflict with our Constitution." Comm hearings at [ ], 
Dec. 12, 1975. 

Chairman Pike summarized the witnesses' testimony as follows: "I gather that you are all 
agreed there should be no Official Secrets Act or the equivalent thereof, and that our Constitution 
simply doesn't allow it, for openers." Ibid., at 5420. 

>can by 


Therefore, the only real enforcement of classification is sanctioning those who depend on access 
to secrets 101 , such as Congress. Congress can be, and has been, cither cut off from classified 
information or convinced to receive secrets selectively. 

That is only the beginning of classification problems. 

The law says that there are to be only three categories of classification: top secret, secret, 
and confidential. 102 In spite of this, intelligence agencies spawn all sorts of higher" 
classification, such as "code word" or "compartment" categories. 102 Just as often, information 
is simply withheld from Congress under ad hoc arrangements. This Committee was frequently 
told that, whereas its mandate was legal authority to receive classified information, that was not 
enough. 104 

1. Oaths and agreements 

The first matter of business between the CIA and the Committee was a request by the 
Agency that all of the staff be required to sign six pages of CIA oaths. 

These elaborate oaths stipulated, in effect, acceptable conduct for Congressional 

101 In the course of the investigation, one official reminded Committee staff of an anecdote 
involving President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. During one of their visits, President 
Kennedy apparently asked the Russian leader about a Soviet citizen who had been sentenced to 
23 years for running naked through Red Square shouting, The Party leader is a moron." 
Chairman Khrushchev allegedly replied, "He got one year for indecent exposure, two years for 
insulting the Chairman, and twenty years for revealing a state secret." 

102 The classification categories and criteria used by the executive branch are defined in 
Section 1 of Executive Order 11652, as follows: 

"SECTION 1. Security Classification Categories. Official information or material which 
requires protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national defense of foreign 
relations of the United States (hereinafter collectively termed "national security") shall be classified 
in one of three categories, namely Top Secret," "Secret," or "Confidential," depending on the 
degree of its significance to national security. No other categories shall be used to identify official 
information or materials as requiring protection in the interest of national security, except as 
otherwise expressly provided by statute." Executive Order 1 1652, See. 1, Fed. Reg., Vol 37, No. 
48 (March 10, 1972). 

103 For the CIA's explanation and justification of the compartmentation system, See, note 
| J, and accompanying text. 

104 "Since, however, the issue of compartmented clearances had not been resolved with 
respect to all of your staff, our ability to discuss some details was somewhat inhibited." Letter to 
Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA, July 28, 1975. 

employees with respect to things CIA had determined were secret. 10 '' Without oaths, secrets 
would not be forthcoming. The staff represents, of course, Committee members, but the 
members were not asked to sign oaths. Perhaps this was because members would not do 
anything untoward with secrets. More likely, it was because they would protest loudly about 
signing Executive oaths. 

The Committee reminded CIA that subjecting our employees to Executive oaths would 
violate the concept that Congress is an independent and co-equal branch of government. 

It is the Constitutional responsibility of Congress to control its own staff 106 , and this 
is the course the Committee followed. It required every employee to sign a statement, drafted by 
the Committee, reflecting the needs and considerations of the Congress, and enforced by 
Congress. 107 This may seem like so much posturing; but it is important not to underestimate 
the significance of firmly establishing the premise that a target of an investigation does not lay 
down ground rules. As the Agency noted, this has not been the case in the past; and it may be 

105 These oaths were variously titled: 

"Central Intelligence Agency, Communication Intelligence Indoctrination; 

"Oath of Secrecy; 

"Indoctrination and Secrecy Oath; 

"Security Indoctrination and Secrecy Agreement; and 

"Compartmented Intelligence Indoctrination." 

106 Article I, Section 5, U.S. Constitution. 

107 The following excerpts are from the agreement signed and honored by the members of 
the Committee's staff: 


"1. I have read House Resolution 591, 94th Congress, establishing the House Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and this Committee's Rules and Security Regulations. 

"2. I understand that as a condition of employment with the Committee I am required 
to, and hereby agree to, abide by House Resolution 591, 94th Congress, and by the Committee's 
Rules and Security Regulations. 

"4. I further agree that I will not divulge to any unauthorized person in any way, form, 
shape or manner the contents of classified information received or obtained pursuant to House 
Resolution 591, 94th Congress. I understand that it is my responsibility to ascertain whether 
information so received or obtained is classified. I further understand and agree that the 
obligations hereby placed on me by this paragraph continue after my employment with the 
Committee has terminated." Employment Agreement, Sel. Comm, on Intel!., 94th Congress, 1st 
Session (1975). 

scan by 


one of the reasons this investigation had become necessary. 

The next move was to require the Committee to enter into agreements. 

The proposed agreements outlined certain categories of information so sensitive that the 
Committee was to agree in advance not to see them. When this was rejected, a modified version 
of those agreements set forth proposed rules and regulations the Committee would abide by if 
certain classified information were to be made available. 109 These agreements also included a 
proposal to "compartment" our staff. 1 10 Compartmenting would mean dividing them up and 
restricting their access to each other's work. 

The Committee refused to sign. It refused even to agree, as a matter of "understanding," 
that Executive rules would be binding. Such proposed understandings included allowing 
intelligence officials to review the notes of investigators before notes could be brought back to 

108 As the Chairman expressed it to Mr. Rex Lee of the Justice Department: "It means the 
Executive Branch comes up and whispers in one friendly Congressman's ear or another friendly 
Congressman's ear, and this is exactly what you want to continue, and that is exactly what I 
think has led us into the mess we are in." Comm Hearings, at | |, Sept. 12, 1975. 

109 "c. The compartmentation procedures of the Intelligence Community have been 
established pursuant to statute and National Security Council Intelligence Directives. The 
simplest way for the staff to obtain access to this compartmentcd material would be to accept the 
normal secrecy arrangements as modified in the enclosed. This would ensure against difficulties in 
access to such compartmented material throughout the Intelligence Community." Letter to 
Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA, July 28, 1975. 

110 See, note [ ), and accompanying text. The specific suggestion came in a letter to the 
Chairman: "The security principle of 'compartmentation' involving special access and 
information dissemination controls is designed to ensure that only those individuals whose need 
to know' have been specifically approved by some higher authority, who have been specially 
indoctrinated, and who undertake special commitments to protect it are provided access to a 
particularly sensitive category of foreign intelligence sources and methods. Compartmentation 
assists in the application of the 'need-to-know' principle by ensuring that individuals are provided 
access to only that information clearly essential to the performance of their duties. 

"For your information, in addition to the Senate Select Committee's use of the modified 
secrecy oath dealing with compartmented access, the following I louse and Senate committees 
have obtained compartmented access for their staff, which was granted after the normal briefings 
and signing of the secrecy oath: 

"Armed Services Committee 
"Appropriations Committee 
"Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee" 

Letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA, July 28, 1975. 


Committee offices. Other committees have consistently been subjected to that arrangement. 111 

The FBI proposal was even more restrictive than CIA's. Secret documents would be 
made available in special rooms at the FBI, with FBI monitors present. Notes would be 
reviewed by FBI agents. After notes had been appropriately sanitized, thev would be sent to our 
offices. 112 

Once again, the Committee refused to sign. It did agree orally to put all future requests 
for documents in writing. The repercussions of this oral agreement illustrate quite nicely the 
problem with agreement. A few days later the Committee received a letter from the Justice 
Department stating that requests for materials that had been made a month earlier by Committee 
members in public hearings had not been fulfilled. Even though FBI officials had publicly agreed 
to furnish the documents promptly, the requests had not been "in writing." 1 11 

While the Committee was negotiating an end to the cut-off from classified information, 

The CIA has also informed this Committee that all other Congressional committees leave 
their personal notes at Agency headquarters. 

112 "(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room 4171 to those 
materials requested: 

"(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined by the Attorney 
General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelligence sources of peculiarly 
sensitive ongoing foreign intelligence operations. 

"(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the identities of so-called "live" 
informants or potential informants as defined in the FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no 
access will be furnished unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential 
informant has already been made known to the Committee. . . . 

(a) Before the copies of . . . materials are taken to the Committee's offices, the Bureau 
shall, within 24 hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of information 
which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive FBI sources or sensitive ongoing 

The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened materials only if such notes are 
reviewed and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of (6) (a) thru (c) above." Procedures, 
submitted by the Department of Justice, to the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Aug. 19, 

You will recall that the Committee agreed to put all requests for materials, documents, 
information, and briefings in writing. 

To date the Department has not received written requests which encompass all of the 
oral requests which were made by the different Committee members during the testimony of 
Messrs. Pommcrening and Walsh before the Committee on August 7, 1975. Letter to Mr. Field, 
from Mr. Steven Blackhurst, Assistant Special Counsel, Department of Justice, Aug. 21, 1975. 



another agreement for handling secrets was proposed by the Executive. The Committee was 
asked to agree that certain categories of information be inaccessible.' 14 Other categories would 
be available only to senior members, by means of selective briefings. 1 15 Again, it was not 
agreed to. 116 

2. Selective briefings 

Soon after the opening hearings, staff began investigating a high-risk, secret program. A 
request was made to interview the official in charge of the program. T he interview was granted, 
but the official refused to talk about the program. lie sat with a thick book of documents, but he 
refused to let any documents be reviewed. They were "too secret." 

Intelligence officials made a proposal the Committee would hear again and again. The 
Chairman and perhaps the ranking minority Member could be briefed on the program.” 7 In 

114 "1. Identities of secret agents, source and persons and organizations involved in 
operations which, if disclosed, would be subject to personal physical danger, or to extreme 
harassment, or to economic or other reprisals, as well as material provided confidentially by 
cooperating foreign intelligence services; diplomatic exchanges or other material the disclosure of 
which would be embarrassing to foreign governments and damaging to the foreign relations of the 
United States; and 

"2. Specific details of sensitive intelligence methods and techniques of collection. 

"Verification procedures will continue to be available in case of Committee questions 
concerning matters deleted by the Executive agency. 

"Other matters, the complete confidentiality of which the President personally certifies is 
essential to the effective discharge of Presidential powers, may be withheld." Draft Agreement, 
submitted to the Committee, Sept. 28, 1975. 

115 This refers to the verification procedures. Ibid. See, interview with .1. Marsh, by A. 
Donner, Sept. 28, 1975, copy on file with Select Committee on Intelligence. 

1,6 Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Sept. 29, 1975. 

1 17 This request was a constant problem as illustrated by the Chairman's remarks with 
reference to subpoenaed Forty Committee materials: 

"Chairman PIKE. It has been indicated to me that I would be permitted to go down and 
look at these documents. That is not satisfactory to me. We subpoenaed these documents for 
the Committee. One of the difficulties which my predecessor had was that he was in possession 
of information which the rest of the Committee did not have. This Chairman has made it clear 
from the outset that when we subpoena documents for the Committee and when there is 
information which the Committee feels it is essential that the Committee have, 1 am not going to 
look at the information and deprive the rest of the Committee of it." Comm Hearings, at [ J, 
Nov. 14, 1975. 


light of the fact that the Committee had been told that clearances or secrecy categories would not 
be used to block the staff's work, it protested. When the Chairman refused to be briefed alone, 
intelligence officials relented and allowed staff to have access to the information, so long as the 
Chairman was briefed first. 

A second example illustrates the problem with selective briefings. The Committee 
inquired into a project that included foreign military assistance via the CIA. It was "too sensitive" 
to discuss with staff. Once again, intelligence officials asked to brief the Chairman and senior 

The full Committee and staff were briefed, and the consensus was that the project had 
turned out to be one of the more outrageous ventures by CIA. Some months later, this same 
project was the subject of a Committee action to ask the President that the full story be made 

A recent CIA operation in Africa followed the same awkward course of senior Member 
and senior staff briefings first, then full and prompt disclosure to the Committee. This 
Committee consistently maintained this policy that everything told to senior members was 
promptly told to the full Committee. 1 18 If Congress wanted a one- or two-man Committee, it 
had every opportunity to set one up. It has not done so to date. Preventing this from happening 
de facto was, and is, a serious challenge. 1 19 

1 18 . 

"Chairman PIKE. I have two problems with that verification situation. 

'We have had this situation time and time again in the House of Representatives where 
the members of a committee, and the members of the House are asked to trust the discretion of 
the Chairman, or of the Chairman and the ranking Member. 

"I have a great deal of problem with the concept that I should be privy to information 
which is withheld from the rest of the Committee. That is No. 1." Comm. Hearings, at [ ], 

Sept. 20, 1975. 

1 19 Intelligence agencies are constantly maneuvering to keep information from Congress: 




TOPICS DISCUSSED. Senator Jackson's advice to us was as follows: 

"1. Senator Jackson felt strongly that the first order of business for CIA in terms of 
handling the basic issues that were involved in the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on 
Multinational Corporations asking the Agency about its activities in Chile in 1970, was to discuss 
the problem with the White House. (Jackson) was quite explicit that this conversation should be 
carried out by Schlessinger and that he should talk with no one other than President Nixon and 
Mr. Halderman (sic). The Senator stressed repeatedly that the Church Subcommittee on 
Multinational Corporations had focused on ITT only in the sense that this was the top of the 

"2. Senator Jackson felt that the ultimate solution to the problem facing the 

scan by 

3. Special restrictions 

Committee Members are not the only object of secrecy anangMTients proposriby 
intelligence officials. Other Members of Congress apparently cannot be trusted with secret 

be difficult to turn over documents because 

of Rule 11. Rule 1 1 is a House rule that allows Members of the House of Representatives 
have access to all "committee hearings, records, data, charts, and tiles • • • 

Despite Committee rules protecting against dissemination of materials to othe ^ Member , 
the Committee was asked to sign letters affirming that it would not turn over documen s to 
Ither^r of the House. The Committee was eventually asked to pass a Resohffion to 
that effect Sometimes this acted to delay the forwarding of documents. I he primary result was 
22 rr^st materials the Committee received in the closing months of its investigations were on 

A cenc v could be found in getting Senator McClellan, acting on behalf of Senator Stenms to call 
a session of the CIA Oversight Committee. This committee would handle thc^Foreign Rektions 
Committee Senator Jackson repeatedly made the comment that in his view the CIA Oversigh 
Committee had the responsibility of protecting the Agency in the type of situation that was 
tot in the Church P Subcommittee. As a result of this conviction, Senator Jackson would 

work with the Agency to see that we got this protection... . . rIA , 

"4 Once the Oversight Committee had heard the details provided on the CIA s 
involvement, 'the Agency could send a brief statement to the Church Subcommittee staff 
members in response to the questions which they had previously posed to U/L Senator Jackson 

agreed that the following statement would be perfectly adequate for this purpose^ 

agreed «1^e folio ^ ^ ^ on , „„ 7 Pebruao . before, he Seoa.orPore^ReUuohs 

Committee clearly established that CIA neither gave to nor received from II 1 funds for use “J 
Chile in 1970 for support of pohtical parties. In addition, Mr. Helms ^ test *^^,1 
fact that there were no joint action programs established in the context of th p 

developments in Chile. CIA regards Mr. Helms testimony on this topic to be accurate, thus, n 

further Senator j ac kson was extremely helpful throughout 23 lebruary on the 

issue of the AgencyTproblems with the Church Subcommittee. Senator Jackson is convinced 
that it Is essenUal that the procedure not be established whereby CIA can be called upon to testify 
before a wide range of Congressional committees. 

120 Soecificallv House Rule XI(2) (e) (2) provides that: 

"M committee hearings, records, data, charts, and files shall be ke P t f e P^^^ dl ^ Ct 
from the congressional office records of the Member serving as chairman of the committee, and 
such records fhall be the property of the House and all Members of the House shall have access 

thereto. ^ ^ nQf the legislative history of its enactment suggests that the House 

intended any distinction between such records generally and records which contain sensitive 
information, whether or not so classified under executive order. 


loan.' 121 

The concept of loaning materials to the Committee had other advantages for the 
intelligence community. 

The first advantage was the right to possession and control of final disposition of our 
files. Without a loan arrangement, staff was told that certain papers could not be provided. 

The other advantage in loaning documents pertained to a possible court contest over 
release of classified information. If release of a document were going to be legally disputed, the 
Executive clearly wanted to be in the position of having legal possession of that document. 
Unfortunately, release or publication of Committee information raised far more immediate, and 
practical, problems. 

4. The release of information 

One of the most troubling problems the Committee faced was what information to 
release and what process to follow in making its decision. A corollary problem was what to do 
about unauthorized release of information. 

Existing standards for classifications are vague, arbitrary, and overused. Almost anything 
can be a 'source" or "method" of intelligence-which are the primary criteria for foreign 
intelligence classifications. 122 As a result, the sources or methods by-line is used to classify 
items that have practically no bearing at all on intelligence, but arc extremely embarrassing. 122 

Overuse of classifications is inevitable when, by the Executive's most recent estimate, 
some 15,466 persons can classify information. 124 

The difficulty is that no one in Congress can de-classify. The E’xccutive Branch claims exclusive 

j 2 1 

The standard caveat, which accompanied all materials turned over to the Committee, was 
adopted from a letter of Sept. 30, 1975: 

"This is forwarded on loan with the understanding that there will be no public disclosure 
of this classified material (nor of testimony, depositions or interviews concerning it) without a 
reasonable opportunity for us to consult with respect to it." letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr 
Colby, CIA, Sept. 30, 1975. 

1 O') 

This standard comes from the National Security Act of 1947. See, note 29. 

123 A typical example was the CIA refusal, at first, to declassify part of the 1973 Mid-East 
War Post-Mortem. That position produced the following exchange with the CIA Special 

Chairman PIKE. Mr. Rogovin, I find, as I look at what has been deleted and what has 
been omitted and what has been retained and read, differs not as to sources and methods, not as 
to the necessity of protecting the sensitivity of stuff, but whether it is in fact self-serving, or 
whether it is in fact rather damaging-' Comm. Hearings, at | ], Sept. 11, 1975. 

This estimate was provided to the Committee by the Interagency Classification Review 
Committee, which was established by President Nixon in Executive Order 1 1652, which also 
established the security classification system now in force in the executive branch. 



and sole jurisdiction. This gives an administration the power to use the classification system in a 
manner than can result in manipulation of news by declassifying information that can be used to 
justify policy, while maintaining classification of information that may lead to contrary 
conclusions. Another aspect to be recognized is that classification can hide conduct from the 
American people that is well-known to the foreign country involved. Castro knew of the 
assassination attempts, the Cambodians knew they were being bombed, but the American people, 
whose government was engaging in these practices, were not aware of the activities because of the 
classification system. 

The dilemma arises when a Congressman or Committee receives information which one 
or the other decides should be brought before the people they represent. This Committee faced 
that problem and did not reach a satisfactory solution. 

The procedure followed by the Committee was that when it was decided to consider 
making public certain information taken directly from classified documents or testimony, it would 
give appropriate executive branch officials 48 hours notice. It would then allow those officials to 
appear before the Committee, in closed session, and present arguments against release of all or 
part of the information. If no agreement could be reached, the materials at issue would be 
forwarded to the President. They would be released unless the President asserted, personally and 
in writing, that release would be "detrimental to the national security." 

The Committee used this process with three separate pieces of information. All three 
were covert CIA projects. Their release was proposed in separate motions placed before the 
Committee by Congressman Johnson. 

The initial Johnson motions were introduced in November 1975, and voted down by the 
Committee, with five Members not present. Some weeks later, the motions were made again, 
with all but one Member present, and approved by the majority. 1 this began the release of 
information process. 

The next step was to draft a short statement outlining the significant aspects of each 
covert operation. 128 The statements were forwarded to the Special Counsel to the Director of 
Central Intelligence, with an accompanying letter notifying him of an opportunity to present the 
Intelligence Community's views in a hearing three days later. 129 I he Director of Central 

125 Release procedures are the subject of Committee recommendations. .See, part III. [n.b. 
not included.] 

126 "In the event of disagreement, the matter will be referred to the President. If the President 
then certifies in writing that the disclosure of the material would be detrimental to the national 
security of the United States, the matter will not be disclosed by the Committee, except that the 
Committee would reserve its right to submit the matter to judicial determination." Letter to 
Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA, Sept. 30, 1975. 

127 The votes were 10-2, 10-2, and 10-2. 

128 The shortest statement was two pages; the longest was 14 pages. 

129 Letter to Mr. Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel, DCI, from Mr. field, Dec. 15, 1975. 





Intelligence, Mr. Colby, appeared, accompanied by appropriate officials, to present any specific 
objections he might have. His response was specific, but sweeping. I Ie objected to everything, 
no matter how it was worded, and no matter how impossible it would be to identify a country, a 
source, or an operational method. 130 

Mr. Colby's responses seemed to end any good faith efforts to work out mutually 
acceptable release of information, but the Committee made one more effort. The three 
statements were rewritten, making them even more general than before. Names of countries were 
taken out; only gross dollar totals were used; and innumerable generic descriptions were inserted. 
In one case, far less remained than had appeared in newspaper articles attributed to high executive 
branch officials. 

In a hearing the next day, Mr. Colby still objected to the release of anything . 131 Two 
of the three statements were approved by the Committee for release. 

This meant that all the materials had to be forwarded to the President for a decision on 
whether release would be detrimental to the national security. The President, of course, turned to 
CIA for guidance. 

More than three weeks later, the Chairman was informed in writing by the President that 
the Committee could not implement its decision to release the two statements. 132 

Incredibly, the President's letter was classified "secret." The secret stamp was 
unnecessary, because there were no facts at all about the covert projects in his letter. The types 
of projects at issue were not even mentioned. The letter was simply a rhetorical pronouncement 
of how important confidentiality is, and how telling the American people what their government 
is doing in these matters would harm our best interests. 

It should be noted that one of the items which allegedly would harm this nation's 
security if made public had already been made public — by Dr. Kissinger. 133 

130 "Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, we have several difficulties with this report. We looked 
through it. We tried to identify what things might be released and what things might not. There 
are a few odd sentences that might be released." Comm. Hearings, at [ ), Dec. 18, 1975. 

131 "Mr. NELSON. ... I consulted with the Director. It is his position that he would object 
to the declassification of either of these papers as I described them to him over the phone." 

Comm. Hearings, at [ J, Dec. 19, 1975. 

132 Letter to Chairman Pike, from President Ford, Jan. 15, 1975. 

133 Tokyo-U..S. assistance prevented a takeover by Soviet-backed elements in Angola in 
July, a senior official aboard U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's plane said en route to 
Tokyo yesterday." Washington Post, A-17, Dec. 8, 1975. 

This was the first administration acknowledgment of U.S. involvement in Angola. 

"Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's admission that the United States is trying to be 
helpful to some neighbors of strife-torn Angola is a surprise only because Kissinger has openly 
acknowledged it." Jeremiah O'Leary, "U.S. Admits Indirect Aid to Angola," Washington Star, A- 
4, Dec. 10, 1975. 

scan by 




No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement and Account of the 
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to 

Art. /, Sec. 9, cl. vii, U.S. Constitution. 

Money and spending were the first topics of Committee hearings. This choice of a 
beginning was founded on Constitutional responsibilities, and it implemented a straightforward 
investigative technique -- by following the dollars, the Committee would locate activities and 
priorities of our intelligence services. 

The inquiry was fruitful and interesting. By the time it was over, General Accounting 
Office accountants on loan to the Committee had concluded that the foreign intelligence budget is 
three to four times more costly than Congress has been told. 1,4 An Office of Management 
and Budget review of the domestic intelligence budget, conducted at the Committee's 
request 1 , concluded that it may be five times the estimate given to Congress by federal 

Totals do not tell the whole story. Congressional and Executive scrutiny of these budgets 
was found to range somewhere between cursory and non-existent. Spending controls by the 
agencies themselves were, likewise, often inadequate, as a few preliminary examples indicate. 

* A CIA Station in a small country spent $4 1 ,000 on liquor, in one year. 

* Taxpayer monies were spent to provide heads of state with female companions, and to 
pay people with questionable reputations to make pornographic movies 146 for blackmail. 

* The "accommodation procurement" mechanism was used to buy limousines for foreign 

134 A special study done in 1971 by Dr. Schlesinger, as head of OMB, concluded that the 
foreign intelligence budget was nearly double the amount being told to Congress at that time. 

See, A Review of the Intelligence Community, OMB (March 10, 1971.) 

135 See, note [ ]. 

136 One of these was titled "Happy Days," with Mr. Robert Maheu as casting director, make- 
up man, cameraman and director. 


dignitaries, with cash payments that were difficult to verify. 

* A huge arsenal of weapons and access to ammunition lias been developed by CIA, 
giving it a capability that exceeds most armies of the world. 

* A middle-man who is a close friend of top FBI officials tacked thousands, if not 
millions, of dollars of unwarranted mark-ups on to covert purchases. 

These examples reflect the wide range of problems with secret financing of secret 
activities. A more detailed review of these and other examples, along with the basic processes or 
mechanisms that accompany them, is a good base for suggested reforms. 

1. Deceptive budgets 

Much attention is paid to numbers when the foreign and domestic intelligence budgets 
are prepared. Not much attention is paid to substance. 

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Director of Central Intelligence 
(DCI), and other officials go through an elaborate process in arriving at budget numbers. As 
described to Congress, it is an impressive procedure. 137 

What is not described is the close, almost in-bred relationship between OMB officials and 
intelligence budgetmakers. OMB also does not point out that it completely lacks the expertise to 
evaluate huge technological expenditures by the National Security Agency. 

Executive officials do not stress the lack of a centralized budget authority in the 
intelligence services, which causes enormous waste, duplication, and hidden costs in military 
intelligence. There is little consideration given to the extraordinary spending latitude granted to 
CIA, or to CIA's heavy use of "unvouchered" funds. There is no explanation from FBI of the 
reasons for millions of dollars of "confidential" purchases. 

When appearing before Congress, executive branch officials do not review the 
inadequacies of internal Agency auditors. No mention is made of items transferred elsewhere in 
the federal budget to keep the intelligence budget small. 

These officials do not remind Congress that our government's auditors, the General 
Accounting Office, have been denied access to secret intelligence budgets for more than a decade. 
They do not explain abuses of covert purchasing mechanisms, domestic as well as foreign. 138 

1 17 • 

William Colby, in testimony before the Committee on August 4, 1975, described how 
each agency in the foreign intelligence community develops its own intelligence program budget. 
Then a unified national foreign intelligence program (NFIP) budget is submitted to the Office of 
Management and Budget for detailed review prior to inclusion in the President's overall Federal 
budget. Budgetary items are not readily identifiable as part of the NFIP but arc generally 
included in the budget submission by the agency responsible for parts of the NFIP (primarily the 
Department of Defense). The Director of Central Intelligence represents the intelligence 
community in hearings by subcommittees of the Congressional committees on Appropriations, 
Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs; the DCI also testifies separately for CIA's portion of the 


All these problems are discussed in greater detail in the following sections. 

scan by 


These same officials do, however, stress that anything they can or will say must be kept a 
secret. 139 

All this adds up to more than $10 billion being spent by a handful of people, with little 
independent supervision, with inadequate controls, even less auditing, and an overabundance of 

It begins with OMB officials and their counterparts in the various agencies. Testimony 
before this Committee revealed that only six OMB employees work full-time on the foreign 
intelligence budget. 140 Of those six, three are former CIA employees. 141 In turn, the CIA 
official in charge of the Agency's budget has recently arrived from OMB, where he had primary 
responsibility for CIA's budget. 142 

This, in itself, does not bode well for a vigorous review of the merits of intelligence 
programs. It is set back further by the fact that OMB is not told of sensitive projects as they are 
being planned. 143 Even after it is told, OMB's officials are not free to evaluate all details of 
sensitive projects. 144 

The absence of real involvement by outsiders in intelligence spending continues. 

For example, CIA's budget appears as only a single line item in the published Federal 
budget. This is done in the name of secrecy, but it gives CIA an unusual advantage. Congress 

139 See, note | ], and accompanying text. 

140 Prepared statement of James Lynn, Director of OMB, before the Committee, Aug. 1, 

'...Under Mr. Ogilvie, this unit (OMB National Security Division), consisting of a branch 
chief and five professional examiners, reviews the budgets of the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and those intelligence activities of the 
Army, Navy and Air Force that bear most directly on U.S. intelligence capabilities." Co mm . 
Hearings at [ ], Aug. 1, 1975. 

"MR. K.ASTEN. On another subject, it is my understanding ... that basically five 
individuals at OMB do day-to-day work on the foreign intelligence budget. 

"MR. LYNN. Six." Ibid., at | ]. 

141 "MR. DELLUMS. Is it a fact that of the six or so employees assigned to the Intelligence 
Community Branch that three are former CIA agents and at least two have at least ten years 

"MR. LYNN. I believe that is true, sir." Ibid., at [ |. 

142 This fact was verified in a staff interview with the Deputy Comptroller of CIA, on July 
25, 1975. 

143 The Director of OMB, Mr. Lynn, pointed this out in his testimony of August 1, 1975. 

His point is reiterated in a Top Secret letter dated October 10, 1975, from Donald G. Ogilvie to 
the Committee. 

144 Ibid. 


requires any agency wishing to transfer funds from one line item to another to come back to 
Congress for approval. 145 

This is called reprogramming. Most agencies have many line items, giving Congress 
some check on their spending. CIA has had no reprogramming problems in the past. 14 ® It 
could tell Congress it was spending a certain amount on covert action, then proceed to transfer 
large amounts to covert programs without Congress' approval. 147 

This is not, however, the most significant lack of knowledge about intelligence spending. 
Billions of dollars spent every year for intelligence are not included in the "official" intelligence 

One way this has been accomplished has been by shifting items that have traditionally 
appeared in the intelligence budget into other budget categories. For example, the Department of 
Defense has switched the following items, by reclassifying them as "communications": 
Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities; Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy; and the 
Advance Location Strike Program. A sizeable secret reconnaissance activity at Defense was 
switched to research and development.' All of the activities and many more were, until recently, 








1 MR. FIELD. As I understand it the way the appropriation process works, an agency or 
department has line items and they cannot shift money between line items without approval of 
Congress or OMB. 

The CIA is somewhat unique because they have one line item. Now, how do you 
check when they shift funds between the programs? They have come to Congress, we have 
appropriated funds on the basis of the programs they have laid out. When they want to shift 
fiinds now between lets say covert action and analysis, do they report to you? Do they have 
some understanding with you as to how that will be handled? 

"MR. OGILVIE. We are generally aware, Mr. Field, that they arc not required to 
formally report it." Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Aug. 1, 1975. 

MR. FIELD. ...Isn't it a fact in the last few years the CIA has shifted literally milli ons 
of dollars in one case between programs and OMB has not found out about it until after the fact? 

MR. OGILVIE. Mr. Field, that may well have happened. It happens frequently in the 
Defense Department." Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Aug. 1, 1975. 

MR. ASPIN. For the record again, tell us who has to approve reprogramming, who is 
! informed, and who approves reprogramming? 

"MR. COLBY. Ido. 

"MR. ASPIN. And that is all? 

"MR. COLBY. Yes. 

"MR. ASPIN. So there is no OMB or Congressional approval? 

MR. COLBY. They follow it. You will recall I mentioned our monthly comptroller's 
meeting. That is where reprogramming takes place or is suggested. If there is some question 
5 about it, I will look into it ..." Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Aug. 4, 1975. 

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in Defense's intelligence budget. 148 

Defense is not alone in using this tactic. 

The costs given Congress for military intelligence do not include expenditures for tactical 
military intelligence, which would approximately double intelligence budgets for the three armed 
services. 149 Roughly 20 percent of the National Security Agency's budget is not added into 

148 In total, the transfer of these programs from the "intelligence" portion of DOD's budget 
to "communications" and "Research & Development" by themselves involved hundreds of 
millions of dollars and thousands of personnel. 

149 Some costs for military /tactical activities are disclosed to Congressional Committees in 
chart form, entitled "Intelligence Related." However, after examination, the staff believes that the 
charts vastly understate the costs of military/tactical intelligence activities. 

Examples of types of programs found throughout the Department of Defense's budget, 
which should be included in whole or in part in calculating costs of military /tactical activities 

1 . Surveillance Radar Station/Sites under Strategic Forces; 

2. Under General Purposes Forces: 

Ship Towed Array Surveillance System 
SIGINT (Signals Intelligence Tactical Support) 

Tactical Intelligence Processing 
USMS Photo Reconnaissance 

3. Under Guard and Reserve Forces: 

Reconnaissance Squadrons (R F 8-Gs) 

ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) Centers 

4. Under Research and Development: 

Nuclear Monitoring Research 
Nuclear Vulnerability and Assessment 
Nuclear Surveillance and Survey 
Evaluation of Foreign Components 
Foreign Weapons Evaluation 
Technology Assessments 
Surveillance Towed Array 
Towed Array Sensors 
Advanced Detection System 
Reconnaissance, E. W. Equipment 
Acoustic Search Sensors 
Tactical Surveillance Systems 
Net Technical Assessments 
Moored Surveillance Systems 

Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance 


the intelligence budget. 150 It should be noted that NSA does nothing else except gather and 
analyze technical intelligence, and it has one of the largest budgets in the intelligence community. 

Sometimes entire agencies, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, are 
completely omitted from estimates of intelligence-related costs as well as the intelligence 
budget. 15 ' 

The budget for the National Security Council is omitted completely, although a sizeable 
portion of their staff and subcommittees work exclusively on intelligence matters. 152 

Still another technique is undervaluation of the real cost of certain operations. The 
Committee analyzed one covert operation and found that the dollar amounts given by CIA for 
weapons supplied were about half of the Defense Department's contract prices. 153 

At the Committee's request, OMB did add up the total cost for all federal domestic 
intelligence, for the first time ever. The total they came up with was more than five times the 
amount that had been given to the Committee in testimony by domestic intelligence 
officials. 1 54 The FBI, for example, had neglected to include such clear intelligence functions as 

The part of NSA's budget excluded dealt with code-breaking and cryptologic equipment 
costs. These costs, when combined with the Navy, Army, and Air Force comparable costs, 
amount to more than 10 percent of the Defense Department's budget being excluded from 





In reviewing the DoD's budget, the staff noted that certain activities of the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) were intelligence or intelligence-related. Nowhere 
in the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program could the staff find evidence that any DARPA 
intelligence or intelligence-related activities were included. 

Staff discussions with DARPA, CIA, and other DoD representatives revealed that a 
substantial portion of DARPA's efforts are intelligence or intelligence-related, and were included 
in the staffs calculation in arriving at the total cost of intelligence. 


Examples of this would be the Forty Committee whose sole task is to approve covert 
action projects, or the Verification Panel and its Restricted Working Group who verify 
intelligence indicating alleged Soviet violations of SALT. 

153 See, notes [ ], and accompanying text. 

154 Letter to Staff Director, from Mr. Ogilvie, OMB, Nov. 12, 1975: 

FY76 except as noted 

"Department of Justice 

$ in K 


Deputy Attorney General's Office 



Federal Bureau of Investigation 



Drug Enforcement Administration 

1 1,913 


Immunization & Naturalization Service 



Criminal Division 





scan by 


the National Bomb Data Center, or Counterintelligence. 155 More significantly, there had 
never been an attempt to add up all the divergent intelligence operations in the federal 

By using the new OMB figures for domestic intelligence, and by adding such items as 
transferred expenditures, the full NSA budget, and revalued cost figures, the Committee estimated 
that the cost of intelligence today is at least three to four times the amount reported to Congress. 

An obvious question is how can there be such a difference in total cost estimates? One 
answer is the lack of coordination in approaching the budget. Another is that there are no 
adequate standards for what is, and is not, intelligence spending. A final answer may be that 
there is a conscious desire to keep the totals small, by dividing and confusing the estimates. 

It should be obvious that if nobody has ever added up the costs of the many domestic 
intelligence units, then certainly nobody is coordinating their budgets, as intelligence per se. In 
foreign intelligence, the problem is, to a large degree, a lack of centralized authority. For 
example, the DCI presents the entire foreign intelligence budget to Congress and the President, 

Civil Service Commission 

National Agency Check & Inquiry 



Full Field Investigations 



Other Investigations 





Department of Treasury 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms 



Customs Service 



Internal Revenue Service 

Intelligence Division 



Internal Security (Inspection) 



Secret Service 










Energy Research & Development 







*1975 costs 

155 Testimony on Aug. 7, 1975 by Eugene W. Walsh, Assistant Director, Administrative 
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

"MR. FIELD. It sounds like that is all they are over there for and that it is a way of 
shifting the real cost of intelligence out of that budget. How about the National Bomb Data 

"MR. WALSH. Yes, sir. 

"MR. FIELD. That is intelligence? 

"MR. WALSH. It may be in the dictionary's definition, sir, but it is not in ours." 
Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Aug. 7, 1975. 


but he only has authority for CIA's budget. 156 Defense officials testified that a substantial part 
of their intelligence budget is considered the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. The DCI, 
they say, merely reviews their work. 157 

Fragmented authority leads to overall coordination problems. A good illustration is the 
existence of separate counterintelligence budgets in FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, Army, Navy, and Air 
Force 158 Some are included in the intelligence budget; some arc not. Some coordinate with 
other counterintelligence programs; some do not. The FBI testified, for example, that it does not 
know if CIA has a counterintelligence group, that it does not know how much CIA's operations 
cost, and that it does not know if CIA duplicates FBI's work. 159 

Fragmented authority and coordination leave the budget wide open to distortions. Each 
agency applies its own budget standards, particularly because there is no uniform standard. 

There is, for example, no standard for allocating the cost of a military base whose 
primary purpose is to support intelligence operations. The repair of a submarine damaged on 
intelligence duty may or may not be included in intelligence costs. The Committee asked OMB, 
GAO, and all the intelligence agencies for their standards for allocating support costs. No agency 

1 "...After consulting with the member agencies, I then provided to the President my 
independent assessment of the Intelligence Community resources requests, along with my overall 
recommendations for the National Foreign Intelligence Program. 

"My annual recommendations do not constitute a budget in the traditional sense, as I 
have statutory authority only for the CIA." 






1 "DR. HALL. ...the programs of our intelligence program, overall intelligence program, 
are responsible to the Secretary of Defense. All programs within our Department are reviewed by 
the Director of Central Intelligence so he reviews and sees all the programs that go on." Comm. 
Hearings, at [ ], Aug. 5, 1975. 

158 When Mr. Walsh appeared before the Committee on Aug. 7, 1975, he was asked if FBI 
was aware of the multitude of counterintelligence programs: 

"Are you aware that the CIA, the DIA, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and NSA, all 
have their counterintelligence programs? 

"MR. WALSH. I haven't acquainted myself with their programs, sir." Comm. Hearings, 
at [ ], Aug. 7, 1975. 

159 Mr. Walsh was also asked: "Do you know if the CIA spends more than you do? 

"MR. WALSH. I would certainly t hink so. 

"MR. FIELD. Has anybody in the administration ever told all of those people, who 
spend multi-multi-millions of dollars, over and over again— really on the same program— has 
anybody in the vernacular of my generation, told them to 'get their act together'? 

"MR. WALSH. I have no knowledge on that, no sir." Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Aug. 7, 

scan by 


had any to offer. 160 No agency had even a basic definition of intelligence. 

In a statement prepared for the Committee, the DCI made it clear that there are no good 
definitions 161 in use today. As he said, "...[I]n essence, it boils down to a judgment call." 

The Committee has compiled its own set of suggested guidelines. 1 In addition, a 
good first step would be to include the same items in the intelligence budget from one year to the 
next. This alone would have prevented the official intelligence budgets from remaining at 
constant levels over the past few years, which is fundamentally deceptive. 

160 Letter to Staff Director, from Mr. Donald Ogilvie, OMB, Sept. 15, 1975. Mr. Elmer 
Staats, Comptroller General, had the following suggestion: "... the Congress should make clear its 
interest in having the intelligence investment determined on a reasonable basis and reported to the 
Congress along with the rationale used in making the determination. As an example, if out of a 
force of 30 ships of a type two were normally deployed on intelligence missions, it would be 
reasonable when budgeting for a replacement ship to use 6 2/3 percent of the total cost in 
computing the amount of intelligence investment." Letter to Staff Director, from Mr. Staats, 

Nov. 10, 1975. 

161 Statement of Mr. Colby, before the Committee: "In summary, Mr. Chairman, I have 
tried to outline for you and your Committee the difficulties in defining intelligence, and thus, its 
costs. In essence, it boils down to a judgment call... Comm. Hearings, at | |, Nov. 20, 1975. 

162 Ibid. 

163 The Committee used three major classifications: 

1. Foreign/National - This intelligence relates to "national" programs (i.e. overhead 
reconnaissance) with various detection and sensing devices targeted against foreign countries. 
Intelligence of this nature is "national" in the sense that it is a concerted effort of the CIA, DOD 
components and State Department. 

a. National intelligence is intelligence bearing on the broad aspects of U.S. 
national policy and national security transcending the competence of a single agency to produce. 

2. Domestic Intelligence - This intelligence includes activities of civil departments and 
agencies such as DEA, IRS, FBI. It is conducted within the United States and directed at U.S. 

3. Military /Tactical -- Intelligence of this nature includes a variety of DoD activities to 
support military commanders ranging from detailed weapons performance assessments of our 
adversaries, to R & D projects for upgrading present radar early warning and ocean surveillance 
and patrol systems. 

a. Tactical intelligence is intelligence in support of military plans and operations 
at the military unit level. 

b. Strategic intelligence is intelligence in support of military plans and operations 
at national and international levels. 

sna n h v aurh i dd a nh i otn rv nrn 


2. An absence of accountability 

The General Accounting Office (GAO) is the auditing arm of Congress. When it comes 
to intelligence agencies, that arm is no arm at all. 

In its early years, GAO was generally limited to an auditing function. 164 With the 
passage of time, Congress has turned to GAO for more than balancing books. Today, under 
authority of law, 165 GAO is empowered to analyze the economy and efficiency with which 
government funds are spent. 

The Comptroller General, who heads GAO, testified that he cannot even balance CIA's 
books, let alone analyze its efficiency. 166 He testified that he has no idea how much money 
the United States spends on intelligence. 167 Specifically, he said that from 1962, GAO has 
made no attempt to audit the CIA, because it was allowed scant access to classified 
spending. 168 

164 GAO's early functions, as statutorily mandated, state: "Hxcept as otherwise specifically 
provided by law the financial transactions of each executive, legislative, and judicial agency, 
including but not limited to the accounts of accountable officers, shall be audited by the General 
Accounting Office in accordance with such principles and procedures and under such rules and 
regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States..." 31 U.S.C. 
§67 (a) (1973). 

165 31 U.S.C. §60 states: 'The Comptroller General is authorized and directed to make an 
expenditure analysis of each agency in the executive branch of the government (including 
Government corporations), which, in the opinion of the Comptroller General, will enable 
Congress to determine whether public funds have been economically and efficiently administered 
and expended." 

166 "On May 23, 1961, the Comptroller General wrote to the Chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee and the Director of CIA to restate the restrictions GAO experienced on the 
scope of its audit; he also restated the conclusion that no worthwhile audit activity could be 
conducted under the circumstances." Comm. Hearings, at [ ], July 31, 1975. This situation has 
not changed since 1961. 

167 "MR. STAATS. I should emphasize at this point that we cannot independently verify 
the accuracy of any estimates which may have been made as to the size of the intelligence 
community budgets. And, in any attempt to calculate an overall intelligence budget, there will 
always be judgmental issues over how to account for the cost of such things as submarines." 
Comm. Hearings, at [ ], July 31, 1975. 

1 (ill 

Mr. Staats made the following remarks in his opening statement before the Committee: 

"On May 16, 1961, the Comptroller General wrote the Subcommittee Chairman and the 
CIA director to express the view that, under existing security restrictions, GAO did not have 
sufficient access to information to make comprehensive reviews on a continuing basis that would 
be productive of evaluations helpful to the Congress and that, as a result, it planned to 


Last year, GAO was directed to compile basic budgetary information on federal 
investigative and intelligence functions. It was refused information by CIA, NSA, and intelligence 
agencies of the Defense Department. 169 In another recent instance, the FBI refused to permit 
GAO to examine case files. The Bureau offered special summaries, but refused to allow any 

• 1 7ft 

verification of those summaries. 

The Executive agencies' treatment of GAO is curious. In January 1966, the CIA entered 
into a sole-source contract with the management consulting firm of Peat, Marwick, Livingston & 
Co., for a total contract price of $55,725.00. CIA could have saved taxpayers some money, if it 
had given GAO access. 

CIA officials conceded that these independent consultants were given complete and free 
access to all classified procurement documents, as well as all personnel concerned with Agency 

discontinue audits of CIA activities. The GAO specifically related that, while access to overt 
activities of the Intelligence Component was reasonably good, its activities were not such as 
would be generally susceptible to productive audits. There was no access at all to the Plans 
Component. The overt and confidential activities of the Support Component were so integrated 
that a reasonably comprehensive audit could not be made. That same day, the Sub-committee 
Chairman discussed the contents of the May 16 letter with GAO staff; he expressed concern over 
plans to terminate audit activities at CIA." Comm. Hearings, at | |, July 31, 1975. 

(69 "Although we did obtain some data on State Department, Atomic Energy Commission, 
and some Defense Department intelligence activities, we were refused data by the Office of 
Management and Budget, for the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and 
certain other sensitive Defense intelligence activities. We were directed to the congressional 
intelligence oversight committees for this data." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Staats, GAO, 
July 31, 1975. 

no "Yhg Bureau was concerned that GAO's having free access to its domestic intelligence 
files could negatively affect its capability to develop informants and conduct intelligence 
investigations. Accordingly, a procedure was worked out whereby the Bureau prepared special 
summaries of the case files randomly selected by GAO for review. These Bureau-prepared 
summaries and follow-up interviews with appropriated personnel associated with the sample cases 
is providing information on how the Bureau's policies and procedures are carried out in domestic 
intelligence investigations. To ensure the accuracy of the summaries, however, we need to verify 
the inf ormation contained in the case summaries. 

"We proposed a verification procedure by which we would randomly select documents 
from the case files and insure that these documents were accurately reflected in the summaries. 
The Bureau could block out the names of its informants form the documents before giving them 
to us. However, the Attorney General and the Bureau's Director have not, to date, been willing 
to allow us access to these documents and have so notified the Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee; there fore our report to the Committee will be based largely on unverified data 
furnished by the Bureau." Ibid. 



procurement activities. 171 In June 1966, the firm completed its work and issued a full report 
of findings and recommendations. A cover memorandum addressed to the Inspector General 
expressed appreciation for the Agency's full cooperation. 

By contrast, this Committee's staff encountered lengthy delays in gaining limited access to 
similar documents and personnel, including the report of Peat, Marwick, I .ivingston & Co. 172 

The issue is not really whether Congress - with Constitutional responsibility for federal 
spending 173 - should have equal access with a private company. The issue is whether an 
objective look at secret expenditures ever takes place. 

It does not take place at OMB. GAO cannot look, T.vcn this Congressional 
investigating committee has tested access and come up wanting. 

Do intelligence agencies themselves adequately audit their own operations? No. 

The CIA is a good example. Their audit staff is undermanned for a comprehensive 
review of complex and extensive agency spending that takes place worldwide. 174 They are 
allowed to balance books, but they axe not always allowed to know the exact purpose of 

171 This fact was confirmed by Mr. Carl Duckett, CIA Deputy Director for Science and 
Technology; the CIA Deputy Director of Logistics; an official of the Office of the Director for 
Science and Technology; and an official from the CIA Review Staff. In the Final Report's 
prefacing Memorandum to the Inspector General, the firm stated:"Working closely with 
representatives of your staff, we have completed a study of Agency procurement 
organization... Our study could have been extremely complicated because of the necessary 
compartmental organization of the Agency. However, this was not the Case. We received 
excellent cooperation from all the Agency personnel who participated with us in the review or 
whose systems were being reviewed. Moreover, we found a general acceptance and enthusiasm 
for the need for assessment of the system... We wish to express our appreciation for the many 
courtesies extended to us during the study." Report, "Study of Agency Procurement Activities," 

[g Peat, Marwick, Livingston & Co. (1966). 

172 On September 16, 1975, the Committee staff requested that CIA furnish "any and all 
Inspector General Reports concerning CIA Covert or General Procurement" activities. The staff 
regularly inquired as to the status of this request. Five weeks later, the Committee was informed 
that the document (termed the "Livingston Report") was available for review at CIA 
headquarters. After reviewing the document, the staff requested that the Report be made 
available to the Committee's office. The request was denied. 

173 Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. vii, U.S. Constitution. 

174 In a committee staff interview on Aug. 4, 1975, Dr. John Clarke, recently retired 
Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and head of the Intelligence Community 
staff, said, "In today's world, the audit staff does not conduct an adequate, commercially sound 
audit." Interview with Dr. John Clarke, by E. Sheketoff, Aug. 4, 1975, copy on file with the Sel. 

S Comm, on Intell. 

scan by 


expenditures. 175 Only five percent of all vouchered transactions are checked, even though 
these add up to 20 percent of CIA's entire budget. 176 Substantive corroborating records are 
not kept. Their audits deviate from the standards of professional Certified Public Accountants, 
and CIA has not compiled a list of these exceptions to control the dcviances. 177 

These and other shortcomings in audit and control, for both foreign and domestic 
intelligence agencies, lead to an inevitable result - spending abuses. 

3. Spending abuses 

The easiest way to illustrate problems encountered in secret spending is to examine a 
number of mechanisms currently in use, and a number of situations that have grown out of those 

a. Covert Procurement 

Many CIA covert actions and clandestine operations must be supported in a "non- 
attributable" manner, which led CIA to establish a covert procurement branch. Unfortunately, 
covert procurement has become an over-used, expensive, and often uncontrollable technique for 
questionable purchasing. 

The branch's activities include support of overseas stations and the procurement of 
weapons and paramilitary materials. To facilitate these requirements, covert procurement has 
under its control a number of operational proprietaries 17 * and "notional" companies. Notional 
companies are merely paper firms, with appropriate stationary and checking accounts. These 
companies make requests to the proprietaries so the proprietary can bill an apparently legitimate 

175 Frank Quinn, the Chief of CIA's Audit Staff, said during a Committee staff interview on 
Aug. 4, 1975 that, "The auditors do not always know the exact purpose of expenditure of funds." 
Interview with F. Quinn, by E. Sheketoff, Aug. 4, 1975, copy on file with Scl. Comm, on Intell. 

176 Frank Quinn also said, 'The purpose of the audits is to minimize potential fraud. In this 
way, they can test if controls are in effect and working. About 5% of all voucher transactions are 
checked, which accounts for 20% of all expenditures." Ibid. 

177 "MR. FIELD. Another point. The Audit staff maintained it applied the standards of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants with many exceptions necessitated by the 
uniqueness of their situation. However, thy never compiled a list of these exceptions and how 
they treated them. Would you think it would be an improvement to the audit operation if they 
could compile this and have a set of standards? 

MR. COLBY. Yes, I do indeed." Comm. Hearings, at | |, Aug. 6, 1975. 

178 The Committee staff did a separate study of all CIA proprietaries, a copy of which is 
reprinted in an appendix to this report. 


company for covert requirements. Needless to say, it is an expensive way to buy a 
refrigerator, 179 and should not be used unnecessarily. 

When an overseas station requires an item that cannot be traced to the United States 
government, it sends a requisition with a special code. One code is for items that should not be 
traceable to CIA. Another code means it should not be traceable to the U.S. government. 

Theoretically, once these codes, called "sterility codes", 180 are attached, there is no 
more traceable involvement with the government. However, the Committee reviewed documents 
which showed that items purchased in a non-traceable manner are sometimes transported by U.S. 
military air-pouch, 181 rather than sent by private carrier as a truly non-government purchase 
would be. 

Another procedure which the Committee staff questioned was the routing of requests for 
small quantity, low-cost, and even non-traceable items through the expensive covert process. The 
logical alternative would be to have the item purchased either overseas or here with petty cash, 
avoiding the expense of covert procurement. These include such items a s quantities of ball point 
pens, ping-pong paddles, or hams. 182 

The staff was also unable to determine the reason for certain high-cost items being 
purchased through this mechanism. Hundreds of refrigerators, televisions, cameras, and watches 
are purchased each year, along with a variety of home furnishings.' 81 

The question is why an American television would be purchased here and sent to Europe 
if someone was trying to conceal his involvement with the United States. This is especially true 
because the power requirements abroad are different, and a transformer has to be installed on an 
appliance bought in the U.S. before it will work. 184 In fact, a large percentage of electrical 

See, note [ J, and accompanying text. 

"Sterility Codes", as they are termed within the Agency, designate the "degree of 
traceability" which can accompany an item procured or shipped. These codes range from 
'unclassified", which may be attributed to CIA, to a code which designates that a purchase is so 
sensitive that it is an "off-shore purchase of a foreign item." 


Classified CIA Covert Procurement and Requisition documents, on file with the Sel. 
Comm, on Intell. 

183 Interview with Covert Procurement Officer, using assumed name, by A.S. Field, Sept. 5, 
1975, copy on file with the Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

184 Commercial electric power supplied in all but a few small countries outside the United 
States is 220 volt, 50 cycle. Appliances purchased in the U.S., therefore, require transformers to 
• reduce the voltage to an operating level. 

scan by 


appliances did not have transformers added, 185 which raises the possibility that these items are 
being covertly purchased for use in the United States. 

The same question arises with the purchases of home furnishings. A review of overseas 
station purchases showed, for example, that one station bought more than one hundred thousand 
dollars of furnishings in the past few years. In that context, additional covert purchases here at 
home seem excessive. Finally, why not buy a Smithfield ham through normal purchasing 
channels? There is no way that ham could be traced to the CIA or the U.S. government, no 
matter how it was bought. 

As in every other component of the Agency, the effort to maintain secrecy, even within 
the branch itself, is highly emphasized. 

The committee was told that because proprietary employees do not have a "need to 
know", they are not put in a position to question any request the Agency might make. 186 
Three high procurement officials have conceded that the sterility code is not questioned by the 
covert procurement staff. 187 The 1966 study by Peat, Marwick, Livingston & Co. stated that 
there was excessive use of these codes, without justification. 188 The Committee's investigation 
indicates that this situation has not been remedied. 

b. Local Procurement 

The Committee's investigation of the covert procurement mechanism led to a review of 
records form local, or in-field, procurement. The staff reviewed records for the past five fiscal 
years form three typical overseas stations varying in size and number of employees. Over- 
spending and under-auditing seemed to be prevalent. 

An example is a medium-sized station that purchased over $86,00 in liquor and cigarettes 
during the past five years. 189 The majority of these purchases were designated "operational 
gifts" - gifts to friendly agents or officials in return for information or assistance. 

It would appear that spending practices have an uncanny way of changing with new 

185 Interview with a Covert Procurement officer using an assumed name, by A.S. Field, Sept. 
5, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

186 Interviews with Covert Procurement officers, by S.A. Zcunc, Sept. 1975, and Oct. 1975, 
copies on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

187 Interviews with two covert Procurement officers and Mr. James McDonald, Deputy Dir. 
for Logistics, CIA, by S.A. Zeune, Sept. 1975, and Oct. 1975, copies on file with Sel. Comm, on 

188 See, note ( ]. This was one of many deficiencies and recommendations highlighted by 
the study. Some of the recommendations were adopted; most were not, according to the 
Committee's investigation. 

189 This figure was computed by Committee staff during several reviews of I xical 
Procurement expenditures for one of the three typical overseas stations. 


station chiefs. A station that purchased $41,00 in liquor in 1971, had a new chief in 1972. Liquor 
purchases dropped to $25,00, which is still a lot of liquor. 190 

One station had purchased over $175,00 in furnishings for leased quarters and 
safehouses. 191 

In an effort to determine whether this kind of spending is questioned by CIA auditors, 
the staff interviewed the CIA audit official who audited these stations. He recalled the liquor, and 
that when he inquired as to the quantity, he was told by the Station Chief that they would "try to 
hold it down in the future". 192 The same auditor had audited the station that purchased over 
$175,000 in furnishings. When questioned, he was not even aware of the total figure. 193 

This experience led the Committee staff to interview several members of the Internal 
Audit Division, as well as eight overseas case officers and chiefs of station. From these 
interviews, several things became apparent. 

Auditors do not perform thorough reviews of case officers' "advance accounts." 194 At 
all overseas station, each case officer is allotted an advance, which is nothing more than a petty 
cash fund. From this fund, the officer pays operation expenses and the salaries of his agents. He 
is required by Agency regulations to obtain a receipt for every expenditure, but, due to manpower 
considerations, these are only spot-checked when audited - which is not often. 195 Such funds 
run into millions of dollars each year. 196 

Every case officer and Internal Audit officer conceded that the Agency must "rely solely 

190 The tow figures were likewise computed by Committee staff during reviews of Local 
Procurement records. The same agency employee who was chief of the station in 1971, is now 
responsible for CIA operations in Angola. 

191 Figures computed by staff during review of local procurement expenditures. " Leased 
Quarters" are housing units supplied by CIA for staff or contract employees at field stations. 
'Safehouses" are housing units where the Agency's primary interest is that of a secure location to 
conduct clandestine meetings; its housing function, per se, in only incidental. The Agency also 
provides furnishings for these quarters, such as refrigerators, ranges, and living room furniture, 
and at times provides luxury items, such as china or crystal ware. 

192 Interview with Agency auditor, by S.A. Zeune, Oct. 29, 1975. The auditor concurred, 
with another high level Agency official, that in the country in question, it was "traditional" to give 
Equor and cigarettes as gifts. He also stated, "the controls on the issuances |of liquor] are not so 
stiff." Ibid. 

193 Ibid. 

194 Ibid. 

195 Ibid. Agency regulations permit expenditures of less than $15.00 without receipts. 

196 Ibid. 

scan by 


on the integrity of its case officers." 197 When a case officer's agents refuse to sign receipts, the 
case officer "certifies" that he expended the funds. A case officer might have as many as ten 
agents working for him, each of whom may receive between $50 and $3,000 per month, all in 
cash. 198 

Finally, audits of all over seas stations are not performed on a regular basis. It may be 
two or three years, or more, before a station is audited? 99 Even then, the Committee 
discovered that recommendations made by auditors are usually not disclosed in the auditor's 
report to headquarters. 200 

c. Accommodation Procurements 

In addition to procuring goods and services for its own use, CIA makes "accommodation 
procurements" for foreign governments, officials, agents, and others. 201 

The Agency serves more or less as a purchasing agent for an undisclosed principal. 
Although the individual for whom the accommodation procurement was made advances the 
necessary funds or repays the Agency after delivery, the indirect administrative costs are borne by 

197 Staff interviews with case officers and a former Chief of Station revealed this fact. 
Interviews, by S.A. Zeune, Oct. 17 & 24, 1975, copies on file with Scl. Comm, on Intell. Further, 
it was revealed during these interviews that polygraph examinations of staff employees at one time 
carried out on a regular basis, are no longer performed except during pre-employment 
investigations. The Agency continues, however, to polygraph indigenous agents on a regular 

198 Interviews with case officers and a chief of station, Oct. 17 and 24, 1975, copies on file 
with the Sel. Comm, on intell. 

1 99 Ibid. The staff also requested and reviewed Agency audits for over a dozen overseas 
stations. These records revealed that some smaller stations are audited only every two or three 
years, and at times no site audit is made. Instead, financial records are reviewed at headquarters. 

200 Interview with Agency auditor, by S.A. Zeune, Oct. 29, 1975; interviews with former CIA 
chief of station, by S.A. Zeune, Oct. 24, 1975, copies on file with the Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

201 "MR. NELSON. ...An Accommodation procurement is a procurement made by the 
agency in the United States in most cases, for one of two purposes, either to assist a foreign 
government to make a purchase in the United States, or to assist an individual to purchase 
something that is usually manufactured in the United States. 

"The Ultimate purpose of the accommodation procurement has an operational purpose 
behind it. 

+ ♦ + 

These procurements are paid for by the foreign government or foreign individual who is 
asking us to do the procurement. This is not an expenditure of IJ.S. Government funds." 

Comm hearings, at [ |, Nov. 4, 1975. 


American taxpayers. These costs include the salary of the agency purchaser, certain 
transportation charges, accounting costs, and in some cases the salaries of training and technical 
personnel. 202 

In investigating one series of accommodation procurements, the Committee learned that 
a foreign government received a 20 percent discount by having CIA buy equipment in the name 
of the U.S. government. 

If the foreign government had contracted for the same items in its own name, this 
discount would not have been available. In just two of these actions CIA saved the foreign 
government over $200,000, at the expense of American suppliers. 202 

The Agency will usually refuse to make such procurements only if the requested item 
might appear to be beyond the requestor's financial means, and might therefore give rise to 
questions about the requestor's sources of income. Agency security officers feel that such 
questions might lead to disclosure of the requestor's relationship with the agency. 204 

Accommodation procurements involving less than $3,000 require only the approval of a 
CIA chief of station. When larger sums are involved, approval must be obtained from the 
Deputy Director for Operations. When the amount is more than $500,000, it must also be 
approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. 205 

The committee examined a number of accommodation procurement records. The 
following two examples illustrate that the facilities and resources of the United States government 
are sometimes used to satisfy little more than the whims of foreign officials. 

In one instance, a foreign official described his son's enthusiasm for model airplanes to 
the chief of station. The foreign official wanted three model airplane kits, and even advised the 
CIA officer precisely where the kits could be purchased in the United States. A cable was sent to 
Agency headquarters asking for the purchase of three kits from the store in Baltimore suggested 
by the foreign official. Further, the cable instructed that the items were to be designated by a 
'sterility code", to indicate that the purchase of the kits could not be attributable to the United 
States government. Documents provided to the Committee in this case by the Agency were 






202 The fact that the Agency bears the administrative costs cf the procurements was 
confirmed in interviews with officials of the Directorate for Science and Technology. It was 
reconfirmed in an interview with the CIA officer responsible for a Mid-F,ast country's accounts 
desk, in the Directorate of Operations. Interviews with CIA officers, by S.A. Zeune, Oct. 30 and 
31, 1975, copies on file with the Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

203 Interview with CIA officer form the Office of Electrical Intelligence, by S.A. Zeune and 
J.C. Mingee, Oct. 30, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

204 Interview with james McDonald, CIA deputy Director of I xigistics, by S.A. Zeune, Oct. 
24, 1975, copy on file with the Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

205 Testimony of Mr. William Nelson, CIA Deputy Director for operations. Comm. 
Hearings, at [ ], Nov. 4, 1975. 


scan by 


sanitized. 206 

In another instance, the President of an allied nation was preparing to play golf on a hot 
afternoon. Anticipating his thirst after several hours in the sun, he made a "priority" request to 
the local chief of station for six bottles of Gatorade. An Agency employee was immediately 
relieved of his ordinary duties and assigned to make the accommodation procurement. 

Nor was this the chief of state's only experience with the Agency's merchandising talents. 
In the past, the Agency has purchased for him several automobiles, including at least two custom- 
built armored limousines 208 , and, among other things, an entire electronic security system for 
his official residence, it is worth noting that these security devices are being supplied to a man 
who runs a police-state. 

Accommodation procurements have also involved more expensive and politically sensitive 
items. For example, another head of a one-party state had long been fascinated by certain highly 
sophisticated electronic intelligence gathering equipment, he wished to develop his own 
independent collection capability. As an accommodation, and to "share the take", the Agency 
procured an entire electronic intelligence network for him in two phases. Phase I involved 
contract costs in excess of $850,000, and Phase II cost more than $500, 000. 209 

In investigating one series of accommodation procurements for an oil exporting country, 
the Committee asked CIA officials about the coordination and effect of the Agency's purchasing 
favors on the foreign country's oil pricing policy. The country's oil policy, incidentally, has not 
been among the most favorable to the United States. Agency officials were uncertain as to the 
effect, but they indicated that the two policies are largely considered separate issues. 

206 This information first came to the attention of the Committee form staff review of 
requisition documents in Sept. 1975. Further inquiry about the model plane purchases led CIA 
to give staff access to the cables. 

207 This was related to Staff, in response to questions concerning "Accommodation 
procurements " made for the President of the allied country. The response was supplied by the 
former Chief of Station in the country. Interview with Chief of Station, by S. A. Zeune, Oct. 31, 
1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

208 CIA documents made available to the Committee revealed that the Agency made three 
such accommodation procurements" made for the President for the allied country. In all three 
instances - three times in the last ten years - the Chief of State requested that CIA procure the 
limousines. A staff interview with the former Chief of Station disclosed that int he instances 
concerning the limousines, the Agency was reimbursed by way of American currency, hand 
delivered in bags or briefcases to the Station. In one instance, the trans action involved the 
equivalent of (U.S.) $50,000. Further, the documents appeared to reveal that the Agency was not 
disturbed by the fact that the President, in two instances, did not reimburse the full balance to the 
agency until some months after the transaction had taken place. Interview with Chief of Station, 
by S.A. Zeune, Oct. 31, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

209 Staff interview with Office of Electrical Intelligence staff officer, by S.A. Zeune and J.C. 
Mingee, Oct. 30, 1975, copy on file with the Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

In return for making accommodation procurements, the Agency is usually reimbursed by 
the requesting party. Although reimbursement may be in U.S. dollars, it is usually made in local 
foreign currency. 21 The Committee was unable to learn whether the Agency has any firm 
policy on what rate of currency exchange is to be used in making reimbursement. In many 
countries, U.S. dollars exchanged for local currency at the official rate bring fewer units of local 
currency than if exchanged at an unofficial, but more commonly used, rate. 

d. Research and Development 

CIA has long prided itself on technological capability, and many of its projects operate at 
far reaches of the "state of the art". Such accomplishments are made by the Agency with 
assistance and advice from the private sector. 

Each year, CIA's Deputy Director for Science and Technology enters into hundreds of 
contracts with industry, usually in the name of other government agencies. 21 1 These contracts 
total millions of dollars for agency contracts alone. Not only does the Agency contract for its 
own research and development programs, but also for national intelligence programs. 212 Total 
contracts for both programs amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, annually. 

Committee Staff interviewed numerous members of the Science and Technology Staff. A 
major target of this investigation was "contractor selection" practices. Although Mr. Colby 
testified before the Committee that CIA has Established management controls to insure that 
contracting is carried out according to the intent of Congress, 2 the investigation revealed that 
84% of these contracts are "sole source contracts". 214 

210 A Staff interview with the member of CIA Review Staff (and former Chief of Station) 
revealed that this is considered a further accommodation to the requesting party, inasmuch as the 
local currency is certain to be more readily available than U.S. dollars, 

For security reasons, DIA usually contracts in the name of other government agencies, 
such as Department of Defense, Air force, or Army. Contractor employees are usually unwitting 
of CIA association, although in most cases a high company officer will be briefed by the Agency 
on a "need to know" basis. 

212 Interview with Carl Duckett, Deputy Director, Science and Technology, by S.A. Zeune 
and I. Mingee, Oct. 17, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

Congressional intent, the Committee feels (as does the Agency) is the practice of 
competitive contracting, whenever possible. Comm. Hearing, at | j, Aug. 6, 1975. 

214 "Sole source" contracts are contracts let with no "competitive bidding" process to which 
must be adhered. Contractors are selected on the basis of several things: I) past technical 
performance, 2) financial administration, 3) technical capabilities in the particular area in which 
CIA is interested. Agency officials indicated, however, that financial administration is a secondary 

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Staff also examined "cost overrun" aspects of research and development contracting. CIA 
claimed two and one-half percent of all research and development contracts involved cost 
overruns of 15 percent or more. There is no reason to doubt the figures; however, certain caveats 
must be considered. Contractors' cost estimates in sole-source contracts can easily be inflated to 
cover anticipated cost increases. 215 Overruns can also be labeled "changes in scope". 

In several interviews with contracting officers, "by the book" answers were^ven to 
questions regarding which officer is authorized, and does, accept contract changes. 

However, one former Agency contracting officer indicated that, to a considerable degree, the 
technical representative actually makes the contractual decisions, and the contracting officer then 
has to "catch up" by preparing contract amendments to legitimize changes already made. 2 

Another target of the investigation was the disposal of Government Furnished 
Equipment (GFE). 9 Regulations regarding GFE appear to be precise in determining when 

The 84 percent figure includes all research and development contracts, and includes funds 
used for national intelligence programs. Interview with Carl Duckett, Deputy Director, Science 
and Technology, by S.A. Zeune and J. Mingee, Oct. 17, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on 

215 Cost estimates may be increased originally, in that during the negotiating phase of the 
contract, the contracting officer allows estimated costs, or accepts contractor estimates without 
due consideration of the knowledge and expertise of the contractor. Interview with CIA 
contracting officer, by S.A. Zeune and J. Mingee, Oct. 31, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on 

216 Changes in scope are "amendments to the original contract" which may change 
quantities, technical features, time in which to perform the contract, delivery instructions, etc. 

The Committee does not disagree that many changes in scope arc legitimate. However, because 
of the extremely low percentage of the use of cost overruns incurred by CIA, the Committee 
questions the use of changes in scope to artificially decrease statistics. Ibid. 

217 Interview with CIA contracting officers, by S.A. Zeune and J. Mingee, Oct. 31, 1975, 
copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

218 Interview with former CIA contracting officers, by S.A. Zeune and .1. Mingee, Oct. 31, 
1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

2,9 Government furnished equipment is any equipment furnished for the contractors use, 
whose title rests with the government. This equipment can included such items as testing and 
other technical equipment to such items as desks and office equipment. Interview with Carl 
Duckett, Deputy Director, Science and Technology, by S.A. Zeune and J. Mingee, Oct. 17, 1975, 
copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 


to 'abandon" this equipment. 20 However, the Office of Communications, for example, 
contracted in 1965 with an electronics company to do research work. The contract required the 
purchase of a large piece of industrial equipment, as well as related testing equipment. CIA 
provided funds for the equipment as well as the research. 221 The testing equipment cost 
$74,000 and the industrial equipment over $243,000. At the termination of the contract in 1975, 
the testing equipment was sold to the contractor for $18,500, the large piece of industrial was 
abandoned, in place. 222 

Calls to the manufacturer of this piece of machinery, as well as two "experts" in the field 
of this particular type of testing, revealed that the machinery which was abandoned, while perhaps 
'useless" to the Agency, was not a "worthless" piece of equipment which should have been 
"abandoned". 223 According to documents provided to the Committee, CIA made no attempt 
to contact other government agencies, to see if the chamber could have used by another agency. 

e. Colleges and Universities 

In 1967, Ramparts Magazine disclosed CIA support to the National Students 
Association. As a result, President Johnson issued a flat prohibition against covert assistance to 
educational institution; but the Agency unilaterally reserved the right to, and does, depart from 
the Presidential order when it has the need to do so. 224 

220 Abandoned equipment is government furnish equipment which is left in place at the 
termination of a contract; and for which the contractor pays nothing. Interview with Carl 
Duckett, Deputy Director, Science and Technology, by S.A. Zeune and J. Mingee, Oct. 17, 1975, 
copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

221 In this instance, CIA did not advance the funds to the contractor for the purchase of the 
test equipment or the industrial equipment. The cost of both was added to the contractors fee to 
the Agency. Interview with Office of Communications staff members, by S.A. Zeune and J. 
Mingee, Oct. 28, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

222 Interview with Office of Communications staff members, by S.A. Zeune and J. Mingee, 
Oct. 28, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

223 Telephonic interview with President of the company which manufactured the industrial 
equipment, Dec. 8, 1975; telephonic interview with consultant on the particular area of testing 
involved, Dec. 8, 1975; telephonic interview with electronics consultant, Dec. 8, 1975, by S.A. 
Zeune, copies on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 






224 "3. It is proposed that upon your approval: 

a. The attached guidelines be applied immediately to all future 
contractual arrangements with U.S. educational institutions. 

b. Contracts and grants now in existence be conformed to these 
guidelines as rapidly as feasible and wherever possible, no later than 30 December 67 for 

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There is no evidence that President authorized this departure from the Johnson directive. 
As background, President Johnson had appointed a committee to investigate the matter 
and make policy recommendations. 

Undersecretary of State, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, and CIA Director, Richard H. 

Helms, served on the Committee. It recommended that "no federal agency shall provide any 
covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or 
private voluntary organizations." 25 

On March 29, 1967, President Johnson issued a statement accepting the recommendation 

«• • • • • 09ft * ^ 

and directing "all agencies of the government to implement if fully." 

The Agency then issued internal policy statements to implement the President's 
orders, 227 stating that, whenever possible, the Agency's identity and sponsorship are to be 
made known. 22 But the Agency was to clearly retain the option of entering into a covert 
contract with colleges and universities, after obtaining approval from the Deputy Director for 
Administration. 229 

Mr. Carl Duckett, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, testified before the 
Committee on Nov. 4, 1975, that the Agency still has on-going contracts with "a small number of 

relationships that will extend beyond that date.. .The thrust of the review of existing contracts and 
the placement of future contracts will be that our contractor relationships with academic 
institutions will be strongly on the premise that CIA will be identified as the contractor... Any 
special contract arrangement will be considered only when there is extremely strong justification 
warranting a variance from the principles of CIA identification as the contractor. It is felt that the 
Agency must retain some flexibility for contracting arrangements with academic institutions and 
this can be carefully monitored and accomplished within the policies and principles expressed in 
the Katzenbach report..." Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, June 21, 1967. 

225 Report to the President, [ ) 

226 Statement by the President (Lyndon B. Johnson), March 29, 1967: "I accept this 
committee's proposed statement of policy and am directing all agencies of the government to 
implement it fully." 

227 Ibid. 

228 Ibid. 

229 Ibid. 


universities". 230 Mr. Duckett also revealed that some of the contracts involved "classified 

and some are covert. 

f. U.S. Recording 

On October 9, 1975, the Committee held hearings on electronic surveillance in the United 
States. One of the witnesses, Mr. Martin Kaiser, was a manufacturer of electronic surveillance 
and counter-measure equipment. In the course of his testimony, he revealed that all sales of his 
equipment were routed - pursuant to FBI instructions - through a cut-out or middle-man, U.S. 
Recording Company, of Washington, D.C. 232 

The equipment was neither modified nor serviced by U.S. Recording 233 Kaiser 

230 Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Nov. 4, 1975. 

232 "I began my relationship with the FBI around 1967 or 1968. All my correspondence was 
sent directly to the FBI. However, I think it was on only one occasion that the Bureau ever 
contacted me personally. All other addresses were made personally or verbally. Once they began 
purchasing equipment I was directed not to send this equipment to the FBI, but rather sell it to a 
company known as United States Recording, a private company operation on South Capitol 
Street in Washington, D.C. I informed the Bureau, as if they needed that piece of information, 
the Federal law would not allow me to sell equipment to anyone except bona fide governmental 
agencies. The FBI agents assured me my actions were proper and subsequently supplied a stamp 
to United States Recording which purported to certify on the purchase orders that the transaction 
was in accordance with Federal law." Comm. Hearings, at [ ]. Oct. 9, 1975. 


233 "MR. OLIPHANT. Do you know of any servicing of Martin Kaiser's work that was 
done by U.S. Recording? 

"MR. HARWARD. Servicing? 

"MR. OLIPHANT. Yes, repair, servicing, fixing it. 

"MR. VERMEIRE. Subsequent to the purchase. 


"MR. OLIPHANT. Do you know of any times subsequent to the purchase that 
equipment was tested and refined by U.S. Recordings? 

"MR. HARWARD. Specifically of Martin Kaiser's equipment, it was purchased 
through U.S. Recording as a way of that type of equipment. At least that was in a category that 
we would ask to be purchased confidentially and I don't know of any case where U.S. Recordings 
performed any repair work." Interview with Mr. William Harward, J.B.F. Oliphant and R. 
Vermeire, Nov. 11, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 



testified that he delivered 80 percent of his equipment directly to the FBI. 234 On one such 
occasion Kaiser noticed an invoice from U.S. Recording for equipment he had supplied, and it 
showed that U.S. Recording had tacked on 30 percent more than it had paid for the 

• 0 “3 *5 


The mark-up interested Committee investigators because, according to Kaiser, the 
middle-man had handled only paperwork and deliveries. The staff therefore acquired records of 
all sales between U.S. Recording and the FBI involving Kaiser's equipment. A Committee staff 
accountant did a detailed study and determined that the 30 percent mark-up on the invoice seen 
by Mr. Kaiser was representative of all such sales. 

As a result of numerous interviews, it became apparent that Mr. Joseph Tait - the 
President of U.S. Recording - was a long time friend and poker-playing companion of Mr. John 
P. Mohr, the Associate Director of the FBI in charge of Administration until 1972. 236 

During the course of investigation, the staff learned the poker games had been held at the 
Blue Ridge Club near Harper's Ferry, West Virginia, on several weekends each year for the past 
decade. 237 Guest lists included FBI officials connected with the Administrative Division, 

234 Kaiser made this statement to staff accountant in December 1975, when the accountant 
was reviewing Kaiser's records at his place of business in Codkeyesbille, Maryland, kaiser referred 
to his records in order to determine which shipments had been made directly to the FBI. 

235 "I might point out at this time, by the way, that nearly all the equipment deliveries I 
made to the Equipment Bureau involving orders to United States Recording were handled by me 
and billed to United States Recording. So the paperwork went through that route. I discovered 
at one time that markup on the bills for the equipment. During my dealings with the Federal 
Bureau of investigation I sold them approximately $100,000 worth of electronic equipment." 
Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Oct. 9, 1975. 

236 "MR. VERMEIRE. Mr. Tait, I believe at the last deposition, November 21, you 
mentioned that you had played poker on a number of occasions with Mr John Mohr, former 
Assistant Director of the FBI. 

"MR. TAIT. Yes." Interview with Mr. Tait, by J.B.F. Oliphant and R. 
Vermeire, Dec. 1, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

237 "MR. VERMEIRE. And I think you testified that you had played poker with him not 
only privately at each other's homes or homes in the area but also at a club up in Harpers Ferry. 

I think at the time that is all that was said; it was up in Harpers Ferry. 

"MR. TAIT. That's right. 

"MR. VERMEIRE. What was the name of that club? 

"MR. TAIT. Blue Ridge. 

"MR. VERMEIRE. How did you become a member of the club? 

"MR. TAIT. I used to play cards up there prior with another man by the name 
of Parsons, Donald Parsons (former Chief of the FBI Laboratory Division), who died. 

"MR. VERMEIRE. And was Mr. Parsons alive when you became a member? 
|o "MR. TAIT. No. 




OMB officials, and a procurement officer from CIA. The only non-governmental officials at the 
poker games were Tait, and Mr. Gus Oberdick - the President of F ; argo International - a supplier 
of police equipment to the FBI and CIA . 238 Mr. Mohr had invited all the guests, although 
Mr. tait was the only person in the poker games who possessed a membership in the Blue Ridge 

Interestingly, the Blue Ridge Club burned to the ground the evening before two staff 
attorneys traveled to Harper's Ferry to examine its records. 

Most purchasing procedures of the FBI are governed by General Services Administration 
(GSA) regulations. However, confidential contracts are not subject to GSA regulations or 
supervision. The U.S. Recording Company was the sole company serving as an FBI 
cutout 239 Interviews revealed that there was virtually no control exercised over the 
confidential contracts between U.S. Recording Company to the FBI. 

Neither the Laboratory Division, which initiated the equipment requisitions, nor the 
Administrative Division, which authorized the requisitions, had any knowledge of the percentage 

"MR. VERMEIRE. How long had you been playing at the club prior to 
becoming a member? 

"MR. TAIT. I don't know. I'd say probably four or five years." Ibid. 

'MR. VERMEIRE. Who is the one business person who was connected with private 
enterprise that was there? 

"MR. TAIT. A man by the name of Oberdick. 

"MR. VERMEIRE. Mr. Oberdick? 

"MR. TAIT. Yes. 

"MR. VERMEIRE. May I have his first name? 

"MR. TAIT. Godfrey. 

"MR. VERMEIRE. What business was he in? 

"MR. TAIT. He is - I don't know exactly what you would say. He is a 
representative to various companies that supply equipment. What companies, I'm not sure. 

"MR. VERMEIRE. What kind of equipment? 

"MR. TAIT. Firearms, tear gas." Ibid. 

239 This fact was established through numerous staff interviews with knowledgeable FBI 
personnel in the Laboratory and Administrative Divisions. 

"MR. VERMEIRE. Were there other companies that you dealt with in that way? 

"MR HARWARD. I don't know of any company. 

"MR VERMEIRE. U.S. Recording is the only company that you know of that you had 
this confidential relationship with? 

"MR HARWARD. Yes" Interview with Mr. Harward. See note { } . 

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markup being charged. 240 The General Services Administration was consulted and Gave an 

opinion that an appropriate mark-up for similar services would have been in the 5 percent 

_ 241 


FBI's use of U.S. Recording was apparently motivated by the need for secrecy in 
purchases of sensitive electronic equipment. That justification appears questionable. In most 
instances, FBI laboratory Division personnel negotiated for equipment directly with the 
manufacturers. When manufacturers later received purchase orders form U.S. Recording, for 
equipment with corresponding model number, quantities, and prices, it was apparent that the 
equipment was indeed going to FBI. In fact, the FBI told Kaiser that they were using U.S. 
Recording Company and not to worry about it. 242 

FBI's use of U.S. Recording represents a grossly inefficient expenditure for intelligence 
equipment. Similarly, the fact that the persons within the FBI responsible for requisitioning and 
purchasing the equipment had no clear knowledge of the chain of authority regarding the 
arrangement, is at best, nonfeasance. Further ramifications are presently being investigated by the 
Criminal Division of the Justice Department, and by the IRS. The Committee has made its 
information on this matter available to both authorities. 


During Senate hearings in 1973, to confirm James Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense, 
Mr. Schlesinger indicated it might be possible to make public the total budget cost of foreign 

240 Walsh told staff it was up to the Laboratory to recommend price. Interview with Mr. 
Eugene Walsh, Assistant Director of the Administrative Division, by J.B.F. Oliphant and R. 
Vermeire, Nov. 25, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

Callahan also felt it was up to the Laboratory to determine price and not to get "ripped 
off". He further stated that people of Mr. John P Mohr's former stature would not have been 
concerned with how price was determined. Interview with Mr. Nicolas P. Callahan, Associate 
Director of the FBI, by J.B.F. Oliphant and R. Vermeire, Dec. '7, 1975, copy on file with Sel. 
Comm, on Intell. 

Cochran stated that the Laboratory Division would not usually know what a mark-up 
was charged by a cutout. Interview with Mr. Jay Cochran, Chief of the laboratory Division, by 
J.B.F. Oliphant and R. Vermeire, Dec. 17, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

McMichael stated that pricing would probably never be checked for fairness by his buyers 
on a confidential contract, he felt the laboratory Division was responsible for pricing of 
confidential contracts. Interview with Mr. G. Speights McMichael, Chief of Procurement 
Section, by J.B.F. Oliphant, Dec. 9, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

241 Interview with Mr. J. Bolton, GSA deputy Commissioner in charge of Federal Supplies 
and Mr. Fred Bunke, Asst. Commissioner for Procurement, by J.B.F. Oliphant and R. Vermeire, 
Dec. 12, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

242 See, note {}. 


intelligence. 243 When William Colby was confirmed as head of CIA in 1973, he, likewise, 
testified that publication of budget totals might not be harmful. 244 

In a television interview some years later, Dr. Schlesinger inadvertently revealed the size of the 
foreign intelligence budget. 24S No great harm apparently came from that disclosure. 

243 ". . . former CIA Director James R. Schlesinger told Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., during 
his confirmation hearings for Secretary of Defense: I think it (speaking of releasing selected 
intelligence budget data) might be an acceptable procedure, Senator, to indicate the total figure of 
the national intelligence programs. I would not personally advocate it, but it may be an 
acceptable procedure. . .There is the feeling that it might be wise to give the gross figure. I have 
come to share that feeling at least in this time frame, but that docs not say that is not a 

"Senator Byrd specifically asked: There would be no security reasons why it should not 

be done? 

"Dr. Schlesinger replied: For the gross figure, I think that the security concerns are 
minimal. The component figures, I would be more concerned about but for the gross national 
intelligence program figures I think we could live with that on a security basis, yes." Cong. Rec., 
S. 9603, June 4, 1974. 

244 When the same question was put to William E. Colby during his confirmation hearings 
to be Director of Central Intelligence, he replied: I would propose to leave that question, Mr. 
Chairman, in the hands of the Congress to decide. . .We are not going to run the kind of 
intelligence service that other countries run. We are going to run one in the American society 
and the American constitutional structure, and I can see there may be a requirement to expose to 
the American people a great deal more than might be convenient from the narrow intelligence 
point of view." Ibid. 

245 "Mr. Bob Kuttner, formerly of the Washington Post, is a Senate investigator with the 
Banking Committee. Mr. Kuttner. 

"Mr. Kuttner: Mr. Secretary, you referred to the importance of keeping intelligence 
secrets classified; the difficulty of doing that vis-a-vis the Hill. One of the great secrets over the 
years has been the size of the intelligence budget. I think you let some of that slip the other day 
when you told a reporter that the House Armed Services Committee had cut the intelligence 
budget, hidden in the defense budget, by 10 percent, and then one could look up the figure which 
had been released and see that it was $344 million, and do a little arithmetic and conclude that 
the budget was something like $3.4 billion. Now the skies haven't fallen in. Was that a 
deliberate slip? Was it an inadvertent slip? What was that? 

"Mr. Schlesinger: Well, I think that it's generally been known what the rough magnitude 
of the intelligence expenditures have been of the American government to that- 

"Mr. Buckley: To the Russians or to us? (Laughter) 

"Mr. Schlesinger: To the American Press. 

"Mr. Kuttner: But, I mean, this barely made the papers when you in effect disclosed the 
figure. Why had it been so important to keep it secret in the past? 

"Mr. Schlesinger: The indication, I think, is quite clear: that we arc talking about a very 

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In 1973, a recommendation to publish the annual costs of intelligence was made by a Senate 
Special Committee to Study Questions Related to Secret and Confidential Documents. 246 

On June 4, 1974, Senator J. William Proxmire of Wisconsin offered a floor amendment 
to a defense procurement authorization bill. His amendment would have required the Director of 
Central Intelligence to provide Congress with an annual, unclassified report describing the total 
amount requested for the "national intelligence program" in the budget submitted by the 
President. 2 7 

In June 1975, the report of the Rockefeller Commission recommended that Congress 
carefully consider whether all or part of the CIA budget should be made public. 248 

On October 1, 1975, Representative Robert N. Giaimo of Connecticut offered a floor 
amendment to a defense appropriations bill, prohibiting any of the funds provided for "Other 
Procurement, Air Force" from being expended by the CIA. 249 Had the amendment been 

rough, approximate number incorporating all of the intelligence activities contained within the 
Department of Defense. There has been concern in the past that if the details of that budget were 
put out— and particularly the CIA figure— that there would be a reaction to start slashing away at 
that figure on the floor. The CIA has no constituency and particularly at the present time. And 
the revelation of that figure could elicit some adverse reaction on the floor of the Senate or the 
House. I think it's a possibility in any event." Firing Line, October 9, 1975. 

246 "Accordingly, the Committee recommends that the Appropriations Committee itemize in 
the Defense Department Appropriations bill the total sums proposed to be appropriated for 
intelligence activities by each of the following agencies: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office and any separate 
intelligence units wit hin the Army, Navy, and Air Force." S. Rept. 93-466, p. 16, 93rd Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1973). 

247 "At the appropriate place in the bill insert a new section as follows: 

"Sec. [ ], On or before March 1 each year the Director of Central Intelligence shall 
submit an unclassified written report to the Congress disclosing the total amount of funds 
requested in the budget, transmitted to the Congress pursuant to section 20 1 of the Budget and 
Accounting Act of 1921 (31 U.S.C. 11), for the national intelligence program for the next 
succeeding fiscal year." Congressional Records, Senate, June 4, 1974, p. S 9601. 

248 "Recommendation (4) Congress should give careful consideration to the question whether 
the budget of the CIA should not, at least to some extent, be made public, particularly in view of 
the provisions of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution. Rockefeller Comm. Report, 

p. 81. 

249 "Amendment offered by Mr. Giaimo: Under "Other Procurement, Air Force," on page 
29, line 17 after 'September 30, 1973.', strike the period and insert in lieu thereof: ': Provided, 
That none of the funds in this appropriation shall be available for expenditure by the Central 
Intelligence Agency." Cong. Rec., H-9358, Oct. 1, 1975. 

rhiHHpnhiQtnrv nrn 


adopted, a subsequent amendment would have been offered to restore funds for the CIA, and a 
specific total for the agency would have been disclosed. 

Today, however, taxpayers and most Congressmen do not know, and cannot find out, 
how much they spend on spy activities. 

This is in direct conflict with the Constitution 250 , which requires a regular and public 
accounting for all funds spent by the federal government. 

Those who argue for secrecy do not mention the Constitution. They do not mention 
taxpayers. Instead, they talk of rather obscure understandings the Russians might derive about 
some specific operation 251 , even if all the Russians knew was a single total which would be in 
the billions of dollars and would cover dozens of diverse agencies. 

How the Russians would do this is not clear. The Committee asked, but there was no 
real answer. What is clear is that the Russians probably already have a detailed account of our 
intelligence spending, far more than just the budget total. 252 In all likelihood, the only people 
who care to know and do not know these costs today are American taxpayers. 


It is one thing to conclude that tens of billions of intelligence dollars have been rather 
independently spent, and sometimes misspent, over the past few years. 

The important issues are whether this spending sufficiently meets our needs, whether Americans 
have received their money's worth, and whether non-monetary costs sometimes outweigh the 

The latter question is a matter of risks, and is addressed in a subsequent chapter. To test 
the first two questions, the Committee investigated a representative spectrum of recent events. 

cn # # 

Such disclosure is required by the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution, specifically, 
Article I, Section 9, Clause vii, which states: No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular statement and Account of the 
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. 

251 "CHAIRMAN PIKE. . . Do you think the Soviets know what our intelligence effort is? 
"Mr. COLBY. They know a good deal about it, from the various books that have been 

published by "X" members of the intelligence community." Comm. Hearings, at, Aug. 6, 1975. 

252 'CHAIRMAN PIKE. . . Don't you think really that the Soviets have a far better 
estimate of what we are spending for intelligence than the average taxpayer in America has? 

"Mr. COLBY. I think they have put a great deal of time and attention trying to identify 
i that, and they undoubtedly have a better perception of it than the average taxpayer who just 
; | takes the general statements he gets in the press. But— and that comes from the careful analysis of 
5 the material that is released. This does help you get a more accurate estimate of what it is." Ibid. 


scan by 


Some involved war; some involved law enforcement. Some involved American lives overseas; 
some involved personal freedoms at home. All involved important interests. 

How did intelligence perform? Let the events speak for themselves. 

1. TET; Failure to adapt to a new kind of war 

War in Vietnam meant that intelligence had to adapt to an unconventional war, and true 
perception could spell life or death for Americans. In Tet, perceptions were shattered. 

Taking advantage of the Vietnamese lunar holiday, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 
forces launched an all-out offensive on January 30, 1968, against virtually every urban center and 
base in South Vietnam. The scale of attacks was unprecedented in the history of American 
involvement in the Vietnam War and flatly challenged the reassuring picture intelligence officials 
in Saigon and Washington had helped present to the American people. 

With nearly all provincial capitals under siege, the American embassy compound was 
penetrated by the Viet Cong, and the pacification program set back in all areas, predictions of 
successes, announced scant months before, had turned into one of the greatest misjudgments of 
the war. 

The Committee's investigation of Tet focused on the question of warning in a combat 
situation and communicating the realities of a guerrilla war to executive branch policy-makers. 
Both are interrelated. Mr. William Colby and the post-mortems certify, "warning of the Tet 
offensive had not fully anticipated the intensity, coordination and timing of the enemy attack." A 
chief cause was our degraded image of the enemy. 253 

a. The Order of Battle Controversy 

According to Mr. Colby, the CIA had been suspicious of MACV's numerical estimate of 

253 After reviewing the battlefield situation in March of 1968, representatives of CIA, CIA, 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented an Interim Report entitled "Intelligence Warning of the 
Tet Offensive in South Vietnam." Their report details various aspects of why "the intensity, 
coordination, and timing of the enemy attack were not fully anticipated." After discussing how 
unexpected an attack on the date of Tet was, how the comprehensiveness and the nature of the 
targets, i.e. the cities, was unappreciated, the report continues: "Underlying these specific 
problems was a more basic one: most commanders and intelligence officers, at all levels, did not 
visualize the enemy as capable of accomplishing his stated goals as they appeared in propaganda 
and in captured documents. Prevailing estimates of attrition, infiltration, and local recruitment, 
reports of low morale, and a long series of defeats had degraded our image of the enemy. The 
general picture presented was an enemy unable to conduct an offensive of such scope and 
intensity." April 11, 1968. 


the Vietnamese enemy since at least mid- 1966. 254 At an Order of Battle conference held in 
Saigon in September, 1967, the differences between Washington and the field, and between CIA 
and MACV, were thrashed out; but according to Mr. Colby, to neither's satisfaction. 255 

A resulting compromise represented the best resolution of MACV's preoccupation with 
viewing the order of battle in the classic military sense and CIA's assessment of enemy capabilities 
as much broader people's war. 256 The special National Intelligence Estimate that emerged 
from this conference quantified the order of battle in MACV terms, and merely described other 
potential enemy forces. Categories now dropped from previous estimates of order of battle 
totaled as much as 200,000 irregular personnel, self-defense and secret self-defense forces, and 
assault youth and political cadre. 

As foot soldiers realized at the time, and as recent studies by the Army Surgeon General 
confirm, the destructiveness of mines and booby traps, which irregular forces set out, was 

254 In testimony before the Committee, Mr. Colby stated that in August of 1966 "the CIA in 
a special assessment prepared for the Secretary of Defense and also sent to the President, the 
Secretary State and other senior officials, advised: 'Recently acquired documentary evidence now 
being studied in detail suggests that our holdings on the numerical strength of these Irregulars 
(now being earned at around 110,000) may require drastic upward revision.'" Comm. Hearings 
at, Dec. 3, 1975. 

255 In his testimony, Mr. Colby also stated, "I don't suppose the results of the Saigon Order 
of Battle Conference were completely acceptable to any of the parties. The military had a point 
in its argument that their concern was with the combat threat represented by the order of battle 
in the classic sense. CIA had a point, namely, that a responsible national intelligence assessment 
of enemy capabilities would have to include consideration of the much broader insurgency threat 
represented by all organized political, military and quasi -military groups." Comm. Hearings at, 
Dec. 3, 1975. 

256 Asked by Congressman Murphy if he took into consideration the unorthodox war we 
were involved in, in Vietnam, George Carver, former Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs at 
CIA, answered, "Of course we did. You put your finger on one of the root problems which 
bedeviled much of the discussion this morning . . . The Vietnam War was not a classical, 
conventional World War I or World War II type of struggle. We had two armies in the field. 

The Communist force had two armies in the field. The Communist force had a number of 
different components. They had main and local forces, i.e. a regular army. T hey had 
administrative service units which covered everything from sophisticated sappers to part-time 
quarters. They had guerrilla units." "Congressman Murphy: But they were still able to amount 
a major attack at that time." Mr. Carver: Precisely, but they had a whole range of things and 
trying to come to understand them conceptually was the first difficult problem." Comm. 

Hearings at | |. 

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increasingly responsible for American losses. 257 This was primarily because American forces 
were engaging the enemy with increased frequency in his defensive positions. Documents indicate 
that, even during the Order of Battle Conference, there was a large increase in sabotage for which 
irregulars and civilians were responsible. 258 It appears clear in retrospect that, given the nature 
of protracted guerrilla war, irregular forces were basic determinants of the nature and scope of 

The numbers game not only diverted a direct confrontation with the realities of war in 
Vietnam, but also prevented the intelligence community, perhaps the President, and certainly 
Members of Congress, from judging the real changes in Vietnam over time. 

The Saigon Order of Battle Conference dropped numbers that had been used since 1962, 
and used those that were left in what appears to have been an arbitrary attempt to maintain some 
ceiling. 259 It prompted Secretary of State Dean Rusk to cable the American Embassy in 

257 In reviewing the change in the casualty rate over the four year period from 1966 to 1970, 
the Army Surgeon General reported in 1973 that wounding caused by gradments increased from 
50% in the casualty rate to 80% primarily because by 1968 U.S. troops were engaging the enemy 
with increased frequency in his defensive positions. The study further comments, "The deaths 
reflect the nature of the combat. Much higher proportions of the casualties were caused in small 
arms lire, and by boobytraps and mines, than in Korea or World War II." Medical Support of 
the U.S. Army in Vietnam, I965-I970\ Maj. Gen. Spurgeon Neel, Dept, of the Army, 1973. 

258 In his critique of a proposed press briefing by MACV, written in October of 1967, 

George Carver took issue with their characterization of irregular forces as "fifth columnists" and 
"fellow travelers." His challenge was based on the fact that "evidence continues to come in 
showing that the VC make considerable use of the 'irregulars' and not infrequently assigning them 
actual combat tasks." By MACV de fini tions as well, the Self Defense Forces were "a VC 
paramilitary structure" and the Secret Self Defense Forces operated to collect intelligence but also 
to sabotage. Nevertheless, General Sidle, the MACV briefer, did to on to inform the press that 
such irregulars were "essentially low level fifth columnists used for information collection." At the 
Committee Hearings of Dec. 3, 1975, General Graham, now Director of DIA, confirmed an 
assessment made by General Abrams that both the elements deleted from the order of battle 
holdings contained " a sizeable number of women and old people." Irregular forces were to be 
active combatants during the Tet offensive. Comm. Hearings, at Dec. 3, 1975, and Cable, Abrams 
to Wheeler to Helms, Aug. 21, 1967. Gen. Westmoreland provided the Committee with the 
following view: 'These excluded elements were not a part of the enemy army per se. They 
possessed no offensive capability and did not pose an offensive threat to the Allied Forces." 

259 The quantification exercises were never baaed on hard evidence. Particularly during the 
period under question, intelligence should have been continuously reviewed and digures frequently 
changes. (See Carver Memo at Appendix). The exercises were further complicated by changing 
methods for accounting for the various categories of Viet Cong forces. The order of battle figures 
produced in the fall of 1967 dropped irregular force figures previously used, after strong argument 
against that action, at the Saigon Order of Battle Conference in September of 1967. When 
George Allen, Deputy to the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs at CIA, saw a comparison h\/ ni irhirlrlpnhic 


Saigon, on October 21, 1967: "Need your recommendation how to resolve problem of unknown 
percentage of enemy KIA (Killed in Action) and WIA (Wounded in Action) which comes from 
ranks of self-defense, assault youth and VC civilian supporters. Since these others not carried as 
part of VC strength, indicators of attrition could be misleading. 260 " 

When the Systems Analysis office in the Department of Defense examined the results of 
the conference and reinterpreted them in terms consistent with prior quantification, it remarked 
that the new estimate should have been 395,000-480,000 if computed on the same basis as before. 
The computations do not show that enemy strength has increased, but that previous estimates of 
enemy strength were too low." 261 

In the context of the late 1960's, numbers were not at all an academic exercise. Mr. 

Colby has testified that "(T) he effort to develop a number with respect to the enemy strength 
was a part of the advising of our government as to the amount of effort we would have to spend 
to counter that kind of (guerrilla) effort by the Viet Cong." 262 They were also used to inform 
Members of Congress and the American public on the progress in Vietnam. 

The validity of most of the numbers was significantly dubious. Unfortunately, they were 
relied on for optimistic presentations. For example, while mentioning in parenthetical and 
classified comments that the numbers supporting its indicators of progress in Vietnam were 
suspect, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research provided Assistant Secretary of State William 

of the order of battle figure used in November press briefings by M ACV with those tabulated 
before, he wrote the following notation: "This is a step in the right direction, but only a single 
step, not an entire journey. I consider this to be essentially a contrived retrospective effort aimed 
at rationalizing a phony comparison between the old figures and the new; the guerrilla estimate 
was controlled by the desire to stay below 300,000 within the framework of these selected 
criteria." (Emphasis in original) 

When questioned by the Committee, Allen attempted to downgrade the importance of 
his notations by characterizing them as "an emotional, knee-jerk reaction." Comm. Hearings, at 
Dec. 3, 1975. 

General Westmoreland provided the following comment concerning the reasons for 
elimination of "false figures" for the order of battle: "I can state with certainty that adoption of 
these figures would have created false and misleading impressions by the news media. Our 
concern was to keep the record straight, not be a part to misleading the American public as to the 
true enemy situation." Letter to Cong. Milford, from Gen. W.C. Westmoreland. 

260 Cable from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to American Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in 
Saigon, Oct. 21, 1967. 

261 Systems Analysis Division, OSD, "Southeast Asia Reports," December, 1967, p. 5. 

262 Comm. Hearings, at, Dec. 3, 1975. 

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Bundy with quantified measures of success. 263 General Westmoreland used such figures to 
support his contentions in the fall of 1967, that the enemy's "guerrilla force is declining at a steady 
rate." 264 

In testimony before this Committee, Mr. Colby has stated that the infatuation with 
numbers" was "one of the more trying experiences the Intelligence Community has had to 
endure." 265 In the context of the period it appears that considerable pressure was placed on 
the Intelligence Community to generate numbers, less out of tactical necessity than for political 

The Administration's need was for confirmation of the contention that there was fight at 
the end of the tunnel, that the pacification program was working and generally that American 

263 The memorandum to William Bundy is from Fred Greene of the State Department's 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research and is dated Sept. 22, 1967. It notes that claims of enemy 
captured, enemy recruited, weapons, lost, desertions, incidents of battalion size attacks, killed in 
action, vital roads opened, and the percentage of population under South Vietnamese control are 
not supported by the statistics. The memorandum also advises that Mr. Bundy not bring to fight 
other figures that present a negative picture. 

After alleging that the VC was having difficulties in its recruitment, Mr. Green goes on to 
point out, in a confidential comment, that "Recruitment statistics should be avoided since they 
are based on a relatively small number of reports of dubious reliability. Moreover, any use of 
recruitment figures might well be used by our critics to question the reliability of our estimate on 
Communist order of battle, a subject which almost certainly will soon cause us considerable 
public relations problems." 

264 "It is significant that the enemy has not won a major battle in more than a year. In 
general, he can fight his large forces only at the edges of his sanctuaries. . . His Viet Cong military 
units can no longer fill their ranks from the South but must depend increasingly on replacements 
from North Viet Nam. His guerrilla force is declining at a steady rate. Morale problems are 
developing within this ranks." He concluded by saying, "The enemy has many problems: He is 
losing control of the scattered population under his influence. He is losing credibility with the 
population he still controls. He is alienating the people by his increased demands and taxes, 
where he can impose them. He sees the strength of his forces steadily declining. He can no 
longer recruit in the South to any meaningful extent; he must plug the gap with North 
Vietnamese. His monsoon offensives have been failures. He was dealt a mortal blow by the 
installation of a freely elected representative government. And he failed in his desperate effort to 
take the world's headlines from the inauguration by a military victory." General Westmoreland, 
"Progress Report on the War in Viet Nam," before the national Press Club, Washington, D.C., 
Nov. 21, 1967. 

265 "As I look back over the past ten years, I view this infatuation with numbers as one of 
the most trying experiences the Intelligence Community has had to endure. In the minds of 
many, the penchant for numbers created pressures which made a task that was at best difficult 
almost impossible to achieve." Colby, Comm. Hearings, at [ |, Dec. 3, 1975. 



involvement in Vietnam was not only correct, but effective. 266 In this sense, the Intelligence 
Community could not help but find its powers to effect objective analysis substantially 
undermined. Whether this was by conspiracy or not is somewhat irrelevant. 

b. The Consequences 

Four months after the Saigon Order of Battle Conference, the Tet offensive began. On 
February 1, hours after the initial mass assaults, General Westmoreland explained to a press 
conference, "I'm frank to admit I didn't know he (the enemy) would do it on the occasion of Tet 
itself. I thought he would do it before or after." 26 The U.S. naval officer in command of the 
river forces in the Mekong Delta and his army counterpart were similarly caught off guard. 

Appalled at how poorly positioned they were to provide quick and efficient response, the naval 
officer, now a retired Vice Admiral, has told the Committee that he "well remember (s) the 
worlds of the Army General who brought us the orders to extricate ourselves from the mudflats 
as fast as possible. They were, 'It's Pearl Harbor all over again'." 268 

The April, 1968, post-mortem done by a collection of intelligence officers discussed the 
general question of warning. It concluded that while units in one corps area were on alert, allied 
forces throughout the country generally were caught unprepared for what was unfolding. Certain 
forces even while "on a higher than normal state of alert" were postured to meet "inevitable cease- 
fire violations rather than attacks on the cities." In other areas "the nature and extent of the 

According to George Allen, pressure was put on CIA by Walt Rostow, Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, to prepare positive indicators of progress in the 
pacification program. When Mr. Allen suggested that there were few, he received the reply, "I am 
amazed at your unwillingness to support your President in his time of need." Rostow then 
requested that the Office of Current Intelligence produce a compilation of extracts showing 
progress, which OCI did, while attaching a cover letter caveat. Rostow removed the cover letter 
and reported to the President "at last an objective appraisal from CIA." Staff interview with 
George Allen, Dec. 1, 1975. 


Because of premature enemy attacks in the Pleiku area, Gen. Westmoreland did notify his 

• commanders to expect attacks on the night of January 30. There were substantial variations, 
however, concerning how widely such alerts spread throughout the country. See Appendix for 

— April, 1968 report "Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive." 


t ifi8 See Appendix for letter to Chairman Pike from R.S. Salzer, Vice Admiral, USN, (Ret.) 
of Dec. 5, 1975. 

The United State Military Academy's Readings in Current Military History (1969) begins 
its description of the Tet offensive by stating, 'The first thing to understand about Giap's Tet 
: offensive is that it was an allied intelligence failure ranking with Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the 
« Ardennes offensive in 1944. The North Vietnamese gained complete surprise. To that single 
! factor can be traced the campaign's initial tactical success and, far more important, its tremendous 
« psychological impact in America." 

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enemy's attacks were almost totally unexpected." 269 One-half of the South Vietnamese army 
was on leave at the time of the attacks, observing a 36-hour standdown. 270 

In testimony before this Committee, both General Graham and William Colby confirmed 
the fact of some amount of surprise. General Graham preferred to label it surprise at the enemy's 
"rashness." Mr. Colby spoke of a misjudgment of their potential "intensity, coordination and 

Even though quick corrective action was taken to salvage American equipment and 
protect U.S. personnel, the ultimate ra mif ications on political and military fronts were 
considerable. General Westmoreland requested a dramatic increase of 206,000 in U.S. troop 
strength, and additional equipment supplies. Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford began rethinking 
the substance of intelligence. A collection of intelligence officers finally briefed the President of 
the Untied States on the realities of the Vietnam War in mid- March, and a few days later he 

• T71 

announced he would not seek re-election. 

269 See Appendix for April, 1968 report entitled, "Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive." 

"Intelligence Warning of the Tet Offensive." 

This same report acknowledges that irregular units, omitted or slighted during the Saigon 
Order of Battle Conference and the press briefings, participated in the Tet attack. It further 
suggests that main force units (classic order of battle elements) were held back from the assault by 
the NVA, in anticipation of the mass urban uprisings that the irregulars were attempting to 

The "Intelligence" section of Gen. Wheeler's report upon his return from a Special 
Mission to assess the Vietnam situation (Wheeler was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) 
indicates that the estimate of enemy forces committed in Tet through February 23 came from 
"accepted pre-offensive strength of all VC/NVA committed maneuver battalions, regiments, and 
local force companies and platoons in the affected areas." The total figure of 67, 305 enemy 
committed at Tet, therefore, did not include "the number of guerrillas, combat support, 
administrative services, or infrastructure personnel who participated, although we know that 
elements of all of these were used." 

270 Ibid., and Annex A of the MACV Command History, "Tet Offensive in Retrospect." 

271 Immediately after the Tet offensive, President Johnson began to seek independent 
assessments of the U.S. role in Vietnam. Turning first to Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of 
State, he solicited opinions from an informal study group, known as the "Wise Men." Startled by 
the pessimism of these advisors from outside of the government, the President demanded an 
individual presentation of three briefings provided to the group, in order to discover "who 
poisoned the well." George Carver from CIA opined that the President had a two-audience 
problem and could not very well continue to tell the Americans one thing and the Vietnamese 

Staff interview with George Carver, Jan. 9, 1975. 


c. The Aftermath 

The Committee received testimony that problems with intelligence in Vietnam were not 
confined to Tet. Up to the last days of South Vietnam's existence, certain blinder prevented 
objective reporting from the field and an accurate assessment of the field situation by Washington. 
Tet raised the issue of whether American intelligence could effectively account for enemy strength. 
Later events, among them the collapse of the Saigon government, pointed to a failure to properly 
acknowledge weaknesses of allies. 272 

A real attempt to address the shortcomings of friendly forces in Vietnam was hampered 
by many factors. During the time of massive American presence, there was a failure to attribute 
at least partial South Vietnamese "success" to American air power and logistics support. 
Consequently, projected ARVN performance in 1975, after the U.S. pullout, was measured 
against the yardstick of the Easter Offensive of 1972, when American support was crucial. 273 

Mission restrictions curtailed necessary collection activity be professional intelligence 
officers, and forced reliance on officials charged with military aid responsibilities. This promoted 
biased interpretations 274 

The sum total of restrictions, manipulations, and censorship no doubt led to the 
conclusion Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, reached at an April, 1975, news 
conference. He pointed out that "the strength, resiliency and steadfastness of those forces (South 
Vietnamese) were more highly valued than they should have been, so that the misestimate, I 
think, applied largely to Saigon's capabilities rather than Hanoi's intentions." 275 

C n 

272 Besides the loss of life during the confusion that surrounded the fall of southern cities, 
including Saigon, vast quantities of American material were left behind. In July of 1975 the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) began a collection plan to inventory the 
kind and amount of SIGINT equipment abandoned (July 15, 1975 Internal OASDI 

273 Comm. Hearings, at | ], Dec. 3, 1975. Statement of Colonel Henry A. Shockly, Chief of 
Collection and Liaison, Defense Attache Office, Vietnam, March 1974-March, 1975. 

274 Defense attaches in Vietnam held the dual responsibilities of monitoring military aid and 
coordinating intelligence reporting on friendly forces. The former tended to affect the latter, and 
attaches would use supply figures to interpret South Vietnamese capabilities toward the end of the 

oJ The Ambassador in Vietnam in 1975 "personally and through his Political Section 

51 monitored very closely the intelligence reporting from Vietnam." Reports on the political and 

• economic conditions (including reports on corruption) were either censored or retained within the 
St Embassy. (See Henry A. Shockley, "Intelligence Collection in Vietnam, March 1974-March 

3 1975" in Appendix.) 

•! 275 April, 1975 press conference, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger. Col. Shockley 

I concluded his report on intelligence collection in Vietnam by stating, "From my earliest 

• associations with Vietnam (1961), I have been concerned about U.S. handling of information 

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Ultimately, the Vietnam intelligence experience is a sobering reminder of the limitations 
and pitfalls the United States can expect to encounter if it chooses to align itself in 
unconventional battle with unconventional allies. It illustrates how very different guerrilla war is 
from World War II, and how much more problematic an alliance with emerging and unstable 
Third World governments will be. 

Reviewing the American experience in Indochina, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence wrote a note of caution to the Secretary of Defense emphasizing the following view: 

"The problems that occurred in Vietnam or Cambodia can now be occurring in our 
efforts to assess [an allied and an adversary Third World country sl forces, forces in the Persian 
Gulf or forces in the Middle East. These problems must be addressed before the U.S. becomes 
involved in any future crisis in the third world that requires objective and timely intelligence 
analysis." 276 

Given the substantial American involvement in these areas, strong remedies and honest 
retrospect appear necessary, to overcome and prevent intelligence output that fails, for whatever 
reason, to present comprehensive and undisguised perceptions of war. 

2. Czechoslovakia: Failure of tactical warning 

The Czechoslovakia crisis challenged our ability to monitor an attack by the Soviet 
Union--our prime military adversary. We 'lost" the Russian army, for two weeks. 

from that area. Despite the Up services paid to the 'accords' the U.S. Mission in Vietnam 
displayed a highly partisan and paternal attitude towards the Vietnamese military estabhshments. 
This included dehberate and reflexive manipulation of information, restrictions on coUections and 
censorship of reporting. The net result was that decision makers were denied the opportunity to 
get a complete flow of information, determine its vahdity for themselves, and make decisions 
accordingly." (See Henry A. Shockley, "Intelhgence Collection in Vietnam, March 1974- March 
1975" in Appendix.) 

276 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Need for Independent Study of 
Intelhgence Performance During the Collapse of Vietnam and Cambodia=j=ACTION 
MEMORANDUM, no date. An internal memorandum of the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Intelhgence of October 22, 1975 additionally points out that one potential bias 
preventing objective assessment in Third World countries pertains to the nature of U.S. military 
aid. In a review of the U.S. intelhgence capabilities in [an allied Third World country), the 
memorandum comments, 'The focus in assessing [an allied country's! weaknesses tends to be on 
the equipment shortages and the logistic aid the [an allied country| lacks. No assessment is made 
of [an allied country's) ability to use the equipment or its impact on the balance when obtained. 
All additions to equipment and aid tend to be viewed as good. Problems in absorption and 
conversion are ignored. In short, the analysis gives the appearance of either an unqualified 
justification for more aid or an 'insurance policy' advance apologia for possible future failure as 
ascribable to inadequacy of aid." 



Forces of the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968, to overthrow the 
Dubcek regime which, since spring, had been moving toward liberal, independent policies the 
Soviets could not tolerate. U.S. intelligence had understood and reported the basic issues in the 
developing Soviet-Czech confrontation, and concluded that the Soviets were capable of launching 
an invasion at any time. 

Intelligence faded, however, to provide a warning that the Soviets had "decided to 
intervene with force." Consequently, President Johnson first learned of the invasion when 
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin visited the White House and told him. 278 

A review of U.S. intelligence performance during the Czech crisis indicates the agencies 
were not up to the difficult task of divining Soviet intentions. 279 Wc knew Soviet capabilities, 
and that the tactical decision to invade might leave only hours of advance warning. The CIA, 

DIA, and NSA should have been prepared for lightning-quick reaction to Soviet military moves. 

Czech radio broadcasted news of the invasion at 8:50 p.m., Washington time. CIA 
translated and transmitted its reports of invasion to Washington at 9: 1 5 p.m. 280 By that time, 

277 * 

"How well did we report the issues? The answer is that wc understood and reported 
them well. With a flood of open polemics and covert reporting, this was not difficult. . .How 
I well did we report the build-up of Soviet capabilities? The job of strategic warning was well 
done. . How well did we provide more specific warning? We did not suggest to our readers, just 
before the invasion, that the Soviets had decided to intervene with force. Certain items of 
information, collected by technical means before the invasion but not available in Washington 
until afterward, might have made a difference." "Field and Finished Reporting on the 
Czechoslovak-Soviet Crisis", 18 Oct. 1968, CIA, p. 1. 


In his book, The Vantage Point, President Lyndon Johnson writes that at 7:06 p.m. he 
received a call from Walt W. Rostow, his National Security Advisor, requesting an appointment 
for Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin later that evening. An appointment was set up for 8:00 p.m. 
fyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point, N.Y., (1971). 

279 -tt. • 

, 1 nis post-mortem reports that the DIA was able to follow military developments prior to 

•he invasion in a "reasonably accurate" manner, but the DIA had not made a judgment that the 
•soviets would invade. "I hat DIA did not predict the Soviet decision to invade is a more 
Sindamental problem. It is a reasonable assessment that we did not have evidence on which to 
make such a prediction, but beyond that, we neither examined this key question nor took positive 
to collect information on it. (emphasis supplied) The post-mortem pointed out that to 
g overlook the issue of intent was to "ignore a vital part of our mission." "Intelligence and the 
2 Czechoslovak Crisis, "1 Nov. 1968, DIA. 

r 280 * 

President Johnson staff had not informed anyone in the intelligence community that 
t Ambassador Dobrynin had requested an appointment at such short notice. It is not clear, 
iiowever, that this eleventh-hour signal would have substantially increased U.S. ability to respond. 

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President Johnson had already met his appointment with the Soviet Ambassador. 

U.S. technical intelligence learned of the Soviet invasion several hours bcfore^ut the 
information did not reach Washington until after the Czech radio message. The CIA later 
concluded that the information "might have made a difference" 281 in our ability to provide the 
tactical warning. 

One alarming failure of intelligence prior to the invasion occurred during the first two 
weeks in August, when U.S. intelligence could not locate a Soviet combat formation, which had 
moved into northern Poland. Director Helms later admitted he was not "happy about those two 
weeks" when he could not locate the Soviet troops. 282 

Information from technical intelligence, which would have been helpful, was not available 
until days later. Clandestine reporting in the previous weeks had been so slow to arrive it proved 
of little value to current intelligence publications. 283 

Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms reported to the President's Foreign 
Intelligence record of failing detect the actual attack "distresses me." 284 The Director provided 
reassurances that the record would have been better "if West Germany had been the target rather 
than Czechoslovakia." 285 

In 1971, a Presidential Commission reported to President Nixon that its review of U.S. 
ability to respond to sudden attack had found serious weaknesses. 286 The Pentagon was 

Director of Central Intelligence briefing for President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Oct. 

4, 1968, at 15 and 16. 

281 Ibid. | 

282 DCI Briefing for PFIAB, "Intelligence Warning and the Czech Crisis," 4 Oct. 1968, p. 6. 

283 "Reports from clandestine sources generally were too late in arriving to be of use in 
reporting on current developments." Of one potentially valuable clandestine report, also late in 
arriving, the post-mortem commented: "Had this report come in earlier it would have raised even 
more our sense of alarm about Soviet intentions toward the Dubcek regime." "Field and Finished 
Reporting on the Czechoslovak-Soviet Crisis," 18 Oct. 1968, CIA, at 20. 

284 DCI Briefing for PFIAB, 4 Oct. 1968, at 15 and 16. 

285 Ibid. 

286 regard to National Co mm and and Control capability, we find that: 

— The vulnerability of the present National Military Command System (NMCS) to 
nuclear attack is a dangerously weak element in the U.S. strategic deterrence posture. 

directed to improve its warning system. Improvement to the very best possible degree is, or 
course, the minimum acceptable standard. There will be no more important area for 
Congressional oversight committees to explore thoroughly. 


3. The Mid-east war — the system breaks down 

The Mid-East War gave the intelligence community a real test of how it can perform 
when all its best technology and human skills are focused on a known world "hot spot." It failed. 

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a major assault across the Suez Canal and 
Golan Heights against a stunned Israel. Although Israel eventually repelled the attack, at a cost 
of thousands of lives, the war's consequences cannot be measure in purely military terms. 

For Americans, the subsequent U.S. Soviet confrontation of October 24-25, 1975, when 
the Soviets threatened to unilaterally intervene in the conflict, and the Arab oil embargo are 
reminders that war in the Middle East has a direct impact on our own national interests. 

The Committee's analysis of the U.S. intelligence performance in this crisis confirms the 
judgment of an intelligence community post-mortem that "the principal conclusions concerning 
the imminence of hostilities . . .were quite — simply, obviously, and starkly — wrong." 287 Even 
after the conflict had begun, we did not accurately monitor the course of events. 288 

— The capability of the National Military Co mm and System is being reduced, apparently 
for budgetary reasons. There is no discernible activity to satisfy the recognized requirement for a 
viable, survivable command system. 

— Provisions for the continuity of political authority and for the assurance of authorized 
retaliatory decisions in the event of nuclear attack are inadequate. 

— The National Military Command System cannot provide the information that is 
assumed to be required by the National Command Authorities in time for a rapid decision 
regarding retaliation." The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report on National Command and 
Control and Defense Intelligence, July 1, 1970, at 1. 

287 The Post-Mortem begins with the following statement: "There was an intelligence failure 
in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on 6 October." (Emphasis in 
original). "The Performance of the Intelligence Community Before the Arab-Israeli War of 
October 1973: A Preliminary Post-Mortem Report," December 20, 1973, prepared by the 

^ Intelligence Community Staff, at 4. 

288 "-pjyj s tudy reviews U.S. intelligence coverage of the tactical military situation around 
Suez during the final critical phase of the October war. It concluded: (1) that the U.S. 
intelligence community was not able to track accurately the course of military developments 

6 during the war, particularly during its critical stages from 16 to 26 October; (2) that — contrary to 
intelligence available at the time to the U.S. — Israeli entrapment of the Egyptian 3rd Army 
8 probably did not occur until after the first ceasefire was scheduled to go into effect on 22 October; 




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The important question is: what went wrong? 

The last relevant National Intelligence Estimate before the October War was published 
five months earlier, in May, 1973, during a particularly bad period in Arab- Israeli relations. 

That estimate addressed the likelihood of war "in the next few weeks". No long-range view was 

presented, and the crisis soon passed. 

The only intelligence report concerned with future political -military issues was a May 31, 
1973, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) memorandum to Secretary of State 
Rogers. 290 The authors reasoned correctly that Egypt's President Sadat, for political reasons, 

and (3) that Israeli violations of the second cease-fire on 24 October were thus designed to 

consolidate the entrapment. . 

"The study also indicated that the Soviets probably had a more accurate view ot the 
military situation during this period than the U.S. Thus, while the U.S. apparently was confident 
that the Israelis had cut off the Egyptian 3rd Army before the first cease-fire, the Soviets were 
probably informed, correctly, to the contrary. In these circumstances, then, Washington had lar 
less reason to ascribe significance to Israeli cease-fire violations than Moscow. 

"We do not know whether, in fact, these differing appreciations contributed to the 
development of a confrontation between the U.S. and USSR during the final three days of the 
crisis (24-26 October). But this seems to be a real possibility. And it is clear in any event that in 
certain crises and under certain circumstances an accurate view of the tactical military situation 
can be of critical importance to decision makers." (Emphasis in original) "Post-Mortem Report. 
Military Intelligence During an International Crisis: Israel's West Bank Campaign m October 
1973," a Study Produced by the Intelligence Community Staff for the Director of Central 
Intelligence, Nov. 11, 1974. 

289 Page 16 of the CIA's Post-Mortem points out that the National Intelligence Estimate 
focused almost exclusively on Egypt. A draft of the CIA Post-Mortem, "Written Input to the^ 
Intelligence Community Post-Mortem on the Period Before the October 1973 Mid-East War, 
states the possibility of a concerted Arab effort was "not fully addressed" in the estimate 
"Possible Egyptian- Israeli Hostilities," May 17, 1973, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 30-73. 

290 This Memorandum, although it did not dissent from the National Intelligence Estimate 
of May 17 argued the case for Arab intervention on political grounds. 1 wo passages from this 
remarkable memorandum deserve attention because they argue that American diplomatic moves 
may be the key to war or peace in the Middle East. One might argue, accordingly, that key 
intelligence officials should be fully informed on diplomatic steps - the key to the intelligence 

q "Although he |Sadat] has no illusions that Egypt can defeat Israel militarily, he seems on 
the verge of concluding that only limited hostilities against Israel stand any real chance of 
breaking the negotiating stalemate by forcing the big powers to intervene with an imposed 
solution. Should he shed his last doubts about whether military action is essential to achieve this 
American shift, the only remaining decision would relate to the timing and scope of his move. . . 

scan by 

85 | 

would be strongly tempted to resort to arms if diplomacy proved fruitless. Accordingly, the 
report concluded, the "resumption of hostilities by autumn will become a better than even bet" 
should the diplomatic impasse continue. 

By September 30, 1975 — less than a week before the attack — INR had lost "the wisdom 
of the Spring." 91 By then, all U.S. intelligence agencies argued that the political climate in the 
Arab nations was not conducive to a major war. Intelligence consumers were reassured that 
hostilities were not likely. 292 

The next question is why this happened. 

Analytical bias was part of the problem. 293 In the summer of 1973, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DLA), CIA, and INR all flatly asserted that Egypt was not capable of a 
major assault across the Suez Canal. Syria, they said, was not much of a threat either, despite 

"It is not very relevant to weigh the credibility of any particular military scenario. From 
Sadat's point of view, the overriding desideratum is some form of military action which can be 
sustained long enough, despite Israel's counterattacks, both to activate Washington and Moscow 
and to galvanize the other Arab states, especially the major oil producers, into anti-American 
moves." "Information Memorandum to the Secretary," from Ray S. Cline, Director, Intelligence 
and Research, May 31, 1973. 

CIA Post-Mortem, page 15. Also, INR Memorandum to the Secretary of State, 30 Sept. 
1973, "In our view, the political climate in the Arab states argues against a major Syrian military 
move against Israel at this time. The possibility of a more limited Syrian strike — perhaps one 
designed to retaliate for the pounding the Syrian Air Force took from the Israelis on September 
13 -- cannot, of course, be excluded." 

292 "If analysts did not provide forewarning, what did they offer in its stead? Instead of 
warnings, the Community's analytical effort in effect produced reassurances. That is to say, the 
analysts, in reacting to indicators which could be interpreted in themselves as portents of hostile 
Arab actions against Israel, sought in effect to reassure their audience that the Arabs would not 
resort to war, at least not deliberately." (Emphasis in original) CIA's Post-Mortem, page 3. 

293 CIA-DIA-INR-Arab-Israeli Handbook, July 1973. The CIA's Post-Mortem at 13 
characterizes this Handbook and analytic preconceptions: "No preconceptions seem to have had 
a greater impact on analytical attitudes than those concerning relative Arab and Israeli military 
prowess. The June War was frequently invoked by analysts as proof of fundamental and perhaps 
permanent weaknesses int eh Arab forces and, inferentially, of Israeli invincibility. The Arabs, 
despite the continuing acquisition of modem weapons from the Russians, remained about as far 
behind the Israelis as ever." At page 14 the post-mortem concludes: "There was, in addition, a 
fairly widespread notion based largely (though perhaps not entirely) on past performances that 
many Arabs, as Arabs, simply weren't up to the demands of modem warfare and that they lacked 
understanding, motivation, and probably in some cases courage as well. These judgments were 
often alluded to in conversations between analysts. . . " 

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recent acauisitions of sophisticated Soviet SA-6 and SA-7 missile systems and other 
material. 2 4 

One reason for the analysts' optimism can be found in a 1971 CIA handbook, in a 
passage reiterated and reinforced in discussions in early October, 1973. The Arab fighting main, it 
reported, "lacks the necessary physical and cultural qualities for performing effective military 
services." 295 The Arabs were thought to be so clearly inferior that another attack would be 
irrational and, thus, out of the question. 

No doubt this attitude was not far in the background when CIA advised Dr. Kissinger on 
September 30, 1975, that, "the whole thrust of President Sadat's activities since last spring has 
been in direction of bringing moral, political, and economic force to bear on Israel in tacit 
acknowledgement of Arab unreadiness to make war. " 296 

That analysis is quite surprising, in light of information acquired during that period, 
which indicated that imminent war was distinct possibility. By late September, for example, CIA 
had acquired vital evidence of the timing and warlike intentions of the Arabs. The source was 
disbelieved, for reasons still unclear. 297 

There were other positive indications. In late September, the National Securitj^Agency 
began picking up clear sign, that Egypt and Syria were preparing for a major offensive. 2 
NSA information indicated that [a major foreign nation) had become extremely sensitive to the 
prospect of war and concerned about their citizens and dependents in Egypt. NSA's warnings 

294 Ibid. 

295 "Israel superiority in such factors as technical competence, morale, leadership and the like 
offsets the Egyptians (or all Arab) superiority in quantities of men and equipment." CIA-DIA- 
INR Arab-Israeli Handbook, July 1973. 

296 CIA Assessment of Purported Syrian Military Preparations, Memorandum for the 
Secretary of State, 30 September, 1973. 

297 "Certainly few intelligence analysts seem prepared to believe the contents and implications 
of the reports on [Arab| attack plans. This was partly so because there was an element of 'cry 
wolf in them (the imminence of an Arab attack on Israel had been repeatedly reported since 
May), partly because there was contradictory reporting from clandestine and other sources, partly 
for reasons (e.g., the predisposition of the analysts themselves . .)" . . .The accuracy of this vital 
information seemed to "have been basically confirmed" when the Post-Mortem was written. CIA 
Post-Mortem, at 6. 

298 CIA's Post-Mortem, at 8, reports at least seven "unusual" indicators were picked up by 
the National Security Agency. 

87 I 

escaped the serious attention of most intelligence analysts responsible for the Middle East. 299 

The fault may well lie in the system itself. NSA intercepts of Egyptian-Syrian war 
preparations in this period were so voluminous — an average of hundreds of reports each week — 
that few analysts had time to digest more than a small portion of them. E'ven fewer analysts were 
qualified by technical training to read raw NSA traffic. 0 Costly intercept s had scant impact 
on estimates. 

These reports lacked visibility and prestige to such a degree that when, two days before 
the war, an NSA briefer insisted to General Daniel Graham of CIA that unusual Arab 
movements suggested imminent hostilities, Graham retorted that his staff had reported a "ho- 
hum" day in the Middle East. 301 Later, a key military analyst claimed that if he had only seen 
certain NSA reports, which were so "sensitive" they had not been disseminated until after the war 
began, he would have forecast hostilities. 302 

There was testimony that Dr. Kissinger's secrecy may also have thwarted effective 
intelligence analysis. Kissinger had been in close contact with both the Soviets and the Arabs 

299 The draft CIA Post-Mortem states that NSA SIGINT Summaries probably did not 
convey the fuff significance of these technical indicators to the reader. The conclusion of all 
intelligence officials interviewed by the Committee staff was unanimous: the National Security 
Agency products — particularly raw products — are difficult to understand. The CIA's Post- 
Mortem, page 9, states the problem with NSA products as seen by Middle East intelligence 
analysts: "Two particular problems associated with SIGINT should be mentioned here: (1) 

Certain highly classified and specially handled categories of CO MI NT reached their consumers 
only several days after intercept, a circumstance which perhaps had unfortunate effects; (2) 

SIGINT reporting is very voluminous; in a typical non-crisis week, hundreds of SIGINT reports 
on the Middle East cross the desk of the area specialist in a production office. Moreover, partly 
because of the requirements levied on it by a wide variety of consumers, NSA issues most 
SIGINT reports (not merely ELINT) in very technical language. SIGINT can thus challenge the 
ingenuity of even the most experienced, all-source analyst searching for meaning and patterns in a 
mountain of material." See, note for an explanation of the difficulties analysts had with 

■j contradictory clandestine reports). 

300 Ibid. Committee staff interviews with present and former intelligence officials illustrated 
jj ‘his point. One former official went so far as to state the State Department really had only one 
r; or two persons fully qualified to understand raw National Security Agency products. Interview 
f with the State Department official, by G. Rushford, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 



2 301 Committee staff interview with NSA briefer, by G. Rushford, Sept. 5, 1975, copy on file 

|I with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

• 302 From the Draft CIA Post-Mortem: "If the information contained in the NSA messages 

! had been available prior to the time of the outbreak of hostilities, we could have clearly predicted 
[ that [a foreign nation] knew in advance that renewed hostilities were imminent in the Middle 
« East." This particular type of NSA-acquired intelligence was delayed "a minimum of ten days." 

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throughout the pre-war period. He, presumably, was in a unique position to pick up indications 
of Arab dissatisfaction with diplomatic talks, and signs of an ever-increasing Soviet belief that war 
would soon break out. When the Committee was denied its request for high-level reports, it was 
unable to learn whether Kissinger elicited this information in any usable form. It is clear, 
however, that the Secretary passed no such warnings to the intelligence community. 303 

The Committee was told by high U.S. intelligence officials and policy-makers that 
information from high-level diplomatic contacts is of great intelligence value as an often-reliable 
indicator of both capabilities and intentions. 304 Despite the obvious usefulness of this 
information, Dr. Kissinger has continued to deny intelligence officials access to notes of his talks 
with foreign leaders. 

The morning of the Arab attack, the Watch Committee — which is responsible for crisis 
alerts — met to assess the likelihood of major hostilities. It concluded that no major, coordinated 
offensive was in the offing. 305 Perhaps one of the reasons for this was that some participants 
were not "cleared" for all intelligence data, so the subject and its implications could not be fully 

303 Among such reports on Soviet and Arab attitudes were "The Secretary's Afternoon 
Summary," 27 Sept., 1973 which reported an intelligence finding that a high Arab official "has 
said that Kissinger's statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that U.S. policy 
in the Middle East remains the same, destroyed the recent Egyptian hope aroused by President 
Nixon's comment that the U.S. is partial neither to the Arabs or to Israel." See, not for an earlier 
intelligence estimate the Arabs would go to war for political reasons, and that the American 
attitude on diplomacy was an important factor. But the intelligence community was not privy to 
high-level diplomatic conversations between the Secretary of State and Soviet/Arab diplomats. 

304 Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson stated in a Committee staff interview he regularly 
submitted to the CIA memos of his conversations with Soviet diplomats on the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks. Ray S. Cline, former Director of Intelligence and Research, State Department 
(and Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA) told his Committee that the "nuances" of high-level 
diplomatic conversations often contain the best intelligence. Cline believes some high U.S. 
intelligence officials should analyze such conversations regularly. Many intelligence officials made 
the same points in Committee staff interviews; they feel hampered by the lack of information 
from high level administration figures. 

305 "The Watch Committee met in special session at 0900 on 6 October 1973 to consider the 
outbreak of Israeli-Arab hostilities and Soviet actions with respect to the situation. 

"We can find no hard evidence of a major, coordinated Egyptian/Syrian offensive across the 
Canal and in the Golan Heights area. Rather, the weight of evidence indicates an action-reaction 
situation where a series of responses by each side to preconceived threats created an increasingly 
dangerous potential for confrontation. The current hostilities are apparently a result of that 
situation, although we are in a position to clarify the sequence of events. It is possible that the 
Egyptians or Syrians, particularly the latter, amy have been preparing a raid or other small-scale 
action." Special Meeting of the Watch Committee, Oct. 7, 1973. 


discussed. 306 

The entire system had malfunctioned. Massive amounts of data had proven indigestible 
by analysts. Analysts, reluctant to raise false alarms and lulled by anti-Arab biases, ignored clear 
warnings. Top-level policy-makers declined to share perceptions gained from talks with key Arab 
and Soviet diplomats during the critical period. The fact that Israeli intelligence, to which the 
U.S. often deferred in this period, had been wrong was small consolation. 

Performance did not measurably improve after the war's outbreak, when the full 
resources of the U.S. intelligence community were focused on the Middle Fast. 307 

The Defense Intelligence Agency, having no military contingency plan for the area, 
proved unable to deal with a deluge of reports from the war zone, and quickly found itself in 
chaos. 308 CIA and INR also engulfed Washington and each other with situation reports, 
notable for their redundancy. 309 

Technical intelligence-gathering was untimely, as well as indiscriminate. U.S. national 

3°6 "Although it is not mentioned in the report, I am informed that compartmentation 
restrictions on sensitive material — in particular the clandestine reports on Arab plans — were 
such that some Watch Committee representatives at meetings in the few days before the war were 
not aware of these reports and that they were not discusses as evidence at these sessions." The 
Watch Committee was abolished in 1975. Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence 
on "Middle East Post-Mortem Report on Intelligence Performance before the October War," 13 
February 1974, by William Clements, Deputy Director of Defense. 

307 See, note ( ]. 

308 "One hard lesson learned was that no mechanism existed, or developed, to maintain firm, 
centralized control over the heavy volume of specific requests for Middle East Crisis associate 
intelligence received through various channels. Initially, working analysts were deluged with a 
completely unmanageable flow of requirements which impinged heavily and frustratingly on the 
'ime available to do the regularly programmed MEITF activities, ie., preparation of the SITREP 
and Spot Reports, briefings, statistical charts and graphics, specirl quick response queries from 
high level officials, etc." "Lessons Learned from 1973 Middle East Crisis," Defense Intelligence 
Agency, undated, p. 7. 

309 The CIA's Post-Mortem recommended the community "consider the adoption of a 
coherent national family of products for publication during periods of crisis, so as to provide 

high-level consumers with frequent assessments and with warning advisories as appropriate, and 
« so as to create a system which would ensure rapid coordination and the effective expression of 
« any important divergences of views." Unfortunately, this has not been accomplished, and in July- 
August 1974 the Post-Mortem again complained at the redundancy of agency publications which 
; were confusing to their readers. Several "working level" analysts suggested in interviews with 
Committee staff that only the Director of Central Intelligence has the authority to force the upper 
S management of the CIA to do what these analysts think is necessary for current intelligence 
! publications: reduce them by at least 50%. According to this view, too many analysts are too 
« busy meeting each day's publication schedule to think and write in adequate perspective. 

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technical means of overhead coverage of the Middle East, according to the post-mortem, was "of 
no practical value" because of time problems. Two overflight reconnaissance missions, on 
October 13 and 25 , "straddled the most critical phase of the war and were, therefore, of little 

use." 310 

The U.S. failure to accurately track war developments may have contributed to a U.S. 
Soviet confrontation and troop alert called by President Nixon on October 24, 1973. 311 

A second intelligence community post-mortem, the existence of which was not disclosed 
to the Committee until after its hearing 3 2 , reported that CIA and DIA almost unquestioningly 
relied on overly-optimistic Israeli battle reports. Thus misled, the U.S. clashed with the better- 
informed Soviets on the Latter's strong reaction to Israeli cease-fire violations. Soviet threats to 
intervene militarily were met with a worldwide U.S. troop alert. Poor intelligence had brought 
America to the brink of war. 

Administration witnesses assured the Committee that analysts who had performed poorly 
during the crisis had been replaced. 313 The broader record suggests, however, that the 
intelligence system faults have survived largely intact. New analysts will continue to find 
themselves harassed and deluged with largely equivocal, unreadable, or unusable data from CIA, 
DIA, INR, and the collection-conscious NSA. At the same time, they can expect to be cut off, 
by top-level policy-makers, from some of the best indicators of hostile intentions. 

310 In addition, National Security Agency products were "too spotty to identify the forward 
edge of the battle." "Military Intelligence During an International Crisis: Israel's West Bank 
Campaign in October 1973," at 3 and 4. 

3 1 1 "We do not know whether, in fact, these differing appreciations contributed to the 
development of a confrontation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during the final three days of the 
crisis (24-26 October). But this seems to be a real possibility. And it is clear in any event that in 
certain crises and under certain circumstances an accurate view of the tactical military situation 
can be of critical importance to decision-makers." Also: "If U.S. decision-makers had a more 
accurate view of the tactical situation around Suez between 21 and 25 October, they might have 
had better insight into why the Soviets reacted as they did to the Israeli violations." Ibid., at 1 
and 5. 

312 The second post-mortem, quoted in footnotes [ ] and [ |, was not given to any 
Congressional Committee, even those who were told of the first post-mortem. 

313 Three DIA officials were removed from their positions; there were no changes at the 
CIA, INR, or NSA. Community analysts interviewed by Committee staff all agreed the 
reassignments involved internal DIA controversies more than any effort to revamp the agency 
after the Middle East War. 


4. Portugal: the U.S. caught napping 

Do our intelligence services know what is going on beneath the surface in allied nations 
that are not making headlines? Quiet Portugal exploded in 1 974, leaving serious questions in its 

When a group of left-leaning Portuguese junior military officers ousted the Caetano 
regime on April 25, 1974, State Department officials represented to the New York Times that 
Washington knew those who were behind the coup well. State indicated that we were not 
surprised by the coup, and that no significant changes in Portugal's NATO membership were 
expected. 314 Nothing could have been further from the truth. 

The Committee has reviewed documents which show that the U.S. intelligence 
community had not even been tasked to probe deeply into Portugal in the waning months of the 
Caetano dictatorship. 315 As a result, policy makers were given no real warning of the timing 
and probable ideological consequences of the coup, despite clear and public indications that a 
political upheaval was at hand. 16 

The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research had not analyzed events in 
Portugal in the month before the April coup. In retrospect, four warning signals, beginning in 
late February and continuing through mid- March, 1974, should have sparked "speculation at that 
time that a crisis of major proportions was brewing," according to the Director of Intelligence and 
Research, William Hyland. All four events were reported in the American press 317 : 

1. The publication in February 1974, of General Antonio de Spinola's controversial 
book criticizing Portugal's African colonial wars, which unleashed an unprecedented public storm. 

2. The refusal of General Spinola and the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Francisco Costa 
Gomes, to participate in a demonstration of military unity and support for the Caetano 

3. An abortive coup, in mid-March, when an infantry regiment attempted to march 
upon Lisbon. This was followed by the subsequent dismissal of Spinola and Costa Gomes from 
their commands. 

m 314 "u jj Aides Expect Lisbon's Tie to NATO to Remain 1 Unchanged." New York Times, 
j Apr. 26, 1974, 12:4. 


Interview with Dennis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council, by G. 
Rushford, Oct. 3, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. Mr. Cliff stated there was no 
National Security Council effort to levy requirements on the intelligence community, nor was 
there any National Security Council study memorandum addressed to Portugal. 


Testimony of William Hyland before the Committee: "Even a cursory review of the 
intelligence record indicates there was no specific warning of the coup of April 25, 1974 in 
Portugal. As far as the Bureau of Intelligence and Research was concerned, our last analytical 
reporting was in late March and we drew no conclusions that pointed to more than a continuing 
struggle for power but short of a military revolt." Comm. Hearings, at [ |, Oct. 7, 1975. 




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4. A period of rising tensions, the arrests of leftists, and a purge of military officers 
following the first three developments. 

The intelligence community, however, was too preoccupied to closely examine the 
Portuguese situation. Those responsible for writing current intelligence publications had deadlines 
to meet, meetings to attend, and relatively little time to speculate on developments in the 
previously sleepy Caetano dictatorship. 31 

The Committee's investigation indicates there were other, earlier warning signs which 
signs which might have sparked some intelligence interest. Again, these indications of deeper 
unrest were not subjected to close analysis. 

On October 26, 1973, the Defense Attache in Lisbon reported to DIA headquarters in the 
Pentagon rumors of a "coup plot," and serious discontent among Portuguese military 
officers. 319 

On November 8, 1973, the attache reported that 860 Portuguese Army Captains had 
signed a petition protesting conditions. 320 The attache quickly concluded these dissidents had 
no intentions of revolution. Nevertheless, the fact that over 800 military officers felt deeply 
enough to risk retribution was a good indication of the profound social revolution which Portugal 

The record does not suggest that the attache attempted to get to know these junior 
officer, understand their views, or even record their names. Nor had anyone in Washington 
assigned him the task of searching for signs of social and political unrest in the Portuguese 
military. One reason for this was that the Director of Attache Affairs was not allowed to assign 
duties to attaches. Assignments were done elsewhere, in an unbelievable demonstration of 

318 "What we need, I think, is some way to look at longer term trends so when a 
development like Portugal comes, when it blows up rather suddenly, there is some base of 
information and analysis that you can turn to and say, "Well, how does this fit in with the trend 
we have been seeing for two or three years,' and as this article that Mr. Field referred to, by 
Kenneth Maxwell, points out, from sociological, economic, political standpoint, the trouble was 
evident to someone scrutinizing it in deep perspective. It is that lack of perspective in many 
places that concerns me rather than whether we can pinpoint it to the day. That is going to be 
awfully difficult." (Emphasis supplied.) It was the consensus of "working level" analysts 
interviewed by Committee staff that the problems with current intelligence begin with the 
plethora of publications, deadlines, and the rust of daily business. Testimony of William Hyland, 
Comm. Hearings at Oct. 7, 1975. 

319 Defense Attache report from Lisbon to the Defense Intelligence Agency, Oct. 26, 1973. 

320 Defense Attache report from Lisbon to the Defense Intelligence Agency: "These younger 
officers are not disloyal and desire to serve Portugal as military officers and have no intentions of 
revolution. They are patriots who want to make changes for the improvement of the P.A. and 


confusing and inefficient administration. 321 

Also in November 1973, the attache attended a social gathering at the home of a retired 
American officer where he heard discussion of right-wing Spanish and Portuguese countercoup 
plans, should "extremists" overthrow the Caetano government. Neither the identities of the 
counter-plotters nor of the "extremists" were reported by the attache. 322 No further reference 
to this report was found in a review of subsequent attache activities prior to the April coup. 

fn February 1974, the attache forwarded information from December 1973, on the 
Portuguese government response to a petition of complaints signed by over 1,500 junior military 
officers. 323 There was no effort to identify the leaders of the petition campaign or to contact 
any of the signers. After the coup, high CIA officials would complain of the lack of in-depth 
biographic reporting from the attache office. 324 

A review of all Defense Attache reports in the months prior to the coup indicated 

321 Committee staff interviews with DIA confirmed General Wilson's statement that control 
over attaches was split between the Directorate for Collections and the Director for Attache 
Affairs. Other practical bureaucratic realities interfere with the attache's priorities, including his 
relationships with the Ambassador, Military Aid and Sales Missions, the CIA chief of station, and 
the attache's own parent service. 

322 Defense Attache report of 26 November 1973. The source said he had "that morning 
met with high level Portuguese officers. . . to coordinate plans for Spanish Army entry into 
Portugal in the event of an attempted government coup by extremists. He was angry because 
after lengthy discussions concerning use of Spanish Armored Cavalry located near the border in 
the Mirida area, to take control of Portugal and to hold control of the country until duly 
constituted government could be returned to power, one of the Portuguese officers commented to 
the (source's) words to the effect: But we know you Spanish -- if you once come into Portugal 
you'll never go home.'" 

323 Defense Attache report also commented on the Spinola appointment as Deputy Chief of 
Staff, Armed Forces: "Although there are some political reasons in back of this appointment, it is 
reported that he will concern himself mainly with personnel and logistics in the Metropole." 
Defense Attache report, Feb. 6, 1974. 

324 Memorandum for the United States Intelligence Board, 18 July 1974, from George A. 
Carver, Jr., Deputy for National Intelligence Officers. This memo reported "significant gaps and a 
requirement for more timely reporting from the field" in areas including "biographic reporting 
across the board." 

"Mr. Clark. . . No one provided — in the period before 25 April — a full picture of the plans, 
programs, ideological orientation, and different philosopliies of the members of the Armed Forces 
Movement. In hindsight, I think the latter was the chief defect of the reporting record for this 
period. An intelligence assessment published two days after the coup pointed out the gaps in our 
knowledge about the AFM's program and standards, and this is a pretty good contemporary 
indication of the state of our knowledge before the coup." Testimony of Keith Clark, NIO for 
Western Europe. Comm. Hearings, at Oct. 7, 1975. 

scan by 


substantial delays in forwarding reports to Washington. It even took a month for the attache to 
send Washington the Spinola book which unleashed the public storm when it was published in 

Twice, Defense Intelligence Agency headquarters in Washington wrote the attache office 
in Lisbon urging the six officers there to be more aggressive, to travel more, and frequent the 
diplomatic party circuit less. 325 Only the most junior attache, a Navy lieutenant, made an 
attempt to probe beyond the obvious. 

The Committee was also told that a serious problem in DIA is a tendency to reward 
senior officers, nearing the ends of their careers, by assigning them to attache posts. 326 Not 
only were these officers often untrained and unmotivated for intelligence duties, but the Director 
of Attache Affairs testified that he was powerless to assign substantive duties to the attaches in 


any case. 

The committee did not have the opportunity to review raw CIA reports during the six 
months prior to the coup. CIA officials who relied on these reports told this Committee that the 
CIA Station in Lisbon was so small, and so dependent upon the official Portuguese security 
service for information, that very little was picked up. 328 In fact, attaches were in a better 
position than CIA to get to know the Portuguese military. There is no indication that attaches 
and the Chief of Station attempted to pool their resources and combine CIA's knowledge of the 
Portuguese Community movement with attache's supposed military contacts. 

The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Western Europe did attempt an analysis. A 
draft memorandum on trends in Portugal, titled, "Cracks in the Facade," had been in preparation 
for nearly a month, and was almost complete when the April coup erupted. It had to be re-titled. 
The document itself, despite its titles, was not attuned to the real causes of intense discontent 
which produced a leftist-military revolt. 

That same National Intelligence Officer testified that he had some twenty-five European 
countries to monitor, with the help of only one staff assistant. NIO's do not have command 
authority over CIA's intelligence or operations directorates. They cannot order that papers be 
written, that staffers be detached from the current intelligence office to work on an in-depth 

325 Testimony of General Samuel V. Wilson, Director for Attache Affairs, DIA, in 1974. 
Comm. Hearings, at [ ], Oct. 7, 1975. 

326 "There j s ^ a tendency to assign people as attache officers near the ends of their 
careers. We need young tigers, people who will get out and talk to the people, not just officers 
who travel the cocktail circuit. The Defense Attache in Lisbon was bright, but stuck to the party 
circuit, did not travel in the country, and did not understand the developing political situation," 
Staff interview with General Wilson, by G. Rushford, Oct. 2, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, 
on Intell. 

327 See note [ ]. 

328 Confidential staff interviews with CIA, DIA, INR officials. 

329 Testimony of Keith Clark. Comm. Hearings, at | ], Oct. 7, 1975. 


estimate. They cannot instruct clandestine operations to collect certain types of information. 

Nor will the NIO always be informed of covert actions that may be underway in one of his 
countries. 330 

The most disturbing testimony before this Committee was official satisfaction with 
intelligence prior to the Portuguese coup. The Director of Attache Affairs told the Committee 
that intelligence performance had been "generally satisfactory and responsive to requirements.' 
The National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe said intelligence reports had described "a 
situation clearly in process of change, an old order coming apart at the scams." 331 

However, both officials quickly admitted under questioning that the attaches had not, in 
fact, been very aggressive. Nor had any intelligence document warned when and how the old 
order was "coming apart at the seams." Without access to intelligence reports, this Committee 
might have believed official claims that the system was functioning well. 

5. India: priorities lost 

How well does U.S. intelligence keep track of non-military events that affect our foreign 
policy interests? Not very well, if the first nuclear test in the T hird World is any indication. 

The intelligence community estimated, in 1965, that India was capable of conducting a 
nuclear test, and probably would produce a nuclear device within the next few years. 332 In 
1972, a special estimate said the "chances are roughly even that India will conduct a [nuclear] test 
at some time in the next several years and label it a peaceful explosion." 333 

DIA, in reports distributed only within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had stated since 1971 


Testimony of Keith Clark. Comm. Hearings, at | ], Oct. 7, 1975. 



Testimony of Keith Clark and Samuel V. Wilson. Only William Hyland, Director of 
INR, testified without prodding that the system had not functioned well in the Portugal crisis. 


"India's Nuclear Weapons Policy," Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 31-1-65. 
That estimate stated: "We believe that within the next few years India probably will detonate a 
nuclear device and proceed to develop nuclear weapons." 


Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 31-72, "Indian Nuclear Developments and 
their Likely Implications," August 1972. This estimate was in conjunction with a National 
Security Council study (NSSM 156). The Intelligence Community staff Post-Mortem states the 
1972 estimate was "far less bold in estimating India's likely intentions than its predecessor in 
1965". SNIE 31-72 stated that India's eventual test might "come as a surprise, both to most 
Indians and to the outside world". The estimate concluded, 'The chances are roughly even that 
India will conduct a [nuclear] test at some time in the next several years and label it a peaceful 







that India might already have a nuclear device. 334 However, when India did explode a nuckfer 
device on May 18, 1974, U.S. intelligence was caught off-guard. As the CIA's post-mortem says 
of the community's surprise: "This failure denied the U.S. Government the option of considering 
diplomatic or other initiatives to try to prevent this significant step in nuclear proliferation". 

Only one current intelligence article was published in the six months before the May 
explosion. 336 That article, by DIA, stated for the first time that India might already possess 
such a device. Perhaps one reason the article did not provoke more debate and initiative was the 
title: "India: A nuclear weapons program will not likely be pursued in the near term". 

In 1972, U.S. intelligence had picked up 26 reports that India would soon test a device, 
or that she was capable of doing so if the government made the decision to proceed. There were 
only two reports on the subject from August 1972, to May 1974, when the device was exploded. 
Neither was pursued with what the CIA claimed was a "real follow-up". 33 * 

An April 17, 1974 report indicated that India might have already conducted an 
unsuccessful nuclear test in the Rajasthan Desert. The CIA did not disseminate this report to 

334 "An examination of the Intelligence Community's Performance before the Indian Nuclear 
Test of May 1974, Intelligence Community staff post-mortem for the Director of Central 
Intelligence, July 1974, at 3. 

335 Ibid. p. i. "In the months prior to India's 18 May nuclear test, the intelligence 
community failed to warn U.S. decision-makers that such a test was being planned." The post- 
mortem also stated, "Its inability to predict the actual event was due essentially to two factors: 
inadequate priority against communications among those elements of the community, both 
collectors and producers, whose combined talents were essential to resolving the problem." 

336 Ibid., at 3. 

337 Ibid., at 1. 

338 "The character of these requirements, and the lack of any sense of urgency associated 
with them, suggest that few in the community viewed the problem with great interest. Perhaps 
this simply reflected the attitudes of the policy-makers. More important for our purposes, the 
content of the requirements themselves did not know of, or understand, the gaps identified in 
SNIE 31-72 and in the January State cable from New Delhi. Collection emphasis was not on 
intentions but on capabilities. This is probably easier to target and to use once the information is 
gathered. Ibid., at 5-6. 



other agencies, nor did CIA officials pursue the subject. 339 

The Director of Central Intelligence had established the bureaucratic device of "Key 
Intelligence Question" in 1974. Although nuclear proliferation was on the list, few officials 
outside the upper reaches of the bureaucracy expressed much interest, the CIA's general nuclear 
developments priority list did not address India, and the military attaches received no clear 
instructions on nuclear matters. Nevertheless, previous estimates on India had identified "gaps" in 
our information. 340 

After India exploded the nuclear device in May 1974, Director Colby wrote Dr. Kissinger 
to say he intended to amount a more aggressive effort on the nuclear proliferation problem. 341 

One of several justifications for national technical means of overhead coverage over India 
in the two years prior to May 1974, was the nuclear test issue. However, the Intelligence 
Community technical analysts were never asked to interpret the data. The CIA's post-mortem 
stated, in effect, the system had been tasked to obtain data, but the analysts had not been asked 
to examine such data. After the explosion, the analysts were able to identify the test location, 
from pre-test data. 342 

Following the failure to anticipate India's test, the United States Intelligence Board agreed 
to hold one committee meeting a year on nuclear proliferation. Interagency "coordinating" 
mechanisms were established. Teams of experts traveled to various countries to impress on 
American embassy personnel the importance of the proliferation threat. Analysts once again were 

339 Ibid. 

340 Ibid. 

341 In an additional memo (USIB-M-675) concerning discussions of the Indian Post-Mortem 
on August 15, 1975 before the United States Intelligence Board meeting, Director Colby said that 
me "estimative process, as reflected in SNIE 31-72, worked very well but registered concern that 
the paper's conclusions were largely ignored". Mr. Colby's response to the post-mortem indicates 
no sense of urgency that the intelligence system did not work very well. The discussion was brief, 
mr. Colby, however, had made an interesting point. Considering the warnings in the special 
estimates in 1965 and 1972, shouldn't policy-makers have seized the initiative on nuclear 
proliferation problems? Was it necessary to wait until India forced the issue? Memorandum of 
Jan. 14, 1975, submitted to the Committee by the Intelligence Community Staff, "Follow-up on 
Indian Post-Mortem". 

342 "An examination of the Intelligence Community's Performance Before the Indian Nuclear 
I Test of May 1974", at 7 and 8. 

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encouraged to talk to each other more. 343 

The missing element, as the bureaucracy reshuffled its priorities after the Indian failure, is 
quite simple: the system itself must be reformed to promote anticipation of, rather than reaction 
to, important world events. 

6. Cyprus -- failure of intelligence and policy 

Cyprus presented a complex mix of politics, personalities, and NA TO allies. 
Unfortunately, a crisis turned to war, while intelligence tried to unravel events - and America 
offended all participants. 

On the morning of July 15, 1974, Greek strongman General Dimitrios Ioannides and his 
military forces on Cyprus overthrew the elected government of Archbishop Makarios. Five days 
later, Turkey invaded the island, ostensibly to protect the Turkish minority there and to prevent 
the Greek annexation long promoted by the new Cyprus leadership. 344 Unsatisfied with its 
initial military success, Turkey renewed its offensive on August 14, 1974. 

The failure of U.S. intelligence to forecast the coup, despite strong strategic and tactical 
signs, may be attributed to several factors: poor reporting from the U.S. Embassy in Athens, in 
part due to CIA's exclusive access to Ioannides 345 ; the general analytical assumption of 

343 "Follow-up on Indian Post-Mortem." 

344 Cyprus has a long history of intercommunal violence between the Greek Cypriot 
majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority, the latter constituting approximately 18 percent of the 
island's population. Enosis, the union of Cyprus with the motherland, has been a long-term goal 
of Greek governments. On each previous occasion when intercommunal violence erupted or 
when enosis seemed possible, Turkey threatened to intervene. The independence of Cyprus, and 
the rights of the Turkish minority were guaranteed by a 1961 Zu-ich Agreement which gave 
Turkey, Greece or Great Britain the right to intervene to reestablish the status-quo if it had been 
disrupted. On two previous occasions the U.S. moved to prevent just such a unilateral Turkish 

[Material missing from text] "... from Athens was at best conflicting. The CIA is 
backgrounding the press that U.S. intelligence had forewarning of the coup on Cyprus. This is a 
misrepresentation." "Criticisms of United States Policy in Cyprus Crisis." Internal Department 
of State memorandum, at 1. 

345 State Department observers were highly critical of the country team's performance. 

"Why was the reporting from Athens wrong on all counts? The answer appears to be that the 
CIA station and the Ambassador were completely bemused and bedazzled by the clandestine 
contact with Ioannides. In this connection, the recent Inspector's report on Athens expressed 
concern that the USG's only link with Ioannides was through the CIA station which was unable 
to contain its enthusiasm for Ioannides." "Criticisms of United States Policy in the Cyprus 



rational behavior; analysts' reluctance to raise false claims of an impending crisis. 346 

The failure to predict the coup is puzzling in view of the abundance of strategic warnings. 
When Ioannides wrested power from George Papadopoulos in November, 1974, analysts 
concluded that relations between Greece and Makarios were destined to worsen. Ioannides' 
hatred of Makarios, whom he considered pro-Communist or worse, has been described as having 
“bordered on pathological. 347 " Moreover, Makarios was seen as a stumbling block to 
Ioannides' hopes for enosis. Observers agreed that a serious | ] was only a matter of time 348 . 

By spring of 1974, that confrontation would at times appear imminent, with intervening 
lulls. Each trip to the brink elicited dire warnings to policy officials from Near East desks in the 
State Department. However, the nuances of these events, indicating a gathering of storm clouds, 
were largely lost on analysts as their attention remained focused on the Greek-Turkish clash over 
mineral rights in the Aegean. Cyprus remained a side issue despite growing evidence that the 
Ioannides-Makarios relationship was reaching a critical stage. 349 

There would soon be several tactical indications that a coup was in the works. On June 
7, 1974, the National Intelligence Daily warned that Ioannides was actively considering the ouster 

Crisis." Internal Department of State memorandum, at 3. 

346 Former intelligence officials have described to this Committee the difficulties encountered 
by those who must report from an area which has frequent and intense crises. "After a while, 
Washington officials get tired of hearing about impending crises from your area and it actually 
gets embarrassing to report them." That observation gained credence when witnesses from the 
Department of State jokingly referred to the number of times Cypriot Desk officers had predicted 
coups. Interview with intelligence official, by JF. Kirschsteing, Sept. 29, 1975, copy on file with 
Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

347 Department of State cable to Athens Embassy on June 79, 1974. 




348 The Cyprus Post-Mortem states: "When Dimitrios Ioannides assumed power in Athens 
in November, 1973, the community assumed— because of what was known about Ioannides that 
relations between Greece and Cyprus would almost certainly soon take a serious turn for the 
worse." An April, 1974 Interagency Memorandum by the National Intelligence Officers warned 
that Ioannides' interest [in the island] is combined with a deep distrust of Makarios and an 
exaggerated view of the Communist threat on Cyprus. ...The danger that Greece will increase its 
activity in Cyprus is probably not imminent.. .[but if Ioannides consolidates! —his position 
internally in the Greek army.. .he might at some stage try to unseat Makarios." 

349 The Cyprus Post-Mortem states that "until mid-June, when the threat of an imminent 
armed clash between Greece and Turkey over the dispute finally subsided, the current intelligence 
dailies published nearly five times as many items on the Aegean issue as on the Athens- Nicosia 

scan by 


of Makarios if the Archbishop made an "extremely provocative move." 350 On June 29, 
intelligence officials reported that Ioannides had again told his CIA contact nine days before, that 
if Makarios continued his provocation, the Greek would have only two options: to write-off 
Cyprus, with its sizeable Greek majority, or eliminate the Archbishop as a factor. 35 

On July 3, 1974, Makarios made that "extremely provocative move," by demanding the 
immediate withdrawal of a Greek National Guard contingent on Cyprus. 1 he ultimatum was 
delivered in an extraordinary open-letter to the Greek government, accusing Ioannides' associates 
of attempting his physical a well as political liquidation. 352 

On June 29, 1974, Secretary Kissinger, responding to alarms sounded by State 

350 The June 7 National Intelligence Daily was based on a June 3 Field Intelligence Report 
which stated that "Ioannides claimed that Greece is capable of removing Makarios and his key 
supporters from power ;in twenty-four hours with little if any blood being shed and without 
EOKA assistance. The Turks would quietly acquiesce to the removal of Makarios, a key 
enemy... Ionnides prayed for some unexpected favorable gift from heaven. Ioannides stated that if 
Makarios decides on some type of extreme provocation against Greece to obtain a tactical 
advantage, he (Ioannides) is not sure whether he should merely pull the Greek troops out of 
Cyprus and let Makarios fend for himself, or remove Makarios once and for all and have Greece 
deal directly with Turkey over Cyprus' future." That report has been confirmed by former CIA 
Athens officials interviewed by staff. Interview with CIA operations officials, by J. Boos and G. 
Fushford, Oct. [ ], 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

351 "...Ioannides speculated last week about the possibility of removing Makarios and 
entering into an all-encompassing agreement' with Ankara to solve problems between the two 
countries. Ioannides considered such a move dangerous for Greece and he is unlikely to attempt 
it soon unless Makarios presses the National Guard issue too far." National Intelligence Daily, 
June 29, 1974. 

352 rhe letter reads in part; "I have many times asked myself why an unlawful and 
nationally harmful organization which is creating divisions and d'seords, cleaving rights in our 
internal front, and leading the Greek Cypriot people to civil strike, is supported by Greek 
officers. ..The Greek officers' support for EOKA-B constitutes and undeniable reality...I am sorry 
to say, Mr. President, that the root of evil is very deep, reaching as far as Athens. It is from there 
that the tree of evil, the bitter fruits of which the Greek Cypriot people are tasting today, is being 
fed and maintained and helped to grow and spread. In order to be absolutely clear, I say that 
cadres of the military regime of Greece support and direct the activity of the EOKA-B terrorist 
organization. This also explains the involvement of Greek officers of the National Guard in 
illegal activities, conspiracy and other inadmissable situations. ..You realize, Mr. President, the sad 
thoughts which have been preoccupying and tormenting me following the ascertainment that men 
of the Government of Greece are incessantly preparing conspiracies against me and, what is 
worse, are dividing the Greek Cypriot people and pushing them to catastrophe through civil strife. 
I have more than once so far felt, and some cases I have almost touched, a hand invisibly 
extending from Athens and seeking to liquidate my human existence..." Makarios went on to ask 
for the immediate withdrawal of all Greek officers in the Cypriot National Guard. 


Department desk officers, approved a cable to U.S. Ambassador, Henry J. Tasca in Athens, 
instructing that he personally tell Ioannides of U.S. opposition to any adventure on Cyprus. 353 
The instruction was only partially heeded. 

Tasca, assured by the CIA station chief that Ioannides would continue to deal only with 
CIA, and not sharing the State Department desk officer's alarm, was content to pass a message to 
the Greek leader indirectly. 

Tasca's colleagues subsequently persuaded Secretary Kissinger's top aide, Joseph Sisco, 
that a general message passed through regular government channels would have sufficient impact. 
The Ambassador told Committee staff that Sisco agreed it was unnecessary for Tasca himself to 
approach Ioannides, who had no official government position. 354 T hat interpretation has 
been vigorously disputed. It is clear, however, that the Embassy took no steps to underscore for 
Ioannides the depth of U.S. concern over a possible Cyprus coup attempt. 35 














353 The State cable, drafted by John Day, of the Greek desk, was dispatched to the Embassy 
in Athens under Undersecretary Joseph Sisco's signature. It stated, in part: "We share concerns 
of Athens and Nicosia regarding gravity of relationship between Government of Greece and 
Government of Cyprus. From various reports, it is evident that Ioannides is seriously considering 
way to topple Makarios from power. A move which could have disastrous consequences from 
U.S. interest in Eastern Mediterranean as well as for peoples of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. In 
our view effort to remove Makarios by force contains unacceptable risks of generating chaos 
eventually causing Greco-Turk confrontation; involving Soviets in Cyprus situation; and 
complicating developing U.S. -Soviet detente." 

"We know that Ioannides has long been obsessed with issue of communism both in Greece and 
in Cyprus and that his dislike for Makarios has bordered on the pathological. Until recently, our 
impression has been that he preferred to play for time on Cyprus problem until he had 
consolidated his position in the internal Greek context. Now, however, he apparently feels that 
Makarios is seeking to take advantage of Greek-Turkish tensions and the Greek regime's domestic 
difficulties to reduce Greek influence on the island and that this effort is a personal challenge 
which he cannot ignore." The cable went on to instruct Ambassador Tasca to personally tell 
Ioannides that the U.S. opposed any adventure on Cyprus. Department of State cable to Athens 
Embassy, June 29, 1974. 

354 Interview with Henry J. Tasca, by J. Boos, Sept. 26-27, 1975, copy on file with Sel. 

Comm, on Intell. 

Greek strongman General Dimitrios Ioannides, according to CIA, preferred to deal with 
the CIA rather than the U.S. Ambassador, Henry Tasca. The feeling was mutual since the 
Ambassador felt his proper role was to deal directly with officials of the civilian Greek 
government, which was under Ioannides's control. Interview with CIA Operations Officials, by J. 
Boos and G. Rushford, Oct. [ ], 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

355 The Embassy's reaction was no surprise to the State Department Desk officers. "In his 
reluctance to intervene forcefully and decisively with Ioannides, Ambassador Tasca was reflecting 
a frame of mind consistent with the non-interventionist policy laid down by the top levels of the 
Department of State regarding the Ioannides regime." "Criticisms of United States Policy in the 

This episode, the exclusive CIA access to Ioannides, Tasca's indications that he may not 
have seen all important messages to and from the CIA Station , Ioannides suggestions of 
U.S. acquiescence 357 , and Washington's well-know coolness to Makarios, have led to public 
speculation that either U.S. officials were inattentive to the reports of the developing crisis or 
simply allowed it to happen, by not strongly, directly, and unequivocally warning Ioannides 
against it. 358 

Cyprus Crisis." Internal Department of State memorandum, at 4. 

356 See, note [ ]. 

357 General Dimitrios Ioannides has on several occasions suggested that both the United 
States and certain Turkish military leaders may have had prior knowledge and acquiesced in the 
Greek-sponsored coup. The Committee was unable to make a definitive judgement on that 
allegation since it was not furnished information requested from the Department of State. A CIA 
Field Intelligence Report of July, 1974 contains information and quotes which strongly suggest 
that the U.S. had prior knowledge of the coup. In addition, the report clearly shows that Greek 
officials believed the United States would not object to the coup. It should be pointed out, 
however, that the comments quoted in the report could reflect conclusions on the part of Greek 
officials that prior U.S. expressions of concern did not indicate that U.S. policy-makers seriously 
opposed such a move. 

The United States lent credence to the suspicion by declining to recognize Archbishop Makanos 
as the legitimate President of Cyprus despite the fact that the European community, Turkey, 
Britain, and most of the Eastern European nations had called for his return. In fact, Ambassador 
Tasca has told our staff that Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Harman later personally 
conveyed to George Mavros, the post-Ioannides Greek Foreign Minister, Kissinger s desire that 
Makarios not return to the island. 

Indications that Turkey had previous knowledge of the impending coup comes from a 15 July 
1974 [intelligence) report which noted that on the day preceding the actual coup Turkish forces on 
Cyprus were ordered to be in a state of reinforced alert. They were ordered not to fire unless 
Greek forces attacked Turkish areas and were told to have over all Greeks seeking refuge in 
Turkish areas to the United Nations forces on the island. While this report does not prove that 
Ioannides informed Turkey of his coup plans, it apparently indicates that at least Turkish 
Intelligence had correctly predicted the coup. Interview with Henry .1. Tasca, by J. Boos, Sept. 
26-27, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

358 "It is reasonable to ask whether this U.S. action was perceived in Athens as a reflection of 
the depth of Washington's concern about Ioannides' scheme to oust Makarios. clearly General 
Ioannides had much ground to believe that in light of the direct contact he enjoyed with the CIA 
station, he would have received a stronger, more categoric warning if the U.S. were genuinely 
exercised about protecting Makarios, whom he regarded as a communist sympathizer. 

"All this leads to one basic conclusion: I believe that strong U. S. representations to Ioannides 
would have prevented the crisis. This judgement is shared by the rest of the Greek language/area 
specialists in SE." "Criticisms of United States Policy in the Cyprus Crisis." Internal Department 


Due to State Department access policies, the Committee was unsuccessful in obtaining 
closely-held cables to and from the Secretary of State during this period including a message the 
Secretary sent to Ioannides through the CIA the day after the coup. Accordingly, it is impossible 
to reach a definitive conclusion. 

On July 3, 1974, a CIA report stated that an individual, later describes as "an untested 
source," had passed the word that despite new aggressiveness on Makarios' part, Ioannides had 
changed his mind: there would be no coup after all. 359 For reasons still unclear, this CIA 
report embraced and heeded until July 15, the day of the coup. The Intelligence Community 
post-mortem, appears to have concluded that the "tip" was probably a ruse. 360 

Ioannides' dubious change of heart went to virtually unquestioned despite Makarios' 
open-letter, despite further ultimatums from the Archbishop to remove the Greek officers, and 
despite the en masse resignations of three high-level Greek Foreign Ministry officials known to be 
soft-liners on Cyprus. In this setting, the grotesquely erroneous National Intelligence Bulletin of 
July 15, 1974, is not surprising, nor are Ambassador Tasca's protestations that he saw no coup 
on the horizon. 

Almost at the moment Ioannides unleased his forces, a National Intelligence Bulletin was 
reassuring intelligence consumers with the headline: "Ioannides is taking a moderate line while he 
plays for time in his dispute with Archbishop Makarios." 361 

Results of the events triggered by the coup included: thousands of Cypriot casualties and 
refugees, a narrowly-averted war between NATO allies Greece and Turkey, a tragic worsening of 
U.S. relations with all three nations, and the death of an American Ambassador. U.S. intelligence 
must be accorded a share of the responsibility. 

The intelligence community somewhat generously termed its performance during the 
Cyprus crisis as "a mixture of strengths and weaknesses." 362 The Committee's conclusion, 

of State memorandum, at 3. 

359 The Field Intelligence Report stated: "After a series of discussions held in late June and 
early July 1974 with Greek armed forces personnel to develop a realistic, coordinated contingency 
plan to cover the possibility that Archbishop Makarios might force Greece into a showdown 
situation, Ioannides as of 3 July, had decided not to continue consideration of any action 
designed to remove Makarios from power now." 

360 "Criticisms of United States Policy in the Cyprus Crisis." Internal Department of State 
memorandum, at [ ]. 

361 National Intelligence Bulletin, July 15, 1974. 

362 "Post-Mortem Report - An Examination of the Intelligence Community's Performance 
Before and During the Cyprus Crisis of 1974." Jan., 1975. The major failures listed were a) 
failure to warn policy-makers of the impending coup, and b) failure to warn policy-makers of the 
second Turkish offensive. The prediction of the Turkish invasion, Soviet reaction, and the fall of 
Ioannides in Greece were listed as successes. State Department area experts indicate that the 
performance was somewhat less than advertised. 

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after an analysis of the record, is less sanguine. Intelligence clearly failed to provide adequate 
warning of the coup, and it performed indifferently once the crisis had begun. 

The analytical failure in the Cyprus crisis brings to mind several parallels with the 1973 
Middle east debacle. In both cases, analysts and policy-makers were afflicted both with a past 
history of false alarms, and with the rigid notion, unsupported in fact, that foreign leaders 
invariably act "rationally." 363 In the Cyprus crisis, as in the Mid-Cast, analysts were deluged 
with unreadable and redundant data subsequent to the initial intelligence failure. 364 Still, given 
the ample indications that Makarios had sufficiently aroused Ioannides" ire, these analytical quirks 
should not have prevented a correct interpretation of events. 

These appear to have been collection failures in this period, although additional evidence 
could probably not have overcome the analytical deficiencies that caused erroneous conclusions. 
For example, CIA personnel had been instructed by the U.S. Ambassador not to establish 
contacts within the Turkish minority, and to obviate any allegations of collusion with the 
anti-Makarios EOKA-B movement, they were told to seek intelligence on HOKA-B by indirect 
means, rather than through direct contact with members of that organization. 365 Finally, 
signals intelligence in the area was focused elsewhere and even after the coup was not a significant 

363 In both the Mid-East war and in Cyprus, the post-mortems noted a failing of analysts 
who tended to presume foreign leaders act logically. Unfortunately, emotion and political 
incentives were not properly evaluated as a result. 

364 As in the previous Mid-East crisis, many NSA SIGINT reports were too technical to be 
understood by lay analysts. The Post-Mortem added: "As in past crises, most of the Customers 
interviewed complained of the volume of ...reporting, as well as its frequent redundancy. Many 
also complained of too little analysis of the facts, too few assessments of the significance of 
reported developments." 

In addition to the substantial evidence previously mentioned in this report suggesting the 
possibility of a coup, the following factors were also present:a) The Soviet Union warned the 
diplomatic community as early as March 1974 of a possible coup attempt against Makarios, b) 
An Easter European nation's intelligence service with reportedly close contacts with Nicos 
Sampson warned their President of an impending coup on Cyprus three weeks before its 
occurrence, 9c NSA had information which suggested that Soviet preparations for the crisis 
began in the week prior to the coup. 

365 An intelligence official told the Com.nittee that CIA personnel on Cyprus had been 
instructed not to develop contacts with the Turkish minority. In addition, they had been ordered 
to severely restrict their contacts with EOKA-B personnel primarily due to the many attempts 
EOKA-B had made to assassinate Makarios. In fight of our present knowledge that Turkey had 
prior knowledge of the impending coup (see, note [ ]), this restriction on CIA access to 
inf ormation was indeed a mistake. Interview with intelligence official, by F. Kirschstein, Sept. 
29, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 


factor. 366 

Since the coup inevitably led to the two Turkish invasions and the Greck-Turkish 
confrontation, the performance of intelligence in predicting military hostilities after the coup is 
both less important and unremarkable in its successes. 

Along with most newspaper articles of the time, U.S. intelligence concluded that 
Ioannides' installation of Nicos Sampson, notoriously anti-Turk, as Cypriot President insured a 
Turkish invasion of the island. Despite prominent stories in Turkish newspapers and undisguised 
troop movements at the coast, DIA did not predict the invasion until literally hours before 
Turkish forces hit the beaches on July 20, 1974. 367 A National Intelligence Officer's report 
had picked July 20 as a likely invasion date, but was never disseminated to the intelligence 
community. 36 ® 

Perhaps flushed by its "success" in calling the first T urkish invasion just after Turkish 
press did, U.S. intelligence appeared to lose interest, in the belief that the crisis was over. 369 
Thus, there was no real forewarning that the Turkish forces would launch and even more 

Intelligence officials have told our staff that U.S. SIGINT resources were not focused on 
targets which would have the most relevance to an Athens- Nicosia crisis, i.c., Greek national 
Guard communications. Emergency reaction SIGINT teams were rushed into the area after the 
coup and later contributed to some successful intelligence. Interview with Intelligence officials, by 
JF. Kirschstein, De. 2, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 


CIA analysts on June 21 alerted the community to the conditions under which Turkey 
would invade Cyprus. On July 16 they concluded that those conditions had been met. On the 
other had, DIA tactical intelligence, as asserted in the Post-Mortem, was not forthright in 
predicting the Turkish intervention until the 19th of July, just before the invasion. 

368 The NIO responsible for the report which predicted July 20 as the invasion date was 
preoccupied with the production of a National Intelligence Estimate on Italy which was to be 

presented at a USIB meeting on the 18th of July. It should also be noted that Cypriot experts 
within State and CIA were in the process of being shuffled around a bureaucratic reorganization 
of area responsibilities. In addition, State Department Washington experts on all three countries 
concerned, as well as the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, were removed from their posts at one time 
or another during the crisis. 

369 Both CIA and State Department dismantled their task forces in early August. The 
intelligence agencies' difficulties may be partially explained by the Post-Mortem comment that 

'analysis of the crisis may also have suffered as the result of the non-availability of certain key 
categories of information, specifically those associated with private conversations between U.S. 
policy makers and their representatives on the scene and between these policy makers and certain 
principals in the dispute." State Department communications after the coup were mainly 
restricted to the "NODIS" private channel controlled by the Secretary of State. This Committee 
was denied access to all but one of the 136 NODIS cables on the Cyprus crisis during July 1974. 
An even more private class of NODIS, NODIS CHEROKEE is controlled by the Secretary of 
State exclusively. 

scan by 


ambitious invasion on August 14, resulting in the capture of fully one-third of the island. 

In terms of both its immediate 370 and long-range consequences, the sum total of U.S. 
intelligence failure during the Cyprus crisis may have been the most damaging intelligence 
performance in recent years. 

7. Domestic internal security and countercounterintelligence 

The Intelligence Division of the FBI is divided into two sections: Internal Security and 
Counter-intelligence. The Internal Security Division investigates domestic subversive or extremist 
groups with the goal of ascertaining whether individuals are violating federal laws, or may violate 
them in the future. 

These investigations are costly, in monetary terms and in terms of personal privacy. Are they 
effectively and dispassionately controlled, in keeping with criminal priorities? Are they efficiently 
terminated when clearly unproductive? 34 years of investigating the Socialist Workers Party and over 
five years spying on the Institute for Policy Studies provide some examples of disturbing answers. 

a. Institute for Policy Studies 

The FBI Manual of Instructions allows preliminary investigations t be opened on groups 
espousing extremist philosophies. If these investigations do not demonstrate reasonable likelihood 
of uncovering criminal violations, the Manual states that they should be terminated within 90 
days. 371 

370 Some days later, Rodger Davies, the U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, was fatally wounded 
during an anti-American demonstration at the Embassy in Nicosia. Contemporary accounts 
concluded that Davies was simply struck by a stray bullet. Information made available to the 
Committee suggests that Davies may have been the victim of an assassin. 

Ambassador Tasca disclosed to staff a report that EOKA-B had decided to kill either Davies or 
himself. U.S. intelligence officers have asserted not only that Davies may have been intentionally 
shot, but also that the identities of the individuals firing at the Embassy are also known. The 
intelligence sources have alleged that the individuals may be officials of the Nicosia police. 

Despite repeated private U.S. protests, the Cypriot government is said to have declined to remove 
these individuals from their jobs. Interview with Henry J. Tasca, by J. Boos, Sept. 26-27, 1975, 
copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. Interview with CIA officials by (i. Rushford and F. 
Kirschstein, Oct. 22, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

371 Inherent presidential national security power is invoked from time to time, as when the 
FBI participated in the so-called "Kissinger 17" wiretaps. "We do ... cite statutes as a predication 
for any investigation in our internal security field." Interview with W. Raymond, Wannal, Asst. 
Director, FBI Intelligence Division by J. Atkisson, J.B.F. Oliphant, R. Vermeire, Nov. 5, 1975, 
copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. (emphasis added). 

The four statutes cited are 18 USC § 2383, proscribing actual participation in rebellion or 


In 1968, the FBI saw sufficient connection between the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) and 
the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) to open a preliminary investigation of IPS. 2 

The investigation was not terminated after an initial 90-day period, even though it had turned 
up no evidence that IPS members or their associates were violating federal laws. Six months later, 
at the end of a vigorous nine-month investigation of IPS, the Washington field office reported the 
results as "negative." 

The IPS investigation was destined to continue for five more years 

ITie investigation had been based on an SDS connection. During the investigation, however, 
FBI had received information from a source advising "that, in general, the IPS is not well thought 
Of by the hard-core SDS leaders because members of the IPS arc not activists, "except for one IPS 
leader considered sympathetic with SDS objectives. 373 The FBI was not discouraged by the loss 
of its investigative base, and went ahead reporting unrelated matters One report, for example, 
described IPS as "a non-profit,, non-taxable institute which studies programs to present 
policies. 374 The same report noted the fact that "IPS educational curriculum centers on topics 

insurrection; 18 USC § 2384 outlawing seditious conspiracy; 18 USC § 2385 on advocating the 
forceful overthrow of the government; and 18 USC § 241, the Civil Rights Act of 1968 
prescribing criminal sanctions for conspiring to deny civil rights. FBI Manual of Instructions, 
Section 87 "Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals"; Section 122, "Extremist 
Matters and Civil Unrest." 

"Information received or developed indicating a group is engaging in activities, which, if 
uninterrupted, could lead to a violation of that statute, that is the basis for investigating that 
group." Interview with W. Raymond Wannall. Thus, the real basis is a potential violation in the 
future, hence "anticipatory" intelligence gathering. 

172 The connection was seen in the fact that one member of IPS had contacted one member 
of SDS. FBI Memorandum, Nov. 28, 1975, Appendix II. 

There was some confusion about the initial reason for the investigation at the Committee's 
hearing on the subject, Nov. 18, 1975. In response to the Committee's request for "any and all" 

, documents concerning IPS, the Bureau supplied a file commencing in Nov. | ) , 1968, based on 
'he possible SDS connection, was the earliest document in the IPS file. Inexplicably, it had not 
been submitted to the Committee. Comm, hearings, at 1082, Nov. 18, 1975; FBI Memorandum, 

; Nov. 28, 1975, Appendix II. Later, the Bureau speculated that the IPS investigation might 
\ provide leads on SDS fugitives, and accordingly, the investigation continued. 

"Sources," in Bureau parlance, may include confidential informants, documents, public 
| lecords, agent interviews, even newspaper stories - i.e., anything or anybody with information on 
[ the subject. 

J; The one IPS leader is the same individual who had contacted SDS. FBI Washington Field 
; Office memorandum to Headquarters, Mar. 14, 1969. 



374 FBI Washington Field Office memorandum to Headquarters, Mar. 19, 1969. For the 
! Institute's characterization of itself, see statement of Marcus G. Raskin, Comm. Hearings, at 
5 ;060, Nov. 18, 1975. 

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which are critical of the present U.S. system...." 375 

In January 1971, the Bureau continued reporting non-criminal matters, such as the fact that 
the Institute "though small... exerts considerable influence through contacts with educators, Congress 
and labor." 376 It is important to remember that the whole probe began with an investigation of 
alleged contacts between on IPS staffer and an SDS leader. The FBI had effectively reversed the 
traditional concept of "guilt by association." Instead of a suspect group tainting an individual, the 
individual had tainted the group. 377 

An October 1971 Bureau report said of the Institute: 

The popular impression of IPS as the 'think tank' of radical United States politics 
is justified. It has taken and continues to take a major role in the anti-war movement and 
calls for disarmament. While IPS people see themselves as leaders of radical thought, they 
would appear to be leaders without a popular constituency. 378 

The same report concentrated on IPS suspicions of FBI surveillance. It stated that, "they 
suspect that they are being watched from the building across the street and from adjacent buildings." 
The same report went on to say that two members of the Institute had been "observed by a 
representative of the FBI. ..walking slowly around the block of IPS, sometimes several times, 
conversing with each other. ..they appear to be conversing in low tones and in guarded manner." 379 
In August 1972, an alert Bureau agent collected some IPS garbage. 380 

376 Washington Field Office memorandum to Headquarters, Jan. 26, 1971. 

One group may taint another group. The FBI initiated investigation of the Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War because the WAW had the misfortune of being mentioned favorably 
by the Communist Party. 

On September 10, 1967, the CPUSA publication, 'The Worker,' announced that 
the organization WAW had been formed in June 1967, as a non-membership 
organization made up of Vietnam veterans who were opposed to the war. This 
communist publication provided the purpose of WAW as opposition to the 'unjustified' 
war in Vietnam. It announced that WAW had joined the dissent of millions of 
Americans against the war.' FBI memorandum re: justification for investigation of 
WAW from 1967 to the present, Nov. 28, 1975, copy on file with Sel., Comm, on Intell. 

378 FBI Washington Field Office Report to Headquarters, Oct. 7, 1971. 

379 Ibid. 

380 "Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) is DASH, RA. On August two three last, [a Special 
Agent] observed a private trash truck picking up trash from IPS. The truck proceeded to a 
burning dump, where the trash was abandoned. [The Special Agent] obtained the IPS trash, and 
information obtained from this source is being assigned symbol number, [deleted]." NITEL 
Cable to Acting Director, FBI from SAC, WFO, Aug. 8, 1972. 



Ilie trash revealed no evidence of criminal conduct. I Iowever, eight used typewriter ribbons 
were found. Even though there were no signs of crimes, and despite the fact that IPS itself was not 
suspected of crimes, FBI devoted time and money to the expensive process of reconstructing the 
documents that had been typed by the ribbon. 381 

Part of the yield was intimate sexual gossip. 382 

FBI officials told Committee staff, under oath, that personal information, such as sexual 
activities is discarded if it does not bear on a crime. That was not true. Information from the trash 
retrieval, including the sexual gossip, was incorporated into a number of reports. In each report, the 
information was attributed to a "source who has supplied reliable information in the past." 383 

In 1973, the Washington Field Office reported that "the organization (IPS) is fragmented into 
a wide variety of studies and interests, the vast majority of which appear to be within legal 
limits 384 In May, 1974, the Washington Field Office concluded that a "paucity of information 
exists that would support the likelihood of IPS or its leaders to be functioning in violation of federal 
law." Only then, after five years and no evidence of law-breaking, did the investigation become 
inactive. 386 Socialist Workers Party 

The second example involved the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). I’hc SWP adopted a 
Declaration of Principles and a Constitution at their founding convention in January 1938. The 



FBI Laboratory Report to SAC, Washington Field Office, Oct. 12, 1972. 

382 FBI Washington Field Office Report, Oct. 19, 1972. 

The Manual of Instructions states that "[Reports] should not include information 

regarding the subject's social or personal affairs or other background data not relevant to subject's 
subversive activities or affiliations." MOI, Section 87, p. 13. 

383 FBI Washington Field Office Report, Oct. 19, 1972 and other related FBI memoranda. 

384 FBI Washington Field Office Memorandum to Headquarters, Mar 14, 1973. 

385 FBI Memorandum, May 31, 1974. 

"Mr. ATKISSON. ...what, if any, information has the Bureau uncovered about IPS, 
which prompted further investigation of the IPS over a five-year period--! am not asking for type 
of information; what information?" 

"Mr. SHACKELFORD. I think the answer as far as IPS goes back to those persons 
who control IPS and run it, and we looked very close at the activity of those particular 
individuals and then looked at IPS as a product of theirs." 

"Mr. ATKISSON. You looked at them for about five years. Did you find anything?" 

"Mr. SHACKELFORD. That is exactly right." 

"Mr. ATKISSON. Did you find anything during those five years?" 

"Mr. SHACKELFORD. Not for which they could be prosecuted." 

Interview with Bureau representatives W. Raymond Wannall, Asst. Director, Intelligence 
Division; R.L. Shackelford, Section Chief; and David Ryan, Special Agent, by J.B.F. Oliphant, 

R. Vermeire, J. Atkisson, and E. Miller, Nov. 5, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 


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Declaration of Principles was replete with revolutionary rhetoric of the Marxist Ixfft. The fledgling 
Socialist Workers Party also swore allegiance to the world-wide organization of Trotsky - the Fourth 
International. 387 

Nevertheless, the SWP dissolved their allegiance with the Fourth International and retracted 
this Declaration of Principles on December 21, 1940, in order to comply with the Voorhis Act. 388 
The FBI maintained that this disassociation with the Fourth International was merely cosmetic. 
However, the FBI has been unable to prove any illegal relationship between the SWP and the Fourth 

FBI's failure to uncover illegal activity by this political party is not from lack of effort. SWP 
has been subjected to 34 years of intensive investigation. 

On November 5, 1975, FBI officials testified that the Fourth International itself was a body 
made up of Marxist elements around the world and enjoyed no structural power base in the Soviet 
Union. Significantly, these officials demonstrated no detailed knowledge about the Fourth 
International. 390 FBI officials did not mention the fact that the Socialist Workers are a legitimate 
American political party, that even runs a candidate for President. Fqually as important, the FBI 
has found no evidence to support a federal prosecution of an SWP member, with the exception of 
several Smith Act violations in 1941. Since that time, not only have there been no further 
prosecutions against the SWP for any Federal offense 391 , but the portions of the Smith Act under 
which these earlier convictions had been obtained have been declared unconstitutional. 392 

The investigation, which FBI officials tacitly admit has been conducted partially under the 

387 Declaration of Principles and Constitution of the Socialist Workers Party. Published by 
the Socialist Workers Party, 116 University Place, New York, New York. 

388 Socialist Workers Party, et al. vs. Attorney General of the United States of America, et 
al. affidavit by Barry Sheppard, signed Dec. 12, 1974. 

Comm. Hearings, Nov. 18, 1975, Statement of Peter Camejo, Presidential candidate of 
the Socialist Workers Party, at [ ); Voorhis Act, 18. U.S.C. § 2386. 

389 Staff interview of W. Raymond Wannall, et al., by J.B.F. Oliphant, R. Vcrmeire, J. 
Atkisson and E. Miller on Nov. 5, 1975, at 58, 59, 67, copy on files with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

390 Ibid., at 63-67. 

391 Comm. Hearings, Nov. 18, 1975, at [ ). 

"Chairman PIKE. So, since 1941 there have been no indictments or prosecutions of 
members of this party; is that correct?" 

"Mr. ADAMS. To my knowledge." 

392 See: Scales v. U.S., 367 U.S. 203; Noto v. U.S., 290; Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298; 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 

snari hv niirhiHHpnhistnrv nrn 


aegis of an unprosecutable statute 393 , has revealed that the SWP is a highly law-abiding 
group. 394 The SWP has even avoided illegal and potentially violent confrontations with the 
authorities during any sort of civil protests. Nevertheless, this had no impact on 34 years of 
unproductive spying. 

According to the Presidential candidate of the SWP, Peter Camcjo, party members are even 
forbidden by the SWP to smoke marijuana . 395 The Bureau, apparently formulated a philosophy, 

in this case, to justify their investigation . 396 

Considerable resources have been aUocated, to compound the error of a continuing 
unproductive investigation and to back stop the preconceptions of FBI personnel. 

For example, FBI Internal Security investigators committed a massive manpower allocation 

393 Staff interview with Raymond Wannall, et al., Nov. 5, 1975 at 70. "Mr. Ryan: The 
Supreme Court has rendered the Smith Act ineffective for prosecutable purposes. It remains a 
statute.", Nov. 5, 1975. 

394 See note 391. 

395 Staff interview of Peter Camejo by J.B.F. Oliphant and R. Vermeirc, Nov. 16, 1975, 
copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

396 "Oliphant: When exactly does an executive decision get made; let's cut this off; let's cut 
off the resource allocation on following this guy around?" 

"Ryan: I think you have simplified the investigation of the Socialist Workers Party. 

There is a foreign involvement with the Socialist Workers Party investigation. There is in the 
past some evidence of terrorism within the group, supporting advocacy of terrorism. I think you 
cannot take something and say as simple as why are we investigating the Socialist Party? 

"Oliphant: I am not talking about investigating it as a monolith, Mr. Ryan. I am talking 
about the investigation of individuals within it, individuals where there had been no allegation 
they had been involved in any terrorist activities, no allegations of them in touch with any sort of 
foreign power. 

Ryan: I think you are wrong, on all counts. The basic philosophy of the Trotskyite 
movement - of which the Socialist Workers Party is the leading movement — is that only a 
violent revolution can destroy capitalism. They also believe all political groups other than their 
own are counter-revolutionary and must be destroyed. 

"The Socialist Workers Party maintains affiliation with the Fourth International. There 
are elements of that which is based, I believe, now in Brussels, which support terrorist activities, 
particularly in Argentina and other foreign countries. 

"We in the Bureau are much concerned these elements which are within the Socialist 
Workers Party within the United States may reach a point of influence where they could present 
adirect threat." Interview with Wannall, Shackelford, and Ryan, by J.B.F. Oliphant, R. 

Vermeire, and J. Atkisson, Nov. 5, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

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of interviewing landlords, employers, fellow employees, and family relations of SWP members. 397 
The FBI also maintained intensive surveillance of most, if not all, of the SWP's 2500 members. 398 

Americans are often concerned about privacy invasions of domestic security investigations. 
One-fifth of all investigations initiated by the FBI during the last dealt with security matters. 399 
The important issue is whether citizens receive a valuable product in the form of anticipatory 
intelligence which would serve as a deterrent to, and a prevention of, crime. While it is impossible 
to accurately gauge the deterrent effect of FBI efforts, it is obvious that the FBI failed to anticipate 
groups dedicated to the overthrow of the existing government and fully committed to violence. 400 

The FBI has likewise had a dismal record in the prompt apprehension of fugitives from the 
New Left underground. 401 Domestic intelligence appears to be suffering from a misallocation of 
resources and effort. 

397 The staff has been given access to thousands of pages of F BI investigative files regarding 
the SWP and the FBI has admitted on many occasions that it has investigated the SWP since the 

398 Comm. Hearings, Nov. 18, 1975, at [ ]. The staff has been provided over 200 incidents 
of alleged FBI intrusions of SWP members since 1971 by the Political Rights Defense Fund. 

The FBI has admitted that the SWP was a target for COINTELPRO action. 

399 Statement of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States before the 
Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights of the I louse Committee on the 
Judiciary on Domestic Intelligence Operations of the FBI, at 1 1. Appendix III to my statement 
presents detailed information regarding how the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division fits in to 
the FBI's efforts and the extent of which FBI resources have been applied to such efforts. 

"The Intelligence Division is one of 13 operating FBI divisions and is divided into two 
branches— Counterintelligence and Internal Security. The Internal Security Branch coordinates 
all investigation of subversive and extremist matters relating to the internal security of the Unite 
States and does research for the entire division. 

"Overall, during fiscal years 1965 through 1975, security investigations averaged about 19 
percent of all investigative matters initiated by the FBI. A further breakdown of the 
above-mentioned figure is classified because it includes counterespionage as well as internal 
security matters. However, an analysis of percentage increases and decreases in internal security 
investigative matters shows generally that the effort increased i the late sixties and early seventies, 
but in the last year dropped to a level near that of 1965." 

400 The S.L.A. is a example. The FBI provided staff attorneys with a detailed after-the-fact 
history of the SLA. However, the FBI was apparently unable to anticipate the formation of the 
group or thwart its initial criminal activities. FBI briefing on Intelligence by Wannall, et al., 
attended by J.B.F. Oliphant and R. Vermeire. 

401 Mark Rudd, Abbie Hoffman, et al. 

8. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 


In addition to day-to-day bureaucratic efforts to monitor and to improve intelligence, the 
executive branch oversees performance through mechanisms like the quasi-public President's Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) 402 The issue is whether such a mechanism is viable and 

Staff investigation suggests that reliance on PFIAB for oversight responsibility is totally 
without merit. The Board, admittedly part-time, meets for on- or two-day sessions about six times 
a year. The Chairman spends about half his time on PFIAB affairs. Only two professional staff 
members support the Board, and both are detailees from the very intelligence agencies they are 
supposed to oversee. 403 

The meeting and staffing arrangements do not lend themselves to a responsible analysis and 
review of massive and complex intelligence programs. It is said that, from time to time, PFIAB 
submits to the President useful documents on covert action and technical collection programs. 404 
However, the Committee, denied access to these and other periodic PFIAB reports, is unable to 
determine whether the Board has been functioning meaningfully 405 

402 Executive Order 11460, May 20, 1969, ([ | Fed. Reg. [ |). 

403 Interview with Wheaton Byers, PFIAB Executive Secretary, by R. Starek, Nov. 6, 1975, 
copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

404 Interview with Lionel Omer, Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary, by R. Starek 
and T. Yamamoto, Aug. 22, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. The Board has one 
annual responsibility which has been assigned by the President. Each year the Board reviews and 
assesses the quality of the National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet ABM System and makes 
recommendations to the President regarding the thoroughness and accuracy of the estimate. This 
process was begun at President Nixon's direction in 1969. Presidents have also used the Board to 
conduct examinations or post-mortems of intelligence or operation failures. Included have the 
Bay of Pigs, the failure to predict the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the overthrow of Prince 
Sihanouk, the Pueblo crisis and the loss of classified material. In addition, see, Interview with 
Admiral George Anderson, PFIAB Chairman, by R. Starek, Dec. 10, 1975., copy on file with the 
Sel. Comm, on Intell. Admiral Anderson stated that certain members have taken a keen interest 
in electronic and photographic intelligence. In fact, since most to the Board's members of the 
years have had backgrounds in the scientific and technical communities, much of the Board's 
work has dealt with improving aspects of intelligence collection and recommending upgraded and 
more efficient systems for both human and technical collection processes. 

405 The Committee felt that access to materials relied on and prepared by the Board was the 
only equitable method of assessing the Board's past performance and role within the structure of 
the intelligence community. The Committee, without reliance on subpoena, attempted in vain to 
gain access to materials used by and prepared by the Board. After several months of negotiation, 
the Committee was granted access to a classified Board history, which outlined, but did not 
specifically enunciate, the kinds of recommendations the Board has made since its inception, and 

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Two important and limiting factors shed light on the role and performance of the Board. 
The Board cannot establish or even oversee policy, but is limited to advising the President with 
respect to objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities. 406 The Board's 
effectiveness also is limited by the interest and confidence of the President, and this has varied 
considerably throughout the five Administrations of the Board's existence 407 

The problems do not end there. Board members are chosen for distinguished careers in 
government, academia, and the business world. Not surprisingly, members of PFIAB, whose 
principal functions include advice on research and development goals, are typically affiliated with 
firms holding lucrative intelligence and defense contracts. 4 8 

There are no indications that a PFIAB member has ever improperly profited from his Board 
service. However, after searching Board records at the request of Committee staff, a PFIAB 
spokesman stipulated that there are no conflict-of-interest regulations applicable to its members. 
Likewise, there were no regulations covering the expensive and confidential contracts they assess and 
review. 409 Instead, members are provided, on their appointment, with the "Standards of Conduct 
for the White House Staff." 410 

There are obviously difficult policy problems in gathering a group of distinguished 
knowledgeable citizens and, at the same time, insuring that the Board's activities and judgments are 
entirely beyond reproach. 

The part-time nature of PFIAB, if its work is recognized as being cursory, is not necessarily 
undesirable. Members can bring a fresh perspective from their other pursuits, and they are less 
compromised by the secrecy and insular views of intelligence agencies. On the other hand, heavy 
reliance on this Board for oversight, without more outside professional staff and greater Presidential 
commitment, is an illusion. 

the agendas of the Board's meetings from January 1961 to the present. 
406 See, note [ ]. 

407 See, note [ ]. 

408 For example, present members of the Board whose corporations hold such contracts 
include Willo. Baker President, Bell Telephone Laboratories; John S. Foster, Jr., Vice-President 
for Energy Research and Development, TRW; Robert W. Galvin, Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer of Mororola, Inc.; Edwin H. Land, Board Chairman, Polaroid Corporation; and Edward 
Teller, Associate Director of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. In addition, three of the remaining 
four members have formidable military credentials and affiliations: George W. Anderson, Jr., 
former Chief of Naval Operations; Leo Cheme, member of the Board of Advisors of the 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces; and Gordon Gray, former Secretary of the Army and 
Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. 



Letter to Sel. Comm, on Intell. from Wheaton Byers, PFIAB Executive Secretary, Jan 5, 




9. National Security Council Intelligence Committee 

Confusion and indifference are often the rule in executive branch efforts to manage the 
intelligence community's performance. A good illustration is the National Security Council 
Intelligence Committee and its Economic Intelligence Subcommittee. 

Created by President Nixon in a November 5, 1971 memorandum entitled "Organization and 
I Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community." NSCIC was designed as a forum for 
high-level consumers of intelligence to articulate their needs. 41 1 The Economic Subcommittee was 
created in late 1974, to provide a similar, lower-level forum for input on economic intelligence. 

There has been little commitment to these mechanisms on the part of the White House or 
the consumers for whom they were intended. Real doubt exists as to the desirability of their 
continued existence. 

The Intelligence Committee has met only twice in four years. 412 It met once in December 
11971, to organize, and once in August, 1974, to re-organize. It has no permanent staff, other than 
I the NSC Director for Intelligence Coordination, Richard Ober, a CIA detailee and architect of the 
I controversial CHAOS program. There is no indication that the Committee has been effective. 412 

A Working Group is composed of the next lower-level of consumers. Although in existence 
from 1971 to 1974, it apparently did not perform any useful function. This group was revived 
following the 1974 Intelligence Committee meeting and met seven times thereafter. While Wor kin g 
Group principals assert a need for intelligence consumers to somehow institutionally convey their 




The Nixon Memorandum stated at page 5: "[ NSCIC] will give direction and guidance on 
national substantive intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence 
products from the viewpoint of the consumer." 

Undoubtedly, a major impetus for the creation of NSCIC can be found in the report 
entitled "A Review of the Intelligence Community," March 10, 1971 (Schlesinger report): "USIB 
has proved generally ineffective as a management mechanism for several reasons:. ..It is dominated 
by collectors and producers who avoid rasing critical questions about the collection programs 
j jperated by their colleagues Since policy-level consumers are not represented on the Board, they 
! tre unable to give guidance as to priority needs." Schlesinger concluded that the following step 
"should "Increase the usefulness of the product to the national leadership: Major consumer 
representation to and within the intelligence community, perhaps through a restructured USIB, a 
liigh-level consumer council, or other institutionalized ways of communicating consumer needs, 
priorities, and evaluations to intelligence producers." 

Membership consists of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as 
| Chairman, DCI, Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint 
.Chiefs of Staff and Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs. 

412 Summary of Minutes of NSCIC Meetings received pursuant to subpoena on Nov. 11, 

413 A principal member of the Working Group perceived the failure of NSCIC itself to be, at 
least in part, a function of the personal style of Henry Kissinger, who saw little utility in the 
iommittee format. Interview by J. Whieldon and C. Yamamoto, Nov. 3, 1975. 

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problems to collectors, there appears to be a general low level of interest on the ^art of several 
members and misgivings as to the effectiveness of the panel as presently constituted. 

The Economic Intelligence Subcommittee's performance to date can be easily evaluated. 
While its purpose--to provide consumers of economic intelligence a forum to convey their 
needs— appears worthwhile on paper, it has produced no results. One meeting was held in May 1975, 
at the behest of the DC l. 4 15 

The Chairman, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, told Committee 
staff that as a consumer he was generally satisfied with intelligence input, that the group was a waste 
of time, and that intended to hold as few meetings as possible. Displaying an attitude rare among 
government officials, the Chairman disdained formal high-level committees and called for informal 
communication at the working level. 416 He has since left his post and may well be replaced by 
a proponent of bureaucratic committees. Nonetheless, the record strongly calls for an abolition of 
the Subcommittee, as presently operated and tasked. 

10. The management and production of defense intelligence 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense recently expressed frustration at the apparent inability of 
a multi-billion dollar U.S. intelligence establishment to produce timely and useful information. He 
reportedly complained that "In a mechanical sense the system produces the information, but it's so 
damn big and cumbersome and uncoordinated, that you can't get the information properly assessed 
and to the right people." 417 

Mismanaged and uncoordinated intelligence operations result in more than resource wastage. 

During the Mid-east war and Cyprus crisis, for example, uncoordinated and duplicative 
reports compounded the problem of interpreting events. 418 

414 Interviews indicated that while substantia] progress, relatively speaking, was made by the 
Working Group during 1975, several principals seem to have little interest in its work and do not 
attend meetings. There are a few who have taken active roles and made useful suggestions, some 
of which have been implemented. Interviews by J. Whieldon and C. Yamamoto, week of Nov. 

3, 1975. 

415 Interview with Charles Cooper, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International 
Affairs, by J. Whieldon and C. Yamamoto, Nov. 7, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

416 Ibid. 

417 Quoted by William Beecher, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, in 
Report of the Defense Panel on Intelligence, January, 1975, p. 7 of his statement. 

418 See, for example, the IC Staff Preliminary Post-Mortem report on the October War 
which concludes, "The coordination procedures which are followed by the Community during 
normal times are frequently abandoned during times of crisis-bccause the press of time may 


There is a clear need to challenge organizational proliferation, duplication of activity and 
product, and overlapping of management layers that have plagued defense intelligence for years. The 
significance of these problems is contained in the fact that the Department of Defense controls nearly 
80 percent of the intelligence community's resources and employs nearly 90 percent of its personnel. 

Particular attention must be directed toward the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), an 
organization established in the early 1960's to integrate and align defense intelligence activities, and 
a major production unit in its own right. 

As chartered, DIA was to function as both a supervisor and coordinator, and as a centralized 
producer of intelligence. 

Over the years, however, it became increasingly apparent that DIA cold not accomplish the 
ambitious management and production goals envisioned at the time of its formation. A string of 
overviews, including the 1969 Froehlke report, the 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, the 1971 
Schlesinger study for the Office of Management and Budget, the 1974 Management Review, and the 
1975 Panel on Intelligence all found that organizational impediments and product imperfection have 
continued to persist after years of DIA operation. Each in turn recommended reorganization and 
substantive improvements. None solved the problems. 

DIA lacks comprehensive authority to direct and control resources throughout the Defense 
Department, as initially envisioned. For example, the vast cryptologic resources in he armed services 
and the National Security Agency are not responsive to DIA 4,<r DIA's resource management 
functions were taken over in 1972 by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence with a broader 
mandate to coordinate budgeting. 420 

simply not allow regular processes to continue. It thus has been said that the Community is 
pretty good about coordinating, except when the intelligence becomes important. And, in a way, 
this did indeed happen immediately before and during the October War in the Middle East. 
Coordination of the Central Intelligence Bulletin, for example, was suspended for a time, and the 
wartime Situation Reports and Spot Reports prepared by CIA, DIA and 1NR were unilateral and 
often duplicative issuances. This, if not a major problem for the analysts themselves, was 
certainly one for the consumers ...." IIC Staff, The Performance of the Intelligence Community 
Before the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: A preliminary Por.t-Mortem Report, December 
1973, p. 19. emphasis added). The 'Taylor" report notes the "flood of overlapping papers, of 
varying degrees of validity, unleashed on the policymaker" at the national level by DIA, CIA and 
■NR. The report further comments that "No DCI has felt strong enough to bring a halt to this 
practice, or even to offer his services in bringing coherence to it." (D-16). 

Ihese comments put a perspective on analytic and product duplication that is not often 
stressed. The argument that multiple analytic staffs, "keep the system honest" or provide needed 
^dependent judgments on complex world problems breaks down when the consequences are 
examined at the national level. 

419 "Report on Defense Intelligence, Robert Froehlke, July 29, 1969, p.2. 

420 ASDI is the product of the effect of the 1969 Froehlke's reports' findings that "DIA 
manages' only about 25% of the DOD resources devoted to satisfying both military and 
national' intelligence requirements." (p. 2). The 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel noted the 

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The central problem is bureaucratic politics. The three individual branches of the military 
resist any organization which might curb their authority to direct programs and allocate resources. 
They undermine the concept on which DIA was founded, by avoiding its authority and preventing 
it from obtaining qualified manpower. 

President Nixon recognized that DIA had not achieved its purpose and issued a directive on 
Nov. 5, 1971, charging the DCI with responsibility for intelligence budget preparation, including the 
budge for tactical military intelligence. This too failed, since the DCI lacked authority for over 80 
percent of the community's budge, which remained in the Department of Defense. 421 

The only noticeable effect of these reforms has been an added layer of bureaucracy and a 

continued redundancy in the DOD. The 1971 Schlesinger study for OMB indicated that much 
improvement in management would be accomplished only if "Defense were to master its own 
massive intelligence operations." (p. 21) 

421 The President on November 5, 1971, citing the "need for improved intelligence product 
and for greater efficiency in the use of resources allocated to intelligence" charge the DCI with 
greater responsibility for coordinating the community intelligence effort. His Memorandum stated 
that the President would 'look to him (DCI) to improve the performance of the community, to 
provide his judgments on the efficiency and effectiveness of all intelligence programs and activities 
( including tactical intelligence , and to recommend the appropriate allocation of resources to be 
devoted to intelligence." (emphasis added). More specifically, he directed "the Director of 
Central Intelligence to prepare and submit each year, through OMB, a consolidated intelligence 
program budget, including tactical intelligence." (emphasis added). These sentiments are 
reiterated in an October 9, 1974, Presidential Memorandum. 

As the 'Taylor" report indicates, the DCI as presently constituted lacks the 'legal authorities 
that charge the Secretary of Defense with sole responsibility for decisions on Defense programs." 
(31) It also asserts that because Defense expenditures amount to about 5 percent of the DOD 
budget but about 80 percent of the total intelligence community budget, "(I)t can be difficult for 
top Defense management to give major attention to an issue critical to the Intelligence 
Community but of very min or consequence when considered in the context of the total Defense 
budge." (32) The argument is frequently made that since CIA is a professional intelligence 
agency, while in the Department of Defense, intelligence is though of in support terms, CIA will 
always treat intelligence with greater sensitivity than the Department of Defense generally. The 
Department of Defense's fear is that given enlarged budgetary authority a DCI might make 
trade-offs between tactical and national intelligence at the expense of the former. As a budgetary 
device, however, and as the DOD fear expresses, a DCI with overall community budget authority 
would be able to force economies that so far have eluded the Defense people, particularly in the 
military services. (See Schlesinger Report, p. 21). 

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of 1970 would have eliminated DIA and replaced it with it 
with a new Defense Intelligence Production Agency directly under the ASDI. ASDI would also 
be the Director of Defense Intelligence and sit on USIB in place of DIA. 


confused sharing of responsibilities. 422 

The output side of DIA's operation has been criticized from a number of directions. Over 
the years, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the armed services have been completely satisfied with 
DIA product. Secretary of Defense McNamara reportedly preferred CIA's product; the services 
prefer their own analysis. 423 Their criticisms focus on DIA's current intelligence and its estimates. 
They raise questions as to DIA's capability to produce unique and quality intelligence to meet tactical 
and national demands. 424 

As internal Defense Department memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 
January 1974, indicated the scope of DIA inadequacy in light of the Mid-Cast war failures. The 
memorandum concluded: "What has been stated briefly arc only the symptoms of the disease. The 
cause lies deeper . . 

While noting the failure of DIA analysts to predict the war, the memo stated, "the blame is 
not theirs alone. It is a corporate failure, a chronic unsoundness of the entire DIA mechanism. 
Unless we make the required changes in organization, procedures, and personnel, we are going to 
reap another intelligence failure— and the next one could be a disaster involving U.S. forces." 42 

422 See DIA-ASDI charter comparison in app. The vague differentiation of DIA and ASDI 
functions and responsibilities has promoted confusion between the two concerning proper limits 
of their authority. This has led to continuous bureaucratic battles and noncooperation. (For 
example, see ASDI proposed study on Korea data flow.) The longer ASDI exists, the longer it 
feels it must concern itself with so-called "substantive" intelligence in order to properly fulfill its 
product review assignments. DIA fights to maintain its mastery review assignments. DIA fights 
to maintain its mastery of "substantive" intelligence and tries to keep ASDI a "resource manager." 
General Graham predicted that the jurisdictional warfare will probably confront any future 
director of either agency. Staff interview with General Graham, by V. Hyndman and A. Beam, 
Nov. 12, 1975. 

423 General Graham has written the committee: "I believe that much of this criticism stems 
from the early growing pains of the DIA, when its consumers, particularly those on Mr. 
!vi;Namara's staff, turned elsewhere for intelligence analysis when the DIA product did not satisfy 
them." The 1975 Defense Panel on intelligence indicated dissatisfaction with DIA by Secretary of 
Defense Schlesinger and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, both 
important consumers. Vice Admiral David Richardson, in the same report, offered his experience 
as a commander of deployed forces to point out "the institutional inability of the Agency to 
provide other than intelligence for background and data base purposes." 

424 See the 1974 Management review for a discussion of Science and Technology problems. 
D*A has since then virtually abandoned whatever tight or substantive control it formerly 
maintained and accepts the view that Science & Technology should be tied to Research and 
Development capabilities which reside in the services. 

425 The briefing discussed the following "root causes": 'DIA leadership lacks professional 
experience and is overburdened with management tasks. Middle-level management is weak. The 
analyst force is less able than it should be. Analysts are over committeed. DIA lacks ability to 

scan by 


While several of the root causes of poor performance provide an argument for piece-meal 
reform, in general the problems are too permanent to allow for anything less than across-the-board 

A major obstacle to strong analytic capability within DIA results from the civilian-military 
nature of DIA, in a setting of independent military establishments. As long as the service branches 
retain viable intelligence units, DIA remains an unattractive assignment and will not attract qualified 
officers 426 In addition, manpower reductions have spread available personnel to thin for effective 
reporting. 427 

Civilians in DIA are confronted with two disincentives. DIA cannot compete with CIA and 

exploit SIGINT properly. DIA's production procedures need improvement of DIA elements. 
Physical separation cripples the DIA production effort." 

426 Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements was briefed in January 1974: 
"Unfortunately, the Services tend to withhold their best officers from DIA at all levels, and this is 
operative at middle management levels as well . . .DIA provides a convenient 'parking lot' for 
senior 06's (colonels and Navy captains), and 05's (Lieutenant colonels and commanders) on a 
terminal tour or not considered to have promotion potential warranting as assignment in Service 
headquarters." The most recent figures available at ASDI indicate that, while for the one year, 
1974, DIA promotion rates compared favorably with service intelligence, the general trend is still 
against rapid career advancement in DLA. (Internal ASDI memoranda, Sept. 23, Sept. 25, Nov. 
26, and Dec. 1, 1975) 

427 Vice Admiral David Richardson discussed the problem of attracting and maintaining 
competent analytic staff in the January, 1975, Defense Panel on Intelligence. He related the 
difficulty of obtaining "better people" to the prospect of unappealing employment by noting: 
"Improving the quality of the product will improve respect and regard for the DIA. It is 
possible— even probable— that increasing emphasis on getting 'better' people assigned to DIA will 
be counterproductive, as it tends to de-emphasize searching for management arrangements that 
reduce frustrations, bureaucratic procedural nonsense and similar ailments that reduce the viability 
of any organization, including the DIA." (See Defense Panel on Intelligence, January, 1975, his 
statement, p. 7.) 

In earlier inspection of DIA analysts indicated among other things that with the "demand 
for various formatting of the content of their product (summaries, bulletins, briefings, studies they 
(the analysts) are left little time to perform profound analysis of anything, including deception. 
(Emphasis in original.) Foreign Deception Study, 1971, p. 9. In 1974 the Department of 
Defense could still find that "DIA has too few analysts, too committed to demanding daily 
routines, to conduct the kind of trend analysis needed to have tracked and interpreted trends in 
Arab capabilities and intentions. With specific regard to military capabilities analysis, the force of 
six analysts who worked on the Middle East also were required to cover all African military 
forces, and routine order-of-battle updating for a little used automated file system was the 
dominant daily task. In this environment it would have been very difficult for capabilities 
analysis in depth to take place, even if the most capable analysts had been there to do it." 

January, 1974, briefing of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, p. 20-21.) 


NSA in appointments and promotions, and persistent military control of higher grade management 
positions limits mobility. 428 

Officials within DIA are ready to admit they cannot match CIA. They justify their 
contribution as that of "devils advocates," or "honest brokers." Even in military intelligence, the 
Committee was told, "they (CIA) are at least our equals," 429 meaning that DIA was no real 
improvement over CIA intelligence. 

In summary, finished intelligence generated by DIA has repeatedly failed to meet consumer 
needs. The evidence suggests that DIA does not fulfill the ambitious expectations of the early 1960's. 
It is duplicative, expensive, unattractive, and its production capabilities arc handicapped by the 
consistent weaknesses of its own organization. 


The American taxpayer clearly does not receive full value for his intelligence dollar. The 
costs of intelligence should not, however, be measured in dollars alone. Many day-to-day activities 
inevitably pose real risks. 

The Committee has found that when results are measured against hazards alone, certain 
intelligence programs may be wholly unacceptable; other projects may too easily stray from wise and 
worthwhile courses, without detection. 

It is disturbing that the consequences of intelligence activities are sometimes apparently given 
scant consideration by policy makers. Even more troubling are indications that this insensitivity 
continues when dangers reveal themselves. 

1 . Covert action 

The Committee has examined CIA covert action operations and has considerable evidence 
that they are irregularly approved, sloppily implemented, and at times have been forced on a reluctant 
CIA by the President and his National Security Advisor. 

"Covert action" may be defined as clandestine activity other than purely 
information-gathering, which is directed at producing a particular political, economic, or military 

28 The most recent density ratios (supergrades compared to total force) show that possibility 
of advancement for civilians is vastly better in CIA than in DIA. The Civil Service Commission 
has refused DIA exemption from the General Schedule that CIA maintains. A deputy director of 
DIA informed Committee staff that civilians are still "second class citizens" there. Staff interview 
with James Agersborg, DDI/DIA, Nov. 10, 1975. Statistics provided by ASDI. 

429 Staff interview with James Agersborg, DDI/DIA, Nov. 10, 1975; Staff interview with 
Robert Bower, Assistant DDE/DIA, Nov. 5, 1975. 




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result. 430 

Successive administrations have cited Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 as the 
legal justification for covert action. 431 During the course of this investigation, the Special Counsel 
to the Director of Central Intelligence has argued that the President, in his conduct of foreign 
relations, has an inherent Constitutional mandate to authorize these activities. 432 

On the other hand, in recent years, commentators have maintained that in establishing the 
CIA, Congress had no specific intention that covert operations apart from intelligence-gathering 
missions be conducted. Witnesses before the Committee likewise disputed any inherent 
Constitutional power to conduct covert actions. 433 In any event, Congress has implicitly 
acquiesced in covert action through the oversight process. 

It may be argued that there has been explicit approval as well. Just as the War Powers Act 
acknowledges the authority of the President to conduct overt military hostilities, albeit for a limited 
period, without a Congressional declaration of war, the Ryan-Hughes Amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1974 434 formally acknowledges the existence and legality of covert action. 

The Committee has surveyed all Forty Committee approvals since 1965, and has delved 

430 Comm. Hearings, at [ ]. 

431 Section 102(d)(5) calls on CIA, under National Security Council direction, "to perform 
such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the 
National Security Council may from t im e to time direct." 

432 Mitchell Rogovin, Counsel to the DCI, argued that "before there was a 1947 Act there 
was a United States and a United States with a President with the authority to conduct foreign 
affairs and he conducted such affairs over the history of the nation which involved activity which 
we now know as covert activity. Now the 1947 Act did not give the President a power he did 
not have before. The 1947 Act merely came upon the scene as it was and it set up the National 
Security Council. The Council itself subsequently took its authority and devised a 40 Committee 
as an implementing system for getting information with respect to covert activity. So that the 
activity in 1972 grew from two separate legal authorities for the President to pursue." See Comm. 
Hearings, at [ ]. 

433 Comm Hearings, at [ ]. 

434 Section 32 of Public Law 93-559 (The Foreign Assistance Act Amendments of 1974), 
states in part: "No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be 
expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in foreign countries, 
other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the 
President of the United States finds that each such operation is important to the national security 
of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to 
the appropriate committees of the Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the United States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of 
Representatives." The remaining four committees are the Armed Services and Appropriations 
Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate. 


deeply into three recent covert action projects. It is believed that the Committee's review of ten years 
of covert action is without precedent in the Congress or the executive branch. 

a. Ten Year Survey 

Our primary purpose was to determine whether the Forty Committee and its predecessors 
had been exercising their oversight and control responsibilities from 1965 to date. 435 To do this, 
it was necessary to trace the process from proposal to final approval . 

Like other aspects of covert action, fixing responsibility for the initiation of various covert 
action projects was a difficult task. As recorded in Forty Committee records, the vast majority of 
projects was submitted by the CIA, 88 percent of the total projects since 1965. The high number 
of covert action proposals represents a general activism within the foreign affairs bureaucracy, 
especially within CIA. 

The overall picture, however, does not support the contention that covert action has been 
used in furtherance of any particular principle, form of government, or identifiable national interest. 
Instead, the record indicates a general lack of long-term direction in U.S. foreign policy. Covert 
actions, as the means for implementing a policy, reflected this band-aid approach, substituting 
short-term remedies for problems which required long-term cures. 

Covert action proposals came from a variety of interest areas: a foreign head of state, the 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, an Ambassador, CIA, the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, a cabinet member, or the President himself. 

Proposals involving a large expenditure of funds or classified as "politically sensitive," required 
review and approval of the Forty Committee. Unfortunately, the executive branch does not have 
a clear definition of what constitutes a large or politically sensitive operation. 436 Projects of less 
sensitivity are approved within the CIA, usually at the level of Deputy Director for Operations, with 
the determination of "political sensitivity" being left to the Director of Central Intelligence. 

The Forty Committee is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs and includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. Theoretically, a 
detailed proposal is presented to this group. The members are then afforded an opportunity for a 
full discussion the merits and a reporting of their views to the President. In practice, the Forty 
Committee has of the been little more than a rubber stamp. 

The procedures for approval of covert action have changed with administrations, political 
conditions and personalities. At various times, the approval process has been relatively informal, 

435 Subsequent to a subpoena issued by the Committee on Nov. 6, 1975, two staff members 
reviewed all records of the 40 Committee reflecting approvals for ('overt Action from 1 965 to 
1975. All information and statistics used in the section entitled ""Fen Year Survey" are drawn 
from the staff review of those documents. The staff presented their findings to the full Committee 
in Executive Session testimony on Dec. 9, 1975. During that session, Mr. Colby had an 
opportunity to express his views on the staff report and while he had reservations about the 
conclusions, he raised no substantial disagreement with the facts. 


Comm. Hearings, at ( j. 

scan by 


extraordinarily secretive, and pro-forma. 

While on occasion some projects have been considered in depth, at Committee meetings 
which included the approval or disapproval by formal votes, several informal procedures have been 
frequently been used.* 37 These informal procedures, such as telephonic votes, do not allow each 
member to benefit from the views of his colleagues. At times, members have been given only the 
barest of details, and instead of formal votes have simply been allowed the opportunity to 
acknowledge the project's existence. 

The Forty Committee has only one full-time professional staff member. Because of the high 
degree of compartmentation attending these projects, committee members - who are among the 
busiest officials in government — are frequently in the position of evaluating a complex proposal 
without adequate staff support. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the 
Director of Central Intelligence, having the incentive and the resources to cope with Forty Committee 
business, clearly dominate the process. 

The origin of may covert action projects is murky at best. 

The CIA, as the prospective implementation arm, is often directed to produce proposals for 
covert action and is, therefore, incorrectly seen as a plan's original proponent. It is clear that on 
several occasions involving highly sensitive projects, CIA was summarily ordered by the President 
or his National Security Advisor to carry out a covert action program. It is further clear that CIA 
has been ordered to engage in covert action over the Agency's strong prior objections. 

All evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control, has been utterly 
responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs. It must be remembered, however, that the CIA Director determines which CIA-initiated 
covert action projects are sufficiently "politically sensitive" to require Presidential attention. 

From 1965 to 1972, a majority of approvals occurred subsequent to a formal committee 
meeting; although many telephonic approvals also took place during this period. In 1972, the process 
became quite informal, often involving mere notification to members that an operation had already 
been set in motion by the President. The Forty Committee, as the review and approval mechanism 
for covert action, fell into virtual disuse, with telephonic approvals being the rule and formal meetings 
the exception. One formal meeting was held in 1972, none in 1973 and 1974. 'This process did not 
begin to reverse itself until 1975. 

b. Election Support 

from 1965 to date, 32 percent of Forty Committee approved covert action projects were for 
providing some form of financial election support to foreign parties and individuals. 438 Such 
support could be negative as well as positive. This is the largest covert action category, and its 
funding has occurred in large part in the developing countries. With few exceptions, financial support 
has been give to incumbent moderate party leaders and heads of state. 

Certain projects have had a long life. One Third World leader received some $960,000 over 

437 Comm. Hearings, at [ ]. 

438 Comm. Hearings, at [ ]. 


a 14-year period. Others were financially supported for over a decade 419 

c. Media and Propaganda 

Some 29 percent of Forty Committee approved covert actions were for media and 
propaganda projects. 440 This number is probably not representative. Staff has determined the 
existence of a large number of CIA internally-approved operations of this type, apparently deemed 
not politically sensitive. It is believed that if the correct number of all media and propaganda projects 
could be determined, it would exceed Election Support as the largest single category of covert action 
projects undertaken by the CIA. 

Activities have included support of friendly media, major propaganda efforts, insertion of 
articles into the local press, and distribution of books and leaflets. By far the largest single recipient 
has been a European publishing house funded since 1951. There are a number of similar operations 
in the region. About 25 percent of the program has been directed at the Soviet Bloc, in the 
publication and clandestine import and export of Western and Soviet dissident literature. 

d. Paramilitary/Arms Transfers 

The 23 percent approvals in this category from 1965 to 1975 have taken one of essentially 
four forms: Secret armies; financial support to groups engaged in hostilities; paramilitary training and 
advisors; and shipment of arms, ammunition and other military equipment 441 Military ordnance 
is typically supplied by CIA out of its large inventory of U.S. weaponry and captured foreign 

The Committee scrutinized these projects carefully, since this category is the most expensive 
and represents the greatest potential for escalating hostilities and deepening American involvement. 
By far the most interesting, and important, fact to emerge was the recognition that the great majority 
of these covert action projects were proposed by parties outside CIA. 442 Many of these programs 
were summarily ordered, over CIA objections. CIA misgivings, however were at times weakly 
expressed, as CIA is afflicted with a "can do" attitude. 

At times, CIA has been used as a conduit for arms transfers in order to bypass Congressional 
scrutiny. A State Department-proposed project which could have been accomplished under the 
Military Assistance program was tasked on CIA because the Department of Defense did not desire 
to return to Congress for additional funds and approval. 



439 Ibid., at [ ]. 

440 Ibid, at [ ]. 

441 Ibid., at [ J. 

442 Ibid., at [ ]. 


443 Comm. Hearings, at | ), Oct. 21 and 23, 1975. 

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e. Organizational Support 

A plethora of foreign, civic, religious, professional, and labor organizations have received CIA 
funding. There has been no real geographical concentration, although the Third World was 
again well represented. For example, one labor confederation in a developing country received an 
annual subsidy of $30,000 in three successive years. 445 

f. Trends 

Since 1965, there has been a general decline in the number of covert action projects approved 
by the Forty Committee 446 There are indications that the low figure represents the Director of 
Central Intelligence's determination that not as many projects should be considered "politically 
sensitive" and taken to the Forty Committee for approval. This, in turn, may reflect his recognition 
that the Forty Committee had fallen into disuse and their approvals pro-forma. 

There is no indication that the passage of the Ryan-Hughes Amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1974, requiring Presidential certification and briefings of Congressional oversight 
committees, has had a significant impact on the national covert action program. As the events of 
1975 have shown, those who had warned that the Amendment and the Congressional probes into 
the U.S. intelligence community would make covert action impossible, have not seen their fears 

g. Three Projects. 

The three projects examined in depth were selected from major recent operations, apart from 
the American experience in Indochina, and involved different types of covet activity. One was 
election funding of pro-U.S. elements in an allied country. The second was Presidentially-directed 
arms support of an insurgency movement at the behest of the foreign head of a third country. The 
last involved a mix of political action, military training, and assistance to pro-Western forces in 
Angola. The last project was also initiated in part at the request of a third party. 

The Committee became aware of each of these operations through other parts of its 
investigation and through information provided to staff by sources outside the intelligence 
community. For example, a study of CIA arms inventories and shipments led to the major Agency 
para-military support operations. 

The case studies are not representative of all covert action since 1965. The Committee does 
believe that they are not atypical of most major programs of this type. CIA has indicated its 
agreement with the completeness and factual accuracy of the staff's analysis, though not necessarily 
with the conclusions. 




Co mm Hearings at [ ]. 

Ibid., at [ ]. 


Case 1: Election Support 

The U.S., perhaps needlessly, expended some $ 10 million in contributions to political parties, 
affiliated organizations, and 21 individual candidates in a recent parliamentary election held in an 
allied country. 447 

The program was initiated by our Ambassador, who later persuaded the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs to authorize him, rather than CIA, to select funding recipients 
and otherwise control the problem's implementation. The results of the aid were mixed, and 

With national assembly elections less than two years away, the U.S. country team concluded 
from a CIA-contracted survey, that the pro-U.S. elements, which had governed the country since the 
post-war period, were being seriously challenged by the Communists. The opposition, apparently 
heavily financed by Moscow, had scored gains in regional elections and trailed the incumbents by 
only a few points in the opinion polls. 

Pro-West parties and affiliates had received substantial funding in the past. CIA reports total 

447 It appears clear that this expenditure was made despite the fact that money was "not the 

Cable from Chief of Station 

To Headquarters in Washington 3 March 

I "Ambassador continues to cogitate on nature, amount and channel for financial assistance and is 
telling Station very little. He is aware of Station view that money is not the problem, (deleted| 
has plenty and any amount we contribute to [deleted] will have insignificant effect on electoral 
showing. If we could reduce the pernicious effect of intraparty squabbling and get party to pull in 
unison this would be financial support. We do not exclude possibility Ambassador [deleted] will 
want to give some money strictly as a demonstration of 'solidarity,' and a case might be made for 
this, but not two milli on dollars worth." (Emphasis supplied) 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence 
VIA: Deputy Director of Plans 

SUBJECT: Forty Committee Approval for Political Action Program 
18 February 
* Costs : 

This program will cost $1,050,000 the first year and $2,465,000 the second...." 
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence 
SUBJECT: Ambassador [deleted] Proposed [deleted] Election Program 
7 March 

Of the $10,000,000, the $1,790,000 for the [deleted] is to come from the budget approved 
on March 10 by the 40 Committee . . .. $8,300,000 in new funds will be required." 




scan by 


U.S. election financing over previous 20-year period at some $65 million 448 Despite this massive 
aid, the beneficiaries had suffered repeated electoral setbacks. American observers apparently 
concluded that another "quick fix" was necessary to see out clients through the nest vote. 

Anxious to gain control of the covert program, and fearing that inter-agency consideration 
would be inhibiting, the Ambassador has originally sought the President f=s personal approval of this 
proposed political action. 449 

448 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Forty Committee 

SUBJECT: Political Action Program for [deleted) to Arrest the 

Growing Power of the Communists 10 March 

"1. History of CIA Supported Political Action in [deleted). The United States government was 
concerned in 1948 that the Communists would emerge from the national elections sufficiently 
strong to enter the government as a major if not dominant force. As a counter, it was decided 
that CIA should give $1,000,000 to the center parties for this election with the bulk going to 

"Between 1948 and 1964 funds provided to [deleted) totaled approximately $5,450,000. 
Between 1948 and 1963 additional support to [deleted] in eight national and regional elections 
amounted to $11,800,000. Between 1953 and 1968, the [deleted] received about $26,000,000 to 
support its opposition to the Communist dominated labor confederation, [deleted] received some 
$11,350,000 during this period. 

"Between 1948 and 1968 other organizations received about $10,550,000 of CIA 
assistance. This support was given to the following political parties associated with center or 
center-left governments... 

"In sum, excluding the initial $10,000,000 spent in the 1948 campaign, CIA gave [deleted) 
and its related organizations $54,600,000 as well as $10,550,000 to the other non-Communist 
parties and affiliates for a grand total of $65,150,000 over approximately twenty years, starting in 

449 The Ambassador had decided during the first months of the project, that he would go 
directly to the President for his approval, and that he would exclude the CIA from whatever plans 
he would propose. 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters (13 March) 

"Ambassador [deleted] case (which he hopes present to President [deleted] and [National Security 
Advisor]), and not to State Department or 40 Committee... Imperative keep these observations as 
privileged within CIA owing Ambassador [deleted] explicit admonitions to Chief of Station to 
effect he does not repeat not wish inform anyone in Washington his views until he personally sees 
President [deleted). 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters (14 October) 

"Concur that Ambassador [deleted] will raise the need for political action in [deleted] in the 


This course would avoid the Forty Committee and with it, the inevitable role of CIA in 
implementing the program. The Ambassador was rebuffed. Ironically, the Assistant to the President 
then requested that CIA draft a proposal without the knowledge of the Ambassador or the 
Department of State. 450 

It is known that during this period the President was indirectly approached by prominent 

international businessmen^ who were former nationals of the allied country. Their communications 

to the President were not available to the Committee. 451 

future.... A key to his thinking is his strong conviction that any political action program in 
[deleted] which requires interagency approval is not likely to get off the ground 

Cable from Headquarters 

To Chief of Station ( 1 5 October) 

'. . . Keep in mind that Ambassador [deleted] previous proposal re support of [projects in other 
countries] ... floundered in large measure because it was not submitted through proper channels 
and thus was not injected into interagency mechanism until too late. Nonetheless, the 
Ambassador stated to the Committee that he had not really attempted to bypass the Forty 

Comm. Hearings at [ ]. 

'CHAIRMAN PIKE. But was not an effort made to have your plan approved by the President 
without going through the Forty Committee route? 

AMBASSADOR [deleted]. No sir, it would never have occurred to me that this was even 

450 The initial Forty Committee approval paper which was drafted by the CIA stated, 

'4. Coordination. 

"At the request of [National Security Advisor], this program has not yet been coordinated 
with Ambassador or with the Bureau of [deleted] of the Department of State." 

The CIA, while waiting for the President of respond to the Ambassadors proposal, did 
not believe that the CIA could wait indefinitely for that answer. 

Cable from Headquarters 

To CIA Chief of Station (7 January) 

"At this juncture, Ambassador [deleted] should not repeat not be apprised of this draft papers 
preparation. CIA is preparing this draft paper. . . for internal purposes and it will not repeat not 
be discussed with State at this time." 

45 'The CIA alluded to other approaches to the President by private individuals. 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters (10 February) 

"2. An important factor in Ambassador [deleted] desire to present an action program is his 
problem of how to cope with the many American and [deleted| channels to President [deleted] 


The Forty Committee subsequently approved the CIA proposal, but with unusual 
implementation. Despite the usual near-automatic control of covert action by CIA, the Ambassador, 
by all accounts a man of unusual force., successfully extracted from the Assistant to the President 
the commitment that he would have total control of the "mix and implementation" of the 
project. 452 Thus, the Ambassador, who had been in the country less than two years and did not 

Office which now exist. Ambassador [deleted) has become aware of this special character of 
[deleted] -U.S. relations and is trying to get a handle on this problem rather than having to react 
to the advice and influence offered by others." 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters (11 February) 

"B. Ambassador [deleted] insists that unless he proceeds quickly certain people' will push the 
White House into a 'disastrous program.' The name of [an international businessman who 
contacted the White House] finally emerged. 'If you think the [right-wing foreign intelligence 
officers] program is bad, you should see the kind of stuff (international businessman] is trying to 
sell.' In the Ambassador's view '[international businessman] is further to the right than 
[right-wing politician].' " 

State Department officials in talks with the Agency also expressed reservations in dealing 
with these channels to the White House. 


"2. [State Department official] said that one of the problems that he had in dealing with 
[deleted] affairs is that people like [international businessman] had excellent access to higher 
echelons of our government, and there was no way of knowing their information input. He said 
that [international businessman] had very good relations with [deleted] of the White House. (The 
international businessman conducted foreign fund-raising activities for a U.S. political party.)" 

452 Testimony given to the Committee by the CIA Deputy Director for Operations states 
that, . . . The Forty Committee approval stated that Ambassador [deleted] would 'control the mix 
and implementation...' of the program and would by expected to 'forward recommendations' for 
additional overt activities which might be undertaken in support of U.S. objectives in [deleted]" 
Comm. Hearing at [ ]. 

The Agency was uncomfortable with this unaccustomed turn of events. In cables from 
the Station, it was reiterated that the Ambassador was to be the one calling the shots. 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters (June) 

"1. Morning 4 June I delivered to Ambassador, a sterile copy of your message. After reading 
it he commented that 'They still do not understand that the program as approved by 40 
Committee and the President is only an illustrated one leaving to Ambassador [deleted] the 
authority to decide what should be done.' 

"4. Headquarters is in error if it really believes friction with Ambassador [deleted] can be 
avoided if Ambassador understands CIA views better. He understands them only too well. It is 


speak the language, would determine which individuals and organizations would receive U.S. funds. 
The CIA station would be reduced to couriers. The Agency expressed concern that a high profile 

this understanding' that causes the friction and it will continue. . ." The Agency and the 
Ambassador had frequent disagreements over the "mix and implementation" of the project and its 

Comm. Hearings at [ J. 

AMBASSADOR. One of the people who was here this morning, the Acting Chief of Station, 
couldn't get away from the fact that the Agency had traditionally run all this and (thought that] 
the Agency knew better what needed to be done and [couldn't accept | what the 40 Committee 
had said and the President had approved, that the authority and the mix and implementation 
would be mine. He felt that if he disagreed with something, that therefore the could veto it and 
send it back, you see, for whatever. Yes, I did object to this." 

The Ambassador felt so strongly about his differences of opinion with the Acting Chief of 
Station that he mentioned their disagreements nine times during his testimony before the 

The Ambassador reacted vigorously even when his authority was questioned by [the 
National Security advisor] and reviewed by the Fort Committee. When [the National Security 
advisor] decided that the CIA should submit a separate progress report of the project to the Forty 
Committee, the Ambassador was aroused. 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters (28 February) 

"1. You should be aware that Ambassador [deleted] reaction to (memo) was negative in the 
extreme. He considers it offensive to him personally that the CIA would submit annual report. 
Says it is not true that [National Security advisor] 'ruled' that CIA submit report. It was CIA 
that suggested that idea to him . . 

At the annual 40 Committee review of the project, reservations were expressed by the 
members on portions of the operation, particularly the funding of moribund [political action 
group]. The Ambassador was annoyed at this interference from Washington and he apparently 
resorted to subterfuge. 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters (16 March) 

"1. Ambassador intensely annoyed by outcome of 40 Committee meeting. 

"2. You will note that Ambassadors message states he has committed additional [amount of 
money] to [affiliated political action group] effort. This is not repeat not true. He was urged not 
to make this statement because it: (A) not accurate and (B) still not determined that [affiliated 
political action group] could effectively use or absorb this additional amount. Ambassador said 
he insisted on reporting that funds 'committed' to 'tactical reasons' . . .." 

scan by 


by the ambassador would needlessly compromise the program; 4 ”’ 1 their complaints fell on deaf 
ears, despite the agreement of all that exposure would bring down the pro-West government. 454 

A major political party received $3.4 million: a political organization created and supported 
by CIA, $3.4 million: other organizations and parties, a total of $1 .3 million. Substantial funds were 

453 Both the Agency and State Department officials expressed fears over the visibility of the 
Ambassador conducting a covert action project. 


Conversation between CIA Chief of [deleted) Division and State Department Official (14 

"4. I feel that an ambassador should certainly have a strong role (if not the strongest) in 
establishing the policy under which a political action program is to be carried out, but I do not 
feel that any ambassador has the requisite background in clandestine activities to successfully 
manage a covert political action program. This has traditionally been a CIA responsibility and 
given the sophistication and the ramifications of what must be undertaken in [deleted] I urge that 
consideration by given to heading off Ambassador [deleted) now, before the program is approved 
on his terms. 


Conversation with State Department and the CIA (Undated) 

"D. 'Who is going to control this program?' 

As pointed out in the Embassy Air-gram A- 100 there is a large area of overt activities 
where the U.S. government can act without fear of unfortunate repercussions. There is also a 
realm of covert activities which is presented in our 40 paper where the fact of U.S. involvement 
must be plausibly denied. In the latter case, the general thrust of our covert activities must, of 
course, be first coordinated with the Ambassador and have his approval. The details of 
operational implementation on this area must be left to the professional dictates of the CIA . . 

454 In a letter from a later Ambassador, the gravity of the situation in [deleted] was expressed 
as such, *. . . [deleted) is facing important local and national elections in the very near future. 

The outcome of these elections may well determine whether [deleted] maintains its commitment 
to democracy and its alliance with the West. The results here will no doubt influence events 
elsewhere in [deleted]. Any possibility of the U.S. government taking meaningful action to assist 
the democratic forces to stem the momentum of the Communists will be completely destroyed if 
facts should come into the public domain concerning [deleted) political leaders and organizations 
which have received covert assistance from us in the past. I am convinced to make such 
disclosure could result in an electoral victory for the supporting the democratic forces with whom 
it is in our national interests to be aligned at this critical state of [deleted] political development. 
Our influence effectiveness and credibility as allies are at stake. . 


provided to several incumbents whose seats did not appear in jeopardy. 455 Of a total of $11.8 
million approved by the Forty Committee, only $9.9 million was actually spent. The reserve was 
held to be spent in the following year. 

CIA concurred in most of the recipients chosen by the Ambassador, although differences 
were expressed on precise amounts. There were serious disagreements over some recipients. One 
of these was a high local intelligence official to whom the Ambassador wanted to give over $800,000, 
to conduct a propaganda effort. The Ambassador was unmoved by CIA warnings that the man was 
clearly linked to anti-democratic elements of the right, and went ahead with the funding. 456 

455 Comm. Hearings, at [ ]. 

"MR. MURPHY . . . but there is one fellow here in a party that is singled out for more aid than 
the others and he happens to become a [deleted]. It is just because of his philosophy or that he is 
a leader? . . .. Was he involved in a close election? 

[Acting Chief of Station], No." 

456 The Ambassador and the CIA had sharp disagreements about the funding of this 
-right-wing, senior intelligence officer] and his propaganda program. Initially, the Chief of Station 
expressed his reservations bout the project to the Ambassador. 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters (10 February) 

"Ambassador [deleted] insists on proceeding immediately with prop support to [foreign 
intelligence officer]. Chief of Station continues to express serious reservations on program with 
emphasis and magnitude . . . 

3. . . . [foreign intelligence officer] would primarily use [as his chief collaborator, a journalist] who 
was reportedly once connected with [an extremist right-wing political faction) youth group and 
now a member of the [extremist right-wing political faction] central committee. . .." 

The Chief of Station also had misgivings about the recipients ability to use the funds 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters (8 February) 

"B. Until we know specifies, no way to judge whether expenditure would be total waste. 
[Foreign intelligence Officer] is no propaganda expert and we are not aware he has such expertise 
on his staff . . . 

"3. In response to Chief of Stations question, M)o you really care if [foreign intelligence 
officer] propaganda efforts are successful or not, Ambassador [deleted] replied, 'Yes, I do, but not 
a helluva lot. Important thing is to demonstrate solidarity for the long pull.' " 

When the Chief of Station continued to resist further on the funding, the Ambassador 
became very annoyed. 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters ( 1 1 February) 

"3. Ambassador [deleted] said Headquarters absolutely wrong. Said he had discussed in 

scan by 


Embassy control of the funds was poor. Participants in the program testified before the 
Committee that little effort was made to earmark grants or, failing that, at least seek assurances that 
the money was spent a intended by the Forty Committee. The Ambassador resisted most CIA 
control suggestions, insisting that such monitoring would insult the recipient. Thus, there was almost 
no accounting or control of the expenditures. 7 There is no indication that the Ambassador 

Washington (did not say with whom) and all agreed this was legitimate... Chief of Station 
expressed the view that Ambassador [deleted] should first clarify this point in personal exchange 
with CIA. . . He [Ambassador] thereupon accused Chief of Station of dragging his feet in 
contacting [foreign intelligence officer], and said if this continued beyond today he would 'Instruct 
Marine guards not to let you in this building and put you on the airplane.' Chief of Station said 
he thought this a bit extreme and expressed view that Ambassador [deleted]] could hardy object to 
what appeared legitimate Headquarters question. He did object and with vigor." 

The CIA headquarters shared the same concerns as the Station Chief and warned the 
Ambassador in conciliatory terms against funding, especially on a no-strings attached basis. 

Cable to Ambassador 

From Headquarters (11 February) 

"A. The media activities proposed by [foreign intelligence officer) might ultimately play more into 
the hands of the [extremist right-wing political faction) than elements of the political center in 

"B. [Foreign intelligence officer] does not appear at present to have the range of contacts in the 
media field to use [amount of money]. What he would do with the balance of these funds 
concerns us greatly. . . 

'C. [Foreign intelligence officer] in the sphere of political action is a highly sensitive and 
potentially explosive enterprise for both services and governments and must be kept under closest 
possible control. . . 

"2. There has never been any question with us regarding the authority granted you by the 40 
Committee in this operation. We were simply trying to 'reason together' so as to avoid hazards." 

Interview with former Chief of Station, by R. Starek and T. Yamamoto, Oct. 31, 1975, copy on 
file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

457 The Ambassador made it very clear that the CIA was not going to ask any of the 
recipients how they were going to use the funds. 

Cable from Chief Station 
To Headquarters (28 February) 

"7. Ambassador [deleted] made clear to Station officers that his modus operandi for this program 
will be not to ask for much detail, if any, from prospective recipients of funds, nor to tell them 
how to use funds or how to earmark them. 


began to encounter interference from Washington at this point. 

The fruits of this U.S. investments are difficult to assess. The pro-U.S. elements retained 
control of the government by a small plurality, and most of the incumbents supported were returned 
to office. On the other hand, the ruling coalition quickly lost public support and suffered severe 
reverses in subsequent local elections. 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters (8 February) 

"B. [Foreign intelligence officer] should not be asked specifics on how plans to use money. 
Ambassador feels he will volunteer more info over period of time. . ." 

The Ambassador regarded the monies for the project as his own to be dispensed with as 
he deemed necessary. 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters (4 June) 

A. Ambassador [deleted] does not regard program funds as 'Agency funds.' He tends to regard 
them as his funds with CIA have a custodial role only: 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters (8 February) 

D. Ambassador [deleted] 'could , of course,' use a channel other than CIA to give money to 
[foreign intelligence officer]. . ." 

Control over funding was so loose that there was no easy of checking to see if funds were 
being expended for the purposes for which they said they were to be used. The Ambassador said 
before the Committee, "... I think as it tuned out that we did get our full money's worth. 

"Now on the question of the possibility of rip-off, that is quite true. The possibility 
exists . . .. 

Comm. Hearings, at [ ]. 

However, when the [foreign intelligence officer] discovered that his funding was to be 
terminated, another story emerged. Instead of exclusively conducting media activities, this 
individual financed favored politicians without the Embassy's knowledge. 

Cable from Chief of Station 
To Headquarters (June) 

B. [Foreign intelligence officer] said that there were 50 politicians receiving money from him as 
a result of this subsidy. (This is the first time that such information has been made available to 
us). If he stops subsidizing these 50 people they will be convinced that he is placing his allegiance 
elsewhere and 'will turn on him.' He stated that termination of the subsidy at this time ( this is 
approximately a year after the elections were held) places him in a very precarious situation . . .." 

Interview with former Chief of Station, by R. Starek and T. Yamamoto, Oct. 31, 1975, copy on 
file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

scan by 


Case 2: The President's Program 

Records of the Forty Committee reveal that President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. 
Kissinger, at the behest of a foreign head of state, unilaterally directed the CIA to provide arms and 
money to an insurgent group in a third country. 458 The President acted despite the fact that both 
the CIA and the Department of State had rejected similar operations on three occasions over the 
previous two years, and despite a prior disapproval by Dr. Kissinger, as Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs. 459 

The program, ultimately to involve some $16 million, was apparently endorsed by the 
President after a private meeting with the foreign head of state and Dr. Kissinger. 

There was no Forty Committee meeting at which a formal proposal paper containing both 
pros and cons could be discussed and voted on. 0 Instead, members were simply directed to 
acknowledge receipt of a sparse, one-paragraph description of the operation. In a setting of almost 

458 Perhaps the best synopsis of the genesis of this project is a Memorandum to the DCI on 
December 12, 1974, which reads in part: Certain facts pertaining to the genesis of our [project] 
cause us to recommend against going to the 40 Committee with a paper on the problem. Our 
activities were set in motion in 1972-73 as direct product of commitment made to [our ally) 
during a Presidential visit in 1972. Subsequent to that Presidential visit, Secretary Kissinger 
merely informed certain principal members of the 40 Committee of the decision which had been 
taken. This was done orally and via a brief minute from [the Secretary of the 40 Committee] 
which was not left with the 40 Committee. The 40 Committee was not formally consulted, either 
initially or since then on the implementation of the commitment to [our ally] and on the pros and 
cons of the policy involved. As no paper on the subject has ever gone to the 40 Committee we 
anticipate that Secretary Kissinger would be disinclined to go to the 40 Committee on the 
problem at this stage. 

459 The CIA, Department of State,, and the Ambassador to the country concerned all reacted 
negatively to the first serious proposal which came in January of 1970. The Assistant Secretary of 
State for the region made the following remarks in a memorandum to the Acting Deputy Director 
for Plans, on January 20, 1970: The U.S. does not support the concept of an autonomous entity 
with all this could mean for [other countries]; we thus do not wish to become involved, even 
indirectly, in operations which would have the effect of prolonging the insurgency, thereby 
encouraging separatist aspirations and possibly providing to the Soviet Union an opportunity to 
create difficulties for [two other U.S. allies). A CIA cable from the COS in the area to the DCI 
contains the U.S. Ambassadors views on the proposal: My reaction is against giving financial 
support to this operation unless there are important policy consideration to the contrary of which 
I am not aware. ..Furthermore, the road is open-ended and if we begin and then decide to 
withdraw there might be unfortunate misinterpretations of our reasons which could adversely 
affect our relations with [our ally], A second proposal was turned down in August of 1971 and 
again Kissinger conferred with a high State Department official in-dept on the proposal and 
agreed that it should be disapproved. (See Comm. Hearings at 2645-2650, Oct. 21, 1975.) 


Ibid., Memorandum to DCI of Dec. 12, 1974. 



unprecedented secrecy within the U.S. government, John B. Connally, the former Treasury Secretary, 
about to assume a major role in the President's re-election campaign, personally advised the head of 
state that the U.S. would cooperate. 461 

The recipients of U.S. arms and cash were an insurgent ethnic group fighting for autonomy 
in a county bordering our ally. The bordering county and our ally had long been biter enemies. 
They differed substantially in ideological orientation and in their relations with the U.S. 

Evidences collected by the Committee suggests that the project was initiated primarily as a 
favor to our ally , who had cooperated with U.S. intelligence agencies, and who had come to feel 
menaced by his neighbor. 

As our ally's aid dwarfed the U.S. aid package, our assistance can be sec as largely symbolic. 
Documents made available to the Committee indicate that the U.S. acted in effect as a guarantor that 
the insurgent group would not be summarily dropped by the foreign head of state. 462 
Notwithstanding these implicit assurances, the insurgents were abruptly cut off by our ally, three 
years, thousands of deaths, and 16 million U.S. dollars later 463 

46 1 The Secretary of the 40 Committee hand-carried a brief one paragraph synopsis of the 
project to the members for them to initial. The conclusion that the procedure was simply 
pro-forma is indicated by the fact that John Connally had already informed our ally that the U.S. 
would provide support to the insurgents. In addition, even the pros and cons contained in the 
CIA proposal paper prepared for Dr. Kissinger were foregone conclusions. Responding to a 
question by staff concerning why CIA's negative views of the project were not put more 
forcefully, a CIA official responded that ''the Committee must realize that CIA was told to 
prepare a paper on 'how' the project could be done, not 'whether' the project should be done." 
Previous to the distribution of the brief 40 Committee 'minute,' there was some discussion to 
bypass the 40 Committee altogether. A CIA memorandum of conversation of July 10, 1972 
states: 'Col. Kennedy confirmed our understanding that the State Department was not the be 
informed. He added that this activity would probably not be referred to the Forty committee." 
Later, that decision was changed. Interview with CIA Operations official by, F. Kirschstein, Oct. 
10,1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

462 On numerous occasions the leader of the ethnic group expressed his distrust of our allies 
intentions. He did, however, trust the United States a indicated by his frequent statements that 
he trusted no other major power and asserted that if his course were successful he was ready to 
become the 51st state. (See COS cable to DCI of January 16, 1975 for one example.) In 
addition , his admiration for Dr. Kissinger was expressed on two occasions when he sent a gift of 
three rugs and later on the occasion of Dr. Kissinger's marriage, a gold and pearl necklace. A 
May 20, 1974 memorandum to Brent Scowcroft explains the necessity of keeping the gifts secret: 
As you are aware, the relationship between the United Stated Government and the (ethnic group) 
remains extremely sensitive. Knowledge of its existence has been severely restricted; therefore, 
the fact that Dr. Kissinger has received this gift should be similarly restricted. 

j 463 The cut-off of aid to the ethnic group came as a severe shock to its leadership. A CIA 
cable from the COS to the DCI on March 15, 1975, describes the method used by our ally to 

j inform the ethnic groups leadership. On March 5, a representative of our ally's intelligence 

scan by 


It appears that, had the U.S. not reinforced our ally's prodding, the insurgents may have 
reached an accommodation with the central government, thus gaining at least a measure of autonomy 
while avoiding further bloodshed. Instead, our clients fought on, sustaining thousands of casualties 
and 200,000 refugees. 

ITiere is little doubt that the highly unusual security precautions and the circumvention of 
the Forty Committee were the product of fears by the President and Dr. Kissinger that details of the 
project would otherwise leak -- a result which by all accounts would have mightily displeased our 
ally. It is also clear that the secrecy was motivated by a desire that the Department of State, which 
had consistently opposed such ventures in the region, be kept in the dark. 4 

service visited the headquarters of the ethnic group and told [thcm| in bluntest imaginable terms 
that a) the border was being closed to all repeat all movement, b) . . . could expect no more 
assistance from (our ally], c) . . . should settle with [our ally's enemy] on whatever terms he could 
get, and d) his military units would be allowed to take refuge in |our ally's country] only in small 
groups and only if they surrendered their arms to four ally's] army. 

464 Elaborate measures were taken to insure that the Department of State did not gain 
knowledge of the project. Documents suggest that it may have originally been planned to keep 
the project so severely restricted that not even the Ambassador to the country involved was to be 
told. A CIA cable from the DCI to his COS on July 7, 1972 states: The Department of State is 
not aware that visit has taken place. State Department not aware that Helms and Col. Kennedy 
met with visitors nor . . . results. Thus do not discuss with the Ambassador. Later, the 
Ambassador learned of the project when he heard John Connally tell our ally that the U.S. would 
support the ethnic group. Our ally expressed the opinion that the Ambassador was responsive to 
Kissinger rather than the Department of State. Since the Ambassador had already learned of the 
projects existence, the DCI decided to inform him of the project on August 7, 1972, with what 
might be considered a subtle suggestion not to inform the Department of State: I realize that you 
have a good feel for the genesis of this operation: Nixon has, since his talks with |our ally] taken 
a personal interest in the matter. He has felt that we should do all we can to prevent the Soviets 
from exploiting [our ally's enemy] to their advantage and to the jeopardy of [our ally] .... I must 
say in all frankness, however, that not everyone in State sees it in this light. The project has been 
held tightly here in Washington and I know you will help us hold it tightly over there. Another 
August 7, 1972 cable to the COS from the DCI made that direction more clear: Please brief the 
Ambassador on this project for his eyes only, stressing need to use our channels only for 
subsequent communications. We do not know who below U.A. Johnson in State is now witting 
of this action. 

Another CIA cable in 1972 to a foreign head of state with knowledge of the project asked 
that within the American Embassy please lim it discussion to the Chief of Station. In that same 
cable CIA informs the Chief of Station that Since this operation may not have been discussed in 
the State Department below the 40 Committee member level, COS should not repeat not discuss 
with Ambassador. 

In addition, evidence in the Committee fdes is conflicting on whether Secretary of State 
William P. Rogers was ever informed of the project. Officials of Kissinger's staff and CIA 
officials assumed that he had been briefed since U. Alexis Johnson was a member of the 40 


Perhaps more than the President's disregard of the Forty Committee, the apparent "no win" 
policy of the U.S. and its ally deeply disturbed this Committee. Documents in the Committee's 
possession clearly show that the President, Dr. Kissinger and the foreign head of state hoped that our 
clients would not prevail. 465 They preferred instead that the insurgents simplv continue a level 
of hostilities sufficient to sap the resources of our ally's neighboring country. ° This policy was 
not imparted to our clients, who were encouraged to continue fighting. Even in the context of covert 
action, ours was a cynical enterprise. 

It is particularly ironic that, despite President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger |=s encouragement 
of hostilities to keep the target country off-balance, the United States personally restrained the 
insurgents from an all-out offensive on one occasion when such an attack might have been successful 
because other events were occupying the neighboring country. 467 

Committee. And, in an interview with staff, Mr. Rogers stated that he felt certain that he had 
been informed. Nevertheless, a cable from Secretary Rogers almost a year after the project began 
suggests that he did not have knowledge, as of 22 June, 1973. The cable states that in view of 
continued U.S. policy not repeat not give encouragement to the (ethnic groups] hopes for U.S. 
assistance or recognition, we would intend keep contacts at country directorate level. Interview 
with William P. Rogers, by Aaron Donner, Oct. 20, 1975, copy on file with Sen. Comm, on 

465 The progressively deteriorating position of the ethnic group reflected the fact that none of 
the nations who were aiding them seriously desired that they realize their objective of an 
autonomous state. A CIA memo of March 22, 1974 states our ally's and the United States 
position clearly: We would think that [our ally] would not look with favor on the establishment 
of a formalized autonomous government. [Our ally) like ourselves, has seen benefit in a stalemate 
situation ... in which [our ally's enemy] is intrinsically weakened by |the ethnic groups] refusal to 
relinquish its semi-autonomy. Neither |our ally] nor ourselves wish to see the matter resolved one 
way or the other. 

466 The CIA had early information which suggested that our ally would abandon the ethnic 
group the minute he came to an agreement with his enemy over border disputes. Two months 
after initiating the project a CIA memo of 17 Oct., 1972 states: "|Our ally] has apparently used 
[another governments] Foreign Minister to pass word to [his cnemy| that he would be willing to 
allow peace to prevail [in the area] if [his enemy] would publicly agree to abrogate [a previous 
treaty concerning their respective borders]." In addition, CIA memos and cables characterize our 
ally's views of the ethnic group as "a card to play" in his dispute with his neighbor. And, a CIA 
memo of 22 March, 1974 characterizes the ethnic group as "a uniquely useful tool for weakening 
[our ally's enemy's] potential for international adventurism." 

467 A White House memorandum of October 16, 1973, from Dr. Kissinger to the DCI states: 
The President concurs in your judgment in paragraph 3 of your memorandum of October 15 on 
the above subject. You should therefore send the following reply immediately to [the ethnic 
group] — We do not repeat not consider it advisable for you to undertake the offensive military 
action that [another government] has suggested to you. For your information, we have consulted 

scan by 


All U.S. aid was channelled through our collaborator, without whose logistical help direct 
assistance would have been impossible. Our national interest had thus become effectively meshed 
with his. Accordingly, when our ally reached an agreement with the target country and abruptly 
ended his own aid to the insurgents, the U.S. had no choice but to acquiesce. The extent of our 
ally's leverage over U.S. policy was such that he apparently made no effort to notify his junior 
American partners that the program's end was near. 

The insurgents were clearly taken by surprise as well. Their adversaries, knowing of the 
impending aid cut-off, launched an all-out search-and-destroy campaign the day after the agreement 
was signed. 469 The autonomy movement was over and our former clients scattered before the 
central government's superior forces. 470 

with [our ally] through the Ambassador and they have both made the same recommendation." 

468 On Tuesday, October 21, 1975, Mr. Colby testified in executive session on the abrupt 
cessation of aid by our ally to the ethnic group. "He made a decision for himself but of course 
since our assistance ran through him, that effectively terminated our assistance, although we did 
give an additional months subsidy to help the [ethnic group) untangle themselves from the 

469 The attack launched the day after the agreement was signed caught the ethnic group by 
surprise. A message from their headquarters to CIA on 10 March, 1975 read as follows: 'There 
is confusion and dismay among our people and forces. Our peoples fate in unprecedented danger. 
Complete destruction hanging over our head. No explanation for all this. We appeal you and 
USG intervene according to your promises and not letting down ally, to save [ethnic leaders] life 
and dignity of our families, to find honorable solution to [our] problem." On that same day the 
Chief of Station sent the following cable to the DC I: "Is headquarters in touch with Kissinger's 
office on this; if USG does not handle this situation deftly in a way which will avoid giving the 
[ethnic group) the impression that we are abandoning them they are likely to go public. [Our 
ally's) action has not only shattered their political hopes; it endangers lives of thousands." The 
COS proceeded to make suggestions for what the USG could do to help and ended with the 
remark it would be the decent thing for USG to do. 

470 Also on March 10, 1975 the following letter arrived from the leader of the ethnic group 
to Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger: "Your Excellency, Having always believed in the peaceful 
solution of disputes including those between [your ally and his enemy] we are pleased to see that 
their two countries have come to some agreement . . . However, our hearts bleed to see that an 
immediate by product of their agreement is the destruction of our defenseless people in an 
unprecedented manner as [your ally] closed its border and stopped help to us completely and 
while [his enemy] began the biggest offensive they have ever launched and which is now being 
continued. Our movement and people are being destroyed in an unbelievable way with silence 
from everyone. We feel your Excellency that the United States has a moral and political 
responsibility towards our people who have co mmi tted themselves to your country's policy. In 
consideration of this situation we beg your Excellency to take action as immediately as possible 
on the following issues: 1) Stopping the . . . offensive and opening the way for talks between us . 


The cynicism of the U.S. and its ally had not yet completely run its course, however. 
Despite direct pleas from the insurgent leader and the CIA station chief in the area to the President 
and Dr. Kissinger, the U.S. refused to extend humanitarian assistance to the thousands of refugees 
created by the abrupt termination of military aid. As the Committee staff was reminded by a high 
U.S. official, "covert action should not be confused with missionary work." 471 

. . to arrive at a solution for our people which will at least be face saving. 2) Using whatever 
influence you have with [your ally] to help our people in this historically tragic and sad moment 
and at least in such a way that our people and [army] could maintain some livelihood and 
perform at least partisan activity in [our area] until our problem is also solved within the 
framework of an (overall) agreement. Mr. Secretary, we are anxiously awaiting your quick 
response and action and we arc certain that the United States will not remain indifferent during 
these critical and trying times . . 

A CIA cable from the COS to the Director on 22 March 1975 states: "No reply has been 
received from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the message from [the ethnic leader] . . . The 
two additional messages received by radio from [his] headquarters are forwarded this morning . . . 
and underscore the seriousness of [their] situation, the acute anxiety of their leaders and their 
emotional appeal that the USG use its influence with [our ally] to get an extension of the cease 
fire. This would permit the peaceful passage of . . . refugees to asylum . Hence, if the USG 
intends to take steps to avert a massacre it must intercede with [our ally] promptly." Interview 
with CIA official, by J. Boos, Oct. 18, 1975, copy on file with Scl. Comm, on Intell. 

471 Over 200,000 refugees managed to escape into our ally's country. Once there, however, 
neither the United States nor our ally extended adequate humanitarian assistance. In fact, our 
ally was later to forcibly return over 40,000 of the refugees and the United States government 
refused to admit even one refugee into the United States by way of political asylum even though 
they qualified for such admittance. A CIA cable from the COS to the Director on 10 April, 1975 
states the situation clearly: "Invite headquarters attention to confidential Embassy Telegram of 10 
April . . . That telegram indicates that . . . Embassy consular section wants refugee status for 40 . 

. . political refugees who so far have applied ... for visas under section 203 (a) (7). It notes little 
cooperation to date from INS and outlines problems [ethnic group] have in trying to reach INS 
offices ... It proposes INS send officer to . . . process refugees. COS requests that headquarters 
urge office of Dr. Kissinger to exercise some influence within Department and, if feasible, directly 
with INS, to insure favorable positive action is taken in this matter without further delay. The 
world and the [ethnic group] see the USG going to great lengths to evacuate and save refugees 
from South Vietnam, which is right and to our credit. Only a few |ethnic group leaders] know 
that until recently they had our secret support for their military resistance because it diverted 
[their enemy from another U.S. ally]. If senior Americans like Kissinger who are aware of their 
relationship do nothing to help [them] in their present extremity, we may be sure that they will 
not lie down quietly to be buried without telling their story to the world. I lence even if nobody 
in the State Department or Dr. Kissinger cares about what happens to the [ethnic group] they 
had better do something to help them, if only in USG and administration self-interest." That 
help never arrived. 

scan by 


Case 3: Angola 

For reasons not altogether clear, and despite the opposition of senior government officials, 
the U.S. has been heavily involved in the current civil war in Angola. 

The CIA has informed the Committee that since January 1975, it had expended over $31 
million in military hardware, transportation costs, and cash payments by the end of 1975. The 
Committee has reason to believe that the actual U.S. investment is much higher. Information 
supplied to the Committee also suggests that the military intervention of the Soviet Union and Cuba 
is in large part a reaction to U.S. efforts to break a political stalemate, in favor of its clients. 

The beneficiaries of U.S. aid are two of the three contesting factions: the National Front for 
the Independence of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA). The third faction contesting for control of the government, following independence on 
November 11, 1975, is the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the I .iberation of Angola (MPLA). 
CIA estimates that the fighting had claimed several thousand casualties by the end of 1975. 472 

The main U.S. client is the National Front, headed by Holden Roberto, a longtime associate 
and relative of President Mobutu Sese Seko of neighboring Zaire. 473 Subsequent to President 
Mobutu request last winter to Dr. Kissinger, as independence for Angola became a certainty and 
liberation groups began to jockey for position, the Forty Committee approved furnishing Roberto 
$300,000 for various political action activities 474 , restricted to non-military objectives. 

Later events have suggested that this infusion of U.S. aid, unprecedented 475 and massive 
in the underdeveloped colony, may have panicked the Soviets into arming their MPLA clients, whom 
they had backed for over a decade and who were now in danger of being eclipsed by the National 
Front. Events in Angola took a bellicose turn as the U.S. was requested by President Mobutu to 
make a serious military investment. 

In early June, 1975, CIA prepared a proposal paper for military aid to pro-U.S. elements in 
Angola, the cost of which was set at $6 million. A revised program, costing $14 million, was 

472 Comm. Hearings, at [ ). 

473 Ibid. 

474 The political action program included the distribution of 50,000 campaign-type buttons 
identifying the wearer as a supporter of Roberto's FNLA. 

475 The United States has found itself in si mil ar situations on other occasions. Having 
supported colonial powers policies in previous years, they are constrained from developing a 
rapport with indigenous independence movements. The Soviets, however, are not similarly 
inhibited. Once the colonial power relinquishes control, the well-organized, well-financed, 
Soviet-backed group is ready to step into the breach. The United States is forced at that point to 
scurry around looking for a rival faction or leader to support. The U.S. has often chosen leaders 
who had a prior relationship with the colonial power and whose nationalist credentials are thus 
somewhat suspect, or leaders who have spent most of their time outside the country waiting for 
the colonial power to depart. The point is that many of the U.S. -backed groups begin with a 
variety of factors working to their disadvantage. 


approved by the Forty Committee and by President Ford in July. This was increased to $25 million 
in August, and to about $32 million in November. By mid-summer, it was decided that U.S. aid 
should not be given solely to Roberto, but instead, divided between him and UNITA's Jonas 
Savimbi. 476 

The Committee has learned that a task force composed of high U.S. experts on Africa 477 
strongly opposed military intervention; instead, last April they called for diplomatic efforts to 

encourage a political settlement among the three factions to avert bloodshed. Apparently at the 
direction of National Security Council aides, the task force recommendation was removed from the 
report and presented to NSC members as merely one policy option. The other two alternatives were 
a hands-off policy or substantial military intervention. 478 

Of CIA's $31 million figure, said to represent expenditures to the end of 1975, about half is 
attributed to supply of light arms, mortars, ammunition, vehicles, boats, and communication 
equipment. The balance includes shipping expenses and cash payments. 474 The Committee has 
reason to question the accuracy of CIA's valuation of military equipment sent to Angola. 

A staff accountant on loan from the General Accounting Office has determined that CIA 
"costing" procedures and the use of surplus equipment have resulted in a substantial understatement 
of the value of U.S. aid. Examples include .45 caliber automatic weapons "valued" by CIA at $5100 
each and .30 caliber semi-automatic carbines at $7.55. Based on a sampling of ordnance cost figures 
and a comparison with Department of Defense procedures, staff advises that the CIA's ordnance 
figure should at least be doubled. 480 

476 Comm. Hearings, at [ ]. 

477 The task force was composed of African experts within the Department of State, DOD 
officials, CIA officials, and others. Officials from the Department of State have told this 
Committee that the majority of that task force recommended diplomatic efforts to encourage a 
political settlement rather than intervention. After they had prepared their report for the 
Secretary of State containing this recommendation, they were informed by National Security 
Council aides that it was improper for them to make a recommendation on policy. Instead, they 
were instructed to simply list diplomatic efforts as one option among many in their final report. 
Thus, the African experts who made up the task force were not allowed to place their 
recommendations on paper to be reviewed by the Forty Committee. 

479 Comm. Hearings, at [ ]. 

480 After testimony in which specific covert action costs were questioned, the Committee 
directed that the costing of weapons, ammunition, and other related ordnance be reviewed to 
determine whether valuation procedures understated the real cost of covert action activities to the 
American taxpayer. 

The staff reviewed various inventory valuation methods and after considering the 
surrounding circumstances staff concluded that the most representative valuation was that of 
original acquisition cost. While some of the items had been used, discussions with knowledgeable 


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Dr. Kissinger has indicated that U.S. military intervention in Angola is based on three 
factors: Soviet support of the MPLA and the USSR's increased presence in Africa, U.S. policy to 
encourage moderate independence groups in southern Africa, and the U.S. interest in promoting the 
stability of Mobutu and other leadership figures in the area. Past support to Mobutu, along with 
his responsiveness to some of the United States recent diplomatic needs for Third World support, 
make it equally likely that the paramount factor in the U.S. involvement is Dr. Kissinger ps desire 
to reward and protect African leaders in the area. The U.S.'s expressed opposition to the MPLA is 
puzzling in view of Director Colby's statement to the Committee that there are scant ideological 

officials disclosed that the items were in a like-new, combat-ready condition and the staff 
determined that any previous usage was more than offset by rehabilitation and inflation. 

Because of time constraints, a one-third sample was taken and the staff reviewed records 
covering about 20 types of ordnance (mortars, machine-guns, carbines, pistols, etc) involving in 
excess of 100,000 items. The staff found that for this sample, the real cost to the American 
taxpayer, using the DoD original unit costs, was more than double the value the CIA was 
quoting to this Committee. 

Three conflicting inventory valuation methods were found to be in use for charging costs 
to this project. 

1. For items the CIA was buying from the DoD (such as ammunition) and charging to 
this project, the inventory valuation method was the value the DoD charged the CIA. This was 
generally the replacement cost. For instance, .30 caliber linked cartridges purchased by the CIA 
from DoD at .10 each were charged tho this project at .10 each. DoD advised that the .10 unit 
price was the current replacement cost and the staff believes this method approximated what the 
item is costing the taxpayer. 

2. For items drawn from CIA inventories for which stock replenishment was anticipated, 
the CIA charged this project at CIA acquisition cost. To illustrate, 9mm cartridges valued ar .03 
each by the CIA (so-called acquisition cost) were charged to this project at .03 each to replenish 
CIA stocks. 

3. For items drawn from CIA inventories for which replenishment was not anticipated 
and the items considered surplus or excess to CIA needs, the project was charged at one-third the 
stated inventory value. The two-thirds reduction was entirely arbitrary though apparently wit hin 
the limits of Section 13 of the Foreign Assistance Act. 

The following describes how carbines which cost the American taxpayer over $1.5 milli on 
were charged to this covert action project for only $100,00 using the inventory valuation methods 
discussed above. 

Example: 20,000 semi-automatic .30 caliber carbines were in CIA inventory valued at 
$15.00 each. Because these had been declared excess to CIA needs, they were devalued to $5.00 
each, and charged to this project at $100,000. (20,000 items x $5.00 unit valuation.) 

Had these carbines not been excess to CIA needs they would have been charged to this 
project at $300,000. (20,000 items x $15.00 unit valuation, considered the acquisition cost.) 

Had these carbines been charged at their original cost to the American taxpayer of $76.90 
the project would have been charged $1,538,000 (20,000 items x $76.90 unit cost.) 


differences among the three factions, all of whom are nationalists above all else. 481 

Control of resources may be a factor. Angola has significant oil deposits and two American 
multinationals, Gulf and Texaco, operate in the off-shore area. Gulf had deposited some $100 
milli on in concession fees in a national bank now under MPLA control At the suggestion of the U.S. 
government, the company has suspended further payments. 

Until recently, the U.S. -backed National Front was supported by the People's Republic of 
China! which had provided about 100 military advisers 482 Mobutu has provided a staging area 

for U.S. arms shipments and has periodically sent Zairois troops, trained by the Republic of North 
Korea, into Angola to support Roberto's operations. 482 Small numbers of South African forces 
have been in the country and are known to have been in contact with Savimbi's UN1TA troops. 

Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1 974, the President has found that 
the Angola action program is "important to the national security." As directed by the Act, CIA has 
briefed the Congressional oversight committees as to the Forty Committee approvals of increased 
amounts of military aid. 484 

CIA officials have testified to the Committee that there appears to be little hope of an 
outright MPLA military defeat. Instead, U.S. efforts are now aimed at promoting a stalemate, and 
in turn, the ceasefire and the coalition government urged by the long-forgotten NSC task force. 

2. Intelligence Collection 

Human and diplomatic risks are not confined to covert action. Certain methods of 
intelligence-gathering invite the same danger of war and infringement of the Constitutional rights of 

The Committee has examined both technical and non-technical intelligence-gathering 

481 The Committee attempt to determine the difference between the three contesting factions 
in Angola. Mr. Colby responded to questions of that nature: "They are all independents. They 
are all for black Africa. They are all for some fuzzy kind of social system, you know, without 
really much articulation, but some sort of let's not be exploited by the capitalist nations." The 
Committee also attempted to discern why certain nations were supporting different groups if they 
were all similar in outlook: 

"MR. ASPIN. And why are the Chinese backing the moderate group? 

"MR. COLBY Because the Soviets are backing the MPLA is the simplest answer. 

"MR. ASPIN. It sound like that is why we are doing it. 

"MR. COLBY. It is." 

Comm. Hearings, at [ ]. 


Interview with Chief of Africa Division, CIA by A. S. Field and .1. Boos, Dec. 10, 1975, 
copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

484 Comm. Hearings, at [ ]. 

0 I 

0 1 



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programs and has concluded that the risks accompanying them are often unacceptably great; that 
;information obtained often does not justify the risk; the policy-makers have been insensitive to 
dangers, especially of the violation of U.S. citizens f= rights; and, that there arc inadequate policy-level 
mechanisms for the regular review of rick assessment. 

a. Submarines 

A highly technical U.S. Navy submarine reconnaissance program, often operating within 
unfriendly waters, has experienced at least 9 collisions with hostile vessels in the last ten years, over 
110 possible detections, and at least three press exposures. Most of the submarines carry nuclear 
weapons. 485 

The program clearly produces useful information on our adversaries' training exercises, 
weapons testing, and general naval capabilities. It is also clear, however, that the program is 
inherently risky. Committee staff's review of the program suggests if both Congress and the 
Department of the Navy were sufficiently motivated to provide the funds, technical capabilities could 
be developed which would make possible the acquisition of the same data through less hazardous 
means. 48 ” 

The Navy's own justification of the program as a 'low risk" venture is inaccurate, and has, 
therefore, not met or resolved the Committee's misgivings. 487 Documents provided the 

485 Rear Admiral Bobby R. Inman, Director of Naval Intelligence, testified in Executive 
Session that (t)he Commanding Officers directive very clearly spells out that he cannot use those 
nuclear weapons in protection of his platform, that they may only be used upon execution by the 
President in the event of a general war. (Executive Session, at | |.) 

486 This conclusion is based on the fact that a variety of studies done on this program state 
that military risk increased as our submarines approach foreign shores. Thus, if more funds were 
provided for Research and Development efforts designed to produce alternative platforms, 
stand-off sensors, or preferable new equipment which would give our submarines the capability to 
collect the same information at greater distances, the result would be a significant reduction in the 
military risk factor. 

487 Each monthly mission schedule forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Forty 
Committee for approval has an alpha-numeric designator attached for mission risk assessment. 

By far the most frequently assigned is "4 A 4;" the first digit, "4", stands for "low military risk"; 
the second alpha character, "A", stands for "high intelligence value" and the third digit, "4", stands 
for low political risk. No mission has ever been assessed a military risk factor other than low. 

This evaluation is belied not only by the nine collisions, 110 possible detections, constantly 
fluctuating factors which should impact on the calculations of military risk such as presence of 
enemy forces in the area, distance from enemy shores, political conditions, etc., but also by a 
variety of statements by Navy personnel who have conducted studies on this program. For 
example, in 1970, after three collisions involving submarines of this program, Admiral Oliver H. 
Perry, Jr., on his own initiative, convened a fact-finding board to investigate the situation. In his 
final report he stated that the Commanders of two submarines had not been negligent. Instead, 


Committee by the Defense Department indicate that, while risk assessments are made prior to 
operations, they are ritualistic and proforma. In fact, their mission risk assessments do not vary 
despite constant changes in political conditions, information sought, distance from enemy shores and 
hostile forces, and our adversaries' ability to detect the presence of U.S. submarines. During the 
hundreds of missions these submarines have conducted, the Navy has never assessed military risk as 
anything but "low." 488 The Committee is, therefore, troubled by the completely pro forma nature 
of the mission risk assessment as it is presently accomplished. 

Just as the Navy's assurances that the program is secure arc inconsistent with the collisions, 
apparent detections, and press stories, their claims that the sensitive missions are closely monitored 
are belied by the scant tactical guidance given commanders and regular communications gaps. Once 
a U.S. submarine enters the 12 mile limit of another nation, communications security and the lack 
of certain technical capabilities make it impossible to independently verify the location of a submarine 
at any given moment. Many of these difficulties result from factors which are inherent in the nature 
of this covert operation. 

Naval inquiries into collisions and other "untoward incidents," if held at all, are almost always 
conducted at a low level, effectively keeping policy-makers in the dark on changing operational 
conditions. Thus, it took a field-initiated, low-level investigation, conducted after three collisions in 
1970, to determine that pre-mission training and operational guidelines for IJ.S. submarines on this 
type of sensitive mission needed revision and up-grading. 489 If Washington based review had been 

"both were required to make judgments in a high risk situation with little guidance or precedent 
upon which to weigh the risks versus the importance of their missions in arriving at crucial 
tactical decisions. The successes of previous missions were well known to both Commanding 
Officers; the fact that collisions and near misses had taken place were not . . . Commanding 
Officers on missions of this type are required habitually to make judgments in high risk 
situations" (emphasis added). In addition, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
conducted a review of this program in March of 1974. The first sentence under the Risk Section 
stated, (t)he very significant [enemy] progress in ASW during the past ten years raises questions as 
M the future viability of [this program] as they are now conducted. Finally, the argument for risk 
cssessment variability according to distance is well established as indicated by a 1 957 study; "It 
Las been shown that there are varying degrees of risk involved which vary inversely as the 
submarine approaches the [hostile] coast. Outside 12 miles from the coast or in remote areas the 
risk is relatively small, but steadily increases from that point into the shore'cspecially in sensitive 

488 In Executive Session, Admiral Inman was asked whether there had ever been a 
classification other than "low" for military risk. Admiral Inman responded, "(t)here has not been 
one I am personally aware of." Nor has the Committee been able to find one in all of the 
mission risk assessments it has reviewed. See, Executive Session testimony, at [ ]. 

489 The Perry report found three principal and inter-related causes for both of these 
collisions: "a) Commanding Officers on missions of this type arc required habitually to make 
judgments in high risk situations. The judgments made in these two cases is [sic] reflected in 
maneuvers and procedures which resulted in inadequate determination of target course, speed and 

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adequate, it would not have taken this field investigation to determine that U.S. submarines were 
following other submarines too closely. In addition, staff found no evidence which would indicate 
that commanders of submarines colliding with hostile vessels have ever received disciplinary action 

of any kind. At times, commanders have escaped censure despite recommendations to that effect by 
i 490 

a review panel. 

Despite these faults, the Committee noted the procedures implemented by the Navy to insure 
the safety of the mission and the crew in situations which are inherently risky. Washington based 
control, review, and coordination of this program has been an evolutionary matter over the years. 
At present it appears to be extremely well managed, with the exception of the risk assessment area 
and the failure to forward the results of low-level investigations for Washington based review. 

In reviewing pst investigations and formal reviews, the Committee noted the Navy's 
implementation of previous suggestions for change. There is, however, one unfortunate exception. 
A previous review of this program suggested that the Department of the Navy make a firm 
commitment to the necessity of maintaining an intelligence capability with U.S. submarines by 
allocating funds to research and development efforts designed to increase both the capabilities and 
the security of their missions. 491 The Navy has paid only lip service to this commitment. 

Given these factors, the Committee urges a thorough review of the program ps product and 
hazards, to avert another Pueblo, or worse, and to insure that important intelligence collection 
continues with significantly less risk than presently exists. 

b. Interception of International Communications 

The National Security Agency (NSA) systematically intercepts international communications, 
both voice and cable. 492 NSA officials and the Director of Central Intelligence concede that 
messages to and from American citizens and businesses have been picked up in the course of 

range . . . b) a lack of operational guidance for intelligence missions and specific rules for 
engagement and disengagement exists. The op-order unequivocally addresses territorial limits, 
absolute prohibited zones, rules for penetration of the twelve-mile limit, how far to go, and when 
to retire. Similar instructions for operating in close proximity of |cncmy] submarines in these 
missions are lacking, c) Deficiencies exist in the length and type of training provided in 
preparation for intelligence missions.)" Four years later another investigation of another collision 
found that deficiencies in training still exist.) If Washington-based review of this program had 
been sufficient it would not have taken three collisions and a low-level review to determine that 
U.S. submarines were following poor procedures as the Perry report revealed. 

490 Ibid. 

491 The 28 January 1966 final report of the David Committee on ASW intelligence made 
several recommendations for increased research and development efforts designed to upgrade the 
technical capabilities of U.S. submarines for intelligence purposes. 

492 Comm. Hearings, Testimony of William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, at 
( ], and Testimony of Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Director of the National Security Agency, at [ ]. 


gathering foreign communications intelligence. They maintain, however, that these messages are 
small in number and usually discarded in any case. 49 

493 Comm. Hearings, at [ j: 

"Mr. ASPIN. . . . Does the National Security Agency monitor telephone calls between 
American citizens and foreigners abroad? 

"Mr. COLBY. The Agency does monitor foreign communications. 

♦ + + 

"Mr. ASPIN. Does it involve a U.S. citizen at one end? 

"Mr. COLBY. On some occasions, that cannot be separated from the traffic that is being 
monitored. It is technologically impossible to separate them. 

"Mr. GIAIMO. Obviously, we know that in other countries you undoubtedly perform all 
kinds of intercepts. 

"Mr. COLBY. Incidentally we pick up material about Americans abroad; yes. 

"Mr. GIAIMO. That is the point I am trying to get at. Did you say that incidentally you 
are also intercepting American citizens? 

"Mr. COLBY. I did not want to say that we never, never covered any American citizens 
abroad. If I have made a mistake in what I said, that we were not"that we incidentally cover 
Americans in our foreign intelligence activities. 

"Mr. GIAIMO. You incidentally cover Americans where? 

"Mr. COLBY. I say we do incidentally cover Americans. I would like to get into a further 
description of this in executive session." 

Ibid., at [ J. 

"Chairman PIKE. Does your system intercept the telephone calls of American citizens? 

'Gen. ALLEN. I believe that I can give a satisfactory answer to that question which will 
relieve the Committees concern on that matter in closed session." 

Although the Committee met for some four hours in Executive Session to take testimony 
from NSA Director Allen and Deputy Director Benson K. Buffham, primarily concerning the 
interception of international commercial communications, Gen. Allen apparently felt it necessary to 
clarify and elucidate that testimony in a follow-up letter to Chairman Pike on August 25, 1975: 
'Dear Mr. Chairman: 

"I am writing to provide additional clarification to the testimony I gave before your 
Committee on 8 August. 

"At the present time,, the telephone calls of U.S. citizens in the United States to a foreign 
location are not being monitored. The monitoring of telephone conversations of United States 
citizens in the United States to a location in the United States has never been authorized by NSA. 
Currently, we are not now monitoring any telephone circuits terminating in the United States. 

"For several years prior to mid- 1973, a few international radio-telephone circuits were 
monitored between the United States and foreign countries. This monitoring did include the calls 
of U.S. citizens as well as foreign nationals, and calls were sometimes selected for monitoring based 
on the name (or phone number) of a U.S. citizen provided us by another government agency. In 
the summer of 1973, the use of the names of U.S. citizens to select telephone calls was terminated 
and remains so. 

"From mid 1973 until recently a search of our records reveals there were occasions where 

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Earlier NSA programs of questionable legality focused on international narcotics traffic and 
radicalism, and even targeted Americans. The Committee's preliminary investigation reveals at least 
one new area of non-political and non-military emphasis in international intercept — economic 
intelligence. Communications interception in this area has rapidly developed since 1972, partly in 
reaction to he Arab oil embargo and the failure to obtain good information on Russian grain 
production and negotiations for the purchase with American corporations. 494 

The Committee is not convinced that the current commercial intercept program has yielded 
sufficiently valuable data to justify its high cost and intrusion, however inadvertent, into the privacy 
of international communications of U.S. citizens and organizations. Inasmuch as the technical 
complexity of the program defies easy or quick evaluation, the Committee is hopeful that a 
permanent oversight mechanism will closely and comprehensively scrutinize the operation to 
determine whether the risks are necessary and acceptable. 

c. Manipulation of the Media 

The free flow of information, vital to a responsible and credible press, has been threatened 
as a result of CIA's use of the world media for cover and for clandestine information-gathering. 

There are disturbing indications that the accuracy of many news stories has been undermined 
as well. Information supplied to the Committee suggests that some planted, falsified articles have 
reached readers in the U.S. 495 

radio-telephone circuits between a foreign terminal and a U.S. terminal were monitored. On some 
occasions the monitoring was for the purpose of developing patterns of foreign communications use 
and, on yet other occasions, the monitoring was based on the foreign subscriber and the substance 
of the conversation was obtained. Our records indicate that in all of 1974, reports were made 
involving the substance of only eight telephone conversations, wherein a U.S. citizen might be 
presumed to have been conversing, and in these instances, only the foreign intelligence aspects of the 
conversation were reported, and the names of U.S. citizens were never used in these NSA reports. 
This number may be compared with reports involving [a vast number of] other foreign 
communications carried on international circuits. 

"The executive directives applying to these efforts state: a. The purpose of the signals 
intelligence activities of the National Security Agency is to obtain foreign intelligence from foreign 
communications or foreign electronic signals, b. Foreign communications exclude communications 
between or among American citizens or entities. 

"I hope this letter will help clarify the matter." 

/s/ Lew Allen, Jr., Lieutenant General, USAF, Director, NSA/Chief, CSS. 

494 Interviews with two NSA officials, by J. Whieldon, Aug. 22, 1975, copy on file with Sel. 
Comm, on Intell. 

495 William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, told members of the Committee staff 
at an October 25, 1975 meeting, that the Agency plants propaganda in the foreign press, including 
English-language newspapers, and can not be inhibited by the possibility that these planted stories 
may be picked up by American news services, etc. 


Intelligence agencies have long prized journalists as informants and identity-covers. 496 
Newsmen generally enjoy great mobility, and are often admitted to areas denied to ordinary 
businessmen or to suspected intelligence types. Not expected to work in one fixed location, both 
bona fide journalists and masquerading intelligence officers can move about without arousing 
suspicions. They also have extraordinary access to important foreign leaders and diplomats. 

CIA, as no doubt every other major intelligence agency in the world, has manipulated the 

media. Full-time foreign correspondents for major U.S. publications have worked concurrently for 
CIA, passing along information received in the normal course of their regular jobs and even, on 
occasion, travelling to otherwise non-newsworthy areas to acquire data. 4 7 Far more prevalent 
is the Agency's practice of retaining free lancers and "stringers" as informants. A stringer working in 
a less-newsworthy country could supply stories to a newspaper, radio, and a weekly magazine, none 
of whom can justify a full-time correspondent. This may make the use of stringers even more 
insidious than exploitation of full-time journalists. 

The Committee has learned that the employment of newsmen by CIA is usually without the 
knowledge or agreement of the employers back in the U.S. Publishers have been unable, despite 
strenuous effort, to learn from the Agency which, if any, of their employees have had a clandestine 
intelligence function. 498 Newsmen-informants apparently do not often disclose this relationship 

496 Thomas A. Donovan, a retired Foreign Service Officer, wrote 'The CIA Investigation: 
Asking the Unthinkable?" in the Foreign Service Journal , October, 1975 and in it he recounted an 
incident which took place while he was stationed in West Germany for the State Department: "I 
have firsthand knowledge of one such Agency effort. The victim was a young member of the 
Czechoslovak Mission in West Berlin who had the misfortune to meet, and subsequently to be 
propositioned by, a free-lance American journalist whose acquaintance he made at a dinner in my 
home in West Berlin. 

"My role in the matter seemed harmless. I inferred correctly enough that the journalist 
whom I was asked (by an agency employee in the US Mission) to invite to my house was not, in 
r act, a legitimate American correspondent. I had never heard of the news agency listed on his 
calling card. Though I knew, therefore, that I was being used by the Agency to help bring these 
two men together (this is why I took up the agency man on his offer to pick up the tab on the 
cost of the dinner) -- I rather simplemindedly supposed that this was an inconsequential favor on 
J my part. The Czech would be too wily to bite, I assumed, and if I didn't make the meeting 
[1 possible someone else would." 

497 "... a small group of no more than five full-time staff correspondents with general 
circulation news organizations who function as undercover contacts for the CIA and are paid for 
their services on a regular contractual basis . . ." was reported by Oswald Johnston in the 
Washington Star-News on November 30, 1973. 

498 The Deputy Director of Operations at the CIA explained that the Agency wants as few 
people as possible to know the Agency's sources. Therefore, the CIA considers "stringers" and 
free-lancers to be free agents, working for many employers and so there is no necessity for the 
CIA to inform a "stringer's" or free-lancer's publisher of his other employer (CIA). Committee 
staff meeting on October 25, 1975. 




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to their editors. The Committee has learned of cases in which informants moved from one bona fide 
press position to another, without ever making employers aware of their past or present CIA status. 

CIA acknowledges that "stringers" and others with whom the Agency has a relationship are 
often directed to insert Agency-compose "news" articles into foreign publications and wire services. 
U.S. intelligence officials do not rule out the possibility that these planted stories may find their way 
into American newspapers from time to time, but insist that CIA docs not intentionally propagandize 
in this country. CIA insensitivity to the possibility of its adulterating news digested by Americans 
is indicated by its frequent manipulation of Reuters wire service dispatches — which regularly appear 
in U.S. media. Because Reuters is British, it is considered fair game. 499 

A number of CIA officers employed by U.S. and foreign publications write nothing at all. 
Their journalistic affiliation is a "cover"— a sham arrangement making possible full-time clandestine 
work for the Agency. With these arrangements, the employer's cooperation has been obtained. 500 

After the Washington Star-News discovered a CIA-media relationship in 1973, Director 
Colby ordered a review of these practices. Subsequently, the Agency terminated the informant 
relationships of five full-time employees of American periodicals. Stringers and free-lancers are still 
on the payroll, despite their periodic reporting for a U.S. media usually unaware of the writer's CIA 

It is clear that editors have been thwarted in uncovering this clandestine relationship. In 
a New York Times article on December 18, 1973, Martin Arnold wrote: ". . .Fred Taylor, 
managing editor of the Wall Street Journal, said that the Agency would not admit it if (the Wall 
Street Journal) had a valuable agent who was also a newsman." 

499 An ex-CIA Chief of Station explained that ". . .our American media assets. . .are given 
neither Agency guidance nor information which might influence a piece written for an American 
audience. These people are used entirely for intelligence gathering purposes, and are left free to 
write what they would have written had there been no connection with the Agency. . . This 
method is quite different from our handling of foreign media assets, writing for foreign audiences, 
where Agency influence over the content of certain articles is selectively applied." He further 
states, "CIA will undertake no activity in which there is a risk of influencing domestic public 
opinion either directly or indirectly." But he turns around in the next sentence to say: 'The 
Agency does have a responsibility for undertaking certain propaganda activities in foreign 
countries." Director Colby emphatically stated on October 25, 1975 to members of the 
Committee staff and Congressman Johnson that he "differentiates between AP and Reuters. I 
consider AP to be an American wire service and therefore off limits. . .but Reuters is a foreign 
wire service." It was pointed out to Director Colby that Reuters, a British wire service, was 
frequently used by American media, but this fact did not change his mind. In an effort to assure 
that official Washington is not deceived by planted articles in the foreign press, CIA maintains 
high-level liaison with the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency to identify 
spurious stories. 

S00 The CIA's Cover and Commercial staff files show that in 1975 1 1 CIA employees used 
media cover with 15 news field companies— TV, radio, newspaper, and magazines. Five of these 
are of major general news impact, nine of no major general news influence, and one a proprietary. 



The use of American press enterprises as a cover has been tightened somewhat. No longer, 
for example, can a CIA officer in the field arrange for cover without headquarters approval. 502 

Director Colby, citing the Agency's continuing need for reliable information and the 
increasing reluctance of private firms and the government to provide cover, has maintained that the 
recent reforms have reduced risks to an acceptable level. 

d. CIA Presence in the Executive Branch 

CIA personnel may be found in a host of U.S. departments and agencies, in the National 
Security Council, and in the White House itself. 

Typically, their Agency affiliations are unknown to colleagues and to all others, except one 
or two leadership figures. 03 They sit on interagency panels whose members are unwitting. 504 
In some cases these panels already include another, official, CIA representative, giving CIA undue 

50 'When the CIA had fiduciary relations with five full-time correspondents of major 
American news organizations, three of their employers were unwitting, according to William E. 
Colby. Also, see note above. 

502 Director Colby commented on Oswald Johnston's November 30 article saying: "The CIA 
employed staff who concurrently worked for major, general circulation journals, in 1973 there 
were 5, and the management. . .was unwitting in. . .3 cases. These men were used as intelligence 
agents employed by the journals, and used by the Agency as spotters to develop contacts within 
diplomatic circles." 

Colby issued an update of the regulation placing restrictions on the operational use of 
newsmen on September 4, 1973: "2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also 
required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio or news stations, 
whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. 
ownership or control." This means that foreign nationals can be used without regard to Mr. 
Colby's restrictions. 

503 At the National Security Council, there are four CIA employees working as professional 
staff. Three of them are overt employees of the CIA, open employees. The fourth is an 
undercover employee, one who does not acknowledge the CIA as his true employer. Ironically, 
through committee staff interviews, the undercover employee was the only CIA detailee readily 
identified by his colleagues or subordinates. 

504 [Name deleted] sits on the Interagency Classification Review Committee (ICRC), 
representing the National Security Council staff, although he is actually detailed to the NSC staff 
from the CIA. The CIA also has a representative on the ICRC. [Name deleted] told the 
Committee staff that he does not tell other ICRC members of his true affiliation. The man who 
preceded [Name deleted] at the NSC was [Name deleted]. He also sat on the ICRC representing 
the NSC. And he was also a CIA detailee. Further, he was a key NSC staffer, but the only 
people at the NSC who knew that he was form the CIA wee Dr. Kissinger and Alexander Haig. 




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representation . 505 Some of them work in positions involving evaluation of CIA's work product 
and proposals . 506 

These individuals are "detailees" — CIA employees on loan to the Executive, usually at the 
latter's request. They include all types, from gardeners and typists, to intelligence analysts and 
practitioners of covert action . 507 

Detailees are requested for a variety of reasons — because the White House wants to 
circumvent congressional budget ceilings, because there arc no other available secretaries with security 
clearances, because CIA professional expertise is highly regarded, or because the position had always 
been staffed by an Agency officer . 508 

The Committee has found no indications that CIA detailees arc instructed to make 
clandestine reports to headquarters on the inner workings of the host-employer. Nor is there credible 
evidence that they are asked by CIA to perform in any manner which is inconsistent with the best 

505 This Interagency Classification Review Committee rules on questions of declassification 
from the Executive branch agencies. These questions come up as a result of Freedom of 
Information Act (FOI) requests. If an FOI request is initially denied, the requester may appeal 
to the head of the Agency; and if that appeal is denied, he may appeal to the ICRC. Many of 
these declassification cases involve the CIA. 

506 The man who directed Operation CHAOS at the CIA is now detailed to the NSC staff as 
Director for Intelligence Coordination of the NSC staff. His task is to evaluate the quality of 
intelligence sent to the NSC, including intelligence from his regular employer, the CIA. He 
maintains close contact with the CIA, as part of his job. 

507 There are, or have been, CIA detailees working at the White House (including the Federal 
Executive Institute, Cabinet Committee on Price Stability, White House Joint Committee on 
Science, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Council on International Economic Policy and 
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board), the Department of Justice and the Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the State Department and the Agency for International 
Development, the Treasury Department, the Defense Departmert and the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Energy Administration, the Vice 
Presidents Office, the National Security Council and the Commerce Department. 

The CIA details cover: communications technicians, biographic analysts, general 
illustrators, secretaries, clerks, couriers, laborers, telephone operators, graphic analysts, personal 
assistants, physical scientists, intelligence officers, operations officers, economists, administrative 
assistants, program analysts, chauffeurs, sky marshals, and stenographers. 

508 The White House used CIA detailees to keep the total number of staff down, in 
contravention of Congressional appropriation staff ceilings. The NSC staff "borrows" secretaries 
initially from the CIA, until their secretaries get clearances, but in many cases, the CIA secretaries 
stay at the NSC for years. Many executive branches, such as the Department of the Treasury, 
use CIA professionals as advisors to Secretaries, etc. And finally, the NSC staffer responsible for 
covert action proposals and approvals is almost always from the CIA's Directorate of Operations, 
which requests the covert actions. He has sole custody of all the Forty Committee's records. 


interests of the host. Nonetheless, the committee believes that detailing as presently practiced reflects 
an unwise policy. 

At best, intelligence personnel such as clerical help arc diverted from CIA duties thus 
frustrating the budget allocating intent of Congress. A far worse specter is that of CIA officers 
assigned to such posts as the National Security Council where they are susceptible, despite all good 
intentions, to substantial conflicts of interest on the most sensitive issues. The latter problem is 
compounded by the fact that the detailee's background often is unknown to NSC colleagues who are 
also charged with CIA-related responsibilities. 509 

The Committee discovered detailees, whose Agency tics were closely held secrets, making 
recommendations on CIA covert action proposals to unwitting senior NSC officials. Such 
individuals also help conduct the NSC's evaluation of the intelligence product, and in that capacity 
regularly compare CIA's performance with that of rival agencies. 

These individuals have impressed staff as highly motivated professionals, acutely aware of the 
problems resulting from divided loyalties. Their integrity is not at issue. But neither the White 
House nor the CIA is well served by an unnecessary policy which invites cynicism and compromises 
the quality of Executive Branch oversight of the intelligence community. 

e. CIA Relationships with U.S. and Foreign Police 

In creating the CIA, Congress clearly intended to deny it any domestic police functions. 
Their fear that a super-secret, bureaucratically powerful spy agency might evolve into a domestic 
secret police, has not been realized, despite shortcomings in control and oversight. 

Evidence in Committee files, however, indicates that during the late 1960's and early 1970's, 
CIA allowed itself to become involved in domestic police activity. In addition, the Agency undertook 
other police assistance activities which jeopardized the integrity of an otherwise legitimate and useful 
U.S. foreign aid program. 

Association and Collaboration with U.S. Police 

Notwithstanding its charter's 510 clear prohibition against internal security functions, CIA 
has maintained relationships— many entirely appropriate— with various Federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies. Questionable activities prior to the Holtzman Amendment to the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968, included the training by CIA of domestic police and 

509 See previous note on a key staffer at the NSC who made recommendations on policy 
options. He therefore, was called upon to make these recommendations on CIA policies to 
people who did not know of his current CIA affiliation. 

510 50 U.S.C. 403 (f) (1970) in relevant part forbids the CIA from exercising "police, law 
i enforcement powers, or internal security functions. . ." 


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loans of Agency equipment for domestic use. 5 " In return, local police departments cooperated 
with CIA on matters of concern to the Agency's Office of Security. Both activities appear to have 
been improper. The first violated the charter's ban on domestic police functions, and the latter 
tended to circumvent jurisdiction of the FBI and the Department of Justice. 

Of these activities, CIA's role as a source of ordinary as well as exotic equipment is perhaps 
the most troubling and publicized. The Agency has loaned such traditional gear as body protectors, 
billy clubs, mace, and similar civil disturbance paraphernalia/' 12 Most of the equipment was 
provided during the height of the anti-Vietnam War movement and may have been used by local 
police during the May 1971 demonstrations in Washington. 

More exotic loans consisted of decoders, clandestine transmitters, analyzers, and other 
wiretapping devices. 513 

A staff examination of these practices reveals that CIA officials usually provided equipment 
on a no-questions-asked basis, did not require the production of court orders for eavesdropping gear, 
and exercised virtually no control over the loaned items. 514 

The record suggests that on one occasion, CIA-loaned equipment was used in an illegal 
wiretap. In June, 1971, Mr. Kenyon F. Ballew was severely wounded during a raid on his apartment 
by agents of the Division of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, supported by police from Montgomery 
and Prince Georges Counties in Maryland. 

The raid was conducted pursuant to a Federal search warrant for possession of suspected 
firearms and hand grenades. Plainclothes agents and police officers broke down the door to the 
apartment when Mr. Ballew failed to answer their knock. Mr. Ballew, a gun collector, picked up a 
pistol, was shot, and is now permanently disabled. He is partially paralyzed, walks only with the aid 
of a brace and cane, speaks with difficulty, and still has the police bullet lodged in his brain. 

Mr. Ballew was never prosecuted for any gun control violations. The case received a large 
amount of publicity and was the subject of a number of investigations of alleged police misconduct. 
Mr. Ballew brought suit pursuant to the Federal Torts Claims Act and received an adverse judgment 
from the courts in February, 1 975. 51 5 

A CIA Office of Security employee assigned to liaison with the Montgomery County Police 
Department told staff that, in a conversation with a police inspector on the Ballew case, the possible 

51 'interview with an officer of the Security Support Division, CIA Office of Security, by S. 
Hecht, Oct. 28, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. See, also, 42 IJ.S.C. 3756 (1973). 

5,2 Interview with Howard J. Osborn, former Director, CIA Office of Security, by S. Hecht, 
Dec. 11, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

5 13 Attachments to memoranda a) to the Director of Security, from the Deputy Director of 
Security, Feb. 15, 1974, and b) to the Inspector General, from Charles W. Kane, CIA Director of 
Security, Apr. 22, 1974. 

5,4 See, note 

515 Ballew v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 47 (D-Maryland 1975). 


use of CIA-loaned bugging equipment was revealed. 516 He was advised that police intercepted 
a telephone conversation in which plans were outlined to ''kill a cop." However, neither the affidavit 
in support of the search warrant, the subsequent investigations, nor the transcript of the civil suit 
reflected the existence of any wiretap. Mr. Ballew's case is now on appeal, and if there had been an 
illegal wiretap, he may be entitled to a new trial. While the Department of Justice's CIA Task Force 
has been made aware of this possible wiretap for months, it has apparently refused, both to act upon 
it, 517 and to notify the attorneys in the case. 

CIA Involvement with Foreign Police 

From the early 1950's until late 1973, CIA operated a proprietary. International Police 
Services (IPS) in the Washington D.C. area. It had the dual purpose of improving allies' internal 
security, and evaluating foreign cadets for pro-U.S. orientation, which might later enable CIA to 
recruit them as intelligence assets. 518 

In the early 1960's the Agency for International Development's Office of Public Safety (AID- 
OPS) became actively involved in foreign police training. OPS' 14 week course was augmented by 
an additional four weeks of training at IPS, pursuant to a contractual arrangement with AID. 
Students were not made aware that they were being trained at a CIA facility, and only a handful of 
AID officials, including the Director of OPS, knew of IPS's CIA status. 519 

Instructors were asked to record names of students who demonstrated a pro-American 
attitude. 520 It does not appear, however, that the CIA attempted to recruit students while in the 
United States, although CIA documents indicate that with the cooperation of OPS, lists of OPS and 

5,6 Interview with CIA Office of Security employee assigned to liaison with the Montgomery 
County Police Department, by S. Hecht, Dec. 10, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 
See also, Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence from William V. Broe, CIA 
Inspector General, June 6, 1973, "Alleged CIA Involvement in the Ballou |sic| Case," CIA 
'Family Jewels," at 634-5 (May 20, 1973). 


The Agency's position in this case is that the Agency was not involved beyond the loan 
of audio equipment, which may have been used against Mr. Ballcw. See, letter to the Staff 
ifirector of the Sel. comm, on Intell., Nov. 17, 1975, re: Office of Security's relationship with 
domestic police departments. 

518 Memorandum to the CIA Deputy Director of Operations, from James Angleton, Chief, 
counter Intelligence Staff, Apr. 25, 1973, "Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group Activities, " 
CiA "Family Jewels" at 595-9 (May 20, 1973). See also, Interview with an officer of the CIA 
-oecial Operations Group, by S. Hecht, Oct. 30, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

519 Interview with Byron Engle, former Director, AID office of Public Safety, By S. Hecht, 
Hbv. 1, 1975, copy on file with Sel. comm, on Intell. 

520 Interview with a former IPS instructor, who also is an ex-FBI agent, by S. Hecht, Nov. 

12, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

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IPS students were made available, along with biographical information, to CIA components for 
operational use. 521 

As many as 5,000 foreign police officers from over 100 countries, many of whom have 
become high officials, unwittingly received training from the CIA. 522 The positions of these 
foreign police officers may have been damaged when, in 1973, IPS was revealed as a CIA front. 

In addition to damaging the credibility of these foreign policy officers, CIA's apparently 
unnecessary involvement with a legitimate foreign aid program could have seriously undermined that 
program from a propaganda standpoint. 523 Despite these realities, AID-OPS continued its 
relationship with IPS until late 1973. Department of State and AID officials should review these 
practices and develop alternative methods of administering foreign aid programs without CIA 
involvement and support. 

3. Domestic intelligence investigations 

Domestic intelligence 524 carries with it two distinct types of risks. There ar programs that 

521 See, note 

522 According to maximum estimates, IPS trained approximately forty percent of OPS-IPA 
students. The Director of AID-OPS stated that the figure was not that high but could not give 
an estimate. Over 7,000 foreign police officers from 75 countries received OPS-IPA training. 
Lefever, U.S. Public Safety Assistance: " An Assessment," The Brookings Institution, p. 2 (Dec. 
1973). See also, note 

523 For example, the AID-OPS program was damaged considerably by allegations linking 
foreign police training to the CIA. In 1970, Dan Mitrione, a law enforcement officer of 
impeccable credentials and reputation, employed by AID as a Public Safety Advisor in Uruguay, 
was kidnapped and murdered by Tupamaro guerrillas. The Tupamaros alleged that Mitrione was 
a CIA "agent" and that Public Safety Advisors including Mitrione taught torture tactics to police. 
CIA documents indicate that although Mitrione may have had some contact with CIA officers 
stationed in Uruguay, he was not a CIA employee or informant. See, note. Allegations of AID- 
OPS sponsored torture training, depicted in various press reports and the film "State of Siege," 
appear factually insupportable. However, this type of allegation had a tremendous propaganda 
impact which contributed substantially to the termination of AID-OPS in 1975. 

524 Although the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DBA), the IRS, and the 
Secret Service have domestic intelligence capabilities, domestic intelligence as used here refers to 
FBI operations. 

The various kinds of intelligence can be define as follows: 

1. Operational Intelligence: Intelligence developed pursuant to an actual ongoing 
criminal investigation. 

2. Strategic Long-Range Intelligence: Intelligence developed with a specific goal of 


by their very nature and methods offend individual liberties and statutory rights. Then there are 
legitimate intelligence methods that are improperly applied, turning the law-enforcers into law- 

a. Programs as Abuses 

COINTELPRO was a series of covert counterintelligence programs aimed at identifying, 
penetrating, and neutralizing subversive elements in the United States. The program itself consisted 
of myriad clandestine dirty tricks carried out by FBI agents against persons and organizations 
considered subversive by the FBI. 525 Careers were ruined, friendships severed, reputations sullied, 
businesses bankrupted and, in some cases, lives endangered. 526 

profiles on the membership, inter-relationships, mores, and trends of the criminal community. 

3. Counterintelligence: Intelligence aimed at meeting capabilities of foreign-directed 
intelligence operations within the United States. 

4. Internal Security or Domestic Intelligence: The operations, trends, mores and inter- 
relationships of groups of extremists and radicals who, in the opinion of the FBI pose a threat to 
the internal security of the United States. 

5. Automated Intelligence: Operational intelligence developed from criminal 
investigations and the strategic long-range intelligence, combined with statistical facts (arrest 
records, drivers license information, etc.) compiled on target individuals and computerized. 

525 The primary programs were the Communist Party, U.S.A. program (commenced 1956), 
the Socialist Workers Party program (commenced in 1961), the White Extremist program 
(commenced in 1964), the Black Extremist program (commenced in 1967), and the new Left 
Domestic program (commenced in 1968). Lesser programs were the Puerto Rican bomber 
program (1966), Operation Hoodwink (1966) (a program pitting the Mafia against the communist 
Party), Operation Border Coverage (1961), the Cuban program (1961) and the Yugoslav program 
(1969). ALL COINTELPRO programs terminated after their existence was discovered following 
the burglary of the FBI office in Media, Pa. on April 27, 1971. Staff COINTELPRO briefing 
between W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director of the FBI in charge of the Intelligence 
Division and J.B.F. Oliphant and R. Vermeire, at FBI headquarters, Aug. 22, 1975, copy on file 
with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

526 The following are but a few examples of specific COINTELPRO programs, of which 
there were a total of 3,247 proposed and 2,370 carried out: 

In 1969, the FBI authorized and agent to send anonymous letters to the superior 
of Father Augustus Taylor, Jr., a Catholic priest, complaining of Father Taylor's speaking out on 
his televisions show against the war in Vietnam and of his public support of certain black 
organizations. Father Taylor's television show was subsequently canceled and he was transferred. 
FBI COINTELPRO memoranda 100-448006-785, 876, 923. 

In 1968, the FBI authorized interfering with a Mellon Foundation's decision of 
whether to give Unity Corporation, a black organization in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, a $150,000 

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The FBI justified this aberration from traditional law enforcement programs by stating that 
it was dictated by the mood of the times, the FBI, as implementors of the program, thereby became 
the barometer of the country's mood, instead of fulfilling their statutory function of enforcing Federal 
laws. 527 Evidence received by the Committee of FBI racism, 528 bias, and strong conservative 
ideology hardly qualifies it to review people's politics. Moreover, the Constitution prohibits such a 
role and protects the very things FBI was attempting to punish. 

COINTELPRO is only one example, another would be programs grouped under 
"anticipatory" intelligence. 

FBI states: "Because the FBI's investigative responsibilities follow the contours of those 
entrusted to the Attorney General, the Bureau's domestic intelligence investigations ar, of necessity, 

grant. The FBI contacted a confidential source within the Mellon Foundation, the grant was 
denied, and the Unity Corporation subsequently went bankrupt. FBI COINTELPRO 
Memoranda, 100-448006-171, 225. 

In 1969, the FBI approved furnishing information to a responsible Harvard 
University official that a student who was employed by the University was involved in Students 
for a Democratic Society (SDS) activities. Shortly thereafter, the student lost his job. FBI 
COINTELPRO Memoranda, 100-449698-5, 22. 

More seriously, one program was carried out wherein an anonymous letter was 
sent to the Black Panther Party accusing one of their members of being a police informant. FBI 
COINTELPRO Memoranda 100-448006-2308. Another program authorized sending a 
threatening letter to Huey Newton purporting to be from a follower of Eldridge Cleaver. FBI 
COINTELPRO Memoranda 100-448006-2209. 

527 "MR. VERMEIRE. Why was there such a significant break in investigative techniques 
in 1973? 

"MR. WANNALL. Principally because an analysis was made by a predecessor 
and a determination, I think, that we should be aware, I t hin k as we always have been, of the 
climate of the times and restructure on a strict statutory basis. 

"I think the history of the Bureau, and I would not bore you with details, has 
been one of responsiveness, an awareness of the climate of the times, and restructuring." Staff 
Interview with W. Raymond Wannall, FBI Assistant Director in charge of Intelligence Division; 
Robert L. Shackelford, Section Chief, FBI Intelligence Division, and David Ryan, supervisor, 
FBI Intelligence Division, By J.B.F. Oliphant, R. Vermeirc, J. Atkisson and E. Miller, Nov. 5, 
1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

528 A case in point was the FBI's alleged targeting of Congressman Andrew Young, of 
Georgia, wherein the FBI requested Arthur Murtagh, a Special Agent, to surreptitiously obtain 
Congressman Young's personal stationery and handwriting sample. At the time, Congressman 
Young was a candidate for Congress. Comm. Hearings, testimony of Arthur Murtagh, Nov. 18, 

The FBI denies the aforementioned allegation. Furthermore, Black agents 
presently comprise approximately 1.2 percent of FBI agent personnel. Comm. Hearings, 
testimony of W. Raymond Wannall, Nov. 18, 1975. 


broader than investigations strictly designed to collect evidence for criminal proceedings. The FBI's 
domestic intelligence responsibilities have a distinct anticipatory, or preventive, purpose, requiring 
continuing investigative activity in cases wherein criminal conduct remains a future possibility. 52 
Whereas the evidence required to initiate an investigation under such a standard would obviously be 
something less than probable cause of a crime, it would nevertheless be more than mere 
suspicion. 530 The FBI itself states that advocacy of an ideology alone is not sufficient grounds 
for classifying a group as subversive. 531 

Anticipatory domestic intelligence projects, however, do create serious problems on occasion. 
A few examples illustrate the point. 

Lori Paton testified before the committee on November 1 8, 1975. In 1 974, Miss Paton, then 
a high school student, inadvertently wrote the Socialist Workers Party as an academic assignment. 
She intended to write to the Socialist Labor Party. 

The FBI was conducting a "mail cover" 532 on the SWP and intercepted Miss Paton's 
misdirected letter. They immediately began an investigation of her, and the attendant publicity in 
Miss Paton's small town caused her great mental anguish. 

The Bureau's response was that the "FBI did not publicize the fact" 533 of Lori Paton's 
investigation, although they had interviewed her school principal and the local police chief. 

529 Comm. Hearing, at Nov. 18, 1975. Testimony of James B. Adams, Assistant to the 
Director, FBI. 

The Committee staff attempted to find out what triggered domestic intelligence 
investigations. The best answer appeared to be: 

"MR. VERMEIRE. Investigation with respect to a particular crime? 

"MR. SHACKELFORD. Potential crime. 

"MR. VERMEIRE. Potential; is there probable cause? 

"MR. SHACKELFORD. Of course not." 

ibid., at 29. 

Probable cause, of course, has been the traditional test for arrest, i.e., does a 
police officer have reason to believe a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). 

530 Perhaps the test should be the "stop and frisk" standard of "reasonable suspicion" that a 
crime will be committed, enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 

531 Staff interview with Wannall, et al., at 9. 

532 A mail cover is observing only what appears on the outside of an envelope or parcel, a 
practice which is carried out, of course, with the cooperation of postal authorities. The technique 
is perfectly legal. 


FBI Memorandum, 1 1/28/75, Appendix II. 

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Assume, however, that Miss Paton had correctly written to the SWP, as many people 
undoubtedly have. That fact alone would apparently have been grounds for an anticipatory 
V investigation, even though it is hard to imagine what crimes could be anticipated by writing a letter. 
In addition, the chilling effect such investigations have on first Amendment rights, including freedom 
of association, is painfully' clear. 534 

For those who do join SWP, the chill is likely to spread to employers. The Committee 
heard from one witness who termed FBI's inquiries about his employee, Bruce Bloy, who was an 
SWP member, as "presumptive, mysterious, and . . . aggressive. " 535 

Trash covers are another odious form of anticipatory investigations. The IPS trash cover 
has already been discussed, 536 save for a comment on command and control. When FBI 
personnel were originally asked about trash covers by Committee staff, they stated: "we have not 
engaged in [trash covers] since July, 1966. . . We had no trash covers on the IPS." 537 Two weeks 
later, at a Committee hearing, they corrected themselves. They stated that, while there was am FBI 
policy of not conducting trash covers, that policy was not always followed. 538 

Two memoranda show that the Bureau knew of the trash covers and recognized the risks 
in such a method. The concerns? The "potential harm to the FBI and the Federal Government, per 
se, far outweigh the potential information that could be expected." 539 It was not risks to an 

534 The risk may even be intended. As Dean Louis Poliak put it: 

"When the official investigation long outlives its initially professed justification— 
that is to say, reasoned suspicion or criminal activity imminent or actually carried out— at that 
point it is inescapable. . .that an important consequence, if not necessarily a purpose, of the 
continuing investigation will be the imposition of an official stigma on the political or research 
activity being carried out by the "subject." Comm. Hearings, at Dec. 10, 1975. 

535 Comm. Hearings, at, Nov. 18, 1975. 

536 See, notes and accompanying text. 

537 Interview with Wannall, et. al., at 26. 

538 "MR. WANNALL. I think there have been isolated incidents where that has been done. 
The policy of the FBI since the middle of 1966 has been not to conduct so-called trash covers. 

"MR. FIELD. Since 1966 that has been their policy. Did you testify under oath 
before our committee that since then, to your knowledge, trash covers have not been used? 

"MR. WANNALL. I did so testify. I have since learned of one occasion where 
trash which was discarded by an organization was in fact recovered by an agent. It was not done 
with prior knowledge of FBI headquarters. Comm. Hearings, at, Nov. 18, 1975. 

539 "[The Washington Field Office} feels it would be most unwise at this point in time to 
seriously consider instituting a similar operation as encompassed by the utilization of this source 
[the trash cover]. Potential harm to the FBI and the Federal Government, per se, far outweigh 
the potential information that could be expected from such a reinstated operation." FBI 


individual's right of privacy that concerned the FBI. 

b. Law Enforcement Turned Law-Breaking 

The use of informants, albeit an effective law enforcement tool, is a method of investigation 
which is particularly subject to abuses of constitutional rights and rights of privacy. 

The Committee heard testimony from a former FBI informant named Robert Hardy. Mr. 
Hardy chronicled for the Committee his role in a 1971 Camden Draft Board brcak-in. Pursuant to 
FBI instructions, he infdtrated a peaceful anti-war group in Camden, New Jersey. 540 He instigated 
the burglary and supplied the would-be burglars with tools, money, technical assistance and 
encouragement . 54 1 

In sum, Mr. Hardy acted as an "agent-provocateur." At one point, he attempted to halt the 
actual burglary, because a conspiracy had been established. His FBI handling-agents insisted that 
the burglary be committed. 542 

The disturbing lesson is that in the FBI system there is virtually no mechanism to control 
agents in charge of informants. The FBI Manual of Instructions on Informants sets forth specific 
guidelines for the handling of informants, 543 yet the uniqueness and secrecy surrounding each 
informant's relationship with the handling-agent 544 impairs the effectiveness of those instructions. 

In the Hardy case, the informant-agent relationship was further complicated by political 
considerations. 545 The defendants in a celebrated case in nearby Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, had 
recently been acquitted of all conspiracy counts. The FBI apparently felt that an overt act such as 
an actual break-in would be required to insure a conviction, even though the alleged crime of 
conspiracy, which was the basis of later prosecution, appears to have been completed far in advance 
of the actual break-in. 

It should be noted that Department of Justice attorneys were advised of this situation long 

Washington Field Office Memorandum to Headquarters, August, 4, 1973. 

540 None of the group's members was known by the FBI to be violence-prone. Comm. 
(“Hearings, at, Nov. 18, 1975 


All of which were paid for with FBI funds. Ibid. 

542 The FBI's denial of this allegation appears in their Memorandum of Nov. 28, 1975, 
Appendix II. 

0 - 543 


FBI Manual of Instructions, "Security Informants and Confidential Sources," Section 107. 

544 The FBI considers the confidentiality of the relating between a special agent and his 
informant to be of paramount importance. Staff briefing, FBI Intelligence Division personnel 
and J.B.F. Oliphant and R. Vermeire, Aug. 28, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 

545 Staff interview, Guy Goodwin, by J.B.F. Oliphant and R. Vermeire, Nov. 14, 1975, at 
83, copy on file with Sel. Comm, on Intell. 




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before the break-in and did nothing to avert the course of events. 546 

The Committee investigated another example of lack of control over informants. T he FBI 
used Robert Merritt 547 as an informant on New Left activities during the early 1970's. His duties 
included reporting on activities at the Institute of Policy Studies. Merritt told the Committee that 
his FBI handling-agents instructed him to conduct break-ins, deliver unopened mail acquired illegally, 
and solicit and provide information to the FBI regarding homosexual proclivities of politically 
prominent people and individuals of the new Left. 54 

The FBI agents who handled Merritt denied these allegations under oath. They stated that 
Merritt acted on his own. 549 

The handling-agents stated that they terminated Merritt because they ascertained that he ha 
provided false information on one occasion and had reason to believe he provided false information 
at other times in the past. 550 If this was true, it does not fit with other facts. During the seven 
months that Merritt was an FBI informant, he provided over 100 reports on at least 25 people. He 
had, in fact, been categorized as "reliable" in FBI records. 551 

No effort was ever made to "correct" the Merritt reports, by indicating that the information 
contained therein might be unreliable. No prosecutive actions were ever recommended as a result 
of Merritt's allegedly wrong actions. His efforts apparently fit well with intelligence operations. 

Furthermore, Merritt told staff that he had committed numerous illegal acts at the direction 
of District of Columbus Metropolitan Police. 553 

His FBI handling-agents stated that although they acquired Merritt form the Metropolitan 
Police Department, they never inquired as to the nature of his prior activities as a police 
informant. 4 This attitude of "see no evil, hear no evil" appears to violate the seemingly rigid 
regulations of the FBI Manual, designed to effect the recruitment of responsible and reliable 

546 Ibid., at 83-84. 

547 Staff interview, Robert Merritt, by J.B.F. Oliphant, J. Atkisson, F. Miller. Staff memo 
on file with Sel. comm, on Intell. 

548 Ibid. 

549 Staff interview, FBI Special Agents Tucker and O'Connor, by J.B.F. Oliphant, J. 
Atkisson, Nov. 5, 1975, copy on file with Sel. comm, on Intell. 

550 / bid. 

551 Ibid., at 33. 

552 Merritt interview. 

553 Ibid. 

554 Tucker-O'Connor Interview. 


Conflicting testimony in the Merritt matter reveals the problem itself. Since FBI agents' 
instructions to their informants are, by necessity, given orally 555 and without witnesses, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to accurately fix responsibility for an informant's actions. 

If the FBI agent is at fault, the problem becomes one of administrative command and 
control. If, however, the informant has gone bad, the problem is more difficult. For example, if an 
informant successfully instigates others to commit a crime, as in the Hardy matter, his FBI contact 
agent may overlook the informant's improper actions, because the informant is important to a case 
for which the FBI agent is likely to receive credit. 

The risk that informants may use illegal methods is heightened when one considers the kind 
of person needed to infiltrate suspected criminal elements. Understating the problem, James Adams, 
Assistant to the Director of FBI, testified before the Committee on November 18, 1975: "|T]he 
informants you develop are not recruited from Sunday Schools." 556 The dubious character of 
most informants is compounded by the fact that informants are paid cash, and their payment is 
commensurate with the information they furnish. The more incriminating the information, the more 
lucrative the reward. 

Electronic Surveillance — The Kissinger Wiretaps 

In the last half-century, electronic technology has revolutionized the science of investigations. 
These developments also mean that "Big Brother" may be watching. 557 

Improper application of electronic surveillance poses obvious risks because of its enormous 
potential for invading privacy and the difficulty of detecting intrusion. 558 

Some examples follow. 

In the spring of 1969, the Nixon White House was disturbed that extremely sensitive 
information regarding diplomatic relations and national security was leaking to the press on a fairly 
regular basis. 

On May 9, 1969, William Beecher of the New York Times wrote an article on Cambodia 
which triggered a strong reaction from the White House. That day, a series of telephone calls to 
ascertain the source of the leaks took place. The calls were between Dr. Kissinger and J. Edgar 

FBI Manual of Instructions, Sections 107-108. 

556 Comm. Hearings, at Nov. 18, 1975. 

"Before speaking, many people weigh the costs of speaking freely against the risk of the 
possible word-for-word disclosure of their conversations to unintended recipients. The comment, 
'I can't talk over the telephone,' has become the trademark of mistrustful individuals." Michael 
Hershman, Hearings, Oct. 9, 1975, Part 3, p. 942. 


"The nature of illegal electronic surveillance is such that most individuals remain unaware 
of their victimization. Furthermore, many of those who do discover that they have been bugged 
or tapped ar reluctant to report it, because of embarrassment, publicity, and a fear of subsequent 
investigations. These factors combine to make it virtually impossible to estimate how much 
wiretapping taking place." Ibid. 

scan by 


Hoover, and between Colonel Alexander Haig and FBI personnel. 5 59 

The apparent result of these consultations was the installation of a wiretap on the residence 
of a National Security Council staff on May 9, 1969. Significantly, approval for this "national 
security" wiretap was not requested until May 10, 1969. The wiretap was requested by Col. Haig "on 
the highest authority," 560 and was not approved by Attorney General John Mitchell until May 
12, 1969. 561 

Seventeen persons were eventually wiretapped pursuant to this program. 

Although the FBI never overheard information indicating any breach of national security, the 
taps continued for lengthy periods of time. 563 

No approval was ever sought for extensions of the wiretaps as they continued unabated and 
unsupervised. 4 In addition, the FBI continued to report information which can only be 
characterized as political or personal. 565 

William C. Sullivan, former Chief of Intelligence for the FBI, told staff that FBI Director 
J. Edgar Hoover did not regard these tapes as FBI operations, but as executive requests. 566 
According to Mr. Sullivan, Hoover insisted on sending copies of the transcripts directly to the White 
House, so the President would be apprised of the "service" FBI was providing. 567 

Several risks were inherent in the FBI's national security wiretaps installed for Dr. Kissinger. 

The first involved wiretapping United States citizens without prior judicial approval. These 
dangers were recognized by the Supreme Court in 1972. The Court held that electronic surveillance 

559 Staff access to relevant documents at FBI Headquarters, Oct. 30, 1975. 

560 Partially deleted request, see, appendix. 

561 Ibid. 

("Chart prepared by Committee staff from access to relevant documents at FBI 
Headquarters, Oct. 30, 1975, see, appendix.) 

562 Chart, partially deleted, see, Appendix. 

563 Staff review of FBI records, Oct. 30, 1975. 

564 Ibid. 

565 Ibid. 

566 Interview with William C. Sullivan, by J.B.F. Oliphant and R. Vermcire, Oct. 24, 1975. 

567 Ibid. 


of domestic organizations or citizens was forbidden unless prior judicial approval was obtained. 56 * 

Secondly, wiretapping State Department officials and members of the press, tends to stifle 
voices of criticism and dissenting views, and infringes upon freedom of the press. 

Finally, the Kissinger wiretaps posed a risk that the FBI could become the tool by which 
an Administration in power obtains political information. 

The Houston Episode 

On October 9, 1975, Anthony Zavala, a former narcotics officer with the Houston Police 
Department who had been sentences to three years' imprisonment on wiretap convictions, told the 
Committee of widespread illegal police wiretapping in Houston, Texas, from 1969 through 
1972. 569 

Mr. Zavala recounted that wiretapping had become "second nature to us all," and "that it was 
all discussed freely, and that everyone knew what was going on." 570 

The Committee is not unmindful of the Supreme Court's invitation to Congress to 
legislate in this area: 

Given these potential distinctions between Title 
III criminal surveillance and those involving the 
domestic security, Congress may wish to 
consider protective standards for the latter which 
differ from those already prescribed for specified 
crimes in Title III. Different standards may be 
compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they 
are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate 
need of Government for intelligence information 
and the protected rights of our citizens. For the 
warrant application may vary according to the 
governmental interest to be enforced and the 
nature of citizen rights deserving protection. 

United States v. united States District Court, 
supra , 407 U.S. at 322. 

569 Comm Hearings, at [ ], Oct. 9, 1975. 

Mr. Zavala s testimony clearly indicates that DEA (or its predecessor agency, BNDD) 
was similarly aware of the illegal wirctappings: 

"Mr. Chairman, I understand the committee is interested in Federal officers' direct 
participation in wiretaps. I heard about many cases from fellow police officers. But that is 
hearsay. I have more direct knowledge. 

On one occasion -- in 1969 — I was assigned by a captain to monitor a drug case . . .. 

One night a fellow police officer introduced me to several narcotics agents, two of whom I got to 
know pretty well, as they kept coming and going, and listening with me to the conversations of 
the target. Some weeks later the suspect in the case was arrested - by the Federal agents, 

scan by 


In 1973, Anthony J. P. Farris, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Texas, 
learned of allegations of wiretapping. 571 He brought this information to the attention of the FBI 
in the fall of 1973, and requested that the Bureau investigate. 

They did not. His requests continued. Finally, in April 1974, the FBI assigned one special 
agent to investigate the case. He fded reports, which according to Farris were ". . . notable only in 
their lack of substance, consisting largely of Xeroxed newspaper articles. 573 

4. SALT -- Political control of intelligence 

Nowhere is the risk of corrupting intelligence greater than in recent efforts to restrict and 
shape important data on Soviet compliance with strategic arms agreements. 

Staff investigation and examination of key documents reveal that these SALT treaties, which 
are of grave strategic significance, were consummated without full intelligence input, that the prime 

incidentally -- and afterward the three of us were discussing the wiretap at police headquarters. 

My two Federal friends were disturbed because the entire conversation took place in front of a 
high-ranking BNDD supervisor. They said I shouldn't talk about wiretapping in front of him 
that way. The supervisor was smiling the whole time. Ibid, at | |. 

571 Mr. Farris considered the information "... of probative value." Comm. Hearings, at [ ], 
Oct. 9, 1975. 

572 Ibid. 

The complete ineptitude of the FBI investigation of the Houston matter was brought out 
by Congressman Johnson's questioning of Mr. Fams: 

"MR. JOHNSON. Can you tell me why in this case, when you requested information 
with respect to investigation of other law enforcement agencies - in this case the Houston Police 
Department - you didn't get any response from anybody who was of real significance? 

"MR. FARRIS. ... In all other cases they always responded; they always performed 
admirably; but in this case - the investigation of the allegations of illegal electronic surveillance 
by the police department in Houston - there was not only reluctance but obvious foot dragging. 

"MR. JOHNSON. . . . What was the result of your contacts with Saxbe and Kelley and 
the others? 

"MR. FARRIS. To quote myself in other hearings, zip; nothing. Saxbe didn't answer; 
the Assistant Attorney General Crime Section didn't answer. No one answered. I don't think 
they were listening. 

+ ♦ ♦ 

"MR. JOHNSON. But you can characterize cooperation they received prior to that time 

as "zip." 

"MR. FARRIS. It is not worthy of the name investigation; yes, sir. 

"MR. JOHNSON. Once again, this is inconsistent with their response to other requests 
that you might make for other investigations? 

"MR. FARRIS. That is correct." Comm. Hearings, at | ), Oct. 9. 1975. 



U.S. official who sponsored the accords also effectively controls the verification of their feasibility, 
and that day-to-day intelligence analysis of compliance is hindered by arbitrary and inconsistent 
attempts to prevent leaks of SALT data. 

The prime factor in this situation is Dr. Kissinger, with his passion for secrecy and his efforts 
to concentrate power and to consolidate ultimate control of important intelligence functions, through 
his various bureaucratic roles. 

It is clear that, in the final stages of the SALT talks, U.S. negotiators did not fully consult 
or inform intelligence experts, who had been key figures in previous treaty sessions. 5 ' 3 Only 
Russian technical experts were on hand. 574 Dr. Kissinger's private talks with Soviet leaders in this 
period were not disseminated. Some officials assert that "ambiguities" which plague the accords may 
have been the result of U.S. policy-makers' self-imposed intelligence blackout at the critical 
moment. 575 

The record indicates that Dr. Kissinger, U.S. architect of the accords, has attempted to 
control the dissemination and analysis of data on apparent Soviet violations of the SALT pact. 

Although CIA, as the government's principal analytical arm, has both general and specific 
responsibility for the monitoring of SALT compliance, the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs has advised the Agency to avoid any written judgment that the Soviets are in 
violation of SALT agreements. Such findings were to be privately communicated to the National 
Security Council, which coincidentally, was headed by Dr. Kissinger. 576 

When sensitive intelligence reports on Soviet compliance began to turn up with regularity, 
the National Security Council initiated the procedure of severely restricting dissemination of the 
information, by causing it to be placed in a "hold" status. Typically, the CIA Deputy Director for 
Intelligence would, in consultation with NSC staff, place an item on "hold" until Dr. Kissinger or his 
representative agreed to release it. 577 

573 Interview with U.S. intelligence officials, by J. Boos, Dec. 4, 1975. A sworn statement to 
G. Rushford, Dec. 2, 1975, by a former State Department SALT official disclosed the Russian 
delegation was better informed of the U.S. position than was the U.S. delegation. 

574 Ibid. 

575 Interview with U.S. intelligence officials, J. Boos, Dec. 4, 1975, copy on file with Sel. 
Comm, on Intell. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt agreed in testimony to the Committee. Comm. 
Hearings, at [ ], Dec. 17, 1975. 

576 17 October 1972 memorandum for the record, "Phone call from Colonel Merritt, NSC 
staff," by Director of Strategic Research, CIA. 

577 According to a CIA Memorandum to this Committee, Dec. 1975, "A hold' item is 
intelligence which is given very limited dissemination to named recipients on a strict nced-to- 
know basis, and is not included in normal intelligence publications." Memoranda submitted to 
this Committee for the twelve items which have been placed on hold (ranging from one day to 
over six months), show the National Security Council staff in control of dissemination. 

Testimony before this Committee on Dec. 17 reported that the Assistant to the President for 

scan by 


Two principal reasons have been given for access restrictions: fear of leaks by officials 
seeking to influence U.S. SALT policy 578 ; and the need for adequate time to determine a report's 
real significance, thus avoiding rash judgments on complicated technical issues. 

This unusual procedure, invoked previously in such momentous situations as the 1962 
Cuban missile crisis, has been strangely implemented this time. At times, the Secretary of State, the 
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and key U.S. officials in SALT compliance 
meetings with the Soviets have not been aware of the existence of sensitive data suggesting Soviet 
cheating. Dissemination within severed intelligence components has been haphazard and 
uncontrolled. 579 

Two other problems with the "hold" process detract from the integrity of the intelligence 
product. NSC staff, for example, has influenced the timing and content of intelligence community 
publications. 580 Worse, both high officials and working level analysts have been cut off from 

National Security Affairs made the key decisions. See also, Praetor memos of July 13-20, 1973; 
Colby letter to Kennedy, Nov. 1, 1974. 

578 Testimony by William Hyland, Dec. 17, 1975: "I think the whole SALT process has 
been plagued by leaks. Not only have negotiating positions and fail-back positions appeared in 
the press before they could ever be put to the Russians, but the whole issue of compliance has 
been clouded by a considerable amount of misinformation which has appeared in journals such as 
Aviation Week and the newspapers on what the Soviets have or have not done. 

579 The Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Intelligence told staff they had not received SALT hold 
items. Interview by E. Sheketoff with Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Assistant Chief of 
Staff for Intelligence are of the Air Force, Dec. 15 & 16, 1975. On the other hand, one "hold" 
item was given to at least 75 people in CIA alone. Testimony by William Hyland and Edward 
Proctor, Dec. 17, 1975. DIA informed the Committee that it kept no records on "hold" 
dissemination and, consequently could not determine just who was authorized to see these 
sensitive items. Letter to the Committee, Dec. 16, 1975, from office of Thomas Latimer, 
Department of Defense; testimony by Edward Proctor, Dec. 17, 1975. 

Key U.S. officials, like Sidney Graybeal and U. Alexis Johnson of the SALT compliance 
team, were kept away from some data. Deputy CIA Director Proctor noted: "After talking with 
General Walters around noon yesterday I called Ray Cline to tell him about the status outlined 
above. Cline was of course disappointed, He said that he had talked to Rush about the 
situation. Although Rush recalled being briefed by Duckett on [deleted in original] shortly after 
they were discovered, his recollection was very vague. Rush had not realized that Secretary 
Rogers had not been briefed. Ray reported that Rush was very concerned that Alex Johnson and 
Sid Graybeal had not been told. Rush is to talk to Rogers are urge that Rogers talk to Kissinger 
to get permission to tell Johnson and Graybeal." Edward Proctor, Note for the Record, July 13, 

580 See, note | ]. Col. Merritt of the NSC staff told the CIA official that "Dr. Kissinger 
wanted to avoid any written judgment to the effect that the Soviets have violated any of the 
SALT agreements. If the Director believes the Soviets may be in violation, this should be the 

scan bv our 


information for periods of time ranging from days to six months. 581 

Dr. Kissinger's comments on this situation are at variance with the facts. 582 

subject of a memorandum from him to Dr. Kissinger. The judgment that a violation is 
considered to have occurred is one that will be made at the NSC level." 

SR 1 • 

Five items placed on a "hold" status were: 

Date Placed On Mold 

1. 29 June 1974 

2. 26 July 1974 

3. 11 September 1974 

4. 8 October 1974 

5. 22 October 1974 

Date Taken Off Hold 
17 December 1974 
17 December 1974 
17 December 1974 
17 December 1974 
17 December 1974 

Dec. 20 1974 letter to Richard Kennedy, NSC staff, from Director Colby; Kissinger letter to 
Colby, Dec. 17, 1974. In one case, the head of the U.S. SALT team in Geneva, U. Alexis 
Johnson, was not told of a secret understanding made a year earlier on an agreed interpretation of 
the treaty. Johnson first learned of this from his Soviet counterparts. His cable to Washington is 
as follows: 

"To: The White House for General Scowcroft Only 
'From: U. Alexis Johnson, SALT Geneva 

'I. You will note that statement by Ustinov at yesterday's SCC meeting contained reftel refers to 
the agreed interpretive statements of May 26 and July 29, 1972, . . We have no record here, 
and no one in the delegation has any recollection of latter statement. Presume it was a result of 
Henry s exchanges with Dobrynin following Moscow summit. Would appreciate text or 
summary of contents, so that we will be in position to handle when Soviets again raise matter in 
present negotiations on destruction, dismantling and replacement procedures. Presumably Phil 
Odeen or Bill Hyland are familiar with subject. Warm regards, Johnson." June 7, 1973. 

Admiral Zumwalt testified to the same effect. Comm. Hearings at | ), Dec. 2, 1975. 


Dr. Kissinger: "Whatever compliance issues existed at the time were brought to the 
attention of the Verification Panel." Kissinger press conference, Wash. D C., Dec. 9, 1975. 

From documentary evidence: The Verification Panel consists of the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, Deputy Secretary of State, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Director of ACDA, and the Director of Central Intelligence. Intelligence on SALT 
compliance which is put on hold routinely goes to only the Secretary of Defense, Director of 
DIA, and Kissinger. 

Dr. Kissinger: "All the decisions of the Verification Panel with respect to compliance 
have been unanimous." 

From documentary evidence: One member wrote a memo on Jan 14, 1975: "Upon 
further consideration following the recent Verification Panel meeting on SALT which addressed 
compliance issues, I am concerned about the decision not to raise the issue of Air Defense 
Testing . . .. This testing could have major strategic implications and its impact, in my opinion, 

scan by 


The specter of important information, suggesting Soviet violation of strategic arms 
limitations, purposefully withheld for extended periods of time from analysts, decision-makers and 
Members of Congress, has caused great controversy within the Intelligence Community. In 
addition, it has raised questions as to the President's own knowledge of, and concurrence with, the 
"hold" procedure. 584 

The problem continues, as official fears of leaks and policymakers' penchant for a unified 
view on SALT goes on. Former State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Director Ray 
S. Cline, in testimony before the Committee, framed the issue: "I do think the Congress should be 

was not sufficiently assessed at this recent session of the Verification Panel.' 

The Panel also does not vote or make formal decisions. 

Dr. Kissinger: "There is nobody who has claimed that the issue of compliance was not 
being adequately pursued. There is nobody who has objected to the handling of the 

Documentary evidence: Proctor memo of 13 July, 1973 . . . Colby letter to Richard 
Kennedy, Nov. 14, 1974 . . .. 

Dr. Kissinger: "All intelligence concerning alleged noncompliance was immediately 

distributed to all the members of the Verification Panel . . .." 

♦ ♦ + 

Dr. Kissinger: 'The longest time an item was on 'hold' was two months." 

From documentary evidence: Some items were on "hold": 19 June 1973-8 Aug. 1973: 

28 June 1974-17 Dec. 1974; 26 July 1974-17 Dec. 1974; 11 Sept. 1974-17 Dec. 1974; 23 Sept. 
1974-17 Dec. 1974. 

Dr. Kissinger: "No Soviet interference actions have interfered without national means of 

From documentary evidence: Some important concealment activities, as well as Soviets 
interfering with national means of verification. 

583 On January 13, 1973 Dr. Edward Proctor, Deputy Director of the CIA for Intelligence 
and a member of the SALT Steering Group, informed Acting Director of Central Intelligence 
Walters that "It is not 24 days since we reported to Dr. Kissinger on the detection of several" 
alleged Soviet SALT violations. Proctor noted that the "hold" items had been restricted for so 
long as to raise suspicions "that important information is being withheld" from the many people 
in the intelligence community who had related responsibilities. Proctor advised that "there is little 
likelihood that it [the hold item] will be lifted soon," and that Mr. Odeen of Dr. Kissinger's staff 
"would like to see a draft of the Monitoring Report with the item in it to recommend to 
Kissinger whether the Report should be published and whether it should have the item in it." 
Note for the Record, July 13, 1973, Edward W. Proctor. 

584 Proctor wrote on July 13 that "Earlier this morning, I had discussed with General Walters 
and Mr. Colby the DCI's obligation - a la Watergate - to make sure that the President knew of 
the withholding of intelligence, was aware of the consequences of prolonged delay in informing 
others in the Executive and Legislative Branches, and nonetheless had approved the continuation 
of the restrictions." Ibid. The President was never personally approached. 


sure that the procedures for handling of strategic intelligence . . . should have certain checks and 
balances in them so that there is no possibility of suppression of information that is unattractive to 
policy makers." Cline concluded, "As I was leaving government, I found these procedures breaking 
down, and that is why I feel that the problem does deserve attention from the Congress. 585 

J > 




Testimony of Ray S. Cline, Comm. Hearings, at [ j, Dec. 17, 1975. 

scan by 




1 The select committee recommends that there be formed a standing Committee on 

Intelligence of the House of Representatives. 

a. The committee membership should reflect a broad representation of political 

and philosophical views. 

b. The committee should consist of not more than 13 or less than rune 
members, designated by the Speaker in consultation with the minority leader, representing 
approximately the same political ratio as the House of Representatives. 

c. No member of the committee may serve more than 3 consecutive terms on 

the committee, and no member of the staff may serve more than 6 years. 

d. Any past or current member of the committee staff who shall release, 
without authorization of the committee, materials or information obtained by the committee shall 
be immediately terminated from employment and shall be fully subject to criminal and civil action, 

notwithstanding legislative immunity. . , 

e. The committee shall be vested with subpoena power and shall have the right 

to enforce by a proceeding for civil contempt its subpoenas in the IJ.S. District Court for the Distnct 
of Columbia or any other court of competent jurisdiction, without authorization from the House, 
provided the committee has so designated by resolution. The committee staff shall be given statutory 
standing to represent the committee in any proceeding arising from the issuance of a subpoena. 

f. The committee's jurisdiction shall include all legislative and oversight 
functions relating to all U.S. agencies and departments engaged in foreign or domestic intelligence. 
The committee shall have exclusive jurisdiction for budget authorization for all intelligence activities 
and exclusive jurisdiction for all covert action operations. All remaining oversight functions may be 
concurrent with other committees of the House. 


1. The select committee recommends that rule XI. 2 (e) (2) of the House Rules is 
amended to read as foUows: Each committee shall keep a complete record of all committee action 
which shall include a copy of all reports, statements, and testimony of witnesses whether received in 
open or in executive session. 

2. The committee shall have the right to release any information or documents m its 

possession or control by a vote of a majority of the members of the committee under such terms and 
conditions as the committee shall deem advisable. The committee, in making the decision whether 
or not to release such information, shall have the right, but not the duty, to consult with other 
agencies of the Government within the intelligence community or executive branch with regard to 
any decision relating to the release of such heretofore secret information. _ 

3. In the event of a negative vote by the committee on the release of certain classified 
information, a member of the committee may apprise the other Members of the House that the 


committee possesses information which he believes ought to be made public. Other Members of the 
House would then be authorized to have access to that information, provided they sign an agreement 
not to divulge the information. If these other Members agree that this information ought to be made 
public, they will sign a petition attesting to that. Upon obtaining the signatures of one-fifth of the 
House, the House shall convene in secret session for the purpose of advising the entire membership 
of the House of that information. The House may then vote to release the information to the public. 

4. The select committee recommends that the rules of the House be revised to provide 
that any Member who reveals any classified information which jeopardizes the national security of 
the United States may be censured or expelled by a two-thirds vote of the House. 


1. The select committee recommends that all activities involving direct or indirect 
attempts to assassinate any individual and all paramilitary activities shall be prohibited except in time 
of war. 

2. The select committee recommends that as to other covert action by any U.S. 
intelligence component, the following shall be required within 48 hours of initial approval: 

a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall notify the committee in writing, 
stating in detail the nature, extent, purpose, risks, likelihood of success, and costs of the operation. 

b. The President shall certify in writing to the committee that such covert 
action operation is required to protect the national security of the United States. 

c. The committee shall be provided with duplicate originals of the written 
recommendations of each member of the 40 committee or its successor. 

3. All covert action operations shall be terminated no later than 12 months from the 
date of affirmative recommendation by the 40 committee or its successor. 


1 . The select committee recommends that the existence of the National Security Agency 
should be recognized by specific legislation and that such legislation provide for civilian control of 
NSA. Further, it is recommended that such legislation specifically define the role of NSA with 
reference to the monitoring of communication of Americans. 


1 . The select committee recommends that all intelligence related items be included as 
intelligence expenditures in the President's budget, and that there be disclosure of the total single sum 
budgeted for each agency involved in intelligence, or if such an item is a part or portion of the budget 
of another agency or department that it be separately identified as a single item. 



1. The select committee recommends there be appropriate legislation to prohibit any 
significant transfer of funds between agencies or departments in connection with intelligence activities. 

2. The select committee recommends there be appropriate legislation to prohibit any 
significant reprogramming of funds within agencies or departments in connection with intelligence 
activities without the specific approval of the Intelligence Committee and appropriate committees of 

3. The select committee recommends there be appropriate legislation to prohibit any 
significant expenditures of reserve or contingency funds in connection with intelligence activities 
without specific approval of the Intelligence Committee and appropriate committees of Congress. 


1. The select committee recommends that a Director of Central Intelligence shall be 
created, separate, from any of the operating or analytic intelligence agencies for the purpose of 
coordinating and overseeing the entire foreign intelligence community with a view to eliminating 
duplication in collection and promoting competition in analysis. The DCI shall be nominated by 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. This office shall have the following powers 
and duties: 

(a) The DCI shall be the chief foreign intelligence officer of the United States, 
and shall be responsible for the supervision and control of all agencies of the United States 
engaged in foreign intelligence. 

(b) The DCI shall be a Member of the National Security Council. 

(c) The DCI may not hold a position or title with respect to any other agencies 

of Government. 

(d) The DCI shall, along with such other duties, constitute an Office of 
Inspector General for all of the foreign intelligence agencies, including other agencies of gjvmrmt 
or branches of the military which have foreign intelligence functions. Such agencies shall have the 
obligation to report all instances of misconduct or allegations of misconduct to the DCI. This shall 
not constitute a limitation upon the respective agencies reporting to the DCI from maintaining their 
own Inspector General staff or similar body. 

(e) The DCI shall have an adequate staff for the purposes expressed herein and 
be responsible for the national intelligence estimates and daily briefings of the President. 

(f) The DCI shall be responsible for the preparation of the national intelligence 
estimates and such reports shall be immediately supplied to the appropriate committees of Congress 
on request. 

(g) All budget requests shall be prepared by the agencies under the jurisdiction 
of the DCI. As those parts of budget of the military services or components of Department of 
Defense, they shall be submitted as an independent part of such budgets to the DCI. 

(h) The DCI shall be charged with the functions of coordinating foreign 
intelligence agencies under its jurisdiction, the elimination of duplication, the periodic evaluation of 
the performance and efficiency of the agencies in question, and shall report to congress on the 


foregoing at least annually. 

(i) The DCI shall conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the causes of 
intelligence failures, including: inadequate collection tasking; analytical bias; duplication; unusable 
technical output; excessive compartmentation; and withholding of information by senior 
officials, and report to the Committee on Intelligence within 1 year. 


1 . The select committee recommends that the General Accounting Office be empowered 

to conduct a full and complete management as well as financial audit of all intelligence agencies. 
There shall be no limitation on the GAO in the performance of these functions by any executive 
classification system, and the audit function of GAO shall specifically apply to those funds which 
presently may be expended on certification of Director of an Agency alone. 


1. The select committee recommends that the CIA internal audit staff be increased and 
given complete access to CIA financial records, and that overseas stations be audited at least 
annually. It is further recommended that all proprietary and procurement mechanisms be subjected 
to annual comprehensive review, by the CIA's internal audit staff. 


1. The select committee recommends that existing legislation (National Security Act 
of 1947, Sec. 102 (d) (3)) restricting the Directors and heads of foreign intelligence agencies from 
providing full information to Congress should be amended to exclude committees of Congress having 
appropriate jurisdiction. 


1. The select committee recommends that the National Security Act of 1947 be 
amended to provide for the establishment of a permanent Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the 
National Security Council. The subcommittee's jurisdiction, function and composition shall be as 

(a) The subcommittee shall have jurisdiction over all authorized activities of 
U.S. foreign intelligence agencies except those solely related to the gathering of intelligence. 

(b) The subcommittee shall advise the President on all proposed covert or 
clandestine activities and on hazardous collecting activities. 

(c) Each member of the subcommittee shall be required by law to submit his 
individual assessments of each proposal to the President in writing. The assessment should cover 





scan by 


such matters as the likelihood of success, the benefits of success, the damage resulting from failure 
or exposure, the risks against the potential benefits and alternate ways of accomplishing the goal. 

(d) The subcommittee shall be chaired by the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs and shall be composed of: 

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; 

Director of Central Intelligence; 

Secretary of State; 

Secretary of Defense; 

Deputy Director for Intelligence of CIA; 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

The ambassador(s), if there is one, and 

assistant secretaries of state for the affected countries and area. 


1. The select committee recommends that the Defense Intelligence Agency be abolished 
and that its functions be transferred to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the 


1 . The select committee recommends that intelligence agencies disclose the affiliation 
of employees on detail to other Government agencies or departments to all immediate colleagues and 


1. The select committee recommends that the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs be prohibited from holding any cabinet-level position. 


1. The select committee recommends that no agency of the United States engaged 
principally in foreign or military intelligence, directly or indirectly engage in the training or the 
supplying of domestic police agencies of the United States, and that contacts between police agencies 
of the United States and U.S. foreign or military intelligence agencies be limited to those 
circumstances which shall be required on account of internal security or the normal requirements and 
functions of such police agencies. 



1. The select committee recommends that U.S. intelligence agencies not covertly 
provide money or other valuable consideration to persons associated with religious or educational 
institutions, or to employees or representatives of any journal or electronic media with general 
circulation in the United States or use such institutions or individuals for purposes of cover. The 
foregoing prohibitions are intended to apply to American citizens and institutions. 

2. The select committee further recommends that U.S. intelligence agencies not covertly 
publish books, or plant or suppress stories in any journals or electronic media with general circulation 
in the United States. 


1. The select committee recommends that the intelligence components of the armed 
services of the United States be prohibited from engaging in covert action within the United States. 
It is further recommended that clandestine activities against nonmilitary U.S. citizens abroad be 


1. The select committee recommends that the classification of information be the 
subject of the enactment of specific legislation; and further, as an adjunct to such legislation there be 
provided a method of regular declassification. 


1 . The select committee recommends the establishment of an independent Office of the 
Inspector General for Intelligence, who shall have full authority to investigate any possible or 
potential misconduct on the part of the various intelligence agencies or the personnel therein. The 
IG1 shall be appointed by the President, with the approval of the Senate, for a term of 10 years and 
shall not be permitted to succeed himself. The IGI shall have full access on demand to all records 
and personnel of the intelligence agencies for the purpose of pursuing his investigations. He shall 
make an annual report to the Congress of his activities and make such additional reports to the 
intelligence committees or other appropriate oversight committees as he may choose or the 
committees may direct. 


1. The select committee recommends that judicial warrant must issue, on probable 
cause, before an informant or any other agent of the FBI may infiltrate any domestic group or 

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association, when investigation of such group or association or its members is based solely on title 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2383, 2384, 2385. 

2. The select committee recommends that the Director of the FBI have a term of office 
no longer than 2 presidential terms. 

3. The select committee recommends that the Internal Security Branch of the 
Intelligence Division be abolished and that the counter-intelligence branch be reorganized to 
constitute a full division named the Counter-Intelligence Division; that the mission of this Division 
be limited to investigating and countering the efforts of foreign directed groups and individuals against 
the United States. 

4. The select committee recommends the transfer of all investigations of alleged criminal 
activity by domestic groups or individual members thereof to the General Investigative Division. 

5. The select committee recommends that regulations be promulgated that tie the 
investigation of activities of terrorist groups closely to specific violations of criminal law within the 
investigative jurisdiction of the FBI and that charge the Department of Justice with determining when 
a domestic political action group may be appropriately targeted for investigation of terrorist activities. 


All the hearings, all the hassles and all the headlines should have underscored the fact that 
the Select Committee really faced three challenges: 

how to banish abuses from the intelligence system; 

how to control covert operations; 

and how to improve the intelligence product, the analyses for which we spend so much 


The committee has approved a number of recommendations which go to the heart of these 

The establishment of an Independent Inspector General for Intelligence will provide an office 
designed exclusively to hawkeye the intelligence community and see that it is adhering to the law. 

The institutionalization of a successor to the 40 Committee will provide systematic direction 
of covert operations by the executive branch for the first time. 

And creation of a more powerful director of central intelligence will for the first time give one 
man the authority to whip the many intelligence fiefdoms into line and eliminate the duplication and 
waste that the committee found to be rife. 

I think that there is more that we could have done and I have two additional proposals. 

The select committee suggested that a standing committee be informed of an approved covert 
operation within 48 hours after its approval. I have proposed that a standing committee be informed 
of covert operations before they are approved by the President. The standing committee or 
committees should not have veto power, but the committees, or their members individually, should 
have the opportunity to make their views known to the President. 

No doubt a number of members would simply write out a fist of reservations to cover 
themselves in case an operation went wrong. But is that bad? It is a good idea to have advice 
reaching the President from a few people who have a bias for negativism. There is too much 
me-tooism in the executive branch already. 

Furthermore, if the members of the new 40 Committee knew that Congress was part of the 


consultative process, they would be likely to move with greater care and discretion than has been true 
in the past. Prior notification of Congress is one more governor on the intelligence vehicle which 
could inhibit the kind of reckless driving the committee uncovered in its investigations. 

The committee, in a number of its recommendations, has sought to provide a framework for 
improvement. But we have left the CIA high and dry organizationally. I believe that the CIA 
should be divided into two separate agencies — one devoted only to analysis and the other responsible 
for clandestine collection and covert operations. 

Splitting the CIA is the key to attracting the kinds of young men and women we need in 
intelligence analysis. The hostility the CIA has aroused is bound to discourage many good people 
from applying. Furthermore, the analysts need interchanges with academia, and these ties have been 
strained by the public perceptions that anyone connected with the CIA has blood on his hands. 

We have also seen, as in the Bay of Pigs, that proximity breeds bias. One side of the CIA 
planned the Bay of Pigs. The other side of the CIA was not in a position to analyze it independently 
and critically. 

Critics say it is impossible to separate covert collection from covert operations, that many 
of the same people are used for the two purposes. This is quite true. However, my proposal leaves 
covert collection and covert operations in the same organization and simply splits them off from the 
analytical function. 

No improvements will result if proposals for reform are consigned to the archives like the 
report of this committee. Our intelligence services have been ignored by Congress in the past— and 
we have seen the consequences of that inattention. Congress now has a second chance to decide if 
it wishes to play Pontius Pilate and wash its hands of an unpleasant business or confront the issue 
head-on. I hope the Congress will not abdicate its responsibilities any more. 

Les A spin 


( I supported the committee majority in bringing to the House of Representatives those 
lecommendations finally adopted by the committee. However, this should not indicate my approval 
of all the adopted recommendations; several are not strong enough and several additional 
recommendations should have been adopted. These recommendations should stimulate 

extremely important and timely discussion, debate and consensus about such vital and basic questions 

(1) Is secrecy compatible with principles of democracy ostensibly embodied in 
our constitutional form of government? 

(2) If and where is secrecy necessary? 

(3) How much secrecy is required and what forms should it take? 

(4) What safeguards against abuse are required? 

(5) What, if any, are our legitimate and necessary intelligence needs? 

(6) How much change, restructuring, and/or elimination of organizations are 
required to meet on the one hand the legitimate intelligence needs of our Nation, and on the 
other hand safeguard against abuse of people, power, and the Constitution? 

(7) As our world continues its rapid changes and shifts, what level of our 
already limited resources do we perceive as necessary to meet our intelligence needs? 

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These and other questions must be discussed and debated within an atmosphere of reason. 
To resolve these questions and reach some consensus, it will demand the best within each of us as 
representatives of the people. The issues both implicitly and explicitly raised by the committee 
recommendations are of extreme importance and must be addressed within that context. 

I oppose the committee's recommendation regarding: (A) A Mouse Committee on 
Intelligence, insofar as, ". . . The committee shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... for all covert action 
operations." I believe that this information should be more widely shared. Discerning oversight is 
facilitated by involving several relevant committees, and I think jurisdiction over overt action 
operations should be shared with those committees presently involved. 

I am opposed to that part of the recommendation regarding: (B) Release of information (4) 
"The select committee recommends that the rule of the House be revised to provide that any member 
who reveals any classified information which jeopardizes the national security of the United States 
may be censored or expelled by a two-thirds vote of the House." 

"National security" is now an infamous phrase, one open to mischievous interpretation. 
There is a great danger in constructing a chilling system which allows demagogues the easy 
opportunity of injuring a member by making reckless charges. 

The committee's recommendation on covert action is not satisfactory. The committee 
recommendations say, "1. The select committee recommends that all activities involving direct or 
indirect attempts to assassinate any individual and all paramilitary activities shall be prohibited except 
in time of war." 

We should prohibit all covert action. 

We live in a world in which secrecy and cloak and dagger methods, in my estimation, are 
anachronisms from the past. They should have no place today in the world we will continue to live 

It seems to me that whatever action this country takes in a world that is becoming this small 
and this interdependent ought to be overt action. The United States ought to begin to play an 
aggressive role as an advocate of peace in the world, as an advocate of humanitarian concerns, and 
frankly I believe that the level of secrecy that we have been exposed to as members of this committee 
flies in the face of democratic principle. 

Many people conveniently wrap themselves quite fully in the flag, but when pressed to the 
wall on whether or not they are willing seriously to support democratic principles, I find that they 
are willing to sidestep principle. 

Democracy is based on a notion of the development of a consensus. In my estimation covert 
action does not provide for that consensus. It does not provide for debate needed to achieve 
consensus. Instead, covert actions are recommended and approved by a small select group of people. 
The actions can at some point be extremely expensive, at some point extraordinarily risky and at 
some point fly in the face of open debate on any given question. I think that detrimental to the 
democratic process. 

I am willing to try democracy. My concern is that our democracy has been, for the most 
part, a charade or merely symbolic, and I am not sure that many of us truly believe in the concept 
of majority rule. 

I am concerned about secretly providing arms and aid to other countries, presidents able to 
sit down with other presidents and making deals. Yet these things arc issues we found that are part 
of the range of covert actions utilized by this country. 

I think our world is much too complicated to continue to function effectively in this manner. 



The more we get involved in covert action the more we become accused of covert actions in places 
where we may not be involved at all. 

So, the question is, does it really assist this country's role in the world to continue these kind 
of activities. My answer is no. Indeed, I think we do much more harm continuing to function 

Many of these operations are well-known except to the people of the States and/or their 
representatives. So where does the covert rationale apply? It keeps people who are part of this 
society out of the decision and it comes at a level which keeps representatives of the people out of 
those decisions. 

I see no justification for covert operations. If we want to assist, then why not do it in the 
open and let the debate deal with the question of what our role "ought'' to be somewhere in the 
world. On the bias of a consensus publicly made then we can assist. But why do we have to play 
games? Why do we have to get involved? 

Another related question is where have covert operations taken us? Are the nations that we 
have been involved with free democratic societies where the masses of people have benefits of 
democracy, or are those nations for the most part, military dictators, right-wing juntas, or regimes 
with extraordinary wealth and power in the hands of a few elitists? 

If the latter holds, it totally contradicts stated principles of this country. If we have been 
involved in covert actions which generated democracy, freedom and justice around the world, maybe 
we might arrive at some different conclusion. But I don't think anyone can justify continued covert 
action on grounds that we foster and develop democracy around the world. 

If covert action isn't banned, the committee's recommendations on covert action should be 
strengthened and it should be required that the Oversight Committee have preknowledge of all major 
covert activities. 

The nature of covert actions and espionage subtract from the main responsibility of the 
CIA- to serve as an independent central research and analysis facility. Since active involvement in 
clandestine operations can force analysis to be silenced for policy needs, certain present functions of 
the CIA should be divided and a separate espionage (human intelligenccj/clandestine operations 
agency be formed. 

In his testimony, Dr. Ray S. Cline called for a central research and analysis facility to provide 
objective assessments of national security data to Congress and the National Security Council. I 
agree, and I believe this ought to be a separate organization not linked to any policymaker other than 
the President and as free from other institutional bias as possible. Actually, research and analysis are 
the original functions of the CIA and are functions that the Central Intelligence Agency apparently 
does better than any other agency in the intelligence community. Its research and analysis functions 
should be facilitated. 

I recommend that the Central Intelligence Agency be split into two agencies— an intelligence 
research and analysis agency and a second agency to conduct whatever espionage and covert action 
functions are authorized. 

In addition, I recommend that both the new intelligence research and analysis agency and 
the new espionage and covert agency by independent agencies subject to all controls recommended 
by this Committee. 

Possible violations of law by intelligence agency employees or agents should be investigated 
and, if required, prosecuted by the Department of Justice. No agency should have the right or 
capability to bar investigation or prosecution. In addition to criminal penalties there must be 

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provision for civil liability for abuses of authority. Legislation should provide for jurisdiction, 
justiciability and standing, discovery, and relief. 

Several other recommendations are included in my supplemental views to the report of the 
House Select Committee on Intelligence. Every member and the public must have access to that 

It is imperative that the House of Representatives now consider these issues and pass 
legislation based on these recommendations. 

Ronald V. Dellums 


There is no question in my mind that the United States must have a strong, effective, 
professional intelligence service. Our national security depends on it. 

Yet that intelligence service is but part of our Government. And, like all parts, it must be 
balanced against a continuing need for and our tradition of an open society, as well as this Nation's 
moral position, there is now no other country in the world who can take our place. 

If I were CIA Director, I would be happy to see a strong congressional oversight committee, 
because it would be the most effective safeguard against wrongly conceived and wrongly motivated 
covert actions originating in the executive branch. 

Despite allegations to the contrary, congressional investigations have not prevented the 
Agency from doing an effective job. Past performance bears this out; in fact, the failure of the CIA 
and other intelligence agencies to give adequate warning of several international crises may simply 
indicate the limited ability of intelligence to safeguard our national security. 

There was, for example, the October 1973, Mideast war, where there was more than enough 
information available to warn of the impending Arab attack. There were other failures as well; the 
1974 coup in Cyprus and the subsequent Turkish invasion; the Indian nuclear explosion; the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia; the Tet offensive in Vietnam; and the leftist coup in Portugal. All of 
these "failures" occurred long before any congressional committee was directed to investigate the 
intelligence community. 

The intelligence community has operated in the past with a virtual blank check budget. This 
not only removes any incentive to curtail wasteful programs, but, through the very availability of 
funds, leads to both foolish and dangerous covert operations. 

Yet, I am concerned by the committee's recommendation that a line-item figure for the CIA 
appear in the budget. Is it really possible to get a true and accurate figure? In the event that one of 
the branches of the armed services details a vessel to the CIA, is the cost of that vessel a part of the 
costs of intelligence? In my view, a line-item figure for the Agency must conform to principles of 
sound accounting practice. Only then will it have any meaning at all. 


The committee hearings on the FBI documented the problem of informants turned 
agents-provocateur. Informants are necessary; the use of provocateurs is totally contrary to principles 
of decency and honesty. 


One of these agents-provocateur was William Lemmcr, who worked in Florida as an 
informant for the Bureau. Ixmmer infiltrated the Vietnam Veterans Against the War and became 
one of the most active members of the chapter. As such, he allegedly suggested violent means of 
expressing WAW disagreement with the country's Vietnam war policy. This kind of activity, 
directed by the Nation's foremost law enforcement agency, is plainly and starkly wrong. 


IRS projects such as "Operation Leprechaun", "Operation Trade Winds", and "Operation 
Haven", clearly demonstrate that the IRS has gone far beyond its prescribed role in tax enforcement. 
Each of these projects involved illegalities and abuses by the intelligence division of IRS in my own 
State of Florida. 

I would only comment here that our system is grossly misused when Federal agencies violate 
the law in their attempts to enforce it. To adopt the methods of criminals is to become 
indistinguishable from them. 


I strongly support the committee's recommendation that no member of the House serve on 
the new oversight committee we propose for more than 6 years. Such a limitation will help to ensure 
that the committee's members retain their objectivity and not come to look on the intelligence 
community as their own private preserve. 

A similar limitation should be imposed on the Directors of the CIA and FBI, so that neither 
is allowed to serve for so many years that he can no longer distinguish between himself and his job. 

One of the committee's recommendations would require the FBI agents or informants have 
a judicial warrant before attempting to infiltrate any domestic group or association. I agree that this 
requirement is necessary to protect the rights of American citizens, but, in light of recent tragedies 
perpetrated by international terrorists groups, I feel that such a restriction should not be imposed 
when the group or association is wholly or partly made up of aliens. 

In Comparison with other intelligence agencies, and, indeed, with Government agencies in 
general, I fmd the CIA to be highly professional and very dedicated. Despite past lack of 
accountability, the CIA is doing a high level, cost effective job, particularly in its intelligence 
gathering function. 

However, there are serious deficiencies in the operation of the CIA. Much constructive 
rebuilding must be done if American intelligence activities are to be conducted with responsibility and 
integrity-and without undermining the spirit of our democratic society. 

Bill Lehman 



1. I recommend that there be formed a standing Committee on Intelligence of the House 
5 of Representatives, and that committee shall consist of members who hold the respect and confidence 

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of the general membership of the House. 

a. The membership of the standing Committee on Intelligence shall be selected from sitting 
members of the following House committees: 

2 Members from Armed Services. 

2 Members from Internal Relations. 

1 Member from Science and Technology. 

1 Member from Banking and Currency. 

1 Member from Judiciary. 

1 Member from Public Works and Transportation. 

1 Member from Government Operations. 

1 Member from Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 

A Chairman to be nominated by the Speaker. 

b. The candidates for membership on the standing Committee on Intelligence shall be 
nominated by resolution from the above listed committees, supplying the number of members 
designated above. Nominees shall then be confirmed by the Democratic caucus or the Republican 
conference by means of a secret ballot. Vacancies shall be filled by like action. 

c. Candidate selection for service on the standing Committee on Intelligence shall be based 
on individual qualifications and technical expertise, rather than party affiliation, except that, the total 
membership of the standing Committee on Intelligence must always have no less than one-third of 
its total members from each of the major parties. Should the occasion arise when a Major Party 
does not have one-third of its members represented on the committee, the Speaker shall designate 
to the nominating committee or committees the necessary number of partisan candidates to be 


1. I recommend that the standing Committee on Intelligence, or any member of the 
committee, shall not directly or indirectly release any information documents or data bearing a 
security classification unless and until the following sequential procedures have been completed: 

(a) The committee passes a resolution expressing the need and reason for 

(b) The appropriate administrative agency has been allowed reasonable time to 
agree with the declassification or to present reasons for opposition. 

(c) A House Leadership Committee, consisting of the Speaker, the Majority Leader, 
the Minority Leader, the Majority and Minority Whips and the chairmen of the committees 
from which the Intelligence Committee Membership has been selected (a majority of the 
total being present), shall approve or disapprove of the declassification and release. 

(d) Notwithstanding the committee's approval or disapproval, any committee 
member who disagrees shall have a right to petition individual members of the Leadership 
Committee. If three or more members of the Leadership Committee shall concur, said 
member shall have a right to be heard by the full Leadership Committee. 

(e) Any Intelligence Committee member who shall release any materials, 
documents, or data bearing a security classification, without complying with the above 
provisions shall be subject to expulsion from the House of Representatives and shall be 
subject to appropriate criminal or civil action, notwithstanding legislative immunity. 


2. a. Any member of the House having knowledge of classified materials, documents or data who 
shall release such material, documents or data without obtaining the approval of a majority of the 
members of the Leadership Committee shall be subject to expulsion from the House of 
Representatives and shall be subject to any appropriate criminal or civil actions, notwithstanding 
legislative immunity. 


I recommend that the United States Code be amended to provide criminal sanctions against 
any person who shall disclose or reveal properly classified information, documents, data, or plans 
concerning the national security of the United States, such sanctions to apply regardless of intent to 
harm the United States or to aid a foreign nation, notwithstanding legislative immunity. 

Dale Milford 


In light of the investigation by the House Select Committee on Intelligence, I recommend 
that Congress enact legislation or amend existing legislation to protect the confidentiality of tax 
records of American citizens. 

Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code refers to tax returns as "public records" but 
specifies that they be "open to inspection only upon order of the President and under rules and 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate and approved by the President." 

Public use and abuse of the records, however, have been more the rule than the exception 
in the recent past. There has been little emphasis on the need for protecting the confidentiality of 
tax records. 

I recommend a shift in emphasis back to the basic right of taxpayers to privacy regarding 
their tax affairs. We must do more than limit disclosures to certain agencies, individuals, 
congressional committees, and States. We must require the entity seeking tax information to prove 
fiat such i nf ormation is essential to the entity's function and further, that the tax information cannot 
otherwise be acquired. I suggest that House and Senate committees with jurisdiction act with all 
deliberate speed to finalize their work on legislation to better ensure the privacy of tax records. 

Morgan F. Murphy 


■i— < 

< / ) 



CD I would go beyond recommendation N of the select committee, which proposed that the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs be prohibited from holding any Cabinet-level 
position, by recommending the enactment of legislation which ( 1 ) states that the individual who 
holds this position cannot hold any other office in the Federal Government, nor may he be a 
Member of the Armed Forces, (2) requires Senate confirmation of this position, and (3) in order to 
ichieve these purposes, establishes statutorily the position of Special Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs. I have introduced a bill, H.R. 10754, which embodies these provisions. 

James V. Stanton 




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I support the recommendation contained in the majority report under headings: D, F, G, 
I J, L, N, O, Q, R, and S (with the exception of section 1). I do not approve of the other 
recommendations and I offer the following alternative recommendations in those areas in which I 
believe reform is necessary and appropriate. 


I recommend that there be established a permanent standing Committee on Intelligence of 
the House of Representatives. 

1. The committee shall consist of five members composed of one member from each of the 
following committees: (a) Appropriations, (b) Armed Services, (c) International Relations, (d) 
Judiciary, and (e) Government Operations; no more than three of whom shall be members of the 
same political party. The committee membership should reflect a broad representation of political 
and philosophical views. 

2. No member of the committee may serve more than 3 consecutive terms on the 
committee, and no member of the staff may serve more than 6 consecutive years. 

3. Any past or current member of the committee staff who shall release, without 
authorization of the committee, materials or information obtained by the committee shall be 
immediately terminated from employment and shall be fully subject to criminal and civil liability, 
notwithstanding legislative immunity. 

4. The committee's jurisdiction shall include all legislative and oversight functions relating 
to all U.S. agencies and departments engaged in foreign or domestic intelligence activities. The 
committee shall have exclusive jurisdiction for all covert action operations. All remaining oversight 
functions may be concurrent with other committees of the House. 

5. The committee shall be vested with subpoena power, and the rules of the House should 
be amended to give the committee the right to enforce its subpoenas through a civil contempt 
proceeding in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia without specific authorization from 
the full House. 


1. I recommend that the House Committee on Intelligence have the right to release any 
classified information or documents in its possession or control only if the following procedures are 
adhered to: 

(a) the committee shall have the duty to consult with other agencies of the 
Government within the intelligence community or the executive branch with respect to the 
public disclosure of any classified information before any formal committee vote on release. 

(b) After such consultation, the committee may, be an affirmative vote of a majority 
of the members, submit the material proposed to be released to the President. 

(c) If within a reasonable period of time the President certifies in writing that the 
disclosure of the material would be detrimental to the national security of the United States, 
the material would not be disclosed or released. Failing any such Presidential certification, 


the committee would be able to release the material. 

(d) In the event of such a certification by the President, the committee shall be 
given standing to sue and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia shall be given 
jurisdiction over such disputes, so that the matter can be submitted to the courts for judicial 


1. I recommend that all activities involving direct or indirect attempts to assassinate any 
individual be prohibited by law except in time of war. 

2. I recommend that appropriate legislation be enacted to require prior approval by the 
House Committee on Intelligence for all military and paramilitary covert actions proposed by the 
U.S. Government, including those actions in which arms or funds for arms would be provided 

3. I recommend that, as to all other covert actions of a significant size or involving 
significant risk, the Director of Central Intelligence be required, within 48 hours of initial 
implementation, to notify the committee in writing and in detail of the nature, extent, purpose, risk 
and costs of the operation. 





















1. I recommend that the Rules of the House be revised to provide that any member who 
violates the confidentiality of any executive session of any House committee may be censured or 
expelled by a two-thirds vote of the House. 

2. I recommend that the rules of the House be amended to provide that any committee of 
the House which has access to classified information has the authority to discipline any member 
which it reasonably believes has disclosed or publicized such information in violation of the rules of 
confidentiality duly adopted by such committee. These committees ought to be delegated authority 
by the full House to take appropriate disciplinary action against such a member to ensure compliance 
with the rules of confidentiality. Appropriate disciplinary action could be taken only after a vote of 
a majority of the majority members and a majority of the minority members of the committee; and 
any member against whom such disciplinary action is taken shall have a right of appeal to the full 


I recommend that the General Accounting Office be empowered to conduct full and 
complete financial audits of all intelligence agencies. There should not be any limitation on GAO 
access in the performance of these functions by any classification system, and the financial audit 
function of GAO should specifically apply to those funds which currently may be expended on 
certification of a Director of an agency alone. 


I recommend that intelligence agencies disclose the affiliation of their employees on detail 

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to other Government agencies or departments to the heads of such agencies; and that detailees not 
be placed in any position in which an actual or apparent conflict or interest might exist. 

Robert McClory 


(To the Recommendations of the House Select Committee on Intelligence) 

The following are my specific recommendations (on the subjects which they concern) which 
may differ, vary or coincide with recommendations on similar subjects by the majority. The absence 
of any recommendation on a subject covered by the majority is not to be construed as concurrence 
or nonconcurrence with the majority recommendation. 

Recommendation No. I: Joint Oversight Committee 

I recommend that there be established a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign 
Intelligence which committee shall have oversight and legislative authority with respect to all foreign 
intelligence activities. 

(a) The joint committee shall consist of no more than 14 members, equally divided 
between the House and Senate. The committees of the House and Senate having jurisdiction 
over international affairs, armed services, and defense appropriations shall each be entitled 
to representation on the joint committee by at least one member of those committees. 

(b) Membership on the joint committee shall be limited to a period of 6 years and, 
beginning with the fifth year, at least one-third of the committee membership shall consist 
of new members. 

(c) Any past or current member of the joint committee staff who shall release, 
without proper authorization, materials or information obtained by the joint committee shall 
be immediately terminated from employment and shall be fully subject to criminal and civil 
action, not withstanding any plea of legislative immunity. 

(d) The joint committee shall be vested with subpoena power, and the rules of the 
House shall be amended to give the joint committee the right to enforce its subpoenas 
through a civil contempt proceeding in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
without specific authorization from the full House. 

Recommendation No. 2: Obligations of the Executive Branch 

I recommend that the executive branch be required to keep the joint committee promptly 
and fully informed as to all intelligence activities, including covert actions, and including full 
disclosure of allocations wherever they may be in the budget with regard to foreign intelligence and 
all expenditures of funds by all departments and agencies of the executive branch for foreign 

intelligence and covert activities. 

Recommendation No. 3: Access to and Release of Classified Information 


I recommend that the rules of the House and Senate, where necessary, be conformed to 
accommodate the following recommendations, and that, where necessary, legislation be enacted in 
aid thereof: 

(a) Access to information and materials furnished to the joint committee in executive 
session or classified secret by the executive branch shall not be accessible to other members 
of Congress except upon a resolution permitting such access adopted by a two-thirds vote 
of the memberships of both the House and Senate Members, voting in person and not by 

(b) Prior to any action to permit access of such information to other Members of 
Congress, the executive branch shall be given reasonable opportunity to testify and present 
evidence in executive session regarding the proposed action. 

(c) Materials and information received from the executive branch in executive session 
of the joint committee or otherwise classified secret by the executive branch may be publicly 
released only upon adoption of the resolution specified in subparagraph (a) above and upon 
the adoption of a resolution permitting public disclosure adopted by a two-thirds vote of the 
membership of both the House and Senate, the debate on which shall be conducted in secret 
session, and the vote on which shall be in open in session by recorded vote. 

(d) Any member of Congress who reveals any information in violation of the 
foregoing procedures may be censured or expelled by a two -third vote of the House or the 
Senate, as the case may be. 

Recommendation No. 4: Agreements for the Handling of Classified Information 

I recommend that any information furnished to the joint committee by the executive branch 
under an agreement with the joint committee for the handling of such information shall be binding 
in accordance with the terms of that agreement on the joint committee, on the House and Senate, 
and on each Member of Congress. Violation of the terms of the agreement shall be grounds for 
censure or expulsion by a two-thirds vote of the House or Senate, as the case may be. 

Recommendation No. 5: Director of Central Intelligence 

I recommend that a Director of Central Intelligence shall be established, separate from any 
of the operating intelligence agencies, for the purpose of coordinating and overseeing the foreign 
intelligence community. His purpose shall be to eliminate duplication in collection and promote 
competition in analysis. 

(a) The DC I shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 

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(b) The DCI shall be the chief of foreign intelligence officer of the United States, and 
shall be responsible for the supervision and control of all agencies of the United States 
engaged in foreign intelligence. 

(c) The DCI shall be a member of the National Security Council. 

(d) The DCI may not hold any other position, office or title in the U.S. 

(e) The DCI shall, along with such other duties, constitute an office of Inspector 
General for all of the foreign intelligence agencies, including all agencies of Government 
which have foreign intelligence functions. Such agency shall have the obligation to report 
all allegations of misconduct and/or unlawful activities to the DCI. 

(f) The DCI shall be responsible for the national intelligence estimates and daily 
briefings of the President. 

(g) The DCI shall be responsible for reporting to the Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and other appropriate committees of Congress. 

(h) All budget request which include funds for foreign intelligence or covert activities 
shall, insofar as such funds are concerned, be prepared in consultation with the DCI. 
Although the funds for foreign intelligence activities will continue to be budgeted in the 
respective agency budges, the DCI shall be responsible to the joint committee for full 
reporting on the foreign intelligence and covert activities funding set forth in all agency 

(i) The DCI shall coordinate the functions of all foreign intelligence agencies under 
his jurisdiction, shall eliminate unnecessary duplication, conduct periodic evaluation of the 
performance and efficiency of the agencies, and report to Congress on the foregoing at least 

Recommendation No. 6: Disclosures to Congress 

I recommend that existing law (Sec 102(d) 3 of the National Security Act of 1947) which 
restricts officials of the executive branch from providing information be amended to specifically 
exclude from any such prohibition all committees of Congress having appropriate jurisdiction. 

Recommendation No. 7: Assistant for National Security Affairs 

I recommend that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs be prohibited 
from holding any other position, office or title in the U.S. Government. 



Recommendation No. 8: News Media and Publications 

(1) I recommend that the U. S. foreign intelligence agencies be prohibited from covertly 
providing money or other valuable consideration to employees of full-time representatives of any 
journal or electronic media with general circulation in the United States, and prohibited from utilizing 
such individuals for purposes of cover; except that such prohibition shall not apply to the occasional 
or casual furnisher of news stories or articles to the news media. 

(2) I recommend that the U.S. intelligence agencies be prohibited from the covert publication 
of books, articles or stories in any journals or electronic media with general circulation in the United 

Recommendation No. 9: Classification 

I recommend that the classification and declassification of information be the subject of 
specific legislation by the Congress. 

Recommendation No. 10: Director of the FBI 

I recommend that the Director of the FBI have a term of office of 5 years and that no 
director serve more than two 5-year terms. 

Recommendation No. //: Infiltration of Groups or Associations 

I recommend that judicial warrant must issue, on probable cause, before an informant or any 
other agent of the FBI may infiltrate my domestic group or association, when (1) investigation of 
such group or association or its members is based solely on title 18 U.S.C. sec 2383, 2384, 2385, and 
(2) there is no credible evidence that such group or association, or any person connected therewith 
has encouraged, advocated or suggested the use of violence, terrorist activities or other unlawful 

Recommendation no. 12: Study of Intelligence Operations of Foreign Nations 

I recommend that the Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence (or, in the absence of 
the creations of such a committee, the appropriate congressional committee or committees) promptly 
commence a detailed investigation and study of the intelligence operations of foreign nations, 
including, but not limited to the intelligence operations of the U.S.S.R. and the Peoples Republic 
of China, which investigation and inquiry shall include, but not be limited to, the following: 

(a) The means by which intelligence is gathered relating to activities of the United States and 
its allies, both within and outside of the United States. 

(b) The extent of valuable and/or critical intelligence information gathered by foreign nations 
from publicly available journals and documents. 

(c) The methods employed by and the extent of success of foreign nations in the recruitment 
of American or allied nationals in espionage activities, and the methods employed by and the extent 
of success of foreign nations in infiltrating the U.S. Government or U.S. organizations, corporations, 
associations and groups. 

David C. Treen 

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Although I wholeheartedly support many of the recommendations proposed by the 
committee's majority, the majority proposals collectively do not accurately reflect my judgements 
concerning the reforms and improvements which should be made in the U.S. intelligence community. 

To indicate specific points of agreement and disagreement, I have reproduced below the 
majority recommendations together with my own alternative or additional proposals. Language in 
the majority report with which I disagree has been stricken out; my alternative or additional language 
has been underscored. In several instances, I have also added brief comments in brackets following 
the recommendations to which the comments refer. 


1. The select committee recommends that there be formed a |standing| Joint Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Senate. 

a. The committee membership should reflect a broad representation of political and 
philosophical views. 

b. The committee should consist of not more than 13 or less than nine members, designated 
by the President pro tern of the Senate and the Speaker of the House in consultation with the 
minority leader of each House. The majority shall have one more than one-half of the members 
appointed from either House. 

c. No Member of the committee may serve more than 3 consecutive terms on the committee, 
and no member of the staff may serve more than 6 years. 

d. Any past or current member of the committee staff who shall release, without 
authorization of the committee, materials or information obtained by the committee shall be 
immediately terminated from employment and shall be fully subject to full criminal and civil action, 
notwithstanding legislative immunity. 

e. The committee shall be vested with subpoena power and shall have the right to enforce 
by a proceeding for civil contempt its subpoenas in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia or any other court of competent jurisdiction, [without authorization] if authorized (from 
the House, provided the committee has so designated] by resolution. The committee staff shall be 
given statutory standing to represent the committee in any proceeding arising from the issuance of 
a subpoena. 

f. The committee's jurisdiction shall include all legislative and oversight functions relating to 
all U.S. agencies and departments engaged in foreign or domestic intelligence. The committee shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction for budge authorization for all intelligence activities and exclusive 
jurisdiction for all covert action operations. All remaining oversight functions may be concurrent with 
other committees. 

[NOTE: I am opposed to the creation of two oversight committees on intelligence: one in 
the House and one in the Senate. I favor instead the creation of a joint committee because it will 
reduce the burden on the DCI and intelligence officials of repeating testimony before committees with 
similar jurisdiction and also reduce the burden of Congress by having many members assigned to 
tasks which are duplicative. In addition, concentration of oversight in one joint committee would 


reduce the possibility of unauthorized disclosure of information and more importantly would help 
assure that problems would not "fall between two chairs" and be addressed by neither committee. 
The fact that each appropriations committee in reviewing the budge of the intelligence-gathering 
agencies would have an oversight function reduces the possibility that one joint committee would be 
co-opted by the intelligence agency.] 


1. The select committee recommends that rule XI. 2 (e) (2) of the 1 louse Rules is amended 
to read as follows: 

"Each committee shall keep a complete record of all committee action which shall include 
a copy of all reports, statements, and testimony of witnesses whether received in open or in executive 

[2. The Committee shall have the right to release any information or documents in its 
possession or control by a vote of a majority of the Members of the Committee under such terms 
and conditions as the committee shall deem advisable. The Committee, in making the decision 
whether or not to release such information, shall have the right, but not the duty, to consult with 
other agencies of the government within the intelligence community or executive branch with regard 
to any decision relating to the release of such heretofore secret information ! 

2. (a) The Joint Committee on Intelligence may disclose any information upon the 
committee s determination that the national interest would be served by such disclosure. In any case 
in which such committee decides to disclose any information requested to be kept secret by the 
President, such committee shall notify the President to that effect. Such committee may not disclose 
such information until expiration of 10 days following the day on which notice is transmitted to the 
President. If ( 1) prior to disclosure of such information the President submits a written certification 
to the Senate and the House through such committee stating his opinion, and the reasons therefor, 
that the threat to national security posed by such disclosure outweighs any public interest in 
disclosure and that the questions of disclosure is of such importance to the vital interests of the 
United States that it requires a decision by the full Senate and the House of Representatives and (2) 
after receipt of a certification by the President made pursuant to this subsection, the Joint Committee 
on Intelligence decides to refer the question of disclosure of such information to the Senate and the 
House of Representatives, such information may not be disclosed unless the Senate and the House 
of Representatives agree to a resolution approving the disclosure of such information, or the Senate 
and the House of Representatives agree to a resolution referring the matter to the Joint Committee 
on Intelligence for final disposition and the Joint Committee on Intelligence for final disposition and 
the Joint Committee on Intelligence thereafter approves the disclosure of such information. 

(b) Any question referred to the Senate and the House of Representatives by the Joint 
Committee on Intelligence pursuant to subsection (a) shall be disposed by the Senate and the House 
of Representatives by a vote on such question within 3 calendar days following the day on which the 
question is reported to the Senate and the House of Representatives are not in session. 

[3. In the event of a negative vote by the Committee on the release of certain classified 
information, a Member of the Committee may apprise the other Members of the House that the 
Committee possesses information which he believes ought to be made public. Other Members of 
the House would then be authorized to have access to that information, provided they sign an 
agreement not to divulge the information. If these other Members agree that this information ought 

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to be made public, they will sign a petition attesting to that. Upon obtaining the signatures of 
one-fifth of the House, the House shall convene in secret session for the purpose of advising the 
entire Membership of the House of that information. The House may then vote to release the 
information to the public.] 

3. [4.} The select committee recommends that the rules of the House be revised to provide 
that any member who reveals any classified information which jeopardizes the national security of 
the United States may be censured or expelled by a two-thirds vote of the House. 


1 . The select committee recommends that all activities involving direct or indirect attempts 
to assassinate any individual [and all paramilitary activities] shall be prohibited except in time of war. 

2. The select committee recommends that as to other covert action by any U.S. intelligence 
component, the following shall be required within 48 hours of (initial] approval by the President.. 

a. The Director of Central Intelligence shall notify the joint committee in writing, stating in 
detail the nature, extent, purpose, risks, likelihood of success, and costs of the operation. 

(b. The President shall certify in writing to the Committee that such covert action operation 
is required to protect the national security of the United States. | 

[c.] b. The committee shall be provided with duplicate originals of the written 
recommendations of each member of the 40 Committee or its successor. 

3. Reports on all covert action operations shall be [terminated no later than 12 months from 
the date of affirmative recommendation by the 40 Committee or its successor.] submitted every 6 
months by the DCI, or as requested, to the joint committee. 


[1. The Select Committee recommends that the existence of the National Security Agency 
should be recognized by specific legislation and that such legislation provide for civilian control of 
NSA. Further, it is recommended that such legislation specifically define the role of NSA with 
reference to the monitoring of communications of Americans.] 

1. The Director and the Deputy Director of the NSA shall be appointed by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate. 


[1. The Select Committee recommends that all intelligence related items be included as 
intelligence expenditures in the President's budge, and that there be disclosure of the total single sum 
budgeted for each agency involved in intelligence, or if such an item is a part or portion of the budget 
of another agency or department that it be separately identified as a single item.] 


1. The select committee recommends there be appropriate legislation to prohibit any 

significant transfer of funds between agencies or departments in connection with intelligence activities. 

2. The select committee recommends there be appropriate legislation to prohibit any 
significant reprogramming of funds within agencies or departments in connection with intelligence 
activities without the specific approval of the Intelligence Committee and appropriate committees of 

3. The select committee recommends there be appropriate legislation to prohibit any 
sipiificant expenditures of reserve or contingency funds in connection with intelligence activities 
without specific approval of the Intelligence Committee and appropriate committees of Congress. 


1. The select committee recommends that a Director of Central Intelligence shall be created, 
separate from any of the operating or analytic intelligence agencies for the purpose of coordinating 
and overseeing the entire foreign intelligence community with a view to eliminating duplication in 
collection and promoting competition in analysis. The DCI shall be nominated by the President with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. This office shall have the following powers and duties: 

a. The DCI shall be the chief foreign intelligence officer of the United States, and shall be 
responsible for the supervision and control of all agencies of the United States engaged in foreign 
intelligence, including FBI counterintelligence. 

[b. The DCI shall be a Member of the National Security Council. | 

[c-J b. The DCI may not hold a position or title with respect to any other agencies of 

[c. d. The DCI shall, along with such other duties, constitute and Office of Inspector General 
for all of the foreign intelligence agencies, including other agencies of government or branches of the 
military which have foreign intelligence functions. Such agencies shall have the obligation to report 
all instances of misconduct to the DCI. This shall not constitute a limitation upon the respective 
agencies reporting to the DCI from maintaining their own Inspector General staff or similar body.] 

d. The DCI shall have an adequate staff for the purposes expressed herein and be 
responsible for the national intelligence estimates and daily briefings of the President. 

e. The DCI shall be responsible for the preparation of the national intelligence estimates and 
such reports shall be immediately supplied to the appropriate committees of Congress on request. 

f. All budget request shall be prepared by the agencies under the jurisdiction of the DCI. 
As to those parts of budget of the military services or components of Department of Defense, they 
shall be submitted as an independent part of such budgets to the DCI. 

g. The DCI shall be charged with the functions of coordinating foreign intelligence agencies 
under its jurisdiction, the elimination of duplication, the periodic evaluation of the performance and 
efficiency of the agencies in question, and shall report to Congress on the foregoing at least annually. 

h. The DCI shall conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the causes of intelligence failures, 
including: inadequate collection tasking; analytical bias; duplication; unusable technical output; 
excessive compartmentation; and withholding of information by senior officials, and report to the 
Committee on Intelligence within 1 year. 

i. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) should be created by statute 
as an oversight and advisory board whose mission would be to oversee and advise on the direction, 
guidance and control of the intelligence community through the authority of the DCI who would 
also serve as chairman of the PFIAB. 

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The DCI would have overall authority and responsibility for making recommendations to 
the National Security Council on any intelligence related matter. 50 IJ.S.C. sec. 403 (d) (1) (2) would 
be deleted from the statutory authority of the CIA and transferred to the DCI as chairman of the 

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several 
Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty 
of the DCI direction of the National Security Council — 

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence 
activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security; 

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination 
of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as related 
to the national security. 

[NOTE: In essence, the PFIAB Chairman/DCI would become the Nation's principal foreign 
intelligence officer, with authority over intelligence community budges and resources, with 
independence from CIA institutional affiliation, and with right of direct access to the President as well 
as being statutory advisor to the National Security Council. 

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board — a prestigious board of private citizens 
acting in coordinated capacity with their chairman, the DCI, would enable the nation to benefit from 
the exceptional knowledge and experience of its private citizens who would exercise both an oversight 
and advisory role on sensitive intelligence matters.] 


1. The select committee recommends that the General Accounting Office be empowered to 
conduct a full and complete management as well as financial audit of all intelligence agencies. There 
shall be no limitation on the GAO in the performance of these functions by an executive 
classification system, and the audit function of GAO shall specifically apply to those funds which 
presently may be expended on certification of a Director of an agency alone. 


[1. The Select Committee recommends that the CIA internal audit staff be increased and 
given complete access to CIA financial records, and that overseas stations be audited at least 
annually.] It is further recommended that all proprietary and procurement mechanisms be subject 
to annual comprehensive review by the [CIA's internal audit staff | GAO. 


1. The select committee recommends that existing legislation (National Security Act of 1947, 
sec. 102 (d) (3) restricting the Directors and heads of foreign intelligence agencies from providing full 
information to Congress should be amended to exclude [Committees of Congress having appropriate 
jurisdiction.] the Joint Committee on Intelligence; Provided that they, in accordance with the DCI's 


statutory duty to protect sources and methods, could withhold the names of agents, sources and 
methods of intelligence from such committee. 


1. The select committee recommends that the National Security Act of 1947 be amended 
to provide for the establishment of a permanent Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the National 
Security Council. The subcommittee's jurisdiction, function and composition shall be as follows: 

[a. The Subcommittee shall have jurisdiction over all authorized activities of U.S foreign 
intelligence agencies except those solely related to the gathering of intelligence ! 

. . .k/ The subcommittee shall advise the President on all proposed covert or clandestine 
(activities] operations and on hazardous collecting activities. 

c. Each member of the subcommittee shall be required (by law| to submit his individual 
assessments of each proposal to the President in writing. The assessment should cover such matters 
as the likelihood of success, the benefits of success, the damage resulting from failure or exposure, 
the nsks against the potential benefits and alternate ways of accomplishing the goal. 

A _ . d - The subcommittee shall be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs and shall be composed of: J 

Assistant to President for National Security Affairs; 

Director of Central Intelligence; 

Secretary of State; 

Secretary of Defense; 

Deputy Director for Intelligence of CIA; 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

[The ambassador(s), if there is one, and | 

The assistant secretaries of state from the [affected countries and areas.] region 



1 . The select committee recommends that the Defense Intelligence Agency be abolished and 
that its functions be transferred to [the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the CIA I 
J-2. of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ' 


1. The select committee recommends that intelligence agencies disclose the affiliation of 
employees on detail to other government agencies or departments to all immediate colleagues and 
supenors and to the director of such department or agency. 

1. The select committee recommends that the Assistant to the President for National 

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Security Affairs be prohibited from holding any cabinet-level position. 


1 . The select committee recommends that no agency of the United States engaged principally 
in foreign or military intelligence, directly or indirectly engage in the training or the supplying of 
domestic police agencies of the United States, and that contacts between police agencies of the United 
States and U.S. foreign military intelligence agencies be limited to those circumstances which shall 
be required on account of internal security or the normal requirements and functions of such police 


1. The select committee recommends that U.S. intelligence agencies not covertly provide 
money or other valuable consideration [to persons associated with religious or educational 
institutions, or] to employees or representatives of any journal or electronic media with general 
circulation in the United States or use such institutions or individuals for purposes of cover. The 
foregoing prohibitions are intended to apply to American citizens and institutions. 

2. The select committee further recommends that U.S. intelligence agencies not covertly 
publish books or articles or plant [or suppress] stories in any journals or electronic media with 
general circulation in the United States. 

3. In the event that an employee of an intelligence agency publishes a book or article he 
shall be identified in the publication as an employee of such agency. 


[1. The select committee recommends that the intelligence components of the Armed 
Services of the United States be prohibited from engaging in covert action within the United States. 
It is further recommended that clandestine activities against non-military United States citizens abroad 
be proscribed. )[R.[ O. CLASSIFICATION 

1. The select committee recommends that the classification of information be the subject 
of the enactment of specific legislation; and further, as an adjunct to such legislation there by 
provided a method of regular declassification. 


1. The select committee recommends the establishment of an independent Office of the 
Inspector General for Intelligence, who shall have full authority to investigate any possible or 
potential misconduct on the part of the various intelligence agencies or the personnel therein. The 
IGI shall be appointed by the President, with the approval of the Senate, for a term of 10 years and 
shall not be permitted to succeed himself. The IGI shall have full access on demand to all records 
and personnel of the intelligence agencies for the purpose of pursuing his investigations. He shall 
make an annual report to the Congress of his activities and make such additional reports to the 
intelligence committees or other appropriate oversight committees as he may choose or the 
committees may direct. 


[1. The Select Committee recommends that judicial warrant must issue, on probable cause 
before an informant or any other agent of the FBI may infiltrate any domestic group or association! 
when investigation of such group or association or its members is based solely on title 18 U S C 
2383, 2384, 2385. 

[The select committee recommends that the Director of the FBI have a term of office no 
longer than 2 presidential terms. 

[3. The committee recommends that the Internal Security Branch of the Intelligence Division 
be abolished and that the Counter-Intelligence Branch be reorganized to constitute a full division 
named the Counter-Intelligence Division; that the mission of this division be limited to investigating 
and countering the efforts of foreign directed groups and individuals against the United States. 

[4. The select committee recommends the transfer of all investigations of alleged criminal 
activity by domestic groups or individual members thereof to the General Investigative Division. 

[5. The select committee recommends that regulations be promulgated that tie the 
investigation of activities of terrorist groups closely to specific violations of criminal law within the 
investigative jurisdiction of the FBI and that charge the Department of Justice with determining when 
a domestic political action group may be appropriately targeted for investigation of terrorist activities.] 


As these recommendations indicate, my service on the select committee has convinced me 
that reforms are necessary to improve the organization; performance, and control of the U.S. 
intelligence community. At the same time, the experience of the past months has again confirmed 
my understanding of how important an effective intelligence capability is to the future security of the 
American people. Intelligence officials can and must operate in a manner consistent with the 
individual rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. These protections must be guaranteed, 
but so must the nght of the American people to live in security and peace. It is both possible and 
essential for the intelligence agencies to perform their responsibilities effectively, and by means which 
protect both individual rights and national security. 

At a minimum, the intelligence community must regain the trust and confidence of the 
people whom it serves. It is tragic that it was necessary to establish this committee to inquire into 
the activities of agencies on which we depend so heavily for our security. But it would be even more 
tragic if the results of our investigation were now to be ignored. Implementing the recommendations 
I have proposed will contribute significantly to ensuring that there will be no need for another such 
committee to be established in the future. Both Congress and the American people must recognize 
the need to complete the task which we have only begun. 

Robert W. Kasten, Jr.